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Tito© Political Roll© off the People's Liberation! Army 1949=1973 
By CSnffliag Jia-draiag 
For the Begre© off Doctor off Philosophy 
Department of Politics 
Umversity off IMriiaim 
1995 
This thesis is to study the political role of the People's Liberation Army from the approach 
of structure and function. The framework of the thesis consists of three major parts, first, 
the influence of Chinese traditional political culture on, and the formation of, the political 
role of the PL A; second, the influence of domestic political struggles and external military 
conflicts on the development of the political role of the PLA; and the third, the analysis of 
the transition of the PLA's political role from the structure and personnel arrangements of 
the CCPCC. 
Within the above-mentioned three scopes, this thesis make a thorough discussion on the 
following: (1) The relationship between the structure of the PRC and the formation of the 
PLA's political role; (2) How has ideology influenced the army's political role; (3) What is 
Mao's viewpoint and his influence on the development of the army's political role; (4) 
What is the link between the army and the party, and how has this developed; (6) What 
accounts for the expansion of the PLA's political functions; (7) What is the influence of 
political factional struggles on the PLA's political role; (8) Is it political institution or 
military institution that controls the recruitment of the military elite; (9) What are the 
disparities between the military elite in handling international conflicts and what are their 
political considerations; (10) What is the Party's position in the army; (11) How have the 
Party's important meetings and personnel arrangements influenced the rise and fall of the 
PLA's political role? 
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Introduction 
Since World War I I , most developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have 
faced dramatic political changes. With a mix of low political institutionalisation and 
expansion of political participation, the army, with its overwhelming superiority, strict 
organisational system and "barrel of a gun" control, plays a leading role in political 
development. The influence of the military extends from military to non-military affairs. 
The relationship between the military and politics in the PRC is different from that of most 
developing countries. The PLA is the Party's army. Apart from military affairs, its tasks 
also include economic, social and political affairs, which means that in addition to the 
safeguard of national security, the PLA is also responsible for the protection of the Party, 
of the leader and of Communism. One of the striking features of the PLA is that it has 
never attempted either to carry out a coup d'etat to seize power for themselves, or to 
oppress, or blackmail the Government with its armed forces. 
Since the establishment of PRC's regime, PLA has, to a certain degree, been involved in 
various political campaigns, which include the movement of Three Red Banners and four 
major political line struggles, and many other national, economical and social campaigns. 
Furthermore, the different military backgrounds and their civil war experience formed 
factions which posses strong trait of mountaintopism, the small group mentality. Mao, 
therefore, as the supreme authority of the PLA and of the whole nation, took this advantage 
of the contradiction among the military elite and applied PLA as a means to carry out 
power-seizure struggles. 
In the first step, in the 50's, Mao destroyed Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih to consolidate 
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central control over the locals, and then, in order to overthrow Liu Shao-ch'i, Mao tactically 
used Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army to struggle with other field armies. After the Lin Piao 
incident, however, Mao in turn incited the other field armies to eradicate the Fourth Field 
Army's power both centrally and the locally. 
It is worth noting that the political role of the PLA had gone through great changes between 
1949 and 1973. From Peng Te-huai's advocating professional army-building programme 
after the Korea war to Lin Piao's carrying out political army-building program and a series 
of personality cults of Mao after the Lushan conference in 1959, and from Lin Piao and Lo 
Jui-ch'ing's great debate over the military policy of Vietnam War in mid 60'sto Mao's once 
again reinforcing the supreme principal of "Party commands the gun" after the Lin Piao 
incident in 1971. Then from the Eighth CCP National Congress which emphasised collective 
leadership and the Ninth CCP National Congress where military men occupied a high ratio 
of members of CCPCC to the Tenth CCP National Congress which weakened the political 
role of the PLA in the Central and the local, all these are worthy of thorough study. 
It is intended that through the research of this case, this thesis can serve as a most valuable 
reference to similar issues in the developing countries or contribute to researchers for 
carrying out the study of PLA's political role from 1973 onwards . 
To analyse from the intensity of military intervention in politics, civil-military relations can 
normally be illustrated by the application of the Mathematical concept of a continuum, 
shown as follows: 
-> , -> > > > > 
(l)CompIete (2)Occupational (3)Pressure (4)Competitive (5)Veto (6)Direct M i -
Civilian Rule Opinion Group Interest Group Elite Group Elite Group litary Rule 
Note: — > Increase of Military Influence 
i i 
< =—Decrease of Military Influence 
At left end, the complete civilian rule represents the non-existence of military participation 
in political affairs, at right end, the direct military rule represents all the political power 
controlled by the military. This thesis is, therefore, intended to interpret that to what degree 
the political role of the PLA have involved in this diagram. 
This thesis is to study the political role of the PLA from the approach of its structure and 
function. With the characteristic of the dual-role elite of the militarists and of the 
homogeneity of the Army and Party, the political role of the PLA, in practice, can be 
defined as the military elite's position of the Party's policies and their role in the 
participation of inner-Party struggle, such as P'eng Te-huai's criticism on the Policy of the 
Three Red Banners at the Lushan conference in 1959, and the contradiction between the 
professional army building program and the policy of "every man a soldier" in the period of 
People's Communes. 
As mentioned in this thesis, PLA did not enter the political arena of their own accord, but 
at Mao's incitement. As a matter of fact, the PLA has never attempted a coup d'etat, which 
is fully discussed in Chapter IV. 
The central theme of this thesis is the development of the PLA's political role. Its intention 
is to discuss the following: (1) The relationship between the structure of the PRC and the 
formation of the PLA's political role; (2) How has ideology influenced the army's political 
role; (3) What is Mao's viewpoint and his influence on the development of the army's 
political role; (4) What is the link between the army and the party, and how has this 
developed; (6) What accounts for the expansion of the PLA's political functions; (7) What 
is the influence of political line struggles on the PLA's political role; (8) Is it political 
i i i 
institution or military institution that controls the recruitment of the military elite; (9) What 
are the disparities between the military elite in handling international conflicts and what are 
their political considerations; (10) What is the Party's position in the army; (11) How have 
the Party's important meetings and personnel arrangements influenced the rise and fall of 
the PLA's political role? 
This thesis can be broken down into a number of parts to cover the above-mentioned issues. 
The first discusses the influence of Chinese traditional political culture on the political role 
of the PLA in Chapter I . The second covers the characteristics and function of 
contemporary China's social and political structure, which includes Mao's ideology of army-
building programme, Chou En-lai's instructions in "the September letter of the central 
committee" in the Red Army era, the relationship between the Army and Party, and the 
dual role of the Party Elite and Military Elite in Chapter n. Al l these deeply influenced the 
political role of the PLA. The third analyses the international environmental influence on 
the development of the political role of the PLA, and focuses on relevant international 
events, such as the Korean war, Sino-Soviet split, Chenpao island military clashes and the 
Vietnam war in Chapter in. The fourth discusses the domestic environment, and 
emphasises four out of ten major struggles over the party line in the history of the Chinese 
Communist Party since 1949 according to Mao Tse-tung. This includes the "Kao-Jao anti-
Party clique", the "P'eng-Huang anti-Party clique", the "Liu Shao-ch'i event" and the "Lin 
Piao incident" in Chapter IV. The fifth stresses the important congresses and events that 
have had a significant impact on the political role of the PLA, which includes the "Eighth 
CCP National Congress", "Ninth CCP National Congress", "Tenth CCP National Congress", 
"February Adverse Current", "The Purge of Lo Jui-ch'ing", and the "Wuhan event" in 
Chapter V and VI . 
The time scope of this thesis is set between 1949 and 1973, from the establishment of the 
iv 
PRC regime to the convention of Tenth CCP National Congress. Apart from some relevant 
references, such as "Sanwan Reorganisation", "Kutien Conference", "The Party Constitution 
of the Seventh CCPCC" etc., anything beyond this scope of time is outside the discussion of 
this thesis. This thesis excludes the discussion of the purely military aspect of the PLA, such 
as military strategy and tactics , and the analysis of politics irrelevant to this thesis, such as 
political philosophy, the voting behaviour, electoral institution etc. 
The source of materials is mostly original documents including conference records, speeches, 
and lists of personnel organisations and many others. They were collected from the library 
of Durham University, Harvard-Yenching Library at Harvard University, Kent Library at 
Columbia University (New York), and the Library of Institute of International Relations at 
National Cheng-chi University (Taipei). Since the PRC's official publishings normally carry 
a propaganda purpose for the authorities, hence, the quotations from THE SELECTED 
WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG and other official documents in this thesis have been 
carefully selected, compared and verified from different editions. The transliteration of 
personal names and place names is given in the Wade-Giles romanization system. They are 
mostly after consultation with Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism 1921-1965 
published by Harvard University in 1971, and A Comprehensive Glossary of Chinese 
Communist Terminology published by National Cheng-chi University in 1978. 
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Chapter I. The Structure of the P.R.C. 
I f one takes a macro view, it is clear to see that the Chinese revolution of 1911 was in fact 
virtually an "incomplete revolution" due to the unsettled problem of land distribution in 
what was predominantly an agricultural society. Because most of the elite in the 
government were only interested in their own benefiis, this resulted in the characteristics 
of low cohesion and high penetration in the new organisational structure. Therefore, 
when the new government came under too much pressure from its external environment1 
and could no longer defend her national interest, the deterioration of the already unstable 
political, economical and military order was thus further accentuated, the controlling 
factors of the state system were weakened, and it became unstable. 
In fact the 1911 Revolution had not reformed the basic social structure - that is, the 
peasant class, which constituted the majority of Chinese population. Thus when the new 
government fell into difficulties, the CCP seized this opportunity to wage another 
revolution of structural reorganisation by building up a Communist Utopia. This was in 
accordance with China's structural characteristics. 
1Such as China's unsucessful attempt of regaining self-govern tariff and abolishing extraterritoriality at 
both Paris conference in 1919 and Washington conference in 1921, the warlord issues before 1928; the 
event of Japanese massacre of Shantung province in May 1928; the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 
1931 (known as 18 September incident); and The Sino-Japan war between 1937 and 1945. For details 
see Li Chien-nung, THE HISTORY OF POLITICS IN CHINA Vol. I (Taipei: Shang Wu Publishing, 1980); 
Kuo T'ing-i, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPRORY CHINA, (Taipei: 1976). 
1 
I . The Essence of the System 
Shang Yang, Prime Minister of the Ch'in Dynasty implemented a "New Law", which 
crippled the political and military power of feudal nobles, abolished central land monopoly, 
and set up the system of conscription. Chinese society had a new appearance.2 Specific 
addition were, the free trade in land; conscription shifting from nobles to ordinary 
civilians; and government offices being no longer hereditary but appointments instead 
made according to the degree of their military successes. The military became 
professional. 
Confucianism has dominated Chinese political ideology ever since the Han Dynasty 
(206B.C. - ). There is, moreover, the concept of a powerful and stable middle class - that 
is, family structure, existing between a nation and individuals in the Chinese society. 
"Filial Piety" is the fundamental basis for holding the members of family together. These 
moral values based on the family were further extended by Confucianism to form the 
relationship between upper and lower levels in society. People were taught to pledge their 
"Loyalty" to the superiors and to the monarch. The concepts of "Loyalty" and "Filial 
Piety" became public moral values and thus influenced the people from all walks of life. 
Generally speaking, most Chinese soldiers had the sense of "Loyalty" and "Filial Piety". 
The belief in "dedicating oneself to the service of monarch and country" is the cardinal 
trait of their personality. 
The morality behind "Loyalty" and "Filial Piety" was effective in the suppression of 
militarists' interference in politics. In Chinese history, military power was, at all times, 
either directly or indirectly, under the leadership of the Emperor, even at the time of 
2Chang Ch'i-yun, THE HISTORY OF CHINESE MILITARY, (Taipei: Central Cultural & Publication Co., 
1956), p. 3. 
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territorial expansion, of external defence or when suppressing a rebellion. The military 
commanders could only have temporary control over the army. The supreme leadership 
was in the hands of the Emperor. 
In the Chinese feudal society, peasants constituted the majority of the population; in 
politics, they were the foundation of social stability; in military affairs, they composed the 
main source of recruits; in economics, they provided a large supply of agricultural 
production. Nevertheless, this economic structure changed after the "Warring States 
Periods (403-222 B.C.)", the vicious circle of buying and selling lands, which peasants 
relied on for a living, had formed the phenomenon of "annexation of land holdings", and 
thus brought about a new economic model of "landlord economy". The characteristics of 
"landlord economy" included: 
A. In the Political Sphere 
Landlords becoming a new social class, with the economic superiority they possessed and 
the political supremacy arising therefrom. They had even greater power to proceed to a 
further stage of "annexation of land holdings". The phenomenon of "annexation of land 
holdings" not only exited within landlord class, but also amongst the upper class, which 
included bureaucrats and militarists. Even loyal families and their relatives annexed lands 
using their dominant position in society although to differing degree. This situation was 
most serious in the final years of each successive dynasty.3 
B. In the Military Sphere 
The system of "integration of soldiers and peasants" was an important policy in feudal 
China. One essential prerequisite of this system was that it had to be built up on the basis 
3Chin Kuan-t'ao & Liu Ch'ing-feng, THE RISE AND CRISIS - ON ULTRA-STABILIZED STRUCTURE 
OF CHINESE FEUDAL SOCIETY, (Taipei: Ku Feng Publishing Co., 1987), pp. 104-107. 
3 
of a stable agricultural society. Consequently, in the early years of each new dynasty, most 
barren lands or lands that were forfeited by overlords of the former dynasty were 
distributed to peasants or awarded to those soldiers who had made outstanding moves 
towards founding the state. It was such land re-distribution policy that prolonged the 
survival of landowner-peasants and consolidated the military power of the new dynasty. 
The Central government could therefore in turn enrich army finance by taxing from 
landowners. 
However, when the social economy re-emerged in the guise of "landlord economy", the 
economic prominence based on the landowner-peasants gradually died out, and the 
"landlord economy" was very likely to turn into the "feudal lord's economy". It was rather 
common for feudal lords to keep an army to safeguard their personal lands and property, 
but they soon expanded their armed forces to such an extent that it was difficult for the 
Central government to control. As the number of feudal lords grew, the size of army they 
commanded would also increase and the central government soon had to face the problem 
of the shortage of armed forces. 
A large number of landowner-peasants lost their lands and could not rapidly transfer into 
tenant-peasants or into other occupations. This meant that if the speed of decreasing 
number of landowner-peasants was greater than that of the increasing number of those 
landless peasants shifting to other occupations, a large number of vagabonds would 
emerge in the society, and if a country was in the throes of war and needed to raise troops, 
the vagabonds would therefore became the prime manpower of the military. However, 
when the number of vagabonds in the army increased greatly, the calibre of solider was 
obviously lower than before. The military power of that dynasty would thus begin to 
decline. This situation is most common in the last stage of each successive dynasties. 
4 
As the consequence of the Central government implementation of military policy of 
"integration between soldiers and peasants", it was debatable whether "all soldiers are 
peasants" or "all peasants are soldiers". The army based on the peasants were likely to be 
restrained by the characteristics of Chinese social structure and by Confucian ethics. 
Basically, most soldiers possessed the following traits: being loyal to autocratic authority 
or central authority, and "Loyalty" as perfect morality; having certain respect and fear 
towards autocratic authority, fear punishments by superiors; and the army, in name, is the 
nation's army, but, in reality, is the autocratic authority's army, and therefore they 
potentially play an important role in politics. 
After the CCP assumed power in 1949, many of this traditional characteristics of Chinese 
social structure continued4. Soon however these were changed to a considerable degree 
by the CCP with its particular method of social reform, and with its systematic 
programme. I f we regard a nation as having a unified political system,5 and examine this 
from the viewpoint of the functions of system structure, two outstanding characteristics 
can be found in an open system, namely, structure differentiation and functional 
integration. The core function of a political system is the "authoritative decision of values 
for a society".6 
In order to gain peasants' support, the policy of "overthrowing the landlords and re-
distributing lands" in the civil war and the policy of "land reform" from 1950 to 19527 
4The traditional characteristics of Chinese social structure did not have any fundemental changes during 
the Nationalist period. 
5See David Easton, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, (New York: Knopf, 1953) & FRAMEWORK FOR 
POLITICAL ANALYSIS, (New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1965), and Gabriel A. Almond & 
Bingham G. Powell, Jr., COMPARATIVE POLITICS: A DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (Boston: Little 
Brown, 1966). 
6David Easton, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, op. cit., Chapter IV. 
7WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, (Shanghai: 
People's Press, 1983), pp. 365-366. 
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implemented by the CCP had changed the phenomena of polarisation of the social 
economic structure in the countryside since the end of Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911 A.D.). 
China entered a new era, the landowner-peasants became the majority of the agricultural 
population, and the phenomenon of "annexation of land holdings" came to an end. Until 
the implementation of "People's Communes", the reason peasants and the authorities could 
maintain smooth relationship was because the land problems had essentially been settled. 
The people's support of the new government, whether overt or covert, was greater than 
their demands. Nevertheless, the PRC regime had not cast off "central hegemony" which 
had been pursued most vigorously by every successive dynasty. Instead it continued to 
pursue a policy of unified leadership insisting that the "party commands the government" 
and that the "party commands the army". The central authority applied severe 
punishments to eradicate the phenomenon of "annexation of land holdings", to re-establish 
a society based on the landowner-peasants. The peasants, consequently, acquired lands 
and improved their economy, but on the whole the system did not possess the 
characteristics of structure differentiation and functional integration, and, therefore, it was 
not an open system but a closed system. 
Basically, a "closed system" can be easily penetrated and the aims of strict control by 
central authority can be realised through ideology and a leader's charisma that is 
painstaking moulded by the authority. PRC is an example of this. Since the movement of 
the People's Communes, Chinese social structure has gone through another important 
transformation. The leading class of the PRC adopted political means to thoroughly 
eradicate the agricultural society based on the landowner-peasants that they established 
themselves. They attempted to carry out the biggest "annexation of land holdings" in 
modern Chinese history. The principle of "three combinations" -combination of politics 
with the commune, combination of politics with economy, and combination of labour with 
military affairs were applied to the People's Communes. This resulted in the People's 
Communes being not only the organisation for collective economy in the countryside, but 
also the organisation for politics and military. It, therefore, became a weapon for central 
hegemony to control the locality and in turn to suppress anti-governmental organisations. 
Since the implementation of People's Communes, the authorities carried out all kinds of 
political campaigns to initiate the development of military and economic construction. In 
addition, the traditional policy of "everyone's a soldier", on the basis that "soldiers are 
peasants", was combined with the political and military thoughts of Mao Tse-tung. Such a 
social structure built on the combination of military and politics has, as the People's 
Communes fully reflected the preference of "central hegemony". 
The PRC restored the collectivisation of land policy by force in spite of the fact that 
economic conditions for small production based on small landowner-peasants still existed 
in the Chinese agricultural society. In order to consolidate these huge annexations of land 
holdings, similar in size to those of the monarchs of past dynasties, the CCP used the army 
as a tool to maintain its hegemony, to develop the function of system maintenance directly 
or indirectly and to secure system stability under the supreme leadership of the party. 
Moreover, the CCP's revolution was one based on peasant support and led by a small 
number of intellectuals. In view of the need to organise personnel, at the initial stage of 
party-building, an intellectual usually had to be in charge of party's work, or to be an 
commander to direct the peasant uprising. At the stage of army-building, the responsible 
cadres of the party in the central or the locality, were normally political commissars in the 
army. For example Liu Shao-ch'i, was elected as a full member of the CCPCC at the 
"Fifth CCP National Congress" in 1927 and an alternate member of the Politburo of the 
CCPCC at the "Fourth Plenum of the Six CCPCC" in 1931, but, on the other hand, he was 
also Party Central Representative of the "Eighth Red-Army Regiment" and "Fifth Red-
Army Regiment" and Director of the Political Department of "Third Red-Army Legion" in 
1934.8 Chou En-lai was another example, he was Director of the Political Department of 
Whampoa Military Academy and Director of the Political Department of the First Army of 
National Revolutionary Army in 1924, Secretary of the CCPCC Military Commission and 
concurrent Secretary of the CCPCC Military Commission at Chekiang area in 1926, and 
Secretary of the Central bureau of the Soviet Area, Political Commissar of First Workers' 
and Peasant's Red Army and Vice-chairman of Central Revolutionary Military 
Commission.9 Among leaders of the CCP revolutionary generation, most of them were 
dual-role elites from political and military backgrounds. Party and military leadership had 
no significant differentiation and were controlled by the same organisation.10 After its 
regime was founded in 1949, the party leaders of the revolutionary generation not only 
occupied important posts in the party and the army, but also became administrative 
bureaucrats of various government organisations. Based on such a unique combination of 
party, military and government, hence, the overlapping between the various roles and 
functions in the PRC political system can be seen in many cases.. 
Since the PLA has a strict class stratification, the political participation of the military is, in 
reality, confined to only those military elites. The military elites of the revolutionary 
generation normally played the role of party elites at the same time. They were thus 
involved in the actual participation and decision-making of an authoritative policy. The 
background of such dual-role elite provided PLA with a regular channel of political 
participation, which is used to deliver their political view through the party's system. This 
is one of the reasons why the ultimate principle of the "party commands the army" or of 
the "party commands the gun", which Mao pursued has never been opposed publicly by 
the military bureaucrats, including P'eng Te-huai. Peng, who was then Minister of 
8WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, op., ext., pp. 533-
534. 
9Ibid.,p. 611. 
10See Chapter II, Section III. 
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National Defence, attempted to establish a "professional army-building program". He was 
forced to express his supports of the "party commands the army" in public by saying that 
"the entire comrades of the PLA have showed their high initiative and creativity in the 
climax of the movement of the "Great Leap Forward", and successfully completed the 
tasks that entrusted by the Party and the people".11 Nevertheless, P'eng was forced to step 
down from his position of power following his "public criticism" of the failure of the 
"Great Leap Forward" at the Lushan conference in 1959.12 
As a direct result of effective political participation by the leading class of the PLA, the 
praetorian political system13 did not appear during Mao's regime. The party organisations 
and its ideological standpoint have been the ultimate guide of all things in the PRC. It has 
proved to be a perfect case of the "party commands the army". It should be noted that the 
scope and depth for militarists' to participate in politics depends entirely on how much the 
party leader or the supreme authorities have to rely on the army. Consequently, under the 
leadership of the CCP, the so-called political participation of military does not mean the 
well institutionalised political participation. This phenomena can also reflect the general 
course of political participation by non-military social class. As mentioned above, 
influenced by the power of the supreme authorities, the political participation of the PRC 
is a kind of passive participation. Consequently, the PRC regime belongs to a state of low 
political institutionalisation. 
There is another structural characteristic of Chinese society, that is, the existence of two 
influential social classes - the intellectuals and the vagabonds.14 At the time of social 
1 1 "A Speech at the National Days by Marshal Peng Te-huai, Minister of National Defence", PEOPLE'S 
DAILY, 2 Oct., 1958. 
J2See Chapter IV, Section II. 
13Refer to Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army", COMPARATIVE 
POLITICS, Vol. I, No. 3, (April, 1969), p. 200. 
14Lei Tsung-hai, CHINESE CULTURE AND CHINESE SOLDIERS, (Hong Kong: Lung Men Bookstore, 
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unrest and corruption of central control, the dispossessed and the vagabonds could be 
grouped together with little efforts by a slightly-organised group, either peasant or 
intellectual with a charismatic leader. However "the chief drawback of intellectuals is that 
they know nothing about the military".15 In peace time, intellectuals relied on bureaucratic 
or authoritarian systems to preserve their influence in the centre or the localities. When 
there were big upheavals, the power which they relied on for existence, shifted to the 
hands of the vagabonds in lower class, who were skilful at assembling the masses to fight 
against the existent system by applying superstitious and religious rites to the existing 
structure. The "Yellow Turbans" in Eastern Han Dynasty (25-220 A.D.), "The Armed 
Rebellion of Huang Chao" in Tang Dynasty (618-906 A.D.), "The White Lotus 
Insurrection" in Yuan Dynasty (1234-1368 A.D.), and "Boxer Uprising" in Ch'ing Dynasty 
are all examples of this. These all comprised a good many vagabonds, a small number of 
obscurantists and famine victims.1 6 The chief drawback of the vagrants was their low 
education level. They accomplished nothing in peace time, but when turbulence came, the 
central government, on which the intelligentsia relied, lost its control. They seized the 
opportunity to take the lead and, i f luck was with them, they sometimes achieved great 
success. "A small number of vagabond leaders succeeded even in founding a state. They 
normally had a smooth personality and the ability to recognise some individuals abilities 
and assigned them relevant jobs commensurate with their competence. Such as Kao Tsu 
of Han Dynasty and Tai Tsu of Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 A D.) are two well-known 
figures in Chinese history". "They needed intellectual input in founding the state" "but 
relied on their efforts even more afterwards in governing the state".17 
1968), p. 137. 
}5lbid, p. 138. 
16Ibid., p. 140. 
17Ibid.,p. 142. 
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Mao had his own viewpoint about the function of the intellectuals18. He pointed out, "the 
revolutionary forces cannot be successfully organised and revolutionary work cannot be 
successfully conducted without the participation of revolutionary intellectuals. However 
the intellectuals often tend to be subjective and individualistic, impractical in their thinking 
and irresolute in action until they have thrown themselves heart and soul into mass 
revolutionary struggles, or made up their minds to serve the interests of the masses and 
become one with them. Hence although the mass of revolutionary intellectuals in China 
can play a vanguard role or serve as a link with the masses, not all of them will remain 
revolutionaries to the end. Some will drop out of the revolutionary ranks at critical 
moments and become passive, while a few may even become enemies of the revolution. 
The intellectuals can overcome their shortcomings only in mass struggle over a long 
period".19 
In the early stage of Chinese Communist Party, intellectuals played an important role. 
They joined the Communist Party with a lofty idea of establishing a new China and had 
revolutionary enthusiasm. However, they lacked in-depth systematic study in Marxism 
and Leninism.20 Such a combination of low political theoretic level and high revolutionary 
enthusiasm, led intellectuals to make the error of over-simplification in their reasoning and 
behaviour pattern when solving problems. The leaders of early stage such as Ch'en Tu-
hsiu,21 Ch'u Ch'iu-pai,22 Ch'en Shao-yu,23 and L i Li-san2 4 were typical intellectuals, who 
1877»e intellectuals refer to persons who receive secondary and higher education. They exited in four 
classes, namely, national bourgioisie, petty bourgeoisie, semi-proletariat and proletariat. For Mao's 
classification of classes, see "Analysis of the classes in Chineses Society (Maarch 1926), SELECTED 
WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. I, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, J975), pp. 13-21." 
J9"Chinese Revolution and Chinese Communist Party (Dec. 1939)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-
TUNG, Vol. II, (1965), op. cit, p.322. 
20Feng Chien-huei, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu - At the Early Period of the CCP", SELECTED WORKS OF THE 
HISTORY STUDY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol.1, (Changsha: Hunan People's Press, 1983), 
pp. 71-72. 
2lCh'en Tu-hsiu, First CCP General Secretary, occupies a position of great significance in China's 
intellectual modernization as one of the prime movers of the May Fourth Movement. Having helped 
found the CCP in 1921, he was its chief in the turbulent phase form 1921 to 1927. See Donald W. Klien & 
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knew nothing about military affairs. On the one hand, Mao Tse-tung perfectly perceived 
the characteristics of China's structure, he seized the opportunity and applied it thoroughly 
and flexibly. This was displayed most vividly in his strategy of building up the party and 
the army. Mao possessed good knowledge of how to control the overall situation and rally 
forces in turbulent days. This trait of his personality was rare even among the 
intellectuals. He also possessed the characteristics of vagabonds on the other hand, laying 
stress on the potential and the class nature of the revolution in the countryside. He applied 
charismatic skilfully to assemble the vagabonds, and on occasions the intellectuals too, 
with diversified thoughts for unifying and moulding their political ideology. 
Furthermore, the majority of the peasants, who participated in armed rebellions under the 
command of the CCP were, such as the final years of the last Empire, normally the 
proletariat and the vagabonds. They joined the PLA, in reality, for the same reason as 
being the bandits in the past. In essence, "It was the unemployed intellectuals who 
commanded members of the Party organisations in the metropolitan and the countryside 
areas".25 
When the gap between the expectation of the unemployed intellectuals and their 
satisfaction towards the society became too wide, they generally tend to engage in 
Anne B. Clark, BIOGRAPHIC DICTIONARY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 1921-1965, (Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 139. 
22Ch'tt Ch'iu-pai, early party leader, CCP chief 1927-1928. Beginning his careers a translator of 
Tolstory. By August 1927 he had replaced Chen Tu-hsiu as the party chief. See Donald W. Klein & Anne 
B. Clark, op. cit., p. 239. 
23Ch'en Shao-yu often known as Wang Ming, he was the leader of the Russian returned student faction, 
which triumphed over the Li Li-san leadership in a major intro-party struggle for power in 1930-1931. 
See Donald W. Klien &Anne B. Clark, op. cit., p. 127. 
24Li Li-san, early labor leader and party leader. Li's policies, known as the "Li Li-san line", dominated 
the party from mid-1928 until his downfall in late 1930. See Donald W. Klien &Anne B. Clark, op. cit., 
p. 512. 
25Cheng Hsueh-chia, FROM CULTURAL REVOLUTION TO THE ELEVENTH CCP NATIONAL 
CONGRESS, (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise, 1978), p. 14. 
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carrying out the transformation of system structure and regard it as a holy commitment. 
At that time, most "young intellectuals who possessed the primitive sense of Marxism-
Leninism and showed interest in politics were recruited by the CCP and became a member 
of the armed forces or a commander".26 Their determination to re-establish the system 
structure was further reinforced by the deterioration of social environment at that time. 
Therefore, "the Soviet areas established by the CCP are virtually expanding instead of 
shrinking".27 
The revolutionary foundation of the CCP, in reality, was built with a blend of discontent 
and aggressiveness amongst intellectuals, the vagabonds and the proletariat in their status 
as professional revolutionaries with their belief of communism, which they weren't even 
clear about at that time. Their belief was the foundation of the Bolshevik Party, and 
portrayed an illusion of prospects to attract a good many of low-educated peasants to 
participate the revolution by applying communist ideology as a kind of religion. The rise 
of communist party in China is just another successful version of vagabond movement in 
the Chinese history. While the party agitated this vagrant movement was the so-called 
Bolshevik party in Chinese style.28 The army of the CCP was actually a typical peasant 
army with vagabond characteristics. 
Mao possessed the characteristics of both the intellectual and the vagabond. Such a dual 
personality enabled Mao to establish an unbreakable leader's charisma throughout the 
party, the army and the whole nation. It should never be disregarded with respect to the 
development of CCP's regime. 
26Ibid 
27lbid. 
28nOn the Sixth congress of the Party", SELECTED WORKS OF CHOU EN-LAI, (Peking: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1981), p. 210. 
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The anti-foreign movement in the modern history of China was a form of resistance 
formed by the masses to combat suppression, aggression and unequal treatments from 
foreign powers29. The anti-foreign movement in late nineteenth century came from the 
movement of chauvinism and of nationalism, and was gradually expanded from some 
individual cases locally, such as "anti-missionaries", to a nation-wide mass movement, 
such as the "Boxer uprising". It was noteworthy, however, that the anti-foreign 
movement was a spontaneous movement by the intellectuals and the masses to join forces 
together. They adopted violent means to combat foreign countries regardless of the fine 
tradition of Confucianism, which advocated humanism and peaceful relationships between 
the people. Since 1860, the movement of anti-missionaries agitated by the intellectuals 
had resulted in numerous bloody and destructive events. In other words, it was the long-
term foreign oppression and self-respect of a weak nation that forced the intellectuals to 
abandon Confucianism and apply violent means against imperialism. The anti-foreign 
sentiment not only formed strong mass forces, which became the major power of anti-
imperialist movement, but also impelled the rise of nationalism and of comprehensive 
moral concepts. 
Since the anti-foreign movement could satisfy people's sentiments of nationalism and 
social morals, it was, therefore, an effective weapon to suppress reactionaries, especially in 
an undemocratic society. The ruling class tended to exaggerate disputes with hostile 
countries and created tensions by making use of bureaucratic organs and mass medium to 
arouse masses' support when they faced certain threats from internal overwhelming forces. 
After PRC's regime was founded, the traditional anti-foreign sentiment was further 
developed into "anti-imperialist" ideology. Mao's early view of imperialism is seen in his 
29The anti-foreign mvement was directed against the West from mid 19 century to early 20 century, and 
against Japan after 1920s, 
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article of The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party(1939). Mao saw 
that the imperialist powers used and continued to use military, political, economic and 
cultural means of oppression, and that China had became a semi-colony. In this article, 
Mao said: Through wars and unequal treaties the imperialist powers have controlled all 
the important trading ports, have acquired extra territoriality, have operated industries, 
and have monopolised china's banking and finance. The imperialist power have supplied 
the warlords with large quantities of munitions and host of military advisors to keep them 
fighting among themselves. Through missionary work and the establishment of hospitals, 
schools, and the publication of newspapers, the imperialists have conducted a policy of 
cultural aggression.30 
Departing from this basic understanding of imperialism, Mao analysed imperialism from 
the point of view of class struggle. The imperialist powers, according to Mao, had 
established a network of comprador and merchant-usurer class in their service, so as to 
facilitate their exploitation of the mass of the Chinese peasantry and their sections of the 
people. 
Following the Comintern's line, Mao pointed out that "imperialism first allies itself with the 
ruling strata of the previous social structure, with feudal lords and the trading and money 
lending bourgeoisie, against the majority of the people".31 In the same article, Mao said, 
"the contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation and the contradiction 
between feudalism and the great masses of the people were the basic contradictions in 
modern Chinese society".32 
30"Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party (1939)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-
TUNG, Vol. 11(1965), op. cit., pp. 311-312. 
illbid, p. 312. 
*2Ibid, p. 313 
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According to Mao, these contradictions and their intensification must inevitably result in 
the incessant growth of revolutionary movement. He said, "The great revolutions in 
modern and contemporary China have emerged and grown on this basis of their basic 
contradictions".33 In Mao's doctrine of revolution, the chief targets of enemies at the first 
stage of the Chinese revolution were imperialism and feudalism, i.e., the bourgeoisie of the 
imperialist countries and the landlord class in China. 
Mao not only focused on class struggle to form his view of imperialism, but further 
combined imperialism with Chinese revolution, which subsequently became his 
fundamental ideology in conducting anti-imperialist movement and in turn to suppress 
reactionaries after his rise to power. 
In 1955, Lo Jui-Ch'ing, minister of public security, delivered a paper entitled Enhance 
Vigilance and Combat Numbness, in which he commented, "As long as there exists 
classes and class struggle in the world, our enemies will not forget us and thereby relax 
their sabotage to us at any moments. Countless facts have showed us that whenever our 
revolutionary undertakings advanced one step forward, it had to suffer serious hostility 
and sabotage on both the domestic front and abroad. They try every contemptible means 
to obstruct the socialist construction of our state".34 
The CCP employed "anti-imperialism" as an important political means to mobilise the 
masses and gain their support. The anti-imperialist ideology was drawn into domestic 
politics ever since 1949. As inner-party power struggle grew stronger. The policy tended 
to be more "left", and the ideology lay more emphasis on anti-imperialism and anti-
foreignism. The continuous political struggle would develop more "left" ideology and 
33Ibid, p. 314. 
34Lo Jui-ch'ing, "Enhance Vigilance and Combat Numbness", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 30 June 1955. 
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stronger anti-foreign sentiments. In the first decade of the PRC, the Peking government's 
policy of anti-foreignism was reflected in both external and internal movements. Large-
scale campaigns such as the "Resist America and Aid Korea" movement clearly were mass 
activities against U.S. imperialism. The "Resist America and aid Korea" movement was 
carried on until 1953. Most of the important domestic movements such as the "Three-
antis and Five-antis",35 the "Suppression of Counter-revolutionaries",36 and the "Anti-
Rightist"37 movements were launched to eradicate people who had relations with 
foreigners and who had "foreign capitalist ideas", particularly those persons "opposing 
party policies". In fact, theses campaigns were strengthened by anti-foreign sentiment or 
anti-imperialism". The details of political movements from 1950 to 1959 are shown on the 
table below:3 8 
Political Movements, 1950-1959 
Year Name of Movements Main Activities Remarks 
1951 Resist-America and Aid 
Korea Movement 
First Movement of 
Suppression of Counter-
revolutionary Elements 
(l)aroused anti-American feelings; (2) encouraged 
students to join the army; (3)forced donations for 
purchase of aeroplanes and artillery. 
(l)urged remnant Nationalist military and political 
personnel to register with the Communist 
government; (2) accused hidden counter-
revolutionaries 
These movements 
were carried on 
until 1953 
3SThe three-anti is a movement against corruption, waste, and bureaucratism carried out between Dec. 
1951 and June 1952. The five-anti movement development from the three-anti movement, they were: 
against "capitalist bribery of government workers, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on 
government contracts and stealing economic information from government sources. See Warren Kuo 
(ed.,) A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, (Taipei: 
National Cheng-chi University, 1978), p. 428, 671. 
36A movement from 1950 to 1952 to eliminate alien elements from the party government and other 
organization. See Warren Kuo (ed.,) op. cit., p. 12. 
37An anti-Rightist movement initiated in the late 1950s. See Warren Kuo (ed.,) op. cit., p. 140. 
38Liao Kuang-sheng, ANTIFOREIGNISM AND MODERNIZATION IN CHINA 1860-1980, (Hong Kong: 
The Chinese University Press 1984), pp. 122-123. 
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1952 Three-antis and Five-
antis Movements 
(1) submit a detailed report on one's own 
background; and review one's own thought; (2) 
urged businessmen to pay evaded taxes; (3) urged 
popular support to battle-fronts. 
Targets of these 
movements were 
industrialists, 
businessmen and 
cadres 
1955 Second Movement of 
Suppression of Counter-
revolutionary Elements 
(1) review of thought; (2) ideological struggles; (3) 
strict classification of class affiliations 
The most bitter 
ideological 
struggle 
1956 Suppression of Counter-
revolutionaries; and 
Rectification Movement 
(1) propaganda; (2) accusations of counter-
revolutionaries 
Movements 
suspended due to 
anti-Communist 
revolutions in East 
Europe 
1957 Rectification Movement; 
(Blooming and 
Contending Movement); 
Anti-rightists Movement 
(1) self-criticism among students and teachers with 
Party membership; (2) participation of non-party-
member students and teachers in the rectification 
Movement; (3) retaliation against non-party-
member student and teachers by those with party 
membership 
Three Movements 
closely related to 
one another 
1959 Movement against 
Rightist Tendencies 
Study of documents issued by Eighth Plenary 
Session of the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party 
Movements carried 
out on a local basis 
in response to the 
CCPCC 
In his power struggle against Liu Shao-ch'i, Chairman of the PRC, Mao applied anti-
foreign sentiment to his attack. Mao linked Liu with "Soviet Revisionism" and accused 
him of being "China's Khrushchev". Mao pointed out that P'eng Te-huai, Minister of 
National Defence, "dared to criticise the failure of the 'Great Leap Forward' at the Lushan 
conference in 1959... Such anti-party activity was, in fact, conducted under the support 
and the shelter of bourgeois headquarters led by the Chinese Khrushchev".39 Mao 
manipulated the media, and aroused the masses with anti-foreign sentiment to reinforce his 
control and consolidate his power. 
In his speech On the Issue of Anti-China in 1960, Mao proclaimed that "their anti-China 
movement is only to evoke the unification of our party and the entire people and to set up 
39"From the Failure of Peng Te-huai to the Bankruptcy of Chinese Khrushchev", RED FLAG, No. 13, 
1967. p. 23. 
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our lofty ambitions".40 In other words, in China, under Mao's regime, external provocation 
could be used as a tool to reinforce internal unification. Since "xenophobia" carried strong 
characteristics of nationalism, which could evoke the masses' emotion and spread quickly, 
a ruler thereby increased his political supremacy every time a large-scare anti-foreign 
movement was conducted. And the ruler's supreme position had always been the best 
weapon to eliminate the dissidents. For instance, during the period of the Cultural 
Revolution, Mao's clique began to mobilise the masses to seize power from "capitalist 
roaders in the party" by early 1967. The mass media manipulated by Mao increased its 
attack on Liu Shao-ch'i without naming him specifically, there was also a simultaneous 
sharp increase in the criticism against Soviet Revisionism. In Peking newspaper for 
example, the articles attacking Soviet Union increased from 6.82 percent between July and 
December 1966, to 18.75 percent between January and June 1967.41 Moreover, according 
to statistical data, there were 58 articles in January and 91 in February published by 
People's Daily to criticise the counter-revolutionary activities carried by Soviet 
Revisionists. "Soviet Revisionists" became common choice of words that used to struggle 
reactionaries. In addition, the articles about "Soviet revisionists' restoration of capitalism" 
were constantly carried in newspapers between 1967 and 1968.42 
In the struggle between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i during the early stage of the 
Cultural Revolution, Mao's apply of "anti-foreigners" policy contained two hidden 
functions. First, Mao's followers claimed to be patriots, constantly attacked foreign 
enemies, and accused that Liu Shao-ch'i had betrayed China's revolution in his attempt to 
collude "Soviet imperialists" and "Soviet revisionists". Mao deliberately called an "internal 
enemy" as a "hidden traitor" and turned "his enemy" into a "public enemy" through nation-
40Liao Kuang-sheng, ANTIFOREIGNISMAND CHINESE POLITICS, (Taipei: 1987), p. 266. 
41Daniel Tretiak, "Is China Preparing to Turn Out?', ASIAN SURVEY, March 1971, p.224. 
42Liao Kuang-sheng, ANTIFOREIGNISM AND CHINESE POLITICS, op. cit, p. 202. 
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wide mass media. Mao applied simple logic, that was, since the "internal enemy" had 
colluded with a "foreign enemy", a large-scale anti-foreign movement would therefore be 
conducive to the criticism against Liu. Secondly, Mao could consolidate his supreme 
leadership through the anti-foreign movement. The masses transformed their patriotism 
into forces to support Mao and his domestic and foreign policies. Chinese people had 
suffered too much humiliation from foreign powers since 1840, which forced them to unite 
under the leadership of a powerful man. On the other hand, since the government must 
prepare itself to fight in the event of war, it was important to unite internal forces and 
establish a unified leadership. Mao, as chairman of the CCP, without doubt became the 
supreme commander. Consequently, the evocation of anti-foreign sentiment not only 
could increase Mao's commanding position, but also minimise the resistance in carrying 
out inner struggles and gain masses' support. 
Without doubt the leading class of the CCP had its purposes for using the mass media to 
provoke external disputes at a time when a full-scale internal power-seizure struggle was 
most vehement. When the media fiercely attacked Soviet Union in early 1967, it was also 
the time when Mao contended with Liu for power the most. Mao attempted to arouse the 
masses' indignation towards "revisionists" through the attack of "Soviet Revisionism", Liu 
was thus accused of being "China's Khrushchev" at that time. But after Liu was purged at 
the Twelfth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC in October 1968, the criticism against the 
Soviet Union in the mass media also dropped dramatically. It is usually too complicated a 
motive for an undemocratic nation to apply nationalism as a means of political 
mobilisation. But, one thing can be for sure, to the leading class of the CCP, anti-
foreignism, undoubtedly, was the best policy to eradicate the dissidents. 
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II . Political Socialisation and Political Culture 
A. Political Socialisation 
After their rise to power in 1949, the CCP faced three cardinal issues i f they wished to 
exercise their absolute leadership. These were: state integration, legalising the communist 
regime and constructing socialism. 
To solve the above issues, the CCP authority started to proceed to structural 
reorganisation. Their purpose was to establish a new political culture so that the members 
in the system could accept the supreme aim of the construction of a "socialist society" 
based on Mao's ideology. This was because "the struggle of the proletariat and the 
revolutionary people to change the world comprises the fulfilment of the following tasks: 
to change the objective world and, at the same time, their own subjective ability and 
change - to change their cognitive ability and change the relations between the subjective 
and the objective world". 4 3 
The ideal society portrayed by communism is based on the model of "from each according 
to his ability, to each according to his needs". It is not merely a kind of economic system, 
but also proposed a hypothesis of excellent personality traits, that is to say, all men will do 
their duty without any consideration of rewards. In addition, it also proposed that i f all 
men possessed the high moral virtue of self-restraint, they would obtain commodities 
according to their needs, not their desires. 
Although Mao was respectfully addressed as representing "the general truth of Marxism-
4 3 "On Practice", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. I (1975), op. cit., p. 303. 
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Leninism of our era"44 and "the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era",45 he did not put the 
Utopian society of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs", the 
pinnacle of communism, into practice. Mao recognised the importance of the proletariat 
to change their own subjective world of their own, and attempted to bring the communist 
society with Chinese characteristics to a new stage of evolution through the changing 
people. Chinese communists proclaimed that "comrade Mao Tse-tung has inherited, 
defended and developed Marxism-Leninism with genius, creatively and comprehensively 
and has brought it to a higher and completely new stage".46 In order to create and to bring 
Marxism-Leninism to a higher and completely new stage, it was primarily necessary to 
change the fundamental values and mores of traditional Chinese society. 
Family was the most important medium for the political socialisation47 in traditional 
Chinese society. However, in order to carry out thoroughly the people's ideological 
reform, the CCP intentionally reduced the function of family to the lowest degree, and 
authorised the organs controlled by the party, such as mass media, schools and peer 
groups, to shoulder the responsibility of political socialisation. 
The movement of "People's Communes" in 1950's can be regarded as a formal challenge 
to the traditional family by the authorities. The implementation of "People's Communes" 
had profound significance in many aspects of society. In military affairs, it was to carry 
out the policy of "everyone is a soldier"; in the area of the economy, it was to support the 
industrialisation of the "Great Leap Forward" through the collectivisation and assembly of 
44"Comrade Chiao Yu-lu is good model of studying and applying Maoist thought in a creative way", RED 
FLAG, No. 4, 1966. p. 9. 
4 5 QUOTATIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG, (Peking: East is Red Press, 1967). p.ii. 
46Ibid. 
47"Political Socialization - the process of a person's learning or being guidance for acquiring political 
orientation and behavior pattern", see Kenneth P. Langton, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION (N.Y.: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), p.5. 
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the labour forces; in politics, it was to create a lower level unit of control for the purpose 
of enforcing a high degree of centralisation. 
The establishment of the "People's Communes" destroyed the traditional structure of 
family as a fundamental constituent of the society. Traditional parental authority was 
replaced by the authority of the people's commune, or, in practice, by the authority of 
party's organisation or the supreme leadership of the party. The social system based on 
the patriarch collapsed, and the authority of parents in the family decreased. Every 
individual became a member of the society instead of a member of family, and the 
functions of the family, which included economical and political socialisation, were also 
replaced with that of a nation or of the people's commune so as to decrease people's 
dependence on the family and transferred to Mao and the Party their responsibility 
towards the family. Such phenomena as the collapse of the family system finds 
confirmation at the time when many children made a clear break with, and even struggled 
against or criticised, their parents during the Cultural Revolution. 
Educational institutions are among the most important organisations for a nation to 
conduct its "political socialisation". They can be used to mould members of that nation to 
form their political orientation and political behaviour.48 According to one study, through 
the personality cult of Mao Tse-tung, the leading class of the CCP have moulded the 
political attitudes of members of the PRC. Mao was cast in the dual role of "loving 
father" and "monarch" in the PRC 4 9 Such a moulding of political attitudes aimed at 
transferring to Mao and to the legitimacy of the PRC regime people's traditional devotion 
towards the family and parents. 
"Ibid 
49CharlesR. Ridley, Paul H. B. Godwin, and Dennis J. Doolin, THE MAKING OF A MODEL CITIZEN 
IN COMMUNIST CHINA (Carlifornia: Stanford University, The Hoover Institution Press, 1971), p. 135. 
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In addition to the support of the legitimacy of PRC leadership, the system further 
encouraged the masses to attack anyone or anything that was harmful to the Communist 
regime by adopting more vigorous means. It hoped that through this kind of attack, it 
would in turn strengthen the foundation of the legitimacy of its regime. For instance, 
traditional Chinese society, the Kuomintang, landlords and the rich were all classified into 
"rightists", "class enemies" and "counter-revolutionaries", and being attacked or being 
criticised all depended on the personal will of a supreme leader, which meant that whoever 
ran counter to Mao's wish or whoever Mao subjectively believed would threaten his 
position was the target of attack or criticism. 
In the PRC, Mao's thought and words had become a kind of "morality". As the result of 
the combination of "morality" with "political authority", Mao was in the vanguard of 
historical development and thus became the "great leader, the great teacher, great marshal, 
and great helmsmen"50 guiding the development of political line and the whole nation 
towards a communist society. Whoever opposed the party or opposed Mao was against 
the law of historical development, immorality, disloyalty and was the enemy to be 
annihilated. 
In its behaviour pattern, P.R.C. constantly emphasised a behaviour model in which the 
party's interests were seen as greater than individual's interests. Each person should 
attribute his success to the party's leadership. As a pioneering communist, one should 
make his utmost contribution to the party and to the communist society. 
Consequently, a series of campaigns were launched among the army by Lin Piao, then the 
50Yen Chia-ch'i & Kao Kao, THE TEN-YEAR HISTORY OF THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 
(Taipei: Institute of Current China Studies, 1988), p. 53. 
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Minister of National Defence. The campaign of "three-eight working style" in May 1960 
referred to three phases and eight characters. The three phrases: "a firm, correct political 
orientation, a simple and arduous working style and flexible strategy and tactics"; and the 
eight characters were t'uan-chieh (unity), ching-chang (alertness), yen-su (sternness) and 
huo-p'o (liveliness)".51 The movement of "four-good company" in December 1961 was an 
honour to be bestowed on companies which were "good in political and ideological work, 
in the 'three-eight' working style, in military training and in arranging their everyday life". 5 2 
At the same time, the movement of "five good fighter" was also launched which set up a 
criteria of five points for a good fighter. They were (1) have a correct political thought; 
(2) be masters of military technique; (3) conform to the three-eight work style, (4) 
accomplish tasks successfully, (5) have good physical training.53 And a series of political 
campaigns to "learn from Lei Feng"54 in 1963 were specially initiated with the aim of 
turning every soldier into "chairman Mao's good fighters". The Army should do it, and so 
should the whole society for Mao wanted "people of the whole country to learn from the 
liberation army".55 
As for the "role recognition", the view that "teaching by verbal instruction is not as good 
as personal example" was emphasised in Chinese traditional culture. The PRC applied 
5 1 "Report at the Representation conference of Cultural and Educational Activities in the PLA ", PEOPLE 
DAILY, 24 May, 1960 or see THE EXPLANATION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, 
(Taipei: China Publishing Company, 1971), p. 67, or see Warren Kuo (ed.,) A COMPREHENSIVE 
GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, op. cit., p. 453. 
52THE EXPLANATION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, op. cit., p. 195; "PLA's Work for 
1966", PEKING REVIEW, No. 49, 1965, pp. 3-4; A COLLECTION OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS ON 
UN PIAO AFFAIR, (Taipei: Institute of Mainland China Affair, 1972), p. 31; Warren Kuo (ed.,) A 
COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, op. cit., p. 524. 
53"The PLA Made Excellent Achievement in the Five-Good Campaign", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 31 July 1959; 
Warren Kuo (ed.,) A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, op. 
cit., p. 673; A COLLECTION OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS ON UN PIAO AFFAIR, op. cit., P.31. 
S4THE EXPLANATION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, op. cit., p. 389; WHO'S WHO 
AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (Shanghai: People's Press, 1983), 
pp. 414-415. 
5S"The Whole Nation Should Learn From the Liberation Army", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 1 Feb. 1964. 
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exemplary figures extensively as a tool for carrying out political socialisation. There are 
two typical examples of "role recognition". First, the above-mentioned "movement to 
learn from Lei Feng". To learn from Lei Feng means to learn from his diligence in reading 
"Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung", to learn to become a activist under the guidance of 
Maoist thought, and to learn to be clear about what to love and what to hate in class 
position.56 Second, the "movement to learn from the Liberation Army". 5 7 To learn from 
the Liberation Army means to learn from them how to "raise high the great red banner of 
Maoist thought", and how to "read Mao's writings thoroughly, and listen to what Mao 
said, and do everything according to Mao's wishes, to become chairman Mao's good 
fighter".58 
The creation of exemplary figures out of common people like Lei Feng was aimed at 
providing an easier way for people to follow so that they could devote themselves to the 
party to the same extent as the exemplary figure had achieved, and henceforth developed a 
sense of participation and devotion towards the society. 
There was another important characteristics in the course of PRC's political socialisation, 
that was, it paid a great deal of attention to the influence of peer groups, "hsiao tsu" (a 
small team) is not only the most fundamental but also the best unit among the peer groups. 
Its functions for political socialisation, whether in the society or in the army, can be 
summarised as follows: 1. The "hsiao tsu" leader can personally supervise and control the 
propagation and conduction of a party's policy. 2. In view of the ways of learning and 
discussion in a "hsiao tsu", which enables members of the "hsiao tsu" to form a strong 
desire and consciousness of political participation. 3. Because a "hsiao tsu" is formed of 
56WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, op. ext., p.415. 
57"The Whole Nation Should Learn From the Liberation Army", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 1 Feb., 1964. 
S8Yen Chia-ch'i & Kao Kao, op. cit, p.171; "Cadres at all levels should follow Maoist Thought and 
become the model of the soldiers", RED FLAG, No. 8. 1966, p. 1. 
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members with the same or similar tasks, they are more liable to exert "social" pressure, 
and are beneficial to the unity of concepts, henceforth will bring about the consistency of 
political behaviour.59 
Moreover, mass media of various kinds have played an important role in the process of 
political socialisation. Its function is for the strengthening and the change of a person's 
political orientation and behaviour pattern. The mass media of the PRC, according to its 
functions, can be classified into the following four categories:60 namely, mobilisation, 
providing information, power struggle and ideological reinforcement. Mao held the idea 
that "Before the elimination of the classes, every piece of news, whether press service or 
newspaper, has its own class character, what bourgeois claimed about free press is nothing 
but a lie." 6 1 
Mao stressed that news undertakings must unconditionally comply with proletarian 
interests, party's newspapers and periodicals are the weapons for power struggle, and the 
tools for propagating, organising, and instructing masses, hence the leader of the party 
"should control the press in his own hands as a weapon for organising and educating 
masses, and a weapon for reflecting as well as directing politics, military and 
economics".62 
Mao made a clear definition about the task and the function of newspapers as a major tool 
of mass media in A Talk to the Editorial Staff of the Shansi-Suiyuan Daily on 2 April 
59James Jownsend, "Political Participation" in Yung Wei (ed.), COMMUNIST CHINA, (Columbus: 
CharlessE. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972), p. 263. 
60Godwin C. Chu, "The Current Structure and Functions of China's Mass Media" in Godwin C. Chu and 
Francis L. K. Hsu (ed.), MOVING A MOUNTAIN: CULTURAL CHANGE IN CHINA (Honolulu: The 
University Press of Hawaii, 1979), p. 58. 
6 1 "The theory and practice of Mao Tse-tung's journalism constitute a part of the thought of Mao Tse-
tung", THE YEAR BOOK OF CHINA NEWS 1984, p. 88. 
62lbid. 
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1948. He commented, "The role and power of the newspapers consists in its ability to 
bring the Party programme, the Party line, the Party's general and specific policies, its 
tasks and methods of work, before the masses in the quickest and most extensive way". 6 3 
In Mao's opinion, since the mass media is a powerful weapon, all newspapers and 
periodicals, broadcasting stations and press services should, therefore, follow the 
leadership of the party unconditionally, and persist in the Party's principle of proletarian 
character. 
The major mass media of "two newspapers and one periodical" - the People's Daily, the 
Liberation Army's Daily and the Red Flag - had loyally transmitted Mao's instructions 
according to his wish. In all political campaigns, the "two newspapers and one periodical" 
applied Mao Tse-tung's thought as a criterion for criticism or support. 
In order to transmit political instructions to every corner of the country, and based on the 
concern that there was a tremendous amount of illiteracy in the countryside, the PRC had 
to set up broadcasting systems in all villages and small towns as a means of transmission 
and apply "hsiao tsu meetings" to convey the instructions verbally. According statistical 
data, it can be seem that between 1965 and 1976, the number of broadcasting 
loudspeakers increased from 8,725,455 in 1965 to 113,246,412 in 1976. In the meantime, 
the number of television stations increased from 12 to 32, and the number of television 
broadcasting stations increased from only 3 to 194.64 
The use of "big-character posters", one of the smaller forms of communication, became 
the primary source of news during the period of the Cultural Revolution, and its political 
6 3 "A talk to the editorial staff of the Shansi-suiyuan Daily", (April 2, 1948), SELECTED WORKS OF 
MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. IV(1969), op. cit, p. 241. 
M'The Rise and Development of Chinese Journalist Academic Circles", THE YEARBOOK OF CHINA 
NEWS 1984, p. 54. 
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significance reached a climax at the time when Mao personally wrote his first poster 
entitled "Bombard the Headquarters - my first big-character poster"65 and made public on 
5 August 1967 to the Eleventh Plenary of the Eighth CCPCC. Due to the function of 
comprehensive public participation it provided, big-character posters became most widely-
used medium by the authority to arouse masses' enthusiasm for revolution. In fact, when 
the masses were fed up with dogmatic official propaganda, the big character posters in 
turn became the more reliable sources of news, and immensely increased its function for 
political socialisation because of the direct masses' participation. 
B. Political Culture 
Chinese political culture is a mix of parochial political culture and subject political culture. 
Within such a mix, the people hold negative and conservative attitudes about politics, they 
have no expectation of the input of the political system, but instead unilaterally accept the 
restrictions from the output of political system. In other words, their support for the 
decision maker or for the authority itself is greater than that of their demands. Under such 
circumstances, people have a very low desire to participate in politics, it is the elite who 
control and operate the politics. Consequently, under the leadership of Mao, the people 
who were really involved in every political campaign, faction or power struggle were 
those party and military elites. The masses were merely considered as a tool of political 
struggle after being indoctrinated. 
As mentioned in the first section, the termination of the phenomenon of annexation of land 
holdings at the initial stage of the PRC's regime had changed the structure of Chinese 
agriculture society to a social model based on small landowner-peasants, which satisfied 
65"Bombard the Headquarters - my first big-character poster", (Aug. 5, 1966), RED FLAG, No. 13, 1967, 
p. 3. 
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the peasant life long dream to possess a piece of land. Although the PRC adopted violent 
means in the course of the movement of land reform, it is indisputable that the majority of 
poor peasants benefited from that movement. Consequently, it can be assured that before 
the "Three Red Banners" movement - Great Leap forward, the General Line for socialist 
construction and the People's communes, the PRC's regime had gained the majority of its 
support from members of grass-root units.6 6 Such support stabilised the uncertain factors 
which a new government often confronts at the initial stage of its regime. 
However, between the movement of "People's Communes" and the movement of "Great 
Leap Forward" which was promoted on the basis of "People's Communes", in less than 10 
years, Mao initiated by force an economic cycle to transform the society based on the 
small landowner-peasants into that of annexation of land holdings. In Chinese history, 
such an economic cycle normally depicted the rise and fall of a dynasty. Mao re-seized the 
land from the hands of small landowner-peasants, and implemented "People's Communes" 
as the basis of social structure. Although the policy of "People's communes" had its 
political significance, as mentioned before, it was applied as a weapon for the central 
hegemony to control the locality or in turn to suppress anti-governmental organisation. 
However, once the masses became a political tool, the phenomenon of universal 
politicisation was very likely to emerge. Moreover, since the movement of "Three Red 
Banners", the PRC launched a series of power struggles in the name of "political line", 
which gave people no means to predict the approach of governmental policies. 
After the Cultural Revolution, the social order was in particular destroyed because of the 
power struggles among the leading class. The people were brought into the political 
arena, and consequently, the sign of structural instability in the PRC began to appear. The 
66This is a conclusion ofintervies with domestic and oversea Chinese. 
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gravity of this phenomenon reached its climax at the time when Lin Piao, - "Mao's close 
comrade-in-arms", and who was listed as "the successor to Mao", and who would always 
"raise high the great red flag of Maoist thought" - was accused of "turning traitor and 
defecting to the enemy" and was classified as "the representative of imperialism, 
revisionism and anti-party, the general backing of landlords, the rich, counter-
revolutionaries, bad elements and rightists, the most fierce and dangerous emery concealed 
in the party", "the bourgeois careerist as well as conspirator" and "the counter-
revolutionary group whose words never strayed from Mao's saying, and the shouts of 
'long live chairman Mao' never ceased, to our faces only spoke good works, but behind 
our backs spread poison".67 At this point, the political values of the masses began to 
appear in the state of divergence and chaos. 
Because the political value formed by the movement of political socialisation at the initial 
stage of the PRC regime conflicted with their subsequent experiences of life, the people of 
the PRC began to doubt the trustworthiness and authoritativeness of the state system. 
The incident of the "Gang of Four" after Mao's death was a reflection of such doubts 
which demonstrated that people had changed their concepts of loyalty towards the leading 
class. 
Moreover, It should be noted that through the use of propaganda, the PRC had hoped to 
create among the masses a consciousness of enthusiasm and initiative, and the spirit to 
fight for a better tomorrow of communism in the process of the transformation of political 
socialisation. However, according to one survey, of all members of society, 60 percent 
held a negative attitude towards the question whether a person's efforts can be duly 
rewarded? 70 percent believed that "one needs to follow the right person in order to be 
67"The Tenth CCP National Congress", RED FLAG, No. 9, 1973, pp. 6-9. 
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successful",68 which also meant the "kuan hsi" (the relationship) with upper leaders is very 
important This reveals that the people of the PRC still belonged to the society of "external 
control" value inclination. There is an obvious gap between the outcome of the survey 
and the communist spirit which stress the importance of enthusiasm and initiative. From 
this we can understand the reason for the occurrence of factional conflicts or power 
struggles. This is largely because once a person is classified as a member of a certain 
interest group, he can not but fight desperately and follow the group leader to the finish 
until the final victory comes. One can observe that there were hardly any factional 
defectors in successive line conflicts, apart from Ch'en Po-ta who deserted Mao's faction 
to join the faction of Lin Piao. This will be addressed in a later chapter. During the period 
of the Cultural Revolution, the Fourth Field Army led by Lin Piao oppressed other field 
armies. After Lin Piao stepped down from the political arena, Mao made concerted 
efforts to eliminate the influence of Fourth Field Army in both politics and military affairs, 
which was the reflection of such phenomenon. 
Another striking feature of the PRC's political culture is the recognition of the central 
authority, but the lack of mutual trust among the people or among political competitors. 
As a consequence of such distrust, there is no rules of games in the PRC, the only efficient 
approach to seize political gains is to follow and depend upon a factional leader. 
It is a general practice in Communist ideology to treat class comrade with love and co-
operation, and class enemy with hate and struggle. Under such a extreme political culture, 
political rivalries became a zero-sum game and can not be compromised, and struggles 
became the only means for factions to survive. Moreover, in a nation putting politics in 
command of everything, making a mistake in one's political stand means the end of his 
^Lucian Pye, THE DYNAMICS OF CHINESE POUTICS (Cambridge: Celgeschleger, gunn & Hain, 
Publishers Inc., 1981), p. 282. 
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political career. Consequently, for the reason of self-protection, the PRC elite never easily 
show their political stand unless they are forced to do so, and i f they do, the wish of the 
supreme authority is the only thing they considered. This explains why no one, except 
P'eng Te-huai, dare to oppose Mao openly and ask him to be responsible for the failure of 
"Three Red Banners" movement even though it had caused great damage to the PRC, and 
why all participants including Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai sided with Mao and attacked 
P'eng at the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC in August 1959.69 
One can roughly see the inevitability of the combination of politics with morality and the 
appearance of nation-wide universal politicisation from the essence of political culture of 
the PRC and from the course of political socialisation. The movement of "the people of 
the whole country should learn from the liberation army" in 1964 was significant with 
regard to the formation of universal politicisation. The comments in that editorial of 
People's Daily gave the best annotation to the substance of political culture and political 
socialisation under the PRC regime, it said "The basic reason why the liberation army can 
become an extraordinary proletarian and extraordinary fighting army is because they raise 
high the great red flag of Maoist thought".70 The leading class of the PRC attempted to 
carry out the movement of political socialisation to its largest extent through the army, and 
to achieve the supreme and final goal of consolidating leadership through role-recognition. 
69For details refer to Chapter IV, Section II. 
70"The whole nation should learn from the liberation army", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 1 Feb., 1964. 
33 
III. The Unique Function of Ideology in the PRC's Regime 
As mentioned before, the state under the control of Chinese Communist Party belongs to a 
closed system. In the closed system, the ideology and the leader's personal charisma are 
the cardinal foundations for the leading class of the system to carry out absolute control 
and establish authoritative leadership within that system. 
Ideology has a special function in the society of the PRC. The final arbiter, determine who 
possesses so-called orthodox ideology, will dominate the final result of a power struggle 
and in turn will influence the trend of its political development afterwards. Because of the 
distinguished class divergence between the dominator and the dominated; the unique 
characteristic of insurmountable class barriers in the Chinese social structure; and also the 
long-term ideological indoctrination of the whole nation with Maoist thought; Mao 
established a supreme or immortal (God-like) status in the PRC. Since Mao was the final 
arbiter of orthodox ideology, this put him in an invincible position in every faction or 
power struggle. 
The ideology has multi-functions: - firstly, it provides people with a conceptual framework 
and a rational approach, which serves as the fundamental pattern for the recognition of an 
objective world. Secondly, it is the guiding principle for a person or a group movement. 
Thirdly, it forms the criterion for the evaluation of the people's as well as a nation's 
conduct. 
Generally speaking, ideology has two important functions in the PRC system, namely 
legitimacy and political mobilisation. 
A. The function of legitimacy 
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No regime can rely on violence for its government in the long run, it has to win people's 
support, which include manifest and latent support. Under such circumstances, the 
ideology shoulders an important function of legitimacy - it entitles the leading class to 
govern and turns their political control into an everlasting and more effective authoritarian 
leadership, this makes people concede to the legitimacy and reasonableness of its 
domination and willing to follow and obey the orders of their own accord. 
After the Chinese Communists gained power in 1949, they failed to use democratic 
elections as a means to win people's support. Under the leadership of these "self-
perpetuating" revolutionary militarists, there was a need to develop a common 
consciousness conforming to the demands of Communist China so their leadership was 
recognised as the only legitimate one. And only ideology could fulfil this function. 
B. The function of political mobilisation 
With revolutionary characteristics, an ideology will normally promise the prospects of an 
ideal society and a better life for tomorrow. The ultimate goal of such an ideal state is to 
reach the mythical Utopian society. It may not satisfy the material needs of the great 
majority, but, in reality, it will certainly meet their psychological needs. Under such 
circumstances, the ideology is the conversion of ideas into social levers, it can inspire the 
masses to strive for the myth of a Utopian society. 
In the PRC, the retarded economy had nullified the attempt to mobilise the masses in 
production through material motivation, consequently, the spiritual stimulus was used to 
achieve the mobilisation. This can be seen in some propaganda and many of Mao's 
speeches. For example, in one of his speech, You Are Models for the Whole Nation, at the 
early stage of the PRC's regime, Mao indicated, "You are an activists propelling the 
people's cause forward to triumph in all spheres of endeavour, a firm pillar of support to 
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the people's government.... China must build a powerful national defence force and a 
powerful economy - two tasks of major importance, fulfilment of theses tasks depends on 
you comrades forging close ties of unity and making concerted efforts together with all the 
commanders and fighters of the PLA and all the workers, peasants and other sections of 
the people".71 Another example is that Mao encouraged the PLA who entered the Korea 
war with the following passage: "You must fully anticipate various possible and inevitable 
difficulties and be prepared to overcome them with great enthusiasm, courage, care and 
stamina".72 Moreover, the government defined the "mass heroes" as: "They are men and 
women who have the spirit of overcoming difficulties and of devotion to socialist 
construction with no thought of self,... they do not think of individual reward or 
comfort.... The 'mass heroes' have created 'miracles' by their day-to-day behaviour".73 
From which we can learn the importance of spiritual stimulus being used to mobilise the 
mass. 
According to Marxist doctrine, the function of ideology is only a part of superstructure, 
and "with the change of economic foundation, the superstructure of great vitality will 
change accordingly sooner or latter".74 Consequently, the economy is a decisive factor in 
the final analysis. However, according to Mao's annotation of the function of ideology, 
ideology in the PRC's regime was more than a part of superstructure. It had influenced 
Chinese social operations. Mao asserted, "We recognise that in the general development 
of history, the material determines the mental and social being determines social 
consciousness, we also - and indeed - recognise the reaction of mental on material things, 
7 1'Tow are Models for the Whole Nation (25 Sept. 1950)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, 
Vol. V, (1977), op. cit., pp. 41-42. 
72"Order to the Chinese People's Volunteers (8 Oct., 1950)", ibid, p. 43. 
73"Conference of Mass Heroes", CHINA RECONSTRUCTS, Vol. VIII, Dec. 1959, p. 1. 
74"Preface on the Criticism of Political Economics", A COMPREHENSIVE WORKS OF MARX-ENGELS, 
Vol. XIII, (Peking: People's Press, 1960), p. 9. 
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social consciousness on social being and of the superstructure on the economic base".75 
From Mao's point of view, one can understand the ideology not only existed in the 
superstructure but also had its function in infrastructure, which was the "spiritual 
reaction", this accounted for Mao's unbeatable position in the CCP when his thought 
became the orthodox ideology. Generally speaking, Maoist thought, in essence, differs 
from the analytic and theoretical ideology of Marxists.76 
In his paper On New Democracy, Mao stressed "To advocate 'wholesale westernization' is 
wrong, China has suffered a great deal from the mechanical absorption of foreign 
materials. Similarly, in applying Marxism to China, Chinese communists must fully and 
properly integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese 
revolution, or in other words, the universal truth of Marxism must be combined with 
specific national characteristics and acquire a definite national form i f it is to be useful, and 
in no circumstance can it be applied subjectively as a mere formula, Marxists who make a 
fetish of formulas are simply playing the fool with Marxism and the Chinese revolution, 
and there is no room for them in the ranks of the Chinese revolution".77 Once Marxism 
had acquired a Chinese form, Maoist thought would become the only representation of the 
"Marxism in Chinese-style", or even override Marxism and become the supreme guiding 
principle of the PRC's political campaigns. 
The Seventh CCP National Congress formally embodied Mao Tse-tung thought in the 
'General Program" of the Party Constitution. Mao became the ideological monopolizer in 
China, and Maoist thought became the guiding principle for the party's policies and the 
75"On Contradiction (Aug. 1937)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. I (1975), op. cit, 
p.336. 
76Refer to Frang Schurmann, IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA, (California: 
University of Berkeley Press, 1968), p. 22. 
77"On New Democracy (Jan. 1940)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. I (1965), op. cit., 
pp. 380-381. 
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basis for the army's line. Mao's leadership reached to its climax at the Seventh CCP 
National Congress and was unsurpassed by any other party and army elites in the PRC. 
After the establishment of PRC's regime, in view of the fact that the socialist construction, 
or even communist world, must be realised under the extremely adverse economic 
conditions, the leadership had to continue its efforts in promoting the cult of Mao Tse-
tung and of Maoist thought. Basically, the leading elite had attempted to transfer to the 
organisation people's obedience towards Mao. However, until the death of Mao Tse-tung 
in 1976, this attempt had never been realised. Mao's personal authority surpassed 
organisational authority, and Mao controlled the party machines and state organs 
throughout his life. 
The failure of the "Great Leap Forward" movement in 1958 seriously damaged Mao's 
supreme position in the Party. However, Mao's charisma hadn't faded out because of this. 
On the contrary, through Lin Piao's continued propaganda of Mao's sacredness 
throughout the army, the development of the cult of Mao Tse-tung was thus transformed 
into some sort of religious movement. As Maoist thought became a religion of this life, 
Mao was fully supported by the people of the whole nation. This explained why Mao 
could still rely on his ideological authority to initiate the Cultural Revolution to struggle 
against Liu Shao-ch'i, who was then the Chairman of the PRC and had a strong Party 
background, after he had lost his official organisational authority (i.e. Mao was replaced 
by Liu Shao-ch'i as chairman of the PRC in 1959). 
The result of the above-mentioned two functions, legitimacy and political mobilisation, 
fulfilled by the ideology in the PRC regime can be attributed to the following two impacts, 
namely, the impacts of political culture and the impacts of organisational characteristics in 
China. 
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1. The impacts of political culture 
Political culture refers to the orientation and the behaviour pattern that members of the 
political system hold about politics. Since the majority of Chinese society consists of 
peasants, and China, based on an agricultural society, belongs to a closed system, the 
people therefore uncritically accept any inputs from the leading class. This is the mix of 
parochial political culture and subject political culture asserted by Almond and Verba.78 
They argued, within such a mix, the majority are indifferent to who the decision-makers 
are, and to the output of a policy. This remains so as long as the decision-makers, or the 
leading class, could fulfil and protect their interests and security. They do not mind 
whether the process of a decision-making is legitimate and conforms to social justice. 
Moreover, modern China moved towards a nation of authoritarianism. It had to restore 
people's self-esteem and satisfy their traditional sentiment of being the "centre" of the 
world. On the other hand, it had to provide a foundation of social reconstruction which 
differs from that of feudal society. Since Chinese political philosophy is deeply influenced 
by its traditional culture, the people feel insecure if there they lack a national leader or 
"Godfather" to guide them and an ideology to comply to and to maintain the social order. 
Such a mentality of the people is beneficial to the establishment of orthodoxy. 
Since the founding of their state, the CCP had been making full use of the characteristics 
of political culture, continuously dominating the social values with brief and forceful 
slogans and symbols, and establishing the system of political belief.79 In other words, 
through the use of political jargon, political leaders had legitimised their authoritative 
leadership. Take the PLA for example. The PLA had been indoctrinated with official 
78Gabriel A. Almond & Sidney Verba, THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND 
DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), pp. 16-18. 
79Lucian Pye & Sidney Verba (ed), POLITICAL CULTURAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, (New 
Jersey: Princeton Uni. Press, 1965), p. 545. 
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ideology for such a long period that it had transformed into an internalised ideology. They 
recognised the closeness of the PRC system and had a strong degree of adherence towards 
the system. Consequently, the official ideology not only spread among the PLA at all 
levels, but also became a unified ideology to be complied with, and moreover, such 
obedience was regarded as an essential property of a soldier or member of the armed 
forces. 
2. The impacts of organisational characteristics in China 
A system's existence highly depends on the degree of satisfaction that members of the 
system have towards the output of policies; the degree of their recognition of the system 
itself; and the degree of their fear for retribution from the system. 
Through the mobilisation of broad masses of peasants and vagabonds in the infrastructure, 
the CCP gained power and founded the state on the basis of rebellions in the armed forces. 
However, the broad masses needed a political belief to preserve their enthusiasm and 
support to a new regime. 
The reason why the majority of the intellectuals supported the CCP at the early stage of 
the Chinese revolution was because they recognised the CCP's promise to reconstruct the 
social structure to bring about a better future, not because they accepted the communist 
ideology. In other words, the intellectuals had no profound allegiance to communist 
regime itself. What they strove for was a prosperous and strong China. Consequently, 
after their rise to power, the CCP realised the fact that communism was not applicable to 
the construction of a modern democratic country and that Chinese Communist couldn't 
continue to attract the people with the promise of better prospects and better economic 
conditions to preserve the stability of the CCP regime. Under such circumstances, they 
had to propagate the official ideology throughout the country in order to gain continuous 
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support from the masses and the intellectuals. Their aim was to change China's traditional 
political culture and people's mentality so as to sustain the CCP regime. 
The characteristics of the PRC system structure can be summarised in the following nine 
points, all of which have profound impacts on the formation and the function of the 
political role of the PLA. (1) Political system is a system of centralised hegemony based 
on agricultural society. (2) The System structure, basically, belongs to a form of 
restoration of the "Asiatic mode of production". (3) An ideology based on Mao Tse-tung 
thought has ultimate arbitration and supreme authority. It is the standard of social 
morality and social value. (4) The process of political socialisation is strictly controlled by 
the authority. (5)Xenophobia is used as a tool in the struggle against the opposed. (6) 
The PLA is mainly comprised of intellectuals and vagabonds. It carries a strong 
characteristic of peasant movement. (7) After the implementation of the policy of the 
"People's Communes", the system structure began to bear the essence of "militarisation". 
(8) Party and military leadership had no significant differentiation, the elite normally 
posses both political and military backgrounds. The principle of "party commands the 
army" is a common recognition by the party and military elites. (9) Influenced by the 
traditional culture, the army pledges their loyalty to the authority and regards "loyalty" as 
the perfect morality. 
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Chapter II . The Formation of the PLA's Political Role 
I. The Origins 
In feudal China, one of the main functions of centralism was to conduct large-scale 
irrigation works for maintaining agricultural production. The control of water resources 
by the government meant the control of peasant production and their loyalty towards the 
government. The government dominating the water supply as a means of rewarding or 
punishing the society that serves as the ruling model of autocratic monarchy in politics. In 
addition, chronic insecurity forced the ruler to be a military leader, while the villages 
provided the necessary source of armed forces. Since villages are an isolated and 
decentralised organisation in the framework of agricultural society, with a strong 
attachment towards family system but politically aloof, the ruler controlled the channel for 
vertical movement between upper and lower classes in society. Under such a closed 
system, peasant needs, are based on economic but not on political considerations. 
Landless peasants once organised would bring about the phenomena of system instability. 
Prior to the Chinese Communist Party gained power in 1949, Mao Tse-tung realised the 
importance of the agricultural society in the framework of Chinese society - it provided an 
inexhaustible source of armed force which could be developed as the "revolutionary base". 
In the "report" based on his visit to Hunan in January 1927, Mao made the significant 
observation that peasants in China have revolutionary importance; therefore the peasants 
and armed forces should be the pillar of revolutionary power. Mao perceived that "the 
revolution in the countryside is for the peasant class to overthrow the landlord class", and 
therefore "overthrowing the armed forces of the landlords and establishing those of the 
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peasants".1 Mao rapidly succeeded as a result of applying peasant forces, which in itself 
raised peasant consciousness and hence increased its importance in his mind, "most 
dynastic change came about as a result of such peasant uprisings... poor peasants, the 
biggest motive force of the Chinese revolution",2 "It is the peasants who are the source of 
the Chinese army, the soldier are peasants in military uniform".3 He believed that only 
through a political movement to inspire the peasant forces and to control "the peasants in 
military uniform" could the communists overcome objectively social as well as economic 
conditions, and propel history forward. 
Because of the simplicity of the armed forces' tasks, the peasant army could still elaborate 
their specified functions in the period of insurrection. However once the character of the 
armed forces of the peasants had changed and became a regular army, the ideological 
structure of the military peasants must also be changed if they wish to maintain their 
functions, and the purely "insurrectionist viewpoint" must be removed so as to create a 
revolutionary consciousness of "fighting for whom? and for what?". 
Therefore the P.R.C. placed the army under the leadership of the Party and attempted to 
carry out the multiple functions for the achievement of the revolutionary target through 
the Party's control and the communist ideological transformation. The PRC's army is like 
the army of those successive dynasties since the Ch'in (221 B.C. - 207 B.C.), taking 
peasants as the major source. But, if one compares them with those of each successive 
dynasty in Chinese history, the cardinal difference was that the army of Mao's Dynasty was 
implemented with the thorough teachings of political ideology and was bestowed with a 
1 "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan (Mar. 1927)", SELECTED WORKS OF 
MAO TSE-TUNG, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), p. 28, 41. 
2"Chinese Revolutions and Chinese Communist Party (Dec. 1939), SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-
TUNG, Vol. 11(1965), op. cit.pp. 306-307, 324. 
3 "On Coalition Government (24 Apr. 1945)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. Ill (1967), 
op. cit., p. 250. 
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high degree of political responsibility. Its view was "war is politics and war itself is a 
political action", "war cannot for a single moment be separated from politics",4 "politics is 
war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed" and "war is the continuation 
of politics by other means, when politics develops to a certain stage beyond which it 
cannot proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep obstacles from the way",5 
hence when analysing the use of warfare, Mao always emphasised that the military should 
serve politics, and that military issues should be dealt with the Party's position in mind and 
also from the viewpoint of political interests. He opposed a purely military viewpoint and 
recognised that in all military works "politics takes the lead", and that the army should 
follow the "absolute leadership" of the Party and hence act according to Party's political 
line. 
The function of PLA in politics was determined at the "Sanwan Reorganisation" in 
September 19276 and "Kutien conference",7 on 29 December 1929. Mao commanded the 
survivors of the autumn harvest uprising elements to preside over the meeting of the Party 
committees of the fronts at Sanwan village, Yunghsin county in Kiangsi Province, to deal 
with the reorganisation of the army. At the meeting, Mao proposed the principle that the 
party branch should be organised on a company basis, each squad having its party group 
and each company having its party branch, furthermore, each battalion and regiment 
4"On Protracted War (May 1938)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. II (1965), op. cit., p. 
152. 
5Ibid. p. 153. 
6Survivors of the Worker-peasant Revolutionary Army led by Mao at Sanwan, Kiangsi in September 1927. 
In the wake of the abortive "autumn harvest uprisings" in eastern Hunan, Mao Tse-tung led his troops in 
retreat, moving eastward to Lohsiao Mountain. On their way to Chingkang Mountain, they were 
ambushed and a great many men deserted Mao. Then the remainder arrived at Sanwan in Yunghsin 
county, Chiangsi in September 1927, only a few hundred men of the 1st Division of the Worker-peasant 
Revolutionary Army were left. Then, Mao persuaded his reliable cadres to reorganise into a regiment of 
about 400 men and dismissed the pessimists with severance pay. 
See COMMENTS ON HISTORICAL FACTS IN THE PERIOD OF THE SECOND REVOLUTIONARY 
WAR IN CHINA, (Peking: San Lien Bookstore, 1956), p. 56. 
7 "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec. 1929)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, 
Vol. I (1967), op. cit., pp. 105-116. 
44 
should set up a party committee, and the army at all levels above company should set up 
party representatives, appointing party representatives as the secretary of the party branch 
or as the secretary of the party committee, while the supreme leading body in the army 
was the Party committees of the fronts led by Mao Tse-tung.8 
The "Sanwan reorganisation" was the founding stone of the PRC's implementation of a 
party committee system in the army. Although it also touched upon the institutions of 
political works of the PLA and the so-called democratic system inside the army, in reality 
the quality of the constituent members of the PLA was poor, and thus the political 
programme could not be executed effectively. Nevertheless, the Sanwan reorganisation 
determined the Party's position on the army and initiated the establishment of the system 
of "party commands army". 
In April 1928, after their defeat, the routed forces of the "Nanchang uprising"9, 
commanded by Chu Te and Ch'en I, met the survivors of the "autumn harvest uprising" 
peasants, led by Mao, at the Chingkang Mountains to carry out the army's reorganisation. 
The two groups were reorganised into "The fourth army of Chinese workers and the 
peasants Red Army", Chu Te was the army commander, while Mao was party 
representative and concurrently held the post of secretary of party committees of the 
fronts,10 which were the supreme leading bodies of party, politics and army in the area of 
Chingkang mountains. The party organisation of the Fourth Red Army was divided into 
four levels -company branch, battalion committee, regiment committee, and military 
8WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, (Shanghai: 
People's Press, 1983), pp. 142-143; Lo Jung-huan, "Autumn Harvest Uprising and the Early Stage of Red 
Army", A SINGLE SPARK CAN START A PRAIRIE FIRE, (Peking: Soldier's Press, 1980), p. 130. 
9Warren Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. I (Taipei: 
National Cheng-chi University 1968), pp. 371-373, 425-437. 
10Warren Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. II, op. cit, pp. 
9-10. 
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commission, in which the military commission was the supreme leading body subordinated 
to the party committees of the fronts. 
The Central Committee of the CCP at that time was in fact in favour of the establishment 
of the party committee system in the PLA as adopted by Mao Tse-tung. This viewpoint 
was revealed by Chou En-lai, the secretary of the military commission of CCP, in his 
directive letter to Ho Lung, commander of the Second Red-Army Regiment, and to the 
Front Committees in western Hunan-Hupei Soviet base.11 Chou directed " So long as you 
feel it facilitates work, it is all right for you to form a party branch under the Front 
Committee to take charge of party organisations in the army as a whole. Among the 
troops under Chu Te and Mao Tse-tung the party takes the company as a unit. There is a 
party branch in each company, with party under it and regimental and battalion committees 
above. With a party organisation in every company, there is party guidance in times of 
both peace and combat. People who have come from the Chu and Mao area say that they 
feel the form of organisation is good".12 
Furthermore, in his paper The struggle in the Chingkang Mountains, Mao indicated "as to 
class origin, the Red Army consists part of workers and peasants and part of lumpen-
proletarians. Of course, it is inadvisable to have too many of the latter. But, they are able 
to fight, and as fighting is going on every day with mounting casualties, it is already no 
easy matter to get replacements even from among them. In these circumstances the only 
solution is to intensify political training".13 Mao believed that only through political 
J1The armed troop in the base of Western Hunan-Hupei was "The Second Red Army", Ho Lung was then 
the Chief in Command, and Kuan Hsiang-yin was the political commissar. See Warren Kuo, ANALYTIC 
HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol II, op. cit., p. 12. 
J 2 "Some Questions Concerning the Development of the Western Hunan-Hupei Soviet Area (17 Mar. 
1929)", SELECTED WORKS OF THE CHOU EN-LAI Vol. 1 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press 1981), p. 
28. 
13"The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains (25 Nov. 1928)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-
TUNG, Vol. I (1975), op. cit., p. 65. 
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education could the Red Army soldiers have class consciousness. Furthermore, only after 
the concepts of land distribution and the establishment of political power, and the 
consciousness of armed labours and peasants had rooted in their minds could they fight for 
themselves and for the workers as well as peasant class. 
Based on his experience in the period of armed uprising, Mao commented, "experience has 
proved that the system of the party representative must not be abolished. The party 
representative is particularly important at company level, since party branches are 
organised on a company basis, it is he who has to see that the soldiers' committee carries 
out political training, to guide the work of the mass movements, and to serve concurrently 
as the secretary of the party branch".14 The policy for carrying out political training in the 
army and for the role of the party representative in the military as well as political training 
adopted by Mao was a consequence of the low quality of the constituent members of 
PLA, while such policy pushed the PLA to the dead end of a high degree of politicisation. 
In December 1929, the PLA convened "The Ninth Representative Conference of the 
Fourth Red Army" at Kutien in Fukien province (historically known as the Kutien 
meeting). At the meeting, in the light of ideological confusion in the Red Army at that 
time, Mao delivered his speech On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party15, which was 
later passed as a resolution by the Army Conference, based on "the spirit of September 
letter of the central committee". His speech dealt with the question of erroneous 
conceptions, which included "purely military viewpoint", "ultra-democracy", "the 
disregard of organisational discipline", "absolute equalitarianism", "subjectivism", 
"individualism", "the ideology of roving rebel bands", and "the remnants of putschism". 
14"The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountain (8 Nov. 1928)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-
TUNG, Vol. I (1975), op. cit., pp. 81-82. 
15"On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec. 1929)".SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, 
Vol. 1(1975), op. cit., pp. 105-152. 
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This Kutien resolution provided a substantial historical basis for the political participation 
of PLA and the establishment of the principle of "party commands gun". 
The "Directive from the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Front 
Committee of the Fourth Army of the Red Army", also known as "the September letter of 
the central committee", gave a series of clear instructions, which included the basic tasks 
and prospects of the Red Army; the area in which the Red Army should operate and its 
strategy; the Red Army and the masses; the organisation and training of Red Army; party 
works in the Red Army; and the question of the Red Army's current operation. It laid 
down the basic tasks of the Red Army mainly as follows: (1) to mobilise the masses in 
struggle, accomplish the agrarian revolution and establish Soviet regimes; (2) arm the 
peasants and expand the Red Army; (3) to extend political influence throughout the 
country.16 Furthermore, it pointed out the importance of applying political education to 
correct the PLA's mistaken ideas and to the development of political tasks. Above all, the 
most important one was to oppose the "purely military viewpoint".17 As for the tasks of 
the political commissars, it indicated that the "political commissar's responsibility is to 
supervise administrative work in the army, consolidate political leadership, countersign 
orders, and so on".18 
The Kutien resolution is important not only because it is the first extended treatment of the 
question of political control and education by Mao or any other Chinese communist 
leaders, but because it sets the pattern for the approach to this question throughout the 
army's subsequent history. Political work was, and still is, regarded as a totality which 
1 6 "Directive From the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Front Committee of the 
Fourth Army of the Red Army (28 Sep. 1929)", SELECTED WORKS OF CHOU EN-LAI Vol. I (1981), op. 
cit., p.45. 
nlbid.,p. 56. 
18Ibid. p. 51. 
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embraces all aspects of the army's everyday life, of its cultural, educational, and spare-time 
activities. It also dictates the way in which relations between the army and the civilian 
population, and within the army itself between officers and men, are handled. 
Based on the above-mentioned "September letter", Mao pointed out the mistaken ideas of 
the PLA and the methods for their corrections. The mistaken ideas on the purely military 
viewpoint are as follows: (1) These comrades regard military affairs and politics as 
opposed to each other and refuse to recognise that military affairs are only one means of 
accomplishing political tasks;19 (2) They do not understand that the Chinese Red Army is 
an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution. The Red Army 
besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, should shoulder such important 
tasks as doing propaganda among the masses, organising the masses, arming them, helping 
them to establish revolutionary political power and setting up party organisations; (3) 
Organisationally, these comrades subordinate the departments of the Red Army, doing 
political work to those doing military works. This idea would involve the danger of 
estrangement from the masses control of the government by the army and departure from 
proletarian leadership; (4) In propaganda work they overlook the importance of 
propaganda teams; (5) Selfish departmentalism - they think only of the fourth army and do 
not realise that it is an important task of the army to arm the local masses; (6) Extreme 
addiction to the idea of conserving strength and avoiding action. This is a remnant of 
opportunism; (7) Some comrades, disregarding the subjective and objective conditions, 
suffer from the malady of revolutionary impetuosity. This is a remnant of putschism.20 
X9Mao regarded military affairs are only one means of accomplishing political tasks, this viewpoint is 
different from what Carl von Clausewitz asserted that war is the continuation ofpolitics. To Mao, politics 
carried a strong struggle nature, it worked in concert with the principle of "party commands the gun". 
For Clausewitz's military theory, see Charles Reynolds, THE POUT1CS OF WAR, (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 59-83. 
20"On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec. 1929), SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, 
Vol. I (1975), op. cit, pp. 105-107. 
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Mao considered the source of the purely military viewpoints which included: (1) A low 
political level, from this flows the failure to recognise the role of political leadership in the 
army; (2) The mentality of mercenaries. Many prisoners captured in past battles have 
joined the Red Army, and such elements bring with them a markedly mercenary outlook, 
thereby providing a basis in the lower ranks for the purely military viewpoint; (3) From 
the two proceeding causes there arises a third, over confidence in military strength and 
absence of confidence in the strength of the masses of the people; (4) The party's failure 
actively to attend to and discuss military work is also a reason for the emergence of the 
purely military viewpoint among a number of comrades.21 
In the resolution, it pointed out the methods for correction as follows: (1) Raise the 
political level in the party by means of education, destroy the theoretical roots of the 
purely military viewpoint, at the same time, eliminate the remnants of opportunism and 
putschism and break down the selfish departmentalism; (2) Intensify the political training 
of officers and soldiers. At the same time, as far as possible let the local governments 
select workers and peasants experienced in struggle to join the Red Army, thus 
organisationally weakening or even eradicating the purely military viewpoint; (3) Arouse 
the local party organisations to criticise the party organisations in the Red Army and the 
organs of mass political power to criticise the Red Army itself in order to influence the 
party organisations and the officers and soldiers of the Red Army; (4) The party must 
actively attend to and discuss military work; (5) Draw up Red Army rules and regulations 
which already define its tasks, the relationship between its military and its political 
apparatus.22 
21lbid. 
22"On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec. 1929)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, 
Vol. I (1975), op. cit., pp. 107-108. 
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Furthermore, the "resolution" also criticised the ideology of roving rebel bands among the 
Red Army23. It indicated "the political ideology of roving rebel bands has emerged in the 
Red Army because the proportion of vagabond elements is large and because there are 
great masses of vagabonds in China, especially in the southern provinces",24 this ideology 
manifested itself as follows: "some people want to increase our political influence only by 
means of roving guerrilla actions, but are unwilling to increase it by undertaking the 
arduous task of building up base area and establishing the peoples' political power",25 "in 
expanding the Red Army, some people follow the line of hiring men and buying horses and 
recruiting deserters and accepting mutineers, rather than the line of expanding the local 
Red Guards and the local troops and thus developing the main forces of the Red Army".26 
To eliminate the above-mentioned ideology of roving rebel bands, the resolution laid down 
that the party should "intensify education, criticise incorrect ideas, and eradicate ideology 
of roving rebel bands", "intensify education to counter the vagabond outlook", and "draw 
active workers and peasants experienced in struggle into the ranks of the Red Army so as 
to change its composition".27 
The resolution clearly established that "military affairs are only one means of 
accomplishing political tasks, it is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the 
revolution". Such regulation negated the possibility for PLA only to become a 
23rAe reasons that Mao opposed roving rebel bands are as follows: For a briefperiod after their defeat 
in 1927, a "left putschist" tendency arose in the CCP. Regarding the Chinese revolution as a "permanent 
revolution", and the revolutionary situation in China as a "permanent upsurge", the putschist comrades 
refused to organise and orderly retreat and, adopting the methods of commandism and relying only on a 
small number of party members and a small section of the masses, erroneously attempted to stage a series 
of local uprisings throughout the country, which had no prospect of success. Such putschist activities 
were widespread at the end of 1927. See "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec. 1929)", 
SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. I (1975), op. cit., p. 115. 
24Ibid., p. 114. 
2SIbid. 
26Ibid. 
27Ibid. 
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professionalised army. The PLA was destined to merge with politics as a means of 
accomplishing political tasks. 
It was due to the tendency for putschism, opportunism and selfish departmentalism caused 
by the vagabond outlook at the basic level, and the purely military viewpoint which needed 
to be corrected, that Chinese Communist Party began to apply political and ideological 
education to the PLA and to intensify the leadership of party in the army. The "Sanwan 
reorganisation" determined the party's position on the army, while "the September letter" 
and "Kutien resolution" enlarged the PLA's function in non-military aspects and 
determined its political role. In the future, the development of the party and the political 
tasks of the PLA might be different, but, its basic line would not overstep the above-
mentioned patterns. 
In addition to military tasks, the PLA concurrently shouldered political tasks. Apart from 
its principle that was determined at the "Sanwan reorganisation" and the "Kutien 
conference", and its direction being dominated by Mao's thought of army building, it was 
also a product of habit and design. From the point of view of "habit", the chief cadres of 
PLA were those who had participated revolution and constructed army in the early period 
of CCP, after the state was founded, they had gained both military and party power, since 
there was no distinction between the two; it was only natural that the military should have 
strong political functions. To look at "design" on the other hand, the army by 
participating in political tasks implied two major objectives - to mobilise masses and 
conserve the power of authoritative establishment. 
It is noticeable that before "the September letter" and the "Kutien conference", the PLA 
had held the "Sixth CCP National Congress" in Moscow in July 1928 under the direct 
instruction of the Communist International. Bukharin was sent to participate and to direct 
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its development. All the resolutions at the congress were passed by "The Sixth 
Communist International Congress" which subsequently became CCP's guiding principles 
for Soviet movements in the following ten years. The final resolution "The military of 
Chinese Communist Party" at the Sixth Communist International Congress laid down that 
"all military works should be put together under the CCP central military department, each 
region should set up a military commission and work under the general instructions of the 
local communist party, while in the area of military tactics, it should be directed under the 
central military department".28 To avoid factional conflicts in the CCP, the Third 
International (Comintern) arranged for Hsiang Chung-fa, from a working class 
background, to be the general secretary of CCPCC, and for Chou En-lai to act as the 
Director of Military Department after the inauguration of The Sixth CCP National 
Congress. Since Hsiang Chung-fa was only a pawn to balance factional conflicts in the 
party, the real military power of CCP was in reality held in the hands of Chou En-lai. 2 9 
In January 1938, Chou En-lai made a report entitled Political ork in the Anti-Japanese 
Armed Forces, in which he indicated that "the most important factor in reforming the 
armed forces is the establishment of a system for carrying out revolutionary political 
work.... The Soviet Red Army was able to unite the workers and peasants in the midst of 
ravages and privation and beat back the attacks of the White Guards and foreign 
aggressors; the Chinese Red Army was able, during the past ten years, to unite the people 
of the Soviet areas in waging ruthless battles... these were all 'miracles'. Therefore, we can 
affirm that political work based on dedication to the revolutionary cause is the life and 
soul of every revolutionary armed force".30 
2 8 Warren Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. V, op. ext., p. 37. 
29lbid., pp. 38-39. 
30"Political Work in the Anti-Japanese Armed Forces (10 Jan. 1938)", SELECTED WORKS OF CHOU 
EN-LAI, Vol. I (1981), op. cit., p. 112. 
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As for the political works in the army, Chou directed, "we must carry out revolutionary 
political education among all officers and men in every units... political education in the 
army must be on a par with military training and must be conducted regularly. With 
regard to the political organisations in the army, Chou commented: There must be an 
independent organisational system for doing political work at each level in the armed 
forces, from the highest General Political Department right down to the company political 
instructor... The military officers at the various levels must do everything possible to 
facilitate political work at their respective levels and should refrain from either interfering 
with or obstructing it.... The officers of the political organs at each level have the right to 
impeach, before a political organ at a higher level, any military officer at the corresponding 
or lower levels who harms the revolutionary cause or violates the revolutionary political 
programme or revolutionary discipline".31 
Until the convening of the Tsunyi conference, an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau 
of the CCPCC,32 held from 6 to 8 January 1935, Chou En-lai had been, in reality, in 
charge of military affairs, and one of the chief leaders in the Party. The directive to Mao 
was issued in his status as Director of the Military Department and the member of the 
Political Bureau of the CCPCC. It was certain at that time that Chou's power over the 
31lbid., p. 118. 
32An enlarged meeting of the CCPCC polltburo held at Tsunyi, Kweichow, Jan. 6-8, 1935. The meeting 
is significant in that it enabled Mao for the first time to gain leadership of the CCPCC military 
commission. It also marked a major change in the strategy for the "Long March". Attending the meeting 
were some 20 CCP leaders, including members and alternate members of the politburo Ch'in Pang-hsien, 
Chang Wen-t'ien, Chou En-lai, Ch'en Yun, Chu Te, Ho K'e-ch'Qan; members of the central committee 
Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch 'i, Lo Mai, P'eng Te-huai; alternate members and specially designated persons 
Li Fu-ch'un, Yang Shang-k'un, Wang Shou-tao, Liu Po-ch'eng, Lin Piao, Nieh Jung-chen and Teng Fa, 
and a military advisor from the Communist International, Li Te (also known as Otto Braun). The Tsunyi 
Resolutions for the first time systematically explained Mao's military strategy. In addition, they furnish 
scholars with reasons and evidence of the decline of the so called international function - the downfall of 
Po Ku (Chin Pan-hsien) and the departure of Chou En-lai and Wang Chia-hsiangfrom military duties. 
See Warren Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. Ill, op. cit, 
pp. 16-27; WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, op. cit., 
pp. 189-190; "Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference", THE CHINA QUARTERLY, No. 40, Oct.- Dec. 
1969, pp. 1-17. 
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army was greater than that of Mao Tse-tung. 
Nevertheless, the Tsunyi conference reorganised the CCPCC and the CCPCC Military 
Commission, and dismissed Chou En-lai from his post of chairman of the CCPCC Military 
Commission and appointed Mao Tse-tung to take over.33 The fall of Chou was mainly 
due to the failure of the fifth counter-campaign of encirclement and suppression. The fifth 
campaign was conducted by the Nationalist Government against the Red area in Kiangsi in 
October 1933, Chiang Kai-shek, chairman of the National Military Council, employed the 
strategy of "thirty percent military and seventy percent political actions", which proved to 
be successful. In October 1934, the CCP made a big strategic mistake in retreating, 
resulting in the loss of two thirds of its strength and the dissatisfaction of the leaders of the 
fifth counter-campaign by the party and military cadres. At the Tsunyi conference, P'eng 
Te-huai, commander of the Third Red-Army Regiment, was the first to criticise the 
strategy of escaping which cause the Red Army to suffer a disastrous defeat. Mao also 
condemned the fifth counter-campaign for making the strategic mistake of purely acting in 
defence, which led to the total collapse of the Central Soviet area and forcing the CCP to 
adopt the strategy of retreat. Chou committed the strategic mistakes in the fifth counter-
campaign and during the long distance retreat. Liu Po-ch'eng agreed with Mao's opinion 
and passed the "Resolution on the Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo of the CCPCC -
Examine the Mistake of Military Line by Po Ku (also known as Ch'in Pang-hsien), Chou 
En-lai, Li Te (Also Known As Otto Braun) and relieve Ch'in Pang-hsien of his position as 
Secretary-general of the CCPCC, Chou En-lai of his position as Chairman of the CCPCC 
Military Commission, Li Te, military advisor from Germany, no longer took charge of 
military affairs.34 
33Warren Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. Ill, op. at., p. 
18. 
34Warren Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. Ill, op. cit., pp. 
1-33, and Vol. IV, pp. 433-508. 
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The Tsunyi conference enabled Mao for the first time to gain the leadership of the CCPCC 
Military Commission, but since Mao was not a military expert and lacked a communist 
international background, he had to rely heavily on Wang Ming's support, Wang Ming was 
the head of communist international and had intimate relations with the Soviet Union. 
During the Long March, Mao assigned the party and political work in the army, and the 
party's work in the local area enroute to northern Shensi to the leaders of the communist 
international.35 The members of the Politburo and of the Standing Committee remained 
unchanged except that Mao Tse-tung was a newly elected member. In order to maintain 
the party's unity, Ch'in Pang-hsien and Chou En-lai remained members of the Standing 
Committee of the Politburo although they were dismissed from their posts. Chou En-lai 
remained in charge of military affairs in his capacity of vice-chairman of the CCPCC 
Military Committee. To Mao, this was the only way to secure the military and political 
power that he had gained. 
The Tsunyi conference enabled Mao to become the Chairman of the CCPCC Military 
Commission, but he was not yet Secretary-general of the CCPCC, his power was not 
boundless. However, Mao possessed the dual character of intellectual and vagabond, he 
had the intellectual brain to map out the seizure of power step by step, and a vagabond's 
nerve to adopt vigorous measures for accomplishing it. Lin Piao once described Mao with 
the following passage: "Looking back at the history of the past few decades, is there 
anyone whom he had supported initially who has not finally been handed a political death 
sentence... Is there a single political force which has been able to work with him from 
beginning to end?... He is paranoid and a sadist, his philosophy of liquidating people is 
35At that time, the Communist International appointed Ch'in Pang-hsien as director of the General 
Political Department, under the department had Organisation Division with Lo Mai as the chief, and 
Propaganda Division with Ho K'e-ch'Uan as the chief See Warren Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF 
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. IV, op. cit, p. 458 
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either don't do it, or do it thoroughly. Every time he liquidates someone, he will put them 
to death before he desists; once he hurts you, he will hurt you all the way; and he puts the 
blame for all bad things on others. Frankly speaking, all of those who have been forced 
from the scene in his merry-go-round style have in fact been made scapegoats for his own 
crime,... Today they use this group to attack that group; tomorrow they use that group to 
attack this group, today one small handful, tomorrow another... They not only incite 
cadres to struggle against cadres, and the masses to struggle against the masses, but they 
also incite the armed forces to struggle against the armed forces, and party members 
against party members".36 
The process of Mao's seizure of power was tortuous and slow, Mao deeply perceived that 
"political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" was the fundamental creed for 
accomplishing the seizure of power by armed revolution. In his paper Problems of or 
and Strategy, Mao clearly expressed: "The seizure of power by armed force, the 
settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This 
Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all 
countries... 'In China the armed revolution is fighting the armed counterrevolution. That 
is one of the specific feature and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution'. This 
thesis of comrade Stalin's is perfectly correct".37 As for the tasks of communists, Mao 
commented: "Communists do not fight for personal military power, but they must fight for 
military power for the party, for military power for the people... where there is naivete on 
the question of military power, nothing whatsoever can be achieved... Every communist 
must grasp the truth, 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun', 'our principle is 
36James T. Myers (ed.), "The CCP Central Committee Document", CHUNG-FA (1972), No. 4, CHINESE 
POLITICS-DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS, (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 
p. 152. 
37"Problems of War and Strategy (6 Nov. 1938)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. II 
(1965), op. cit., p. 219, 221. 
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that the party commands the gun, and gun must never be allowed to command the 
party'".38 
Mao believed to control the army he must first control the chief component of the army, 
the peasants. In Mao's opinion, peasants had revolutionary importance, and constituted 
the real motive force of historical development in Chinese society39. Therefore as the 
successor to Marxism, Mao inherited but partly departed from Marxist principle of class 
struggle, Mao chose peasants to be liberated first instead of the workers. This was 
because Mao intend to use peasants to compose the majority of the army and to use them 
as a tool for his revolution. 
The "September Letter" had clear instructions on the establishment of political ideology in 
the PLA, and on the function of party in the army. It was drafted by Ch'en I , secretary of 
the Front Committee of the Fourth Army of the Red Army, for the Central Committee of 
the Chinese Communist Party on the basis of several talks with Chou En-lai and a Central 
Committee meeting, it was read and approved by Chou En-lai.40 Since Mao's Kutien 
resolution was based on that "spirit of September letter", he therefore was substantially 
influenced by Chou En-lai in his ideology of army building. Consequently, Mao could 
develop the spirit of the Kutien resolution organically in the course of PLA's changing 
political environment, which in turn increased his importance in directing the development 
of the PLA's political role and consolidated his leading position. 
38Ibid, p. 224. 
3 9See "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society (Mar. 1926) " and "Investigation of Peasant Movement 
in Hunan (March 1927)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. I (1975), op. cit, p. 17; pp. 
23-59. 
40"Directive From the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Front Committee of the 
fourth Army of the Red Army (28 Sep. 1929)", SELECTED WORKS OF CHOU EN-LAI, Vol. I (1981), op. 
cit., p. 41. 
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II. The Formation of Mao's ideology for Building Up the Army and of 
the PLA's Political Role 
The martial quality of water margins had particular appeal to Mao Tse-tung during his 
formative years. These fascinating stories relate the martial exploits of outlaw heroes who 
dedicated themselves to aiding the peasants of medieval China in the perennial struggle 
against oppressive landlords and repressive governments. Another of Mao's early 
favourites was The Romances of the Three Kingdom. From this absorbing account of 
Ts'ao Ts'ao's (A.D. 155 -220)41 campaigns against the generals of the kingdoms of Wu 
and Shu, Mao painlessly assimilated a sound fundamental education in the arts of 
generalship and strategy and science of tactics. 
The Resolution On Some Historical Issues Since the Founding of People's Republic of 
China, passed by the CCPCC at "Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh CCPCC" On 27 July 1981 
had vividly recalled the ideology of the early stage of the building up of the PL A. It stated 
"Because bourgeois democracy does not exist in our country, and also because the 
reactionary ruling class carries out autocratic and horror acts of exercising control with 
the aid of armed forces, revolution can only proceed in the form of long-term armed 
struggle. The Chinese armed struggle is a revolutionary war led by the proletariat and 
based on the peasants. Since peasants are the most reliable allied force of the proletariat, 
it is necessary for the proletariat to apply advanced thinking, strict organisation, and 
discipline to arouse the masses' consciousness, and to build up bases in the countryside so 
as to further revolutionary war and to strengthen revolutionary force in the long run."42 
41Ts'ao Ts'ao (A.D. 155-220), founder of the short-lived Wei Dynasty. His name and martial 
achievements, perpetuated for centuries in the classical drama, he was a master of mobile war. 
42"On Some Historical Issues Since the Founding of People's Republic of China", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 1st 
July 1981. 
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Since the setting up of the party, the CCP had attempted to agitate industrial workers, 
vagabonds and poor peasants, those who were full of peasant consciousness and strong 
factional concepts but lacked education, to provoke rebellions in the cities and to seize 
political power, however they did not succeed. In his Report on An Investigation of the 
Peasant Movement in Hunan (Mar. 1927), Mao asserted the importance of the peasantry 
and of peasant issues and perceived that the vast areas of the countryside had inexhaustible 
armed forces that could be used as a revolutionary base. In order to seize power, it was 
necessary to "overthrow the armed forces of the landlords and establish those of the 
peasants".43 
Furthermore, in his paper The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist, Mao once 
more emphasised that "The scale of peasant uprisings and peasant wars in Chinese history 
has no parallel anywhere else. The class struggles of the peasants, the peasants uprisings 
and peasant wars constituted the real motive force of historical development in Chinese 
feudal society. For each of the major peasant uprisings and wars dealt a blow to the 
feudal regime of the time and hence more or less furthered the growth of the social 
productive forces".44 
With regard to the tasks of the Chinese revolution, Mao pointed out the following: "The 
peasantry constitutes approximately eighty percent of China's total population... The poor 
peasants in China, together with the farm labourers, form about thirty percent of the rural 
population. They the broad peasant masses with no land or insufficient land, the semi-
proletariat of the countryside, are the biggest motive force of the Chinese revolution, the 
natural and most reliable ally of the proletariat and the main contingent of China's 
43"Report on An Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan (March 1927)", SELECTED WORKS 
OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol, I (1975), op. cit, p. 41. 
44"Chinese Revolution and Chinese Communist Party (Dec. 1939)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-
TUNG, Vol. 11(1965), op. cit., p. 308. 
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revolutionary forces. Only under the leadership of the proletariat can the poor and middle 
peasants achieve their liberation, and only by forming a firm alliance with the poor and 
middle peasants can the proletariat lead the revolution to victory".45 
The characteristics of the Chinese social structure included: Firstly, a feudal and semi-
colonial country with a retarded economy. Secondly, a society where production is 
derived from the small peasants. Thirdly, peasants posses a revolutionary character in 
Chinese history, Fourthly, it posses the historical experience of "the whole nation in arms", 
whether "soldiers are peasants" or "peasants are soldiers". Finally, an agricultural society 
that can provide a boundless resource of armed forces. Based on the above-mentioned 
characteristics, Mao planned a unique line of army building which was fit for revolution. 
In view of "The people, and people only, being the motive force of world history",46 Mao 
summed up his experience of the struggles during the period in Chingkang Mountains and 
thus developed his military idea of integrating peasants with land revolution and armed 
struggle. 
The peasant was the major force of Mao's revolutionary undertakings, Mao believed "it is 
the peasants who are the source of the Chinese army, the soldiers are peasants in military 
uniform".47 Mao's "peasant doctrine" was in fact the psychological reflection of his belief 
that only through man-made changing of the ways of the production relationship and 
through political mobilisation to increase recognition of Maoist thought can the gigantic 
structure of the national system be changed, wholly and immediately, and the nation's 
future developing trend be fully controlled.48 Mao highlighted the ideology of "class 
45Ibid., p. 324. 
46"On Coalition Government (24 Apr. 1945)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. Ill (1967), 
op. cit., p. 257. 
47lbid. p. 300. 
48"On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec. 1929)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, 
Vol. I (1975), op. cit., pp. 105-114. 
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struggle" ostensibly to express detestation and absolute negation of capitalism but really it 
was to consolidate his supreme position in the nation and to establish a permanent Maoist 
Dynasty. Based on his concept of "peasant doctrine", Mao's attempt to seek loyalty from 
all members in China through peasant consciousness presented the viewpoint of "immortal 
revolution". Mao applied the morality of "loyalty" from Confucianism of traditional 
Chinese society to carry out constant revolution in politics, 
Mao developed the "people's war"49 from the concept of "peasant", and "wars are all-
powerful" from the concept of "armed struggles". "In China the armed revolution is 
fighting the armed counter-revolution. That is one of the specific features and one of the 
advantages of the Chinese revolution",50 "Armed struggle in China is, in essence, peasant 
war, and the Party's relations with the peasantry and its close relations with the peasant 
war are one and the same thing",51 and "In China the seizure of power by armed force, the 
settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution",52 
since the issue has to be settled by war, one must affirm the significance of the barrel of a 
gun. Based on this theory of "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun", Mao 
further developed the principle of army building, that is, "the party commands the gun, and 
the gun must never be allowed to command the party",53 which also applied to the 
49A war fought by mobilising and arming all the people. Mao Tse-tung first advocated people's war in 
his report "On Coalition government" on 24 April 1945. Describing the advantage of a people's war, 
Mao said: "This army is powerful because it has the people's self-defence corps and militia - the vast 
armed organisations of the masses - fighting in co-ordination with it. 
In Sep. 1965, Lin Piao honoured this concept as the basis of the CCP's victory in China by saying: "To 
rely on the peasants, build rural base areas and use the countryside to encircle and finally capture the 
cities -such was the way to victory in the Chinese Revolution". 
See "On Coalition Government (24 Apr. 1945)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. Ill 
(1967), op. cit., pp. 263-267; Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War", RED FLAG, No. 10, 
1965, pp. 11-20. 
^"Introducing the Communist (4th Oct. 1939)", SELECTED WORK OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. II (1965), 
op. cit., p. 287. 
51Ibid. 
""Problems of War and Strategy (6th Nov. 1938)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. II 
(1965), op. cit., p. 219. 
s3lbid. 
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relationship between the party and peasants, only the party can command peasants, the 
peasants are not allowed to command the party. The relationship between army and party 
in spirit was subordinate and defined as such at the very beginning of building the army. 
In view of the special features of the members of the PLA and the principle of the "party 
commands the gun", Mao defined the characteristics of the PLA and its tasks, together 
with his criticism on a "purely military viewpoint", at the Kutien conference in 1929 when 
he presented his general conclusion. With regard to its character, he commented " the Red 
Army is an armed body for carrying out the political task of the revolution";54 with regard 
to its tasks Mao concluded that the "Red Army should certainly not confine itself to 
fighting, besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, it should shoulder such 
important tasks as spreading propaganda among the masses, organising the masses, 
arming them, helping them to establish revolutionary political power and setting up party 
organisations".55 
Mao insisted that the PLA must posses the following four characteristics. First, it must be 
under the absolute leadership of the Chinese communist party; Second, it must at the same 
time be a fighting force, a political work force, and a production corps; Third, the Army 
must consist of local forces as well as of regular forces, moreover, it must energetically 
build and develop the militia, thus practising the system of combining the three military 
formations, i.e., the regular forces, the local forces, and the militia; Fourth, the army must 
first and foremost build on a political basis, politics is the commander, political work is the 
lifeline of the PLA 5 6 
5 4 "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec. 1929)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, 
Vol. I (1975), p. 106. 
55lbid. 
56Lin Piao, "Long Live to Victory of People's War (Sep. 1965)", RED FLAG, No. 10, 1965, pp. 11-20; 
PEOPLE'S DAILY, 30 Sep. 1965; Michael Y. M. Kau (ed.), UN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND 
MILITARY COUP, (New York: International Arts and Science Press, Inc., 1975), pp. 265-316. 
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Furthermore, in view of the proposition that the "peasant force is the major force of 
Chinese revolution", Mao organised the army in a way which was based on the peasants, 
and further developed the concept of "militia" form the concept of "people's war". Under 
the leadership of Mao, the basic line of the militia was closely related to politics, such as a 
militarised organisation; politics taking the lead; thoroughly carrying out the class line; and 
persisting with the principle of combining labour with military.57 
The policy of "the whole nation in arms" implemented by Mao was one of the important 
responses to his principle of army building. Mao advanced the viewpoint of 
"overthrowing the armed forces of the landlords and establishing those of the peasants" in 
his Report on Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan at the very beginning of 
the revolution. Mao regarded militia as the important component of army building as the 
militia itself was a majore integration of the masses. It not only could serve as the backup 
force for regular troops but was also a nationwide political campaign, in addition, since the 
majority of militia came from peasant society, it commanded the broad masses and 
possessed a class nature. Therefore, in certain functions, the militia became the major 
force in balancing regular troops to prevent them from departing from the political 
functions. The Militia became an important asset for Mao in conducting class and power 
struggles. 
Moreover, the policy of "the whole nation in arms" had practised the military concept of 
"integration of military and peasantry" in the traditional Chinese defence strategy. Mao 
believed, "the richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people",58 "the 
5 1 Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, "Set up Militia Division", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 30 Oct. 1958. 
58"On Protracted War (May 1938)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. II (1965), op. cit., p. 
186. 
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real bastion of iron is the masses, they sincerely and wholeheartedly support revolution".59 
Through the militarisation of "People's Communes", the aggression of actions, and the 
collectivisation of life, Mao reinforced armed troops and created a society with a character 
of militarisation. 
I f a state possess the character of militarisation and highly appraises the value of armed 
forces, it is likely that the policy is generated with a certain degree of violent inclination. 
The militarists will spontaneously try to play the role of leading actors in the course of 
decision making when they occupy notably high political status; whereas, in a society of 
non-militarisation, militarists are only considered as specialist in their area, and their 
function is mainly to maintain state security. 
Mao's view concerning military power was quite straightforward. He indicated that "every 
communist must grasp the truth, 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun', our 
principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to 
command the party, yet, having the gun, we can create party organisations, as witness the 
powerful party organisations which the Eight Route Army has created in northern China, 
we can also create cadres, create schools, create culture, create mass movements, 
everything in Yenan has been created by having guns. All things grow out of the barrel of 
a gun".60 In order to guard against the appearance of the "gun commands the party", Mao 
deliberately controlled the army through the direct involvement of a power system and 
personnel arrangement in politics, the military as well as the party. He further intensified 
his control over the army to the extent of absolute loyalty to himself alone by developing a 
personality cult in all political campaigns. It was because of this that Mao held a special 
59Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, "The Whole Nation in Arms", RED FLAG, No. 10, 1958, p. 21. 
60"Problems of War and Strategy (6th Nov. 1938)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. II 
(1965), op. cit., pp. 224-225. 
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viewpoint about the political role of militarists, he in reality did not care for the 
importance of the political role of militarists, or whether they were strong or weak, what 
he insisted on was the effective control of the army, and to ensure his supreme position in 
the army. The political campaigns of the PLA, he argued, at all times should follow his 
absolute leadership and should proceed under the general principle of consolidating 
Maoist ideology. Any political movements in the army should stick to the principle of 
"safeguard chairman Mao's military line" and "support the Central Committee led by 
chairman Mao". Thus, the PLA under Mao's leadership became his private-owned troops. 
The political standing of the army needed to be identical to Mao's, and any militarist 
showing a slight difference in his political standing or anyone whom Mao subjectively 
believed did not or possibly would not follow his absolute leadership was criticised, the 
incidents of Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih, P'eng Te-huai, Lo Jui-ch'ing, and Lin Piao were 
examples of this61. 
In the state of primitive political institutionalisation, it is necessary for the political leader 
to mould his personal charisma so that his thinking can become the orthodox ideology in 
the system structure. Ideology is a variable that determines political behaviour and an 
important link in the chains of political phenomena. It is used by the authority to 
transform compulsory means into legitimate and acceptable ones, and is also the source of 
"legitimacy" so called by the leadership of ruling class. Alternatively, through the process 
of political socialisation, the internalised ideology becomes the political personality of 
system's members and thus forms a common recognition towards the nation or regime. It 
is the foundation for integrating a political system. Since ideology is the legitimate basis 
for exercising political power and the foundation for integrating a political system, the 
extent of power controlled by the authorities is closely related to the degree of their 
61For details refer to Chapter III, Section I and Chapter IV. 
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overall monopoly of ideology and to the special position of authoritative annotator. 
In the PRC, whether based on the strategic consideration or practical situation, the 
ideological myth of Mao was gradually brought up through the Yenan rectification 
campaigns62, the Seventh CCP National Congress63, and the "God-making" movement 
promoted by Lin Piao with his utmost efforts. In February 1942, the rectification 
campaigns which lasted for three and half years were brought about under the instigation 
of Mao, one of its main purposes was to establish a good growing environment for 
advancing Maoist thought of "Marxism-Leninism with Chinese characteristics" through 
the attacks on "communist international faction" in the party headed by Wang Ming. 
Another important purpose was to place Mao's speech and writings as the central idea so 
as to internalise Maoist thought of "practically integrating the theory of Marxism-Leninism 
with Chinese revolution" into the conscious of the members of the party and military 
through the means of criticism, review and group learning. 
It is obvious that the Yenan rectification campaign in fact carried strong intentions of 
conducting ideological reform. Mao attempted to create his style of Marxism-Leninism 
through the approach of "Marxism-Leninism with Chinese characteristics". Due to the 
failure of "rectify the party's style of work", one of the activities in the rectification 
62Feb. 1942 when Mao delivered a speech, "Rectify the Party's Style of Work" at the newly reorganised 
party school of the CCPCC. Several days later, Mao again talked on "Oppose Stereotyped Party 
Writing" before a meeting of cadres in Yenan. Afterwards, the rectification campaign spread to party 
units in all areas, in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border area in particular, and lasted for three and a half 
years. The rectification work at that time involved seven area: the party, politics, the military, the 
masses, party-people relations, finance, and education, the real target of this campaign, obviously, was 
the Wang Ming group, Mao's last obstacle on his way to leadership of the Party. 
See Wang Ming, "It Is Not A Cultural Revolution But A Counterrevolutionary Political Coup", RADIO 
MOSCOW MANDARIN BROADCAST, 31 March 1969, (Taipei: Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of 
Defence, 1969), pp. 2-5; "Rectify the Party's Style of Work (1st Feb. 1942)", SELECTED WORKS OF 
MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. Ill (1967), op. cit., pp. 35-51; Warren Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE 
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 369-415. 
63The congress was held in Yenan from 23 April to 11 June 1945 presided over by Mao, it was attended 
by 547 delegates and 303 party members. 
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campaign, the party school of the CCPCC was forced to reorganise. "In the light of such 
circumstance, the party school of the CCPCC is reorganised according to the instruction 
of Central Communist Party. Comrade Mao Tse-tung takes the concurrent post of 
Principal, Comrade Lin Piao and P'eng Chen are the Vice-principals, with regard to the 
leadership of rectification campaigns and the leadership of ideological works, they are 
directly in the charge of comrade P'eng Chen"; "The rectification movement in the Yenan 
party school of CCPCC is the heart as well as the epitome of the whole party's 
rectification movement".64 Mao chose the party school as the focus of rectification which 
was based on the consideration that "Nearly a thousand cadres, coming from all parts of 
the country to be transferred to Yenan, and representatives, selecting from everywhere to 
participate 'Seventh CCP National Congress', are all grouped to receive training in the 
party school".65 In order to establish the leading position of Maoist thought and thus 
become the values standard in the party, Mao had to eliminate ideological dissenters in the 
name of rectification. 
Liu Shao-ch'i delivered a speech Reports on the Revision of the Party Constitution at the 
Seventh CCP National Congress held in Yenan between 23 April and 11 June 1945, in 
which Liu indicated "the general provisions of the Party Constitution clearly state that the 
Chinese communist party guides its entire work by the teachings which unite the theories 
of Marxism-Leninism with the actual practice of the Chinese revolution - Mao Tse-tung 
theory - and fights against any dogmatist or empiricist deviations"; "Maoist thought is 
Communism and Marxism with Chinese characteristics, his thought, from the 'viewpoint of 
universe' to the 'work style', is all for the development of Marxism in a Chinese way, it is 
'"Chang Ting-ch'eng, "The Rectification in Yenan Party School of CCPCC", A SINGLE SPARK CAN 
START A PRAIRIE FIRE, Vol. VI, (Peking: People's Press, 1962), p. 6. 
65Warren Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. W, op. cit., p. 
381. 
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the complete revolutionary theory for the Chinese people."66 The Party Constitution 
passed by Seventh CCP National Congress laid down "it is the obligation of every 
Communist to learn Marxism-Leninism and lay the foundation of Maoist thought".67 
Mao eventually achieved his purpose and became the only annotator and monopolizer of 
the ideology of Chinese Communist Party. 
At the "Lushan conference" in 1959, Mao suffered serious inner-party attacks for the first 
time as the result of the destruction caused by the "Great Leap Forward" movement.68 
Mao delimited the struggle at the Lushan conference to the kind of class struggle and to 
the stepping down of P'eng Te-huai from the political arena,69 but in fact his sacred 
position was violated and the crisis of an inner-party split began to emerge. With the help 
of Lin Piao, Mao had to rebuild his personal myth which had been seriously damaged by 
this struggle. 
The "Extraordinary meeting of enlarged session of the CCPCC Military Commission", 
convened by Lin Piao in Peking between 14 September and 20 October 1960, passed the 
"Resolution of the Strengthening of Political and Ideological Work among the Armed 
Forces". The resolution, which called for a radical overhaul both of the content and of the 
66"Reports on the Revision of the Party Constitution", THE SELECTED WORKS OF LIU SHAO-CH'I, 
(Tokyo: Chinese Cultural Service Publications, 1976), p. 151. 
6 7 "Reports on the Division of the Party Constitution", Ibid. 
drive to increase industrial and agricultural production in the late 1950s. The Great Leap Forward 
policy was conceived by Mao in the winter of 1957 and put into execution after endorsement by the 
National People's congress (NPC) in Feb. 1958. The idea of the Great Leap Forward was seized upon by 
Mao as a means to increase the pace of internal economic development and was prompted in large part 
by the suspension of Soviet economic aid. Anti-conservatism, anti-waste, and self-reliant economic 
development were the major themes of the campaign. The Great Leap Forward ended in 1960 and is 
generally conceded to be a failure. 
See "Ninth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 21 Jan. 1961; COLLECTED LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Vol. VII, (Peking: Law Publishing House, 
1958), p. 4. 
69For details refer to Chapter IV, Section II. 
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machinery of political education in the PLA. It drew attention to the continuing 
importance of Mao Tse-tung's Kutien speech of December 1929 as the "basis for political 
work" and stated that "Mao Tse-tung's thought was the basis for our army in the past, 
present and future". The detailed measures which were laid down in the resolution 
amount to a reaffirmation of the all-inclusive nature of political work as formulated by 
Mao at Kutien. It advanced that "Maoist thought, in the past, present, or future, is the 
guiding light for our army building", it also stressed the importance of "holding high the 
great red banner of Mao Tse-tung thought"70 so as to heighten the revolutionary 
consciousness of the PLA, to formally privatise the PLA and to make the establishment of 
"Mao's army" a task of the highest importance. 
Since the enlarged session of the CCPCC Military Commission, political work conferences 
had been held by the General Political Department of the PLA, which had assessed the 
progress of the movement and called for greater efforts.71 A series of slogans and 
campaigns had been popularised, of which the most important were the "Five-Good" 
campaign for the rank-and-file soldier, the parallel "Four-Good" campaign for army 
companies, the "Three-Eight" working style, the "Seven measures in improving leadership 
over companies", the "Twelve basic experiences in company building", and the "company 
management and education" campaign.72 
Mao had largely increased his authority in the army by developing a personality cult in the 
PLA - the slogans such as "hold high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought", 
70"Extraordinary Meeting of And Enlarged Session of the CCPCC Military Commission - The Resolution 
of The Strengthening of Political and Ideological Work among the Armed Forces (20th Oct. 1960)", 
WORKS CIRCULAR, Vol. IV, (Peking: General Political Department, 1961), p. 219. 
7 1 PLA Political Work conferences had been held in Mar. 1961; 18 Oct. -11 Nov. 1961; Feb. 1963; Jan. 
1964 and Jan. 1966. 
72For the text of theses and other formulae, see "Terms of PLA Political Work", LIBERATION ARMY'S 
DAILY, 22 January 1964, or see Warren Kuo, (ed.), A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE 
COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, op., cit, p. 466, 524, 674 
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"Further apply Maoist thought to arm the brains of commanders and fighters, and insist on 
'Maoist thought takes the lead1 in all tasks", and "study Chairman Mao's writing, follow his 
teachings and act according to his instructions, be chairman Mao's good fighters".73 - all 
initiated by Lin Piao, the Minister of National Defence. Because Mao was the founding 
member of the army and party, he was considered as the father of this big family. This 
combination of parental consciousness with Mao's myth was further enhanced through 
social movements of various kinds. In addition, due to the strict structure and class nature 
in the army, along with its unique discipline and culture, Maoist thought became the 
supreme morality in the army, soldiers were taught to pledge their loyalty to Mao alone 
and to apply Maoist thought as the standard for evaluating between the right and wrong of 
everything. 
Mao's thoughts for army building and for the pattern of the political role of the PLA were 
closely related to his personal experience. His well-known dictum "political power grows 
out of the barrel of a gun" can be understood in the light of the experience of the party's 
struggle and armed seizure of power in his early period of the CCP. This is further 
confirmed when Mao anxiously seized the real commanding power of the Red Army 
instead of being the Secretary-general of the party at Tsunyi conference in Jan. 1935, 
which was held to reorganise Central Committee of the CCP and the CCPCC Military 
Commission. Such was the best explanation for his introspection of the political failure in 
the past and the thorough understanding of the true meaning of power. Mao realised the 
nearest road to obtain the party's power is through the grasping of military power. 
Mao in reality faithfully practised Ludwig Feuerbach's (1804-1872) concept of "religious 
73Lo Jui-ch'ing, "Learn from Lei Feng - To Chinese Youth", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 5th March 1963, or see 
"Proletariat Must Control the Barrel of A Gun -Commemorate the Fortieth Anniversary of PLA ", RED 
FUG, 1967, No. 12, p. 46. 
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alienation"74 during his domination of China. By the hand of Lin Piao and the PLA, 
Maoist thought and the Quotation of Mao Tse-tung became almost the bible of the Maoist 
religion of this life in China, his image was cast in the mould of an omnipresent, mighty 
God, and became the sword of Maoist domination and Maoist religion, whether in the 
army or in politics. After Mao was cast in the mould of God, he used this power and 
position as God to transform his criticism towards the old society, class, line and the 
viewpoint of purely military, into criticism towards his close comrade-in-arms and his 
successor. P'eng Te-huai, who was praised as "the big general who commands the army 
sweeping away the enemy and performs deeds of valour in battle"75 in the period of "Long 
March", was at the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC ( Lushan conference) in 1959, 
denounced: "P'eng Te-huai and his anti-party activities reflect the kind of class struggle in 
which the Chinese bourgeoisie opposes the proletarian socialist revolution and attempt to 
mould the party, the army, and the world in its own bourgeois image... the remnants of 
the Kao Kang clique76 and other right opportunist elements of every variety headed by 
P'eng Te-huai could wait no longer, seized on what they considered an opportune moment 
to stir up trouble, and came out in opposition to the leadership of the central committee 
and Mao Tse-tung. Representing the interests of the bourgeoisie and the upper strata of 
the party bourgeoisie, they seek to sabotage the dictatorship of the proletariat and 
undermine the socialist revolution by splitting and demoralising the vanguard of the 
74The so called alienation is an resisting force which was brought about by the subject in its process of 
development but then conversely transformed into a alien force to oppose subject. 
Ludwin Feuerbach indicated that according to the Bible, the God created mankind according to his own 
image, but in converse, it is mankind who created God according to their own images. Therefore he 
considered only through stopping the worship of God can one overcome the "religious alienation". 
See Wang Jo-shui, "Talk about some issues of alienation", SHIN HUA MONTHLY REPORTS, Oct. 1980, 
p. 15., or see Karl Marx, THE MANUSCRIPTS OF ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY, (Peking: People's 
Press, 1963), p. 52. 
75Huang K'e-ch'eng, "An Upright Person with Loyal Heart Will Last Stand through the Ages", PEOPLE'S 
DAILY, 3rd Jan. 1979, P'eng Te-huai was then the commander of the Red Army Branch in Shensi and 
Kansu area, and Mao was concurrent political commissar. 
76For details refer to Chapter V, Section I. 
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proletariat and organising opportunist factions". 
Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, who had been successively appointed by Mao as successors 
and close comrades-in-arms, both came to a miserable end. At the Twelfth Plenum of the 
Eighth CCPCC in October 1968, Liu was accused of being "the top capitalist-roader in 
power in the party, a renegade, traitor, scab, and a lackey of imperialism, modern 
revisionism, and the Kuomintang reactionaries with a long list of crimes hiding in the 
party".78 Therefore, "The plenary session calls on all comrades in the party and the people 
of the whole country to carry on deep-going revolutionary mass criticism and repudiation 
and eradicate the counterrevolutionary revisionist ideas of Liu Shao-ch'i and the handful of 
other top party persons in authority taking the capitalist road".79 As for Lin Piao, he was, 
at the Tenth CCP National Congress, classified as "the bourgeois careerist, conspirator, 
and double-dealer, engaged in machinations within our party not just for one decade but 
for several decades. At important junctures of the revolution, he invariably committed 
right opportunist errors and invariably played double -faced tricks, putting up a false front 
to deceive the party and the people... Lin Piao and his like, who were capitalist-roaders in 
power working only for the interests of the minority and whose ambition grew with the 
rise of their position, overestimating their own strength and underestimating the strength 
of the people, could no longer remain under cover and therefore sprang out for a trial of 
strength with the proletariat".80 
7 7 "Central Committee Resolution on Feng Te-huai", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 
- A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, (Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc. 1980), p. 755; NEWS 
CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 15 Aug. 1967 
78"Report by the CCP Central Committee's Special Panel on the Case of Liu Shao-ch'i (18 Oct. 1968), 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1976-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. IV, op. cit, p. 
2191. 
79"Communique of the Twelfth Plenum (31 Oct. 1968)", op. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
1949-1976-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. TV, op. cit., p. 2195; NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 1 
Nov. 1968 
80Chou En-lai, "Report to the Tenth Party Congress (24 Aug. 1973)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 1949-1976-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. V, op. cit., pp. 2463-2465 
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Although the above figures (P'eng, Liu, and Lin etc.) represented the antagonistic forces 
towards Mao, initiated by Mao through his playing politics in the process of pursuing or 
consolidating power they also conversely transformed into a force of "alienation" to 
oppose Mao. In reality, neither of them (P'eng, Liu, or Lin etc.) had denied the 
fundamental principle of "party commands the gun" or "gun commands the party", or 
dissented towards the authoritative leadership of Mao in essence. All of them were the 
members of first revolutionary generation like comrade Mao, and recognised Mao's 
parental position in the Chinese communist family, nevertheless they were eliminated for 
transmitting their discontent of certain of Mao's policies, or attempting to acquire more 
power. This made Mao suspicious of their loyalty and he thus adopted vigorous measures 
to deal with it. 
The political role of the PLA was regarded as a tool, or more precisely, a tool under the 
command of Mao, and nobody else. Mao constantly stressed the absolute leadership of 
"party commands the gun", but, in fact, it was the absolute leadership of "Mao commands 
the gun", what Mao called "the party" really means the small group based on himself, not 
the structure of communist organisation. With regard to the PLA, since the countryside 
and social infrastructure constituted the majority of its composition, only i f it didn't run 
counter to Mao's ideology and his authority of leadership, it could continue to enjoy its 
special position in society and the class arising therefrom. Although Mao constantly 
advocated the importance of the proletarian revolution, the PLA would never apply "class 
suicide" to return to the vagabond proletarian class on its own accords, under such 
circumstances, a unique bureaucratic system had thus formed, the PLA had to follow 
Maoist thought and thus became his personal political weapon. Since Mao controlled the 
distribution of class interest in the army, it became necessary for PLA to give their 
absolute support if they wished to secure its vested interests. 
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The political tradition of the PLA formed under such a structure; worshipping an idol, not 
a institution. Mao at all times controlled the military power of the PRC and directed the 
development of the PLA, thus during the period of Mao's rule, the political role of the 
PLA did not rise and fall sharply but gradually developed as part of a steady process. 
Although in the Cultural Revolution, some areas were occupied by local army 
commanders and there was occurrence of the "gun commands the party", if one looks 
from the viewpoint of the overall situation, the PLA had never escaped Mao's domination, 
Mao could still implement the re-establishment of party organisation at the time when the 
initiative of the PLA was raised to the extent of threatening the ecology of the party 
system, and effectively suppressed the already largely expanded political power in the 
army. From this, one can draw the impression that Mao still held certain rules and 
restrictions towards the pattern of the political role of the PLA. Mao was convinced that 
he could use the army as his political weapon in the power struggle. 
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I I I . The Relationship Between the Party and the Army 
A. The Subordination of Military Power 
There was no department in the party actually directing military affairs during the early 
stages when the CCP was building up its army. However in May 1924, the Military 
Affairs Department was formally set up in the Canton Regional Committee and Chou En-
lai was appointed the concurrent post of the Director. Subsequently in 1925, the CCPCC 
established the Military Affairs Department and appointed Chang Kuo-t'ao81 as the 
Director. In 1926 the Ministry Affairs Department of the Canton Regional Committee 
moved to Wuhan and was incorporated into the Ministry Affairs Department of the CCP, 
Chou En-lai replaced Chang Kuo-t'ao as the Director, whose job at that time was to 
organise the armed forces of the workers and peasants and to direct uprisings. In August 
1927, the PRC built up its armed forces and established the "party committee of the 
fronts", "party representatives" and party organisations at various levels, the embryonic 
"party commands the army" began to emerge.82 In May 1928, the CCPCC further drew up 
a "program of military affairs" and it laid down that it should "organise a leading body for 
ilChang Kuo-t'ao also known as (Chang T'e-li) attended the founding congress of the CCP in 1921, and 
was among the most important early party leaders. Chang was the chief party leader in the Oyuwan 
Soviet area after 1932. From 1935 to 1937 Chang and Mao Tse-tung were engaged in a series of bitter 
disputes that centred in party on questions of the strategy and destination of the Long March. The two 
rivals took their forces on different routes, Chang moving westward toward Tibet while Mao moved north 
to Sensi. Unfortunately, for Chang, his units were disastrously defeated in Kansu, and by the time he 
reached Yenan he was in no position to challenge the Mao leadership. After leaving Yenan, Chang found 
refuge in Hankow, then the capital of the Nationalist Government, and later moved on to Chungking 
when the Nationalists made it their capital. From 1939 to 1945, while the Sino-Japanese war continued, 
Chang took some part in Government and KMT affairs. In 1945 he was elected to the KMT Central 
Executive Committee, and in the next year he became director of the Kiangsi regional office of the 
Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Association. When the Chinese communists were completing 
their conquest of the mainland China in 1949, Chang moved to Hong Kong. See Donald W. Klein & 
Anne B. Clark (ed.), BIOGRAPHIC DICTIONARY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM, 1921-1965, Vol. I, 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 38-43. 
82Warren Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 
293-296. 
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Soviet military affairs" which became the Soviet Military Commission.83 During that 
period, the leading body of the CCP military affairs at the central level was the military 
affairs department, while at the local level, it was the Soviet Military Commission. 
Nevertheless, the real power was held by the "party committee of the fronts". 
In order to reinforce their leadership in military affairs in Soviet areas, the CCP decided to 
establish a bureau and sub-bureau of the CCP Central Committee in every Soviet area. In 
November 1931, "the bureau of Central Committee in the Soviet area" was set up in the 
Kiangsi Soviet area, and the "CCPCC Military Commission" was concurrently established, 
Hsiang Ying being appointed the chairman. After the "first All-China Soviet Congress" in 
November, the "CCPCC Revolutionary Military Commission" was set up under the 
"CCPCC Soviet Executive Committee", and Chu Te was appointed the chairman, while 
the "Military-Civilian Department" was under the "CCPCC People's Council", Chu Te was 
also the concurrent director.84 During that period, the three leading bodies of military 
affairs were the - "CCPCC Military Commission", "CCPCC Revolutionary Military 
Commission", and "Military-Civilian Department". 
In January 1934, Chou En-lai replaced Hsiang Ying as chairman of the CCPCC Military 
Committee at the Fifth Plenum of the Sixth CCPCC. While in January 1935 after an 
enlarged meeting of the CCPCC Political Bureau convened at Tsunyi in Kweichow, a new 
Central Committee leadership was established, Chou En-lai was relieved of his post as 
chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission, and was succeeded by Mao. Mao was 
elected a member of the Political Bureau and of its standing committee. 
83Fan Chih-yOan, "The Issues of Chinese Military Leadership", THE SELECTED WORKS OF SEVENTH 
SINO-AMERICANMAINLAND CHINA ISSUES, (Taipei: National Cheng-chi University), pp. 1-2. 
84lbid. Chu Te was then the Chief-in -Commander of the Red Army. 
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Between 1949 and 1976, the structure of the military leadership of the PRC and the 
relationship of the party and army, in law and in substance, can be summarised by the 
following three stages. 
1. The Common Program Period (1949 - 1954)85 
The Common Program article 20 laid down "The People's Republic of China shall build up 
a unified army, that is, the People's Liberation Army,.... which shall be under the command 
of the People's Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central People's Government".86 
During the Common Program period, Mao not only held the post of chairman of "Central 
People's Government" and the concurrent chairman of the People's Revolutionary Military 
Commission, but also was the chairman of CCPCC and the CCPCC Military Commission. 
Mao possessed both nominal military power bestowed by law and the substantial one for 
he was the party leader. 
2. The 1954 Constitution of the People's Republic of China 
8SThe title is "Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference". The most 
important document of the "three great charters" (Common Program, Organic Law of the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference, and the Organic Law of the Central People's Government) 
adopted by the 1st Plenary Session of the CPPCC (Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference) 
on Sep. 29, 1949. This program, in effect, was the "Constitution" of the regime before the 1954 
Constitution was adopted, and hence was the "basic law" for people on the China in the period 1949-54. 
See PEOPLE'S YEARBOOK, (Hong Kong: Ta Kung Bookstore, 1950), Part D, p. 13. 
8 6 Revolutionary Military Commission was set up in 1949, Mao Tse-tung was its chairman and Chu Te, 
Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, P'eng Te-huai, Ch'eng Ch'ien were vice-chairmen. Committee members 
numbered twenty-two including: Ho Lung, Liu Po-ch'eng, Ch'en I, Lin Piao, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, Yeh 
Chien-ying, Nieh Jung-chen, Kao Kang, Su Ytt, Chang Yun-i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Li Hsien-nien, Jao Shu-
shih, Teng Tzu-hui, Hsi Chung-hsun, Lo Jui-ch'ing, Sa Chen-ping, Chang Chih-chung, Fu Tso-i, Ts'ai 
T'ing-k'ai, Lung Yiin, and Liu Fei. When the People's revolutionary Military Commission was abolished 
on Aug. 1954, its chairman was still Mao Tse-tung. 
See STUDIES OF THE ORGANISATION AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMUNIST ARMY, (Taipei: The 
Study Group on Chinese Communist Ministry Affairs, 1956), pp. 3-6; "Common Program of the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference (29 Sep. 1949), THE PEOPLE'S REPUBUC OF CHINA 
1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, op. cit., pp. 52-53; Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark, 
BIOGRAPHIC DICTIONARY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 1921-1965, (Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1971), p. 1064. 
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The 1954 Constitution removed the People's Revolutionary Military Commission, and set 
up the "Council of National Defence" under the "State Chairman" and "Ministry of 
National Defence" under the "State Council". The Constitution article 27 laid down: "The 
National People's Congress exercises the following function and power... to decide on the 
choice of the premier of the State Council upon recommendation by the chairman of the 
People's Republic of China, and of the component members of the State Council upon 
recommendation by the premier... to decide on the choice of the vice-chairman and 
members of the council of National Defence upon recommendation by the chairman of the 
People's Republic of China"; article 42: "The chairman of the People's Republic of China 
commands the armed force of the country, and is chairman of the Council of National 
Defence".87 
During that period (between 1954 and 1959), Mao was the Chairman of the PRC, and 
concurrent Chairman of the CCPCC and the CCPCC Military Commission. Mao 
possessed both a nominal military power bestowed by law and a substantial one being the 
party leader. Between April 1959 and December 1966, Liu succeeded Mao and became 
the Chairman of the PRC, Mao retreated to the second line in government organisation, 
but since he still occupied the post of the chairman of the CCPCC and the chairman of the 
CCPCC Military Commission in party's organ, in practice, he held substantial military 
power without a legitimate basis. 
3. The 1975 Constitution 
The 1975 Constitution abolished the post of Chairman of the PRC, and laid down that 
"The Chinese People's Liberation Army and the people's militia are the workers' and 
87The Constitution of the People's Republic of China (20 Sep. 1954)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 1949-1976-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. I, pp. 101-102; NEW CHINA NEW AGENCY, 20 
Sep. 1954. 
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peasants' own armed forces led by the communist party of China... The Chairman of the 
CCPCC commands the armed forces of the whole nation"88 in its Article 15, Chapter 1. 
This article legally recognised the principle of the "party commands the army". The PLA, 
militia and all the military forces were under the direct leadership of Chinese Communist 
Party. Mao was appointed the Chairman of the CCPCC and the Chairman of the CCPCC 
Military Commission, he controlled the supreme military power both in law and in 
substance. 
The real commandership of the PLA, legally speaking, was in the hands of the Chairman 
of Revolutionary Military Commission and the Chairman of the Central People's 
Government as laid down in the "Common Programme", or in the hands of the Chairman 
of the PRC as laid down in the 1954 Constitution. But in communist China, substantive 
power does not inhere to the bureaucracies established by their constitution, it resides in 
the Military Commission, the organ of the Central Committee and its Politburo which 
deals with military policy. The Military Commission, routinely chaired by the first deputy-
chairman of Military Commission, generates policy directives affecting the armed forces 
on all but the most sensitive and important matters, which are handled by the politburo of 
its standing committee. 
Until April 1959, Mao was Chairman of the Central Committee and the Military 
Commission and Chairman of the PRC. Since he possessed the great power of the party 
and of the military both in reality and in name, he was an example of the principle of the 
"party commands the gun" or the "gun commands the party". After Liu Shao-ch'i replaced 
88"The Constitution of the People's Republic of China", RED FLAG, No. II, 1975, pp. 8-9; "The 
Constitution of the People's Republic of China (17 Jan. 1975)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
1949-1979-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. V, op. cit, p. 2504; NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 19 
Jan. 1975. 
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him as the chairman of PRC in April 1959, the power of the State Chairman and the 
function of "Council of National Defence" remained unchanged in the Constitution, but 
because the political system of the "Party commands politics" had been formed, the 
tradition of party's position being superior to that of the nation was established, Liu was 
merely the nominal commander of the armed forces, the real military leadership was in the 
hands of the Chairman of the CCP and the chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission. 
The General Provision of the Party Regulation, Both in the "Ninth PRC National 
Congress" in April 1969 and in the "Tenth CCP National Congress" in August 1973, laid 
down "the theoretical basis guiding Chinese thinking is Maoist thought as well as 
Marxism-Leninism".89 The 1975 Constitution clearly defined the leadership of military 
subordination as being controlled by the Party Chairman. The power of Mao Tse-tung, 
whether on a legal basis, in ideological leadership, or in substantial operation, was 
unsurpassed by no one else in China. Like all founding emperors of every successive 
dynasty, Mao implemented centralism to control military power. 
B. The Interaction between the Party and Army 
In the structure of the PRC's party and army, the political role of the militarists is 
subordinate to the party, while in the relationship between the party and army, the PLA 
possessed three important characteristics - namely, the homogeneity of the army and 
party; the dual-role elite of the militarists; and the principle of "party commands the gun" 
under the system of party committee. 
1. The Homogeneity of the Army and Party 
89"The Regulation of the CCP", RED FLAG, No. 5, 1969, p. 34. and No. 9, 1973, p. 24. 
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In the communist regime, "Party" is the highest form of the proletariat class and the 
leading force of proletarian revolution, proletarian dictatorship and socialistic 
construction. The fundamental principle of the communist party is that all Communists 
should follow the leadership of the party through the party's organisations. The military 
was used as a tool of the proletarian dictatorship and as an integral part of the party, 
following the leadership of the party. Under such a unique political structure, the party 
and army became homogeneous. The character of the homogeneity of the party and army 
forced the military to participate in the party's political affairs outside their own 
professional activities. The demands for a political role for the military in that system was 
not caused by the pressure from them, but in fact by the central organs of the party. It 
became the rights and obligation of those of the Armed Forces, who possessed party 
membership, to support and participate in the party's political affairs. 
Under such circumstances, it should not be regarded as a challenge to the authority of the 
party or to the legality of the system if the military criticised certain policies or changed a 
policy's orientation in their capacity as party members. Therefore "Kao Kang and Jao 
Shu-shih's anti-party clique"90 and "P'eng Te-huai and Huang K'e-ch'eng's anti-party 
clique"91 could only be treated as opposition by taking a different line or policy, but could 
never be regarded as opposition to the political system structure. 
90PEOPLE'S HANDBOOK, 1956, pp. 78-79; Mao Tse-tung, "Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the 
Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (15th Nov. 1957)", SELECTED WORKS OF 
MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. V (1977), pp. 340-341; WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF 
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, op. cit., pp. 377-378. Please refer to Chapter IV, Section 1 for details 
of the incident. 
9 1 "Resolution of the 8th Plenum of the 8th CCPCC concerning the Anti-party Clique Headed By Peng Te-
huai", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 16th Aug. 1967; WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE 
COMMUNIST PARTY, op. cit., pp. 404-405; Jurgen Domes, P'ENG TE-HUAI - THE MAN AND THE 
IMAGE, (London: C. Hurst & company Ltd., 1985), pp. 77-95. Please refer to Chapter IV, section 2, for 
details of the incident. 
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What Kao Kang wanted was only to take the post as Secretary-general or Vice-chairman 
of the party, or the Premier of the State Council; as for P'eng Te-huai, his intention was to 
query or express dissatisfaction at the policies of the "Great Leap Forward" movement,92 
but they (Kao, Jao, P'eng and Huang) were all eliminated by Mao Tse-tung. From this it is 
obvious that Mao interpreted their behaviour from the view of power. Kao, Jao, P'eng 
and Huang all had military backgrounds, since it is the barrel of a gun that lies behind the 
military, if the military dominated or intervened in the party's leadership, Mao would 
consider it as the forewarning of the "gun commands the party" and thus adopt vigorous 
measures. Additionally, the suppression of the militarists could exactly demonstrate his 
ability of controlling military power. 
In the structure of the homogeneity of party and army, any conflicts between the military 
elite, the party and the government elite is a kind of inner-party conflict or factional 
conflict beyond professional rivalry. The members of factions may cover a wide range 
from all bodies of the party, government and army, thus if one observes the relationship 
between the party and army from the view of power, the "party commands the gun" means 
that the gun itself is the incarnation of the party, and therefore the consistency between the 
army and party, whether in structure of power, in policy design, or in ideology, is very 
high. Under such a system structure, only Mao possessed the power of final arbitration, 
the rest - the leading core of the party, the authoritative establishment, or the successor to 
Mao, - in reality were merely the governing authorities led by Mao. The absolute party 
leadership of the army, which the PRC constantly stressed, was in fact the absolute 
92In the Lushan resolution in Aug. 1959, Mao castigated P'eng for denying the victory of the general line 
and the achievement of the Great Leap Forward, and for opposing the high speed development of the 
national economy, the movement to promote high yields on the agricultural front, the mass movement to 
make iron and steel, the people's commune movement, the mass movements in economic construction, and 
party leadership in socialist construction. 
See "Resolution of the 8th Plenum of the 8th CCPCC Concerning the Anti-party clique Headed by P'eng 
Te-huai", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 16th Aug. 1967. 
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leadership of Mao over the army. Mao controlled and guided the army , while the army 
pledged loyalty to the governing authorities. 
2. The Dual-Role Elite of the Militarists 
It should be noted that the relationship between the party and the military, had been very 
much influenced by the increasing specialisation of leadership roles and the functional 
differentiation of organisational structure in each network. In the early period of the 
communist movement in China, party and military leadership were not clearly 
differentiated particularly since the organisation was more or less functionally diffuse 
rather than functionally specific. In the Kiangsi Soviet period (1930-1934) and the Yenan 
Period the military and the party were controlled by the same organisation. During the 
Sino-Japanese war period (1937-1945), the areas controlled by the CCP also had much 
overlap of personnel in the military, party, and government organisations. 
From the point of view of power, the power relationship between the party and the army 
had experienced several changes since 1949. Before 1954 the military tended to dominate 
party officials, whereas after 1954 the party official assumed increasing control over 
military affairs. The party committee at any military level was responsible to the 
organisations one level above it, and the chain led directly to the Military Commission.93 
The party committee of a given military unit consisted of the military commander, the 
political commissar, and one or more principal staff members who were also party 
members. The formal link between the military and the party networks was in the political 
department, which extended form the PLA headquarters down to the political office of the 
regiment. At the lowest level, the party committee and the political department tend, to 
93John Gittings, THE ROLE OF CHINESE ARMY, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 106-
118. 
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merge, especially at the company level. 
From the point of view of personnel, for the first four years after the establishment of the 
PRC party leadership and military leadership, on the central level and on the regional level, 
could not be clearly distinguished particularly on the regional level, party and military 
cadres shared in the regional administration as well as in the regional party. At the 
beginning of 1953, there were, among the 345 members of the leading organs in the six 
"Great Administrative Regions", 104 military men, a share of 30.1 percent. I f one only 
counts the CCP members in these organs, the share of the PLA was 36.4 percent.94 
This situation changed in 1954, when the Great Administrative Regions were abolished 
and the first constitution was promulgated by early 1956, under the leadership of P'eng 
Te-huai, PLA turned more and more toward professionalisation. Moreover, since the late 
1950s, the party leadership in the PLA, strongly influenced by Liu Shao-ch'i, had 
succeeded in establishing and strengthening its own position within the PLA by way of the 
political commissar network. The PLA had become an organisational network unlike the 
party network. 
Although most of the political commissars of the troop units had a military background, 
77.3 percent of the commissars of the territorial organisation, the military area commands, 
and the military district commands in 1965 had gained their experience in the party 
organisation. At the same time, only 28, or 10.5 percent, of the 267 provincial party 
committees secretaries were military men.95 These figures indicate that in the mid-1960s, 
the party organisation definitely dominated civilian-military relation within the CCP. 
94Jurgen Domes, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE PRC - A TIME OF TRANSITION", 
(London: Westview Press, 1985), p. 118. 
95lbid., p. 119. 
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But soon, a drastic change occurred, when the civilian party and state administrative 
organisation collapsed during the high tide of the Cultural Revolution, the PLA remained 
the only relatively intact major institutional subsystem. Under the slogan "Three-Support, 
Two-Military" (support workers, the peasants, and the left and for management and 
training by the military) movement, the PLA, between January and August 1967, took 
over the leadership of the administration, economy, and political work of almost all the 
provinces of the PRC. 
With Lin Piao's fall from the power and death on 12 September 1971, the balance started 
to change again. Although most of the military leaders kept their positions in the 
provinces until the thorough-going transfer of commanders-in-chief of military area 
commands in December 1973, the majority of new appointments to regional and central 
government and party position were made from the ranks of the civilian party 
organisation. This development has accelerated since 1977 with the exception of the 
Politburo. The change of the membership of the Central Committee and leading organs of 
the State Administrative organs are illustrated by the data presented in the table below.96 
PLA Representation on Leading Organs of the CCP and the PRC (1965-1983) 
Organ 1965 1971 1975 1978 1983 
NPC Standing Committee 17.4 * 14.4 17.3 10.4 
State council 25.4 * 33.3 16.3 5.7 
PPR Secretariats 10.4 62.0 35.2 22.9 6.2 
PPC first secretariats 10.7 72.4 48.3 17.2 13.8 
CC (full members) 34.0 50.0 37.5 32.4 25.2 
Politburo (total) 25.0 56.0 34.6 40.0 40.7 
Politburo (full members) 33.3 57.1 36.4 42.8 41.7 
Note: NPC - National People's congress 
PPC - Provincial Party Committee 
CC - Central Committee 
96lbid, p. 120. 
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- Non-existent or practically non-existent 
I f one observes Party and army from the level of organisation, the appearance of the dual-
role elite in the structure of the organisation can clearly be seen, that is, the military elite 
and party elite are homogeneous. The political campaigns in the army were largely 
influenced by the chief elite in the army system, they therefore could be regarded as 
political campaigns in the state system. 
The phenomena of the dual-role elite in the PRC can be proved as in the cases of Kao 
Kang and Jao Shu-shih of the "Kao and Jao anti-party clique"; P'eng Te-huai and Huang 
K'e-ch'eng of the "P'eng and Huang anti-party clique"; Liu Shao-ch'i; and Lin Piao, - the 
chief figures of the four line struggles since PRC was founded, which was generally 
recognised by Mao in public.97 
Kao Kang had been Political Commissar of the 26th army of the Red Army, Chairman of 
the Northwest Political Bureau of the CCP and Vice-commander and Political Commissar 
of the People's Liberation Army in the Northeast Region; Jao Shu-shih had been Political 
Commissar of both the New Fourth Army and of the Shantung Military Region, member 
of the People's Revolutionary Military Commission and Chief of the Organisation 
Department of the CCPCC; P'eng Te-huai had been acting secretary of the North Bureau 
of the CCP, First Secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP, Vice-chairman of the 
CCPCC Military Commission, Vice-premier of State Council, and Minister of National 
Defence; Liu Shao-ch'i had been Party representative of both the Eighth Red-Army 
Regiment and Fifth Red-Army Regiment, and Director of the Political Department of the 
97CCPCC DOCUMENT CHUNG-FA (1972) NO. 12, "Mao Tse-tung's Talks to Responsible comrades in 
Nanking and shanghai Area During His Inspection of the Troops", YEARBOOK ON CHINESE 
COMMUNISM (Taipei: Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Defence, 1973), Part 7, pp. 5-6; Michael Y. M. 
Kau (ed.), THE UN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, (New York: 
International Arts and Sciences Press Inc., 1975), pp. 55-66. Please refer to Chapter IV for details of 
major power struggles in the history of the CCP. 
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Third Red-Army Regiment, Chairman of the PRC and concurrent Chairman of the 
National Defence Council, and Vice-chairman of the CCPCC; Lin Piao had been 
Commander of the Fourth Field Army, Vice-chairman of the CCPCC Military 
Commission, Vice-premier of the State Council, and Minister of National Defence.98 
Moreover, apart from above-mentioned P'eng Te-huai and Lin Piao, the rest of the "ten 
marshals" possessed the background of both the army and the party. Chu Te had been 
member of the Central Committee, Vice-chairman of the Central Committee, member of 
the Politburo, Vice-chairman of the Politburo, member of the Standing Committee and the 
Politburo and member of the CCPCC Military Commission; Ch'en I had been member of 
the Central Committee, member of the Politburo, Vice-chairman of the National Defence 
Council, Vice-premier of the State Council, Mayor of the Shanghai Municipality, Minister 
of the Foreigner Affairs and member of the CCPCC Military Commission; Ho Lung had 
been member of the Central Committee, member of the Politburo, member of the State 
Council, vice-premier of the State Council, vice-chairman of the National Defence 
Council, member of the CCPCC Military Commission; Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien had been 
member of the Central Committee, vice-chairman of the National Defence Council and 
member of the CCPCC Military Commission; Liu Po-ch'eng had been member of the 
Central Committee, member of the Politburo, member of the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress, vice-chairman of the National Defence Council, member of 
the CCPCC Military Commission; Lo Jung-huan had been member of the National 
Defence Council, vice-chairman of the National Defence Council, member of the Central 
Committee, member of the Politburo, member of the Military Commission and director of 
the General Political Department of the PLA; Nieh Jung-chen had been member of the 
Central Committee, Vice-premier of the State Council, vice-chairman of the National 
Defence Council, Chairman of the Scientific and Technological Commission, member of 
98WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, op. cit, p. 588, 
598, 627, 633, 652. 
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CCPCC Military Commission, Yeh Chien-Ying had been member of the Central 
Committee, Vice-chairman of the National Defence Council, member of the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress, Director and Political Commissar of the 
Academy of Military Science member of CCPCC Military Commission." 
From the backgrounds of the above-mentioned figures, one can roughly understand an 
overall situation of overlapping duties or the dual role of the military elite and party elite. 
Under the monopolised leadership of the Party, the degree of integration between the 
cardinal cadres of the party and military at high-level political system was rather high. 
Such integration had special significance from a political viewpoint, it ensured the control 
of the army by the party; while from the viewpoint of the organisation, it bestowed the 
military with legitimacy to play the political role under the system of the PRC. Such a 
dual role character made the PLA more like a political organisation than a purely 
professional army. Hence when there were power conflicts in the leading class of the 
party, they were handled as military line conflict and considered as conflicts between the 
bourgeois military line and the proletarian military line. On the whole such conflicts can 
only be considered as inner-party struggles or the struggles of the inner-party leading 
class. Such was the case for the incident of "P'eng and Huang anti-party clique" and the 
"Lin Piao incident". Though Lin Piao was classified as having "counter-party elements", 
he did not oppose the CCP system structure nor intend to change it. As did P'eng Te-
huai, P'eng merely wanted to query or express his dissatisfaction with the party's policies 
in his capacity as party member. Since in the structure of the dual-role elite and the 
homogeneity of the party and army, the political conflicts of the military elite was an inner-
party one, the final arbitration of these conflicts naturally fell into the hands of the party's 
leader - Mao Tse-tung. 
"Samuel B. Griffith, II, "The Chinese People's Liberation Army", (New York: McGraw-Hill book 
Company, 1967), pp. 303-317. 
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In addition, the PLA possessed the character of a "peasant army", if the party wished to 
maintain overall control of the army with a "strong peasant consciousness",100 it was 
necessary to proceed with politicisation of the army, such as establishing party 
organisations in the army so that army could be incorporated into the party organisation or 
its personnel system. Under such a prerequisite, apart from the overlapping dual-role of 
military elite and party elite, one distinct character about PLA organisation was that it 
followed the leadership of a military commander in the structure of an army organisation, 
while in reality, it followed the leadership of the party. The army had a high commitment 
to act as subordinate to the party and the party centre, indeed, they pledged their loyalty to 
the party leader. 
Since the party carried out a long-term intensive ideological education among the army, 
militarists developed a high degree of political consciousness. This ensured that the army 
would not depart from politics or weaken its recognition of its relationship to the party. 
Besides, the reinforcement of political consciousness among the army could also prevent 
the appearance of the political culture of the unorthodox Maoist ideology or threaten the 
leadership of the party. Under such circumstances, any attacks against or struggles with 
the authoritative establishment made by the military elite could not represent the intention 
of the whole army, but only personal interests. 
3. The Principle of Party Commanding the Army under the System of Party Committees 
On 9 July 1928, the CCP held the Sixth CCP National Congress in Moscow. At the 
congress it passed the final resolution of "the military tasks of the Chinese Communist 
100"The Directive Letter of the Central committee to the fourth Red Army of the Party Committee of the 
Fronts (28 Sep. 1929)", SELECTED WORKS OFCHOUEN-LAI, Vol. I (1981), op. cit, p. 37. 
90 
Party", which confined the orientation of military tasks being "the militarisation of the 
party members" and laid down that "each region should set up a military commission and 
act under the general instructions of the local communist party".101 
With regard to the composition and source of the Red Army mentioned in the "September 
letter of the Central Committee", it commented that "The source of recruits for the Red 
Army is the vast impoverished peasantry. It is true that the impoverished peasants display 
a very pronounced non-proletarian ideology. But the only way to combat peasant ideology 
is to build up proletarian ideology and made it predominate. There is no point in 
cherishing the illusion that the peasant ideology in the Red Army can be changed by taking 
in a large number of workers right now".102 In order to build up proletarian ideology and 
make it predominate, and since the party is theoretically the supreme form of the 
proletariat and the leading forces of proletarian revolution, proletarian dictatorship and 
socialistic construction, before the destruction of a nation, the party is at all times the 
supreme headquarters of the proletariat and should carry out political leadership - that is, 
the leadership of line and fundamental principle and political supervision, - among various 
proletarian organisations in order to ensure that the great proletarian army will act 
according to the unified direction and target.103 It was therefore important that the PLA 
should follow the party leadership to intensify its proletarian ideology and act according to 
the line and fundamental principle of the party. 
For the accomplishment of the party's goal, it was necessary to "apply political education 
among the soldiers of the Red Army so as to inspire their spontaneous learning, but never 
1 0 1 Warren Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. II. op. cit., p. 
37; WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, op. cit., p. 152. 
102"Directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Front Committee of the 
Fourth Army of the Red Army (28 Sep 1929)", SELECTED WORKS OF CHOU EN-LAI, Vol. I (1981), 
op. cit., p. 50. 
mYeh Shang-chih, ON PARTY'S CONSTRUCTION AFTER 1949, (Anhwei: People's Press, 1983), p. 20. 
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violating the principle of centralised command because democracy can only exist under the 
Party centralised control".104 Under "democratic centralism", the party thereby had the 
double meaning of unification of ideology and organisation. It was because the party 
possessed the character of "class", "revolution" and "authoritative ideology", and 
moreover that PLA possessed the inherited "non-proletarian ideology", thus the only 
means for authoritative establishment to change the nature of the army was to carry out 
the principle of "party commands army". 
In order to correct the "purely military viewpoint", the Kutien conference defined the 
characteristics of the Red Army, "it is an armed body for carrying out the political task of 
the revolution".105 Since the Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political 
task, it should therefore obey the command from the party or from some political 
organisations. In 1932, during the Soviet period in Kiangsi province, the CCP once 
abolished the system of party committees in the army to strengthen the political commissar 
system, as in the general rule of "provisional regulations governing political tasks in the 
Chinese labourers, peasants and Red Army", it laid down that the "political commissar is 
not only the representative of the Soviet regime in the Red Army, but also the 
representative of the Chinese Communist Party in the Red Army, he possess the double 
impact of representing the regime and the party, and carries out the party's political line in 
the Red Army".106 Based on the above regulation, "whenever there is a dispute between 
the political commissar and the army commander, the political commissar has the right to 
terminate the army commander's military power".107 Its purpose was to "consolidate the 
104"The Directive Letter of the Central Committee to the Fourth Red Army of the Party Committee of the 
Fronts (28 Sep. 1929)", SELECTED WORKS OF CHOUEN-LAI, Vol. I (1981), op. cit, p. 39. 
105"On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec. 1929)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, 
Vol. I (1975), op. cit., p. 105. 
106"Provisional Regulations Governing Political Works in the Chinese Labours, Peasants and Red Army", 
THE COLLECTIONS OF RED ARMY REACTIONARY DOCUMENTS, Vol. VI (Military), (Taipei: 
Ministry of Defence), p. 1893. 
J 0 7 "Provisional Regulations Governing Political Works in the Chinese Labours, Peasants and Red Army", 
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leadership of proletarian pioneers - Chinese Communist Party - in the Red Army, and 
enable the Red Army to become forceful armed forces of the workers and peasant 
revolution".108 
Between the 7th and 12th February 1934, Wang Chia-hsiang, the director of General 
Political Department of the Red Army, convened the "First Political Works Conference of 
the Red Army" at Jueichin in Kiangsi province. Apart from Chu Te (chairman of the 
CCPCC Military Commission) and Chou En-lai (vice-chairman of the CCPCC Military 
Commission) delivering speeches at the conference, Wang also reported on "the current 
situation and tasks of political works". The conference concentrated upon strengthening 
the leadership of the party over the army, and also raised some important principles for the 
political works in the army, for example, political works are the lifeline of army; political 
works are the source of the army's fighting capacity and thus should never be neglected; 
political works must ensure the absolute execution of a fighting order; political works 
must ensure the development of military quality in the army; and political cadres must also 
study military affair and leam how to conduct operation.109 All these subsequently 
became the fundamental paradigm for the political works of the Red Army. 
In July 1937, the Sino-Japanese war broke out in China, and the CCP, on the 25 August 
of the same year, held an "Enlarged Meeting for the Political Bureau",also known as 
Loch'uan meeting, at Loch'uan in northern Shensi province.110 The meeting concentrated 
THE COLLECTIONS OF RED ARMY REACTIONARY DOCUMENTS, Vol. VI (Military), op. cit., p. 
1894. 
1 0 8 Warren Kuo, "Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party", Vol. II, op. cit., p. 37. 
J09"The Political Works ofPLA ", THE STUDIES OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, (Taipei: National 
Cheng-chi University, 1986), p. 78. 
110The meeting approved the "Principles Concerning Area Works in the War of resistance" secretly 
issued by the CCP Organisation Department on Aug. 12, and the "Te-point National Salvation Program" 
by the CCP Propaganda Department on Aug. 15. At the conference such matters as reorganisation of the 
Red Armies into 8th Route Army and the letter's future tactical programs, assessment of the situation of 
the War of Resistance against Japan. And the CCP's talks were discussed and the "Decisions on the 
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on disputes over whether the Red Army should be reorganised according to the 
establishment and the institution of the Kuomintang army after it was incorporated into 
Kuomintang army. It subsequently approved that Red Army should, in form, be 
reorganised according to the system of the Kuomintang's army, the system of political 
commissar of the Red Army should be abolished, and the original political commissar 
should be reappointed as the vice-commander or the director of political department in the 
new reorganised army, but continue to carry out his original duties as the political 
commissar so as to maintain party's supervision of military commanders.111 
In the course of the Yenan rectification movement, on 1 September 1942, the CCPCC 
political bureau passed the resolution "on unifying the leadership of the party in anti-
Japanese bases and modifying the relationship among all bodies", which placed special 
stress on the fact that the "party is the proletarian pioneering team and the highest form of 
proletarian body. It should take the lead among other bodies such as the army, the 
government and the masses' group".112 
In order to fulfil the monopolised leadership of the party, the resolution laid down "all 
resolutions or instructions from central representative bodies (bureau or sub-bureau of the 
CCP Central Committee), regional party committee and prefectural party committee 
should be executed unconditionally", "our main forces are the armed troops led by the 
party and are the powerful foundations for building bases and supporting struggles", "any 
Current Situation and the Party's Talks" was approved. As decided by the conference, Li Fu-ch'un 
replaced Ch'in Pang-hsien as head of the Organisation Department, and Yang shang-k'un replaced Liu 
shao-ch'i as secretary of the CCPCC North China Bureau. 
See Mao Tse-tung, "For the Mobilisations of All the Nation's forces for victory in the War of Resistance 
(23 Aug. 1937)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. II (1965), op. cit., pp. 23-28; Warren 
Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. Ill, op. cit, pp. 215-246. 
111Warren Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. Ill, op. cit., pp. 
215-246. 
U2Warren Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 
107. 
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communists in the regime who disobeys the party's resolutions or runs counter to party's 
regulations must be corrected", "the leadership of the party depends on the strict 
execution of the principle that lower levels should obey their superior and the whole party 
should obey the central".113 
According to Jen Pi-shih, the member of the political bureau of the CCPCC and the 
secretary of the central secretary bureau, the CCP placed its stress on monopolised 
leadership of the party at that time because "among the armies, there was little respect for 
the party, they even consider themselves superior than the party", and "treat the party's 
army as their own force".114 The Red Army at that time did not show too much obedience 
to the party, and therefore the CCP tried every possible ways to determine their position in 
the party, for example, the Seventh CCP National Congress in April 1945 decided that the 
party organisations of the army should emphasise the "Kutien resolution". And on the 27 
February 1947 the CCPCC issued the directive to "restore party committee system at 
various levels of the army", demanding all troops to organise party committee system at 
various levels of the army so as to avoid any drawbacks resulted from the purely leading 
cadre's system in the army.115 
Henceforth, through a series of resolutions - "Draft Regulations of Party Committee of 
Chinese People's Liberation Army" issued by General Political Department on the 28 July 
1947; "The Resolution on Amplifying Party Committee System" passed by CCPCC on 20 
September 1948; "On the September Meeting - Circular of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China",116 the inner-party circular issued by CCP on 10 October 
113lbid. pp. 401-402. 
U4Ibid. p. 403; Jen Pi-shih, "Opinions about Some Issues (7 Jan. 1943)", THE REFERENCE 
MATERIALS OF THE RECTIFICATION MOVEMENT, Vol. VI, pp. 71-108. 
J]5Kuo Chan-po, "The Transformation of Party Commanding System in PLA", THE STUDY OF 
CONTEMPORARY HISTORY, Jan. 1983, pp. 119-120. 
116This inner-party circular was drafted by Mao Tse-tungfor the Central Committee of the Communist 
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1948, it restored the party committee system at various levels of the army and the soldiers 
committee system in the companies,117 which had been implemented between 1927 and 
1932 but subsequently removed; and the Report on Methods of orks of Party 
Committees delivered by Mao at the Second Plenum of Seventh CCPCC in March 1949, 
which he directed, "A party committee should keep a firm grasp on its central task, the 
party committee must not merely grasp, but must 'grasp firmly' its main tasks".118 The 
party committee system in the PLA had been gradually re-established, and the principle of 
"party commands gun" had been deeply rooted into the structure of the whole military 
organisation. 
After the PRC regime was founded, in order to strengthen the absolute leadership of the 
party under the principle of "party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed 
to command the party", to ensure the effective implementation of policies and decrees, and 
to avoid the tendency of a purely military viewpoint and individualism among military 
cadres, the "party committee system" of the army was further developed into "The System 
of Individual Responsibility by Leaders under the Collective Leadership of the Party 
Committee". 
In September 1956, P'eng The-huai, the Minister of National Defence, made a brief 
explanation about "The System of Individual Responsibility by Leaders under the 
Collective Leadership of the Party Committee" in his "Report on Military Affairs" to the 
Eighth CCPCC National Congress. The main points are summarised as follows:119 
Party. The meeting was held in Hsipaipo village, Pingshan county, Hopei province. 
See "On the September Meeting - Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (10 
Oct. 1948)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. IV (1969), op. cit., p. 270. 
117"On the September Meeting - Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (10 
Oct. 1948)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. VI (1969), op. cit., p. 271. 
1J8"Methods of Work of Party Committees (13 March 1949)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, 
Vol. IV(1969), op. cit., p. 379. 
n9"Speech at the 8th CCP National Congress by P'eng Te-hui", A COLLECTION OF CCP MILITARY 
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1. In the Armed Forces, the Communist party committees at all levels are established in 
compliance with the system of democratic centralism to provide collective leadership of 
the party over the work of the troops according to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, 
all important matters in the Armed Forces should be discussed at the party committee 
meetings, except in emergency circumstances under which the troop leaders may decide 
according to their authority... the party committee meeting should adopt correct decisions 
for the military and political leaders of the troops the carry out. 
2. In the Armed Forces, the military commanders and the political commissioners are both 
leaders of the troops, sharing responsibilities and dividing the work of leadership over the 
troops. On the orders and directives from higher level organs and the decisions of the 
party committees of the corresponding levels, the military commanders would be 
responsible for implementing those concerning military affairs, with the political 
commissioners carrying out those concerning political work. 
With the regard to the function of this system, P'eng made the following explanation: 
"Implementation of the collective leadership of party committee is necessary in the Armed 
Forces because it can better assure the party leadership over the Armed Forces, insure 
compliance to the party policies and state ordinances, and avoid the tendencies toward 
purely military viewpoints and individualism.120 
The party committee and political commission of the army were two equally important 
DOCUMENTS, (Hong Kong: Ytt Lien Publication, 1965), p. 49; P'eng Te-huai, "Report on Military 
affairs (19th September 1956)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A 
DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, op. cit., p. 439. 
120P'eng Te-huai, "Report on Military Affairs (19th September 1956)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 439. 
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bodies for carrying out the principle of "party leads the army". Moreover, the "Regulations 
Governing Political Work in the Chinese People's Liberation Army"1 2 1 laid down the 
following rules for the works of political commissar of the PLA. 
1. Political Works 
The political commissar has independent rights to issue an order in the aspect of political 
work. 
2. Party Works 
The political commissar is responsible for party committee work and holds the concurrent 
post as the secretary of the party committee. 
3. Military Works 
The issuing of orders, and all personnel arrangements made by the military commander 
will only become effective upon the signature of political commissar of the corresponding 
level. Political commissars have the right to query every work concerning military affairs. 
I f by any chance political commissars encounter the death of a military commander on the 
battlefield, he is empowered to take over and command the army. 
One can learn from the above duties of the political commissar, the dialectical relations of 
both unity and opposites lies between the political commission system and the military 
commander system. The works of political commissars contained two parts - military and 
political. In addition, political commissars were a link between the party and the army, 
1 2 1 REGULATIONS GOVERNING POLITICAL WORK IN THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION 
ARMY, (Taipei: General Political Warfare Department, Ministry of Defence, 1965), p. 16; "The Directive 
of the Central Committee to the Fourth Red Army of the Party Committee of the Fronts (28 Sep. 1929)", 
SELECTED WORKS OF CHOU EN-LAI, Vol. I (1981), op. cit., p. 38; "The CCPCC Issues Regulations 
Governing Political Work in the Chinese People's Liberation Army", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 29 APRIL 1963; 
PEKING REVIEW, No. 21, 1963, p. 3. 
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responsible for the political line and ideological works which enabled them to gain more 
obvious and stronger ideological standing. Moreover, they were also in charge of political 
tasks and thereby persisted in the viewpoint of "politics takes lead". It is therefore the 
political commissars who were liable to evaluate the changing political environment with 
ideological standing, and who formed the conservative force in the army. 
The Party Committee was the major leading body in the army, and consisted of army 
commanders, political commissars, directors of political departments and others. From the 
viewpoint of the functions and purposes of the establishment of party committee, political 
commissions, it is obvious that CCP had indeed built up the power blueprint of the "party 
commands the army". 
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IV. The Relationship Between The Army And the Government 
As of June 1945, the Chinese Communist Army consisted of three major groupings: 
Firstly, the Northeast Democratic Union Army under the command of Lin Piao with Hsiao 
Ching-kuang as deputy commander in chief, Liu Ya-lou as chief of staff, P'eng Chen as 
commissar; secondly, the Eighteenth Army Group (The 8th Route Army) under the 
command of Chu Te with P'eng Te-huai as deputy commander in chief, T'eng Tai-yuan as 
chief of staff; and finally, the New Fourth Army under the command of Ch'en I with Chang 
I-yun as deputy commander in chief, Ch'en Shih-ch'u as chief of staff, Liu Shao-ch'i as 
commissar.122 
In July 1947, all armed forces under the leadership of the CCP were unified as the PLA. 
Their units underwent reorganisation into five field armies: (1) The North-eastern Field 
Army under the command of P'eng Te-huai with Hsi Chung-hsiin as Political Commissar, 
which operated in Shansi, Shensi and Ninghsia. In February 1949, it was renamed the 
First Field Army. (2) The Central Field Army under the command of Liu Po-ch'eng with 
Teng Hsiao-p'ing as Political Commissar, which operated in Honan, Hupei and Anhui. In 
February 1949, it was renamed the Second Field Army. (3) The East China Field Army 
under the command of Ch'en I with Jao Shu-shih as Political Commissar, which operated 
in Shantung, Kiangsu, and parts of Anhui. In February 1949, it was renamed the Third 
Field Army. (4) The Northeast Field Army under the command of Lin Piao with Lo Jung-
huan as Political Commissar, which operated in Manchuria. In February 1949, it was 
renamed the Fourth Field Army. (5) The North China Field Army under the command of 
Nieh Jung-chen with Li Ching-ch'uan as Political Commissar most of the time, which 
1 2 2 "Government of the Republic of China", OUTLINE OF RATTLE DURING THE CIVIL WAR, (Taipei: 
Military History Bureau, Ministry of National Defence), Vol. I, II, and Samuel B. Griffith, II, THE 
CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY, op. cit., p. 341. 
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operated in Hopei, Inner Mongolia, and parts of Shansi. In February 1949, it was the only 
one of the five large PLA units to keep its name.123 
By early 1950 all of the Chinese mainland had been conquered by the PLA. 1 2 4 The PRC 
was divided, until the early part of 1954, into Six Great Administrative Regions: (1) The 
Northeast, garrisoned by units of the Fourth Field Army but under a civilian government. 
With Kao Kang as Commander and Political Commissar. (2) North China, under the 
direct control of the Central Government and garrisoned by the North China Field Army. 
With: Nieh Jung-chen as Commander and Po I-po as Political Commissar. (3) East China, 
under the control of the Third Field Army. With Ch'en I as Commander and Jao Shu-shih 
as Political Commissar. (4) Central-south China, under the control of the Fourth Field 
Army. With Lin Piao as Commander and Lo Jung-huan as Political Commissar. (5) 
Southwest China, under the control of the Second Field Army. With Ho Lung as 
Commander and Teng Hsiao-p'ing as Political Commissar. (6) Northwest China, under 
the control of the First Field Army. With P'eng Te-huai as Commander and Hsi Chung-
hsiin as Political Commissar.125 
Military control began at the local level as soon as a town or county had been liberated. 
The first action of the officer in command of the newly-arrived PLA units would be to set 
up an Military Control Committee (MCC) as the supreme administrative organ of the 
state. The chairman of the MCC, who usually held the concurrent post of Mayor, was 
invariably the senior ranking military officer in the locality, as in the cases of Yeh Chien-
ying (Peking), Huang Ching (Tientsin), Liu Po-ch'eng (Nanking), and Ch'en I (Shanghai). 
]23Jurgen Domes, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE PRC - A TIME OF TRANSITION, op. 
cit., p. 107. 
i24Hainan island was last conquered by the PLA in early May 1950. 
12SJurgen Domes, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE PRC - A TIME OF TRANSITION, op. 
cit., p. 108; Donald W. Klein & Anne b. Clark, BIOGRAPHIC DICTIONARY OF CHINESE 
COMMUNISM 1921-1965, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 1128-1129. 
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The MCC was appointed directly from Peking by the People's Revolutionary Military 
Council (PRMC), and in turn made appointment to the local "People's Government", 
which was usually set up shortly afterwards. This pattern of merged military and 
government functions persisted until early 1954. 
Between 1949 and 1954, there was virtually no distinction between "political" and 
"military" communist cadres, which helped to prevent military domination of the civil 
administration, since cadres transferred from the army to local government also transferred 
their allegiances without difficulty. 
Furthermore, Six Great Administrative Regions, each modelled exactly on the structure of 
the Central Government and intended to act as middlemen between Peking and the 
provinces, municipalities, and counties, for military purpose, PRC was also divided into 
the same six military regions, so that in each area a military region controlled the same 
territory as an administrative region. The details are illustrated in the table below:126 
PLA And Regional Government 1950 - 1954 
Central People's Government Council 
Field Armies Great Military Region Great Admin. Region 
1st 
com.: P'eng Te-huai 
pol. com.: Hsi Chung-hsun 
Northwest 
Com: P'eng Te-huai 
Pol. Com: Hsi Chung-hsun 
Northwest 
Chairman: P'eng Te-huai 
vice-chair.: Hsi Chung-hsun & others 
2nd 
com.: LiuPo-ch'eng 
Pol. com.: TengHsiao-p'ing 
Southwest 
com.: Ho Lung 
Pol. com.: Teng Hsiao-
p'ing 
Southwest 
chairman: Liu Po-ch'eng 
vice-chair.: Teng Hsiao-p'ing and 
others 
126John Gittings, THE ROLE OF CHINESE ARMY, op. cit., p. 307; Samuel B. Griffith, II, THE 
CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY, op. cit., p. 342. 
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3rd 
com.: Ch'enI 
Pol. com.: Jao Shu-shih 
East China 
com.: Ch'enI 
Pol. com.: Jao Shu-shih 
East China 
chairman: Jao Shu-shih 
vice-chair.: Ch'en I and others 
4th 
com.: Lin Piao 
Pol. com.: Lo Jung-huan 
Central-south 
com.: Yeh Chien-ying 
Pol. com.: Lo Jung-huan 
Central-south 
chairman: Lin Piao 
vice-chair.: Yeh Chien-Ying and 
others 
North China or (5th) 
com.: Nieh Jung-chen 
Pol. com.: Pol-po 
North China 
com.: Nieh Jung-chen 
Pol. com.: Pol-po 
North China administered by Central 
Government offices 
North-east China 
garrisoned by units of 4th 
Field Army 
North-east China 
com.: Kao Kang 
Pol. com.: Kao Kang 
North-east People's Government 
chairman: Kao Kang 
From the table listed above, one can realises that the senior officials of the Great 
Administrative Region, the Great Military Region and the Field Army were headed by the 
same person. Moreover, the centralised control of the PLA from Peking was provided by 
the PRMC and its General Headquarters. The PRMC was the highest authority, in 
military affairs, equal in status to the State Administrative Council (SAC) and responsible 
only to the Central People's Government Council. PRMC included all the leading military 
commanders, as well as Mao (chairman), Chu Te, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai and P'eng 
Te-huai (vice-chairman), however, it also including two former Nationalist generals, 
Ch'eng Ch'ien and Fu Ts'o-i, and four so called representatives of democratic parties: 
Chang Chih-chung, Ts'ai T'ing-K'ai, Lung Yun, and Liu Fei It seems likely therefor that 
major policy decisions were taken by the Military Commission operating as a party caucus 
within the PRMC, while the apparatus of the "United Front" approach to military control 
was maintained, just as it was in other areas of government. 
At the Second Plenum of the Seventh CCPCC, held in March 1949, the party made 
preparation to convene the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 
which became the forerunner to the National People's Congress (NPC). The plans for the 
convening of the NPC was discussed in the Fourth Plenum of the Seventh CCPCC in 
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February 1954. In September 1954 the first NPC was convened.127 
Three branches were structurally subsumed under the NPC, the People's Courts and 
Procuracy, the National Defence Council(NDC), and the State Council. The NDC, the 
so-called military branch of the Government, replaced its forerunner, the PRMC. The 
member of the NDC were elected by the representative of the NPC.1 2 8 
With the convening of the NPC, the establishment of the State Council and the expansion 
of the PLA General Headquarters, there were five major departments: General Staff 
Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department, General Cadres 
Department and General Training Department. But by 1959-60 the Cadres and Training 
Departments were abolished following the dismissed of P'eng Te-huai. Ordnance, and 
Finance were also abolished, and their function was taken over by the Logistics 
Department.129 
In Jane 1954, both the six Great Military Regions and the corresponding Great 
Administrative Regions were abolished, to be replaced respectively by thirteen military 
regions under PLA Headquarters control and by provincial governments responsible 
directly to the People's Government. 
1^"Constitution of the People's Republic of China (20 Sep. 1954)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 99-106. 
128See 1954 Constitution, Article 27, Ibid., pp. 101-102. 
129Paul Wang, CHINA'S HIGH LEADERSHIP IN THE SOCIALIST TRANSITION (New York: The Free 
Press, 1976), p. 20. 
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The Military Organisational Structure as shown in the table listed below:130 
State Council National Defence 
Council 
General StaffDept 
Military Region 
Party Military Affair 
Committee 
Ministry of National Defence 
PLA Headquarter 
General Political Dept. 
Garrison Commands 
General Logistic Dept 
Service Arms 
(4 FA) Canton 
Kwangsi 
Hunan 
(1,2 FA) Chengtu Szechuan 
(3 FA) Foochow....Kiangsi 
(2 FA) Kunming.. .Kweichow 
Yunnan 
(1 FA) Lanchow.... Tsinghai 
Kansu 
Ninghsia 
Shensi 
(3 FA) Nanking..... Chekiang 
Anhwei 
Kiangsu 
(5 FA) Peking. 
Shansi 
(4 FA) Shenyang... Kirin 
Liaoning 
Heilungkiang 
(3, 5 FA) Tsinan 
(2 FA) Wuhan 
Hupei 
(1, 5 FA) Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
(1 FA) Sinkiang Autonomous Region 
Kwangtung 
Chengtu 
Lanchow 
Lhasa 
Peking 
Shanghai 
Tientsin 
Wuhan & other major towns 
Hopei 
Shantung 
Honan 
CantonAir Defence 
A rmoured Force 
Armoured Force 
Artillery Force 
Navy 
Railway Corps 
Signal Corps 
Public Security Forces 
Coastal Defence 
Technical Service 
People's Militia 
130John Gittings, THE ROLE OF CHINESE ARMY, op. cit, p. 281, 308; William W. Whitson, THE 
CHINESE HIGH COMMAND - A HISTORY OF COMMUNIST MILITARY POLITICS 1927-1971, 
(London: The MacMilIan Press Ltd. 1973), pp. 506-507. 
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(2 FA) Tibet Autonomous Region 
Note: Command Structure by the Government 
Real Command Structure 
FA: FieldArmy 
In 1954, the chairman of the National Defence Council was Mao Tse-tung, with fifteen 
vice-chairman, Chu Te, Peng Te-huai, Lin Piao, Liu Po-ch'eng, Ho Lung, Ch'en I , Teng 
Hsiao-p'ing, Lo Jung-huan, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, Yeh Chien-ying, Nieh Jung-chen, Chang 
Chih-chung, Fu Ts'o-i, ch'eng Ch'ien, Lung Yun. Committee members including Li Ming-
yang numbered 81. 1 3 1 With the exception of Fu Ts'o-i and Ch'eng Ch'ien, who were 
former nationalist generals with only symbolic and not substantial significance, the vice-
chairmen consisted of members of "ten marshals", vice-chairmen of the CCPCC Military 
Commission and responsible leaders in other military organs. 
In April of 1959, Liu Shao-ch'i was elected chairman and P'eng Te-huai, Lin Piao, Liu Po-
ch'eng, Ho Lung, Ch'en I , Lo Jung-huan, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, Yeh Chien-ying, Teng Hsiao-
p'ing, Ch'eng Ch'ien, Chang Chih-chung, Fu Ts'o-i and Wei Li-huang were made vice-
chairmen. Committee members including Su Yu numbered 100.132 Of all the vice-
chairmen, 8 of the "ten marshals" were re-elected with the exception of Chu Te and Nieh 
Jung-chen, Both Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and Wei Li-huang, former Nationalist General, were 
new vice-chairmen, the rest were members of the CCPCC Military Commission. 
In December 1963, Liu Shao-ch'i was re-elected chairman and Lin Piao, Liu Po-ch'eng, 
Ho Lung, Ch'en I , Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, Nieh Jung-chen, Yeh Chien-ying, 
Lo Jui-ch'ing, Ch'eng Ch'ien, Chang Chih-chung, Fu Ts'o-i, Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai were made 
131Warren Kuo, (ed.), A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, 
op. cit, p. 301. 
132Ibid. 
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vice-chairmen. Committee members including Wang P'ing numbered 107.133 The 
membership of the National Defence Council reflected the actual power structure in the 
party at that time. Lin Piao replaced P'eng Te-huai to rank the number one among the 
vice-chairman, which balanced the power of Liu Shao-ch'i. Like the election in April 
1959, Ch'eng Ch'ien, Chang Chih-chung and Fu Ts'o-I were made vice-chairmen only in 
name without substantive powers. 
In October 1968, the Twelfth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC, the communique stated the 
resolution to expel Liu Shao-ch'i from the party once and for all, and to dismiss him from 
all posts both inside and outside the party.134 Since then, the National Defence Council 
stopped functioning, and its organisation and administration were not mentioned in the 
Constitution adopted on 17 January 1975, by the fourth NPC.1 3 5 
In some cases, evidence concerning leadership conflicts, and mobility could be detected 
through an inspection of changes in the membership and ranks within the NDC, especially 
in its chairmen. For instance, P'eng Te-huai ranked number two among the vice-chairman 
of the NDC, only next to Chu Te, in the first term when he was still Minister of National 
Defence. But when P'eng was purged at the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC 
(Lushan conference) in 1959, he was dismissed from his post as vice-chairman of the 
NDC, and his name was absent in the list of vice-chairmen of the NDC thereafter. 
In the case of Lin Piao, his ranking rose from number three in the first term to number two 
133lbid. 
J34"Report by the CPC Central Committee's Special Panel on the Case of Liu Shao-ch'i (18 Oct. 1968)", 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 
2191-2193 
1 3 5 "The New Constitution of the People's Republic of China (17 Jan. 1975)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. V, op. cit., pp. 2502-2506; NEW CHINA 
NEWS AGENCY, 19 Jan. 1975. 
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in the second, and then to number one in the third term among the vice-chairmen. 
The NDC controlled no real military power, but the change of the membership within the 
NDC, including the ranking and whether in or out of the list, reflected a change in the 
distribution of power. With the exception of few former nationalist generals, who had 
only symbolic roles, all members in the NDC had overlapping background in the Military 
and the Party. 
Traditionally, in the PRC's power structure, the military power is controlled by the 
CCPCC Military Commission and by the Standing Committee of the Politburo. The 
CCPCC Military Commission is the pinnacle of the PLA pyramid; not only does it set 
military policy and strategy, it is also involved in budgeting, training, military technology, 
command of forces, militia work, approving promotions of officers at division level and 
above, and political indoctrination. Virtually all directives to the PLA as a whole come 
from the CCPCC Military Commission as opposed to the Ministry of National Defence or 
some lower echelon. Subordinate organisations such as the General Staff and General 
Political Departments are responsible to the CCPCC Military Commission.136 
Beneath the chairman are a small number of vice-chairmen. The Minister of National 
Defence is normally the First vice-chairman who runs the day-to-day affairs of the CCPCC 
Military Commission and takes charge of routine meetings when the chairman is not in 
attendance. Until the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC in August 1959, this post was 
taken by P'eng Te-huai. He was succeeded by Lin Piao in August 1959.137 
136POUTICS-MILITARYRELATIONSHIPS IN COMMUNIST CHINA, (Washington D.C.: Department of 
State, 1963), pp. 5-6. 
137Hsiao ching-kuang, Hsiao K'e, Huang K'e-ch'eng, Li Ta, Liao Han-sheng, Tan Cheng, Wang Shu-
sheng was appointed vice-ministers of the National Defence in Nov. 1954. 
Ch'en Keng, Hsiao ching-kuang, Hsu Kuang-ta, Hsu Shih-yu, Liao Han-sheng, Liu Ya-low, Lo Jui-ch'ing, 
Su Yii, Tan Cheng, Wang Shu-sheng was made vice-ministers of the National Defence in Sep. 1959 
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Lin had carried out most of his responsibilities through the CCPCC Military Commission. 
Despite the apparent power of the post as vice-chairman of the CCPCC Commission, the 
defence minister has been in a political decline following Lin Piao's disappearance in 1971. 
Yeh Chien-ying was made Defence Minister in January 1975. 
The minister and vice-ministers of the National Defence comprise the core of the standing 
committee of the CCPCC. The chief of the General Staff Department of the PLA is 
another important member, who normally serves concurrently as the secretary of the 
CCPCC Military Commission.138 Before 1976, with the exception of Su Yu and Teng 
Hsiao-p'ing, all of the six former chiefs of the General Staff Department were purged 
including Huang K'e-ch'eng, Lo Jui-ch'ing, Yang Ch'eng-wu and Huang Yung-sheng.139 
Due to its power, the membership of the standing committee of the CCPCC is highly 
political and fluid. The CCPCC Military Commission effectively centralise control over 
the PLA. Military region commanders and service arms and branches are all closely 
supervised by and must report to this body. 
The Ministry of National Defence had three major staff units, namely, General Staff 
Department, of the General Political Department and General Logistics Department. The 
functions of these departments are as follows: 
The General Staff Department takes charge of operations, intelligence, military training, 
military administration, equipment, supplying arms for the people, martial law and 
138Warren Kuo, (ed.), A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, 
op. cit, p. 625. 
139For details refer to Chapter IV and V. 
109 
communication.140 This department is expected to be able to assume the work of co-
ordination between the army and the government. It has divisions for operations, 
intelligence, military training, military affairs, equipment, mobilisation, transportation, 
signal communication, military schools, surveying, meteorology and political affairs and 
general bureau for military law.1 4 1 
The General Staff Department is the chief executive of the CCPCC Military Commission. 
Military orders, as opposed to political directive, are issued through it, it is the second step 
in the command chain. The Chief of General Staff must exercise restraint when issuing 
orders under his own authority lest the CCPCC Military Commission perceive it as 
usurping its authority. Anyway, the CCPCC would certainly retain final decision-making 
powers over all military planning. 
The General Political Department has division for organisation, propaganda, culture, cadre 
administration, security, liaison, youth work, mass work, and army posts. The General 
Political Department is headed by a director and several deputy directors. The director 
usually serves concurrently as deputy secretary of the CCPCC Military Commission.142 
The functions of the General Political Department fall into three broad categories; 
ideology, discipline, and moral. Ideologically, the General Political Department must 
ensure party leadership over the armed forces and see to it that the party line and 
regulations are implemented; it is responsible for the ideological condition and political 
indoctrination of the PLA. 
,40Warren Kuo, (ed), A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, 
op. cit, p. 625. 
141Ibid, p. 625; THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, GOVERNMENT AND 
MILITARY ORGANS. (Taipei: The Study Group on Chinese Communist Personnel Sources, 1962), p. 144. 
142Ibid, p. 624, and Ibid, pp. 144-145. 
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With regard to discipline, the General Political Department has broad responsibilities for 
PLA internal security. It is specifically charged with keeping track of the political and 
ideological quality of high ranking cadres. In order to carry out its many tasks, the General 
Political Department has at its disposal a pyramid of party committee, political 
departments, and commissars within the PLA, a network reaching to every geographic 
corner of China . Before 1976, the post of the department director had been held 
successively by Lo Jung-huan, T'an Cheng (purged in 1962), Hsiao Hua (purged in 1967), 
Li Te-sheng, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Wei Kuo-ch'ing. 
The General Logistics Department has divisions for political work, finance, munitions, 
medical service, engineering, transportation, installation, materials, tractors, fuel, horses, 
and veterinary medicine.143 It is also responsible for supplying armies to foreign allies and 
insurgent groups through its International Equipment Division. The General Logistics 
Department also produced some famous figure in the inner power struggle of the PRC, 
such as Hung Hsueh-chih who was director of this department and was purged before the 
Cultural Revolution. Afterward, another director, Ch'iu Hui-tso, was liquidated in 
September 1972 on charges of having collaborated with Lin Piao.144 
143lbid., p. 146. 
144For details of Lin P'iao's incident refer to Chapter IV, Section IV. 
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Chapter II I . The Relationship Between The Development of 
Military Line and Politics of PRC 
There were no objections as to the principle of "party commands the gun" among the 
leading class of the PRC in the development of the military line, and it was commonly 
agreed prior to the Korea war that the role of the army was based on the principle of 
"Sanwan reorganisation" and "Kutien resolution". Mao had always argued that the army's 
political role should be expanded, and that the Red Army should be an armed body for 
carrying out political tasks. A new voice rose from the PLA after experience gained from 
the Korean war, however, which recognised an urgent need for the professionalisation and 
modernisation of the military, and thus held different viewpoints about the role of PLA. 
This voice was headed by P'eng Te-huai, then the commander of "Chinese People's 
volunteers" for the "struggle to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea" and the Minister of 
National Defence. 
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I. The impact of Korean War on the Development of the Political Role of 
the PLA 
In the afternoon of October 1950, the CCPCC held a meeting at Yi-nein Hall in Peking 
and reached an agreement to dispatch troops to aid Korea against the U.N. with P'eng Te-
huai as its commander. They was in favour of Lin Piao to be the commander in the first 
place, but Lin turned them down for the reason of his poor health. On 4 October, P'eng 
arrived in Peking, and attended the Political Bureau conference the following day, in 
which he was appointed the commander of the "Chinese People's volunteers for the 
resistance against U.S. aggression and aid Korea" and a concurrent political commissar by 
the CCPCC. Mao also instructed the "Chinese People's volunteers" to take North East 
Administrative Region as their general rear-area base with Kao Kang the commander and 
a concurrent political commissar of Northeast Military Region as its responsible leader.1 
On 19 October 1950 PRC dispatched troops on a large scale to intervene in the Korean 
war.2 The strategy of "taking mobile warfare as the major force, combining it partly with 
positional warfare and guerrilla warfare in the enemy controlled area" was applied.3 But 
since "Korea is a long and narrow peninsula with many mountains and forestry but narrow 
topography and is boarded on the sea in three sides", it "largely restricted the mobility of 
our troops".4 Under such circumstances, the PLA could not employ the same mobile 
warfare to annihilate U.S. forces as they had done against Kuomintang troops in the civil 
war, and thus the strategy was changed to protracted war and active defence, and the form 
lTHE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF P'ENG TE-HUAI, (Peking: Contemporary China Press, 1993), pp. 400-404; 
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF NIEH JUNG-CHEN, Vol.11, (Peking: The PLA Press, 1984), p. 736. 
2The first group of armies to enter the North Korea was the 13th legion, including 38th, 39th 40th and 
42nd corps; and the 1st, 2nd and 8th artillery divisions. See Ibid., p. 403. 
3 "The Conclusion of Korea War, (27 Dec. 1958)", SELECTED WORKS OF PRC MILITARY WRITINGS, 
(Taipei: Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Defence, 1968). p. 245; see THE B1BLOGRAPHY OF P'ENG 
TE-HUAI, op. cit, p. 406. 
4Ibid, p. 244; ibid, p. 406. 
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of the warfare was changed from mobile warfare to positional warfare.5 
The PLA suffered a terrible mauling. The casualties were calculated as being between 
700,000 and 900,000, medical services were inadequate, food in short supply, and even 
clothing was unsuitable for the Korean winter. Almost 90 percent of Chinese troops were 
reported to have suffered from frostbite in the harsh winter campaigns. Weapons included 
those left by the Kuomintang when they retreated to Taiwan and were a motley 
assemblage of American, Japanese, Russian, German, and other materials - all four types 
often being used in the same regiment. Only in 1951, as the Soviet Union made MIG 
fighters available, did the Chinese get any parity in the air. And they never had any 
effective naval forces to counteract the formidable sea power of the United States.6 
In view of the above-mentioned situation, the PRC had to adjust its policy during Korea 
war. The original intention of expelling U.N. forces out of Korea peninsula was replaced 
with the hope of reaching an effective political settlement. It was obvious that the strategy 
of protracted war and decisive campaigns was no longer applicable to the Korean war. In 
addition, the PLA had a difficult time in fighting powerful and well-equipped hostile 
forces, and the narrow Korea peninsula provided no bases in the countryside which made 
it even more difficult for the PLA to conduct a long-term revolutionary war. The senior 
commanders of the PLA for the first time realised that the lack of naval and air forces was 
a serious obstacle for accomplishing their military target. Under such circumstances, the 
war carried out by the PLA outside the Chinese territory was a positional warfare which 
exacted a high sacrifice, the operational guidance which the PLA accumulated from 
experience during the Civil war was no longer applicable to the Korean battlefield. After 
5Ibid., p. 246; ibid, pp. 406-407. 
Jonathan D. Spence, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA, (London: Century Hutchinson Ltd., 1990), 
p. 557. 
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the Korean war, a summary of the war experience was concluded as follows: The 
experience of the Korean war is very precious. It has certainly effected our army-building 
program, and is beneficial for us to study and learn the Soviet army-building experience. 
It can also serve as a valuable reference in future warfare.7 
The experience of the Korean war undoubtedly had a profound effect on the army-building 
program of the PLA. With aid from Soviet Union, "to learn from Soviet Union" became 
the current trend. In his special article to celebrate "August 1 Army-Building Day", Li 
Yu, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, appealed to the PLA "to speedily build 
up modernised armed forces, to study aggressively the advanced experience of Soviet 
forces, to acquire the art of modern wars, and to modernise our army-building in 
accordance with the Soviet armed forces".8 
Furthermore, on 1 October, 1954, following his September appointment as vice-Chairman 
of the National Defence Council, Vice-premier of the State Council, and Minister of 
National Defence from the original post as Commander of "Korean War", P'eng Te-huai 
ordered all members of the PLA to study aggressively all the advanced experience of the 
Soviet forces, to acquire the art of modern wars, to obey orders, observe discipline, and 
struggle to assure victory in each military operation. This marked the beginning of a 
concentrated effort thoroughly to professionalise and regularise the armed forces in 
accordance with the Soviet military ethic and style. The Soviet rank, pay, and career 
educational systems and its military doctrine became standards for PLA emulation. 
During the Korean war, the advent of ultra-professionalism in the PLA seriously 
7"The Conclusion of Korea War (27 Dec. 1958)", SELECTED WORKS OF PRC MILITARY WRITINGS, 
op. cit., p. 245. 
8TA KUANG DAILY, 1 Aug. 1954 
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undermined the credibility of the commissar, especially at the unit level. His traditional 
right to countersign all orders was frequently ignored, especially at the company level 
where battle pressures were most acute. By 1954, with the formal reorganisation of the 
PLA along Russian lines the commissar found his role seriously restricted. 
Since the political control didn't reduce the amount of casualties in positional warfare, the 
decreasing importance of commissars among the PLA during the Korean war could be 
anticipated. Having learned the lessons from Korea, P'eng Te-huai embarked on a 
program of professionalisation and regularisation, thus the army-building program 
emphasised by the 1929 "Kutien resolution" confronted a great challenge. The army-
building program of regularisation and professionalisation in accordance with the Soviet 
forces had met with little resistance inside the communist party before the Sino-Soviet 
split. In fact, many regulations were formulated without opposition. 
On 7 Feb. 1955, the Fifth Session of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress approved the "Draft Conscription Law".9 This law was drawn up in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 10 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China 
which states: "It is the sacred duty of every citizen of the People's Republic of China to 
defend the Motherland. It is the honourable duty of citizens to perform military service".10 
The importance of conscription as a means of contributing to national security was 
obvious. Defence Minister P'eng Te-huai's report on the Draft Conscription Law was 
delivered to the National People's Congress on 16 July 1955. 
The Conscription Law laid down the following concerning the army-building program of 
9"Draft Conscription Law, (Feb. 1955)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1976 - A 
DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol.1, op. cit, p.306-310. 
10Ibid.,pp. 306-307; "Constitution of the People's Republic of China, (20, Sep. 1954)", THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 100. 
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regularisation: Chapter I : General Provision. Article 2: All male citizens of the People's 
Republic of China reaching the full age of 18, regardless of nationality, race, occupation, 
social status, religious belief, or educational background, have the duty of performing 
military service as required by this law.11 Article 4: The armed strength of the People's 
Republic of China shall be composed of the various components and units of the Chinese 
People's Liberation Army.12 Article 5: Military service shall be divided into active and 
reserve service. Those performing active service shall be called active military personnel 
and those performing reserve service, reserve military personnel.13 Article 6: Active 
military personnel and reserve military personnel shall be divide into officers, non-
commissioned officers, and privates.14 Article 12: The state council and the state 
administrative organs of provinces, autonomous districts, and municipalities under the 
direct jurisdiction of the Central People's Government, autonomous chou (prefecture), 
hsien (county), autonomous hsien, and municipalities shall organise military draft 
committees to guide conscription work. The organisation and functions of such military 
draft committees shall be stipulated by the state council.15 And article 13: Provinces, 
autonomous districts, and municipalities under the direct jurisdiction of the Central 
Government, autonomous chou, hsien, autonomous hsien, and municipalities shall 
establish military draft bureaux to administer the work of drafting conscripts. The 
Peoples' committee in chou under the jurisdiction of municipalities, hsiang, and chen 
(town) shall administer the work of drafting conscription in conformity with the 
stipulations of the military draft bureaux of municipalities under the direct jurisdiction of 
the Central People's Government, hsien, autonomous hsien, and municipalities.16 
nIbid.,p. 307. 
l2Ibid. 
™Ibid. 
i4Jbid. 
15lbid. 
l6Ibid. 
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Furthermore, Chapter 4. Article 33 to 37 regulated the rank of officers in active and 
reserve service, especially Article 34 which laid down the stipulations on the maximum 
age for officers in active and reserve service.17 
Other chapters included "Rights and Duties of the Active Officers and Reserve Service 
Officers", "Wartime Conscription", "Military Training for Students of Senior Middle 
Schools and Higher Schools". In essence, the Soviet model was its blueprint in 
conscription. 
Accompanied by the "Draft Conscription Law", the document Explanation of the Draft 
Conscription Law1* was issued, in which it clearly proclaimed that "The Draft 
Conscription Law of the People's Republic of China is formulated on the basis of the 
actual condition in the country as well as Soviet advanced experience. The Conscription 
Law we have drawn up used the advanced experiences of the Soviet Union as a basic 
guide".19 
The Korean experience had changed the PLA markedly, by July, 1953, a total of thirty-
five corps had been used to strengthen and equip the twenty-five corps that fought in 
17A (1). Second Lieutenant of the ground force, air force, and public security force, active service (AC), 
age 30; first class reserve service (FCRS) age 40; second class reserve service (SCRS), age 45; (2). First 
lieutenant: AC, 30; FCRS, 40; SCRS, 45; (3). Captain: AC, 35; FCRS, 45; SCRS, 50; (4). Senior captain: 
AC, 35; FCRS, 45; SCRS, 50; (5). Major: AC, 40; FCRS, 50; SCRS, 55; (6). Lieutenant colonel: AC, 45; 
FCRS, 55, SCRS, 60; (7). Colonel: AC, 50; FCRS, 55; SCRS, 60; (8). Senior colonel: AC, 50; FCRS, 55; 
SCRS, 60; (9). Major general: AC, 55; FCRS, 60; SCRS, 65; (10). Lieutenant general and above shall be 
decided according to the actual condition. 
B.(l). Officers of the naval force and seaborne public security vessels; ensign; AC, 35; FCRS, 40; SCRS, 
45; (2). Lieutenant junior grade: AC, 35; FCRS, 40, SCRS, 45; (3). Lieutenant: AC, 40; FCRS, 45; SCRS, 
50; (4). Lieutenant commander: AC, 45; FCRS, 50; SCRS, 55; (5). Commander: AC, 50; FCRS, 55; 
SCRS, 60; (6). Captain: AC, 55; FCRS, 55; SCRS, 60; (7). Senior captain: AC, 55; FCRS, 55; SCRS, 60; 
(8). Rear admiral: AC, 55; FCRS, 60; SCRS, 65; (9). Vice admiral: AC, 60; FCRS, 60; SCRS, 65. 
Ibid., pp. 308-309. 
18"Explanation of the Draft Conscription Law, (Feb. 1955)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
1949-1979-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. I, op. cit, pp. 310-315. 
19Ibid, p. 312. 
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Korea. The remaining fifteen regular corps (in contrast with the many deactivated corps) 
had also rotated many of their officers into Korea or had sent them to the New Advanced 
Military Institute in Nanking, where Liu Po-ch'eng, the commander of Second Field Army, 
was teaching the lessons learned in Korea, lessons that bore little relationship to Mao Tse-
tung's thoughts on people's war. 
P'eng's idea of army-building was that the PLA should not only build up modernised 
armed forces, but at same time must speedily establish a regularised military system. This 
idea was stated clearly in his report on the "Draft Conscription Law" delivered to the 
Nation People's Congress on 16 July 1955, in which he stressed once more: "We must 
speedily build up powerful modernised armed forces. We must have not only a mighty 
army but also a mighty navy. To have powerful armed forces does not mean relying on 
the numerical strength of an over-sized peacetime standing army; for this is not only 
disadvantageous to the productive pursuits of the people and to national construction but 
it also of limited military significance. Powerful armed forces primarily depend on a 
combination of strong active units and strong reserves. This makes it necessary for our 
country to go over speedily to a system of military service which conforms to the 
requirements a modern national defence, a system of periodic call-up and demobilisation, 
in other words, a system of compulsory military service".20 
On 19 September 1956, P'eng delivered a report on military affairs to the Eighth CCP 
National Congress,21 in which he made the following explanation concerning the 
disarmament and military budget: "During the past 7 years, a great deal of work 
concerning national defence construction has been carried out . According to the 
20P'eng Te-huai, "Report on the Draft Conscription Law, (16, July, 1955)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 316. 
2JP'eng Te-huai, "Report on Military Affairs, (19 Sep. 1956)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. I, op. cit, pp. 434-442. 
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requirements of actual circumstances, nearly 5 million men of our army have been shifted 
to civilian production and construction, including 31 full divisions and 8 regiments, 
demobilised cadres, and army men who shifted to civilian work after discharge. At 
present, the number of officers and men in the Liberation Army, including new recruits is 
2.7 million less then the highest number at the time of liberation. Military expenditures 
had been reduced to 19.98 percent of the total state expenditure for 1956 as against 48 
percent in 1951".22 
As for the development of the PLA, P'eng pointed out: "The Chinese People's Liberation 
Army, which used to be entirely an infantry force, has now become armed forces with 
various branches, including air, naval, anti-aircraft, public security forces, artillery and 
armoured forces, engineering, railway engineering, signal, and anti-chemical warfare 
corps".23 
When he spoke of the army-building program of modernisation and regularisation, P'eng 
indicated: "Artillery and armoured forces have been greatly strengthened and the 
technique and equipment of other branches immensely improved. The air defence force 
has been built up with modernised equipment. There has been some development in the 
22The Military Expenditure of People's Republic of China 1950-60 (according to official statistics) 
Year Million Yuan Percent of Budgetary Expenditure 
1950 2827 41.53 
1951 5061 48.00 
1952 4371 26.04 
1953 6176 28.00 
1954 5814 23.60 
1955 6500 24.30 
1956 6117 19.91 
1957 5523 18.85 
1958 5000 15.12 
1959 5800 11.12 
1960 5826 8.30 
Ibid. p. 438; Jonathan D. Spence, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA, op. cit., p. 558; John Gittings, 
THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE ARMY, op. cit., p.309. 
23Ibid. 
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build-up of our navy.... Following the rapid development of our rational economic 
construction, the standard for the modernisation of our armed forces will be further raised. 
Simultaneously with the improvement of military technique and equipment, our armed 
forces have launched a regular training program to raise the levels of its command 
capacity, technical drills, political consciousness, and its science and culture.... Up to the 
present, various academies and schools have been set up by the PLA, and a large number 
of officers with past combat experience have been receiving further training and elevating 
their knowledge of the principles of modern warfare and technology".24 
In addition, as to the concept of "regular military system", P'eng explained as follows: 
The "regular military build-up" consists of a unified command , a unified organisation, a 
unified system, unified training, and unified discipline.25 
P'eng stressed the importance to learn from Soviet advanced experience in this report, as 
he said: "It was a correct proposal to learn all the advanced experiences of the Soviet army 
when the modernisation of our army first began... the Soviet Army is the most advanced 
modernised revolutionary army, its military science is superb, its military tactics are of the 
first rate, and it possesses rich experience. It is the shortcut towards the speedy 
modernisation of our army".26 
Apart from P'eng Te-huai, Chu Te also advocated the importance of learning from 
advanced Soviet experience as early as the Army Day in 1953, when he pointed out that "a 
unified regular training program had begun throughout the PLA. This program covered 
the fields of weapon training and manoeuvres, of organisation and planning, and of 
24lbid. 
2SIbid. 
26lbid., p. 441 
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military discipline". 
One of the Marshals Yeh Chien-ying told the sixth Military colleges conference in May 
1956, "We must also learn from the fraternal countries, and study their useful experience. 
Apart from this, we must also study the military doctrine of the capitalist countries. This 
must be studies both from the point of view of learning their doctrine and techniques".28 
People's Daily also pointed out, new techniques in training were called for in the age of 
modernisation. The army had acquired "rich and valuable experience during the 
revolutionary war, but this experience did not suffice to meet modern requirements. 
Military training should be intensified, and the PLA should redouble its efforts to 
strengthen its highly centralised and united organisational disciplinary qualities".29 
The accomplishment of military tasks was an essential prerequisite of army-building 
programme of regularisation and professionalisation. Military training therefore must 
increase considerably, while other political and non-military tasks must decrease in 
proportion. Based on this condition, not only the role of political commissars and 
members of party committee must be restricted, but their power and responsibility must 
also be reduced, and thus the principle of "party commands the army" and the fundamental 
essence of the "army is the fighting group as well as working team", which were 
determined by the "Sanwan reorganisation" and "Kutien conference", would also be 
questioned. The army-building program of regularisation and professionalisation was in 
essence in confrontation with the principle of Mao's "party commands the gun" and 
"politics takes the lead". 
27John Gittings, THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE ARMY, op. ext., p. 146. 
28UBERATIONARMY'S DAILY, 5, May, 1956. 
29"On the Tasks of the PLA ", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 24, July, 1954; John Gittings, THE ROLE OF CHINESE 
ARMY, op. cit, p. 147. 
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However, Peng's army-building program was not fully supported by most elites in the 
PLA, one of his subordinates, T'an Cheng, Deputy-director of the General Political 
Department, criticised the mistakes of the advanced experience of Soviet armed forces 
shortly after P'eng delivered his report on military affairs at the Eighth CCP National 
Congress in September 1956. T'an indicated, "In the course of regularised army building, 
all cadres should of course obey the regulations governing their duties and disciplines, the 
regulations itself however must be formulated based on the historical characteristics and 
current situation of our army, and must adopt the organisational forms of various kinds 
which is accustomed by our army. Under no circumstances should we mechanically apply 
foreign experience".30 T'an Cheng's comments represented the PLA's disapproval of 
P'eng's army-building program of regularisation, they remained to consider the "party 
commands the gun" as the supreme guiding principle of the army-building program. The 
so-called "historical characteristics" mentioned by T'an Cheng had explicitly expressed the 
fact that the traditional line of "politics takes the lead" which the PLA had always 
highlighted could never be changed. This viewpoint was carried out by T'an as he pointed 
out, "The process of modernisation, it was explained, would itself suffer if divorced from 
the army's revolutionary traditions", "Revolution is the army's basis and essence; 
modernisation is its special tendency, and is dependent upon revolutionisation. Not only 
can we not weaken the latter for the sake of the former, but we should not place them on 
the same level or regard them as coextensive. I f we overlook revolutionisation, and 
concentrate excessively on modernisation, not only will we not raise our army's fighting 
strength, but on the contrary we shall enfeeble our army's revolutionary characteristics, 
and even make it become a 'fake tiger'".31 
"Questions of Political Work at the New Stage of Army Building", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 24, Sep. 1956. 
"Oppose One-sided Emphasis on Modernisation", LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, 17, Aug. 1958. 
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Basically, it was the professionalism accompanied by the regularisation which could 
threaten party's leadership in the army that worried PLA's political commissars the most, 
and yet their concern was aggravated when the Eighth CCP National Congress passed the 
resolution to enumerate Marxism-Leninism instead of Mao Tse-tung's thought as the 
"guiding principle" for the Party in the General Program of the new Party Constitution. 
And thus the General Program of the former Party Constitution adopted by the Seventh 
CCP National Congress stating "Mao Tse-tung thought - the theory which integrates 
Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution - as the guide in all its 
works"32 was changed into "The Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism as its 
guide to action. Only Marxism-Leninism correctly sets forth the laws of development of 
society and correctly charts the path leading to the achievement of socialism and 
communism" in the new Party Constitution.33 P'eng Te-huai failed to satisfy political 
commissars' demand for securing the principle of "party commands the army", although he 
did try to relieve their concern by making the following comments on the relationships 
between military commanders and the political commissioners when he delivered his 
report on military affairs at the Eighth CCP National congress. "In our armed forces", he 
said, "the military commanders and the political commissioners are both leaders of the 
troops, sharing responsibilities and dividing the work of leadership over the troops. On 
the orders and directives from higher level organs and the decisions of the party 
committees of the corresponding levels, the military commanders would be responsible for 
implementing those concerning military affairs, with the political commissioners carrying 
out those concerning political works"34 
32"On the Party", THE SELECTED WORKS OF LIU SHAO-CH'I, Vol. I, (Peking: Foreign Language 
Press, 1984), p. 315; "The Constitution of the Communist Party of China (26 Sep. 1956)", THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1979, A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol.1, op. cit., p. 406. 
33"Constitution of the Communist Party of China (26, Sep. 1956)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 406; NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 
26 September 1956. 
34P'eng Te-huai, "Report on Military Affairs (19, Sep. 1956)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 439. 
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Prior to the convening of the Eighth CCP National Congress, Mao had disapproved of 
Feng's army-building program. He clearly criticised P'eng's viewpoint to learn from 
Soviet military experience in his article On the Ten Great Relationships35 in April 1956, 
in which he commented that "We must analyse and learn critically.... We must not create 
a bias for copying any and everything foreign, for mechanically transplanting it". After the 
Twentieth CPSU Party Congress of the same year, the editorial department of the 
People's Daily published an article On the Historical Experience of Proletarian 
Dictatorship, strongly attacking dogmatism. In June of the same year, the CCPCC 
further issued a Circular on studying five documents including "Improve Our Study", 
indicating the importance to "overcome subjectivism in our daily works, which refers to 
dogmatism and experimentalism".36 
Presided by P'eng Te-huai, the convening of the enlarged meeting of the CCPCC Military 
Commission between 27 May and 22 July 1956 was aimed at resolving three major issues 
in the army so as to support P'eng's army-building program, namely, the army-building 
policy including party leadership, inner army relationship and the relationship between the 
people and the army; army-building approach including the modernisation and 
regularisation of the army-building program; and strategic approach including the 
preparation of a war and the organisation and construction in all armed services.37 On 9 
June, however, the theme of the meeting changed and the situation began to turn "left" 
when Huang K'e-ch'eng passed on Mao's directions to the participants. Huang said, 
"Chairman Mao showed his great concern over this meeting. Nobody leaves until we have 
made certain progress... The Party secretary in all divisions must attend the meeting if we 
3 5 "On the Ten Great Relationship (April 1956)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979-A 
DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 325-331. 
36THE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF P'ENG TE-HUAI, op. cit., p. 545. 
37Ibid., p. 551. 
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wish to extend the scope of the meeting. Chairman Mao also indicated one important 
point, that is, dogmatists ignore the truth that the existence of a society decides people's 
mentality, and people's mentality can in turn affect the existence of a society. They do not 
realise the fact that a big nation has its own Constitution , whereas a small nation also has 
its own Constitution. The rules and regulations of the Soviet Army can only grow in 
Soviet soil. They deny the existence of the Chinese society and the fact that China's has 
its own special character".38 
At the "Conference of Party's Leading Cadres on National Military System", presided over 
by P'eng between 7 December 1953 and 26 January 1954, P'eng had made a compromise 
on the political commissar's position in the army. He was forced to give up the system of 
unified leadership under a military commander in the army, and adopted the system of 
leading cadre's responsibility under the leadership of the army and party.39 This 
compromise, however, did not make Mao loose his attack on P'eng in the subsequent 
"Conference on Opposition to Dogmatism". 
The removal of Mao Tse-tung's thought in the Party Constitution of Eighth CCP National 
Congress was the prerequisite for turning the PLA into a professional and regular national 
army. While this move was enough to deepen Mao's disapproval of P'eng Te-huai, the 
leading figure of army-building program of professionalisation and regularisation. P'eng's 
attempt to reconstruct the army into a modernised armed force had offended Mao. After 
the Eighth CCP National Congress, Mao began to reconstruct the army to ensure "red" 
above "expert", and the long-standing tradition of "party command the gun", and to 
further secure his supreme leadership. 
3*Ibid, pp. 509-513. 
39lbid, p. 552. 
126 
Shortly after the Eighth CCP National Congress, Lo Jung-huan was dismissed from his 
post as Director of the General Political Department at the end of 1956 because of his 
failure to proceed with political works in the army, giving a free hand for PLA to move 
towards the road of "expert but not red". In November 1957, Liu Po-ch'eng who 
supported P'eng Te-huai's army-building program of regularisation was also discharged 
from the post of Director of the Department of Training Supervision and the President of 
the Military Academy. 
To correct the deviation of "only expert but not red", the PLA set off a movement to 
"send cadres from higher to lower organs" between the end of 1957 and beginning of 
1958, there was a program for regular cadres "to merge with the soldiers in practical 
work, eat, sleep and operate together so as to learn their skills".40 Between 27 May and 
22 July 1958, the CCPCC Military Commission held an enlarged meeting in Peking, in 
which Mao seriously condemned P'eng's army-building program,41 he believed the army-
building program promoted by P'eng would not only belittle the importance of party in the 
army, but would also change the principle of "party commands the gun". In fact, what 
Mao could not tolerate was the fact that the army-building program of regularisation 
would weaken his control over the armed forces. Mao had been attempting to take 
overall control of the army since he became Chairman of the CCPCC Military 
Commission in January 1935 at the "Tsunyi conference", he initiated the well-known 
dictum "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun", believing that only through firm 
control of the armed forces could he maintain his supreme power. Once the professional 
militarists fostered by P'eng Te-huai's army-building program of regularisation were in 
power, they would become the major threat to Mao's leadership among the army and the 
40HoLung, "Fight for the Continuous Progress of Military Works", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 29, Sep. 1959. 
41WHOSE WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, (Shanghai: 
People's Press, 1983), p. 398. 
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party. Mao therefore began his power-seizure struggle after the Eighth CCP National 
Congress, and Lin Piao was the person whom he appointed to launch this series of attacks. 
Before the Eighth CCP National Congress, Lin Piao ranked the last among the 13 
members of the Political Bureau of the CCPCC. The order was: Mao Tse-tung, Liu 
Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Lin Tzu-han, Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Yun, Dung Pi-wu, 
P'eng Cheng, K'ang Sheng, P'eng Te-huai, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and Lin Piao.42 After the 
Eighth CCP National Congress, the Political Bureau was reorganised, and Lin Piao 
promoted to the seventh place among the total 17 members, only after Mao Tse-tung, Liu 
Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Ch'en Yun, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, but before P'eng Te-huai 
who ranked 14th of all. 4 3 At that time P'eng Te-huai was the First Vice-chairman of the 
CCPCC Military Commission and Minister of National Defence, while Lin Piao was 
merely Vice-chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission. Mao's intention to promote 
Lin and repress P'eng was quite obvious. At the Fifth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC in 
May 1958, Lin Piao was elected the Vice-chairman of Central Committee and a member 
of standing committee of Political Bureau,44 his political position in the party had 
surpassed that of Feng's. 
After Lin Piao was promoted to the Vice-chairman of the Central Committee, he delivered 
a speech to the senior cadres of the army, in which he attacked P'eng by saying, but 
without mentioned his name, "ignoring politics is backwardness, anyone who is politically 
backward will lose his direction, cannot see through the main stream and the essence, and 
thus will put himself in an improper position"; "someone said only foreign things are real 
things, this is wrong... comrade Mao Tse-tung's military writings are military science and 
42THE SUM-UP STUDY OF EIGHTH CCP NATIONAL CONGRESS, (Taipei: Bureau of Investigation, 
Ministry of Judicial Administration, 1956), p. 136. 
"WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, op. cit., p. 689. 
"Ibid., p. 398 
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are the creative development of Marxism-Leninism in the military aspect", "our army is for 
the service of politics, we take politics to be the guide of the military, and the guide of 
routine tasks. Politics is the most basic foundation. A political backward will also lag 
behind in any other aspects".45 
Lin Piao's speech undoubtedly revealed an important political signal - that was, the 
increasing conflicts between "red" and "expert". A year later, the struggle to purge P'eng 
Te-huai at the "Lushan conference" between July and August 1959 formally broke out. 
On 17 August 1958, after the CCPCC adopted the "Resolution on the Establishment of 
People's Communes in the Rural Areas"46 when the Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo of 
the CCPCC convened at Peitaiho, Mao began to take each people's commune as a unit 
and to organise the masses in a form of militia for carrying out the policy of "the whole 
nation in arms", and to expand the armed forces through militarisation of organisation, 
aggression of action, and collectivisation of life. It was an arduous, massive, and political 
task for the PRC to implement the policy of "the whole nation in arms". Mao aimed at 
proceeding with ideological reform through nation-wide political mobilisation and 
consolidating the "supreme" position of Maoist thought. 
"The basic line of the militia is the leadership of the Party Committees and is 'politics takes 
the lead'. They must think in accordance with Maoist thought".47 From the political 
viewpoint, the movement of "the whole nation in arms" was, to a certain extent, the 
reflection of Mao's disapproval of P'eng Te-huai's taking the Soviet line and his army-
45Li T'ien-min, THE PROFILE OF LINP1AO, (Hong Kong: Ming Daily Press, 1978), p. 90 
46"Central Committee Decision on People's Communes, (29 August 1958)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 678-684; or see NEW CHINA 
NEWS AGENCY, 9 September 1958. 
47Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, "ExpandMilitia Division", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 30, Oct. 1958 
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building program of regularisation. Mao attempted to suppress P'eng Te-huai with a 
Maoist army. 
In view of nation-wide disasters caused by the "Three Red Banners" movement,48 P'eng 
spoke to the Northwest group meeting consecutively from 3 to 4 and 6 to 10 July in the 
enlarged meeting of politburo of the CCPCC between 3 and 23 July (also known as 
Lushan conference), criticising the policy of the Great Leap Forward, the focal points in 
his speech are summarised as follows: Firstly, the fault of bureaucracy - it is very easy to 
make the mistake of bureaucracy because the application of the party's prestige will 
certainly gain the trust of the masses, but it will also produce more administrative 
orders. .. It is every one's responsibility, including comrade Mao Tse-tung, to criticise the 
fault of bureaucracy. Secondly, the fault of boasting and exaggeration - the over-
estimating of the output of agricultural production at the commune in chairman Mao's 
home town created a false appearance. And finally, the fault of left adventurism - politics 
and economics each have their own rules, and thus economic development cannot be 
replaced by ideological education.49 
P'eng Te-huai did not speak about military affairs in his capacity as Minister of National 
Defence, rather he placed emphasis on the criticism of economical production. The 
emphasis of "bureaucracy" and "politics and economics each have their own rules" in his 
speech at the Lushan conference was in fact showing his dissatisfaction of Mao's 
oppression of regularised army building. P'eng's "politics and economics are two different 
48Three Red Banners - the Great Leap Forward, the General Line for Socialist Construction and the 
People's Communes. For details refer to "The Eighth CCPCC Convened 1st 9th Plenary Session", 
PEOPLE'S DAILY, 21Jan. 1961. 
49THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF P'ENG TE-HUAI, (Peking: People's Press, 1981), pp. 281-287; Wang 
Yuan, PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE, (Taipei: Department of East Asia Studies, National 
Cheng-chi University, 1982), pp. 158-162; Ting Wang, "Issues of P'eng Te-huai Event", COLLECTIONS 
OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION OF THE P.R.C., Vol. Ill, (Hong Kong: Ming Daily Press, 1969), pp. 
1-3. 
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things" had a further implication - that was, "politics and military are different". The 
original aim of the Lushan conference was to target the "anti-leftists", but the situation 
was reversed and P'eng was classified as the "anti-party group" and of being a 
"representative of rightist opportunism attacking the party". When Mao threatened that "If 
we deserve to perish then I'll go away, go to the countryside to lead the peasants and 
overthrow the government, if you (the Liberation Army) don't follow me, I'll go and find a 
Red Army, I think the Liberation Army will follow me".50 
At the conference, Mao accused P'eng of "recruiting men and buying horses" and being 
"overweeningly ambitious", and further the "Resolution of the Eighth Plenary Session of 
the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Concerning the Anti-party 
Clique Headed by P'eng Te-huai", passed on 16 Aug., especially pointed out the 
following: "P'eng Te-huai has long been making vicious attacks and spreading slanders 
inside the party and the armed forces against comrade Mao Tse-tung, the leader of the 
party, and against other leading comrades of the Central Committee and its military 
commission. He took the Lushan meeting as his opportune moment. Because of his 
position in the Central Committee and in the People's Liberation Army, and also because 
of his tactics of feigning candour and frugality, P'eng Te-huai's activities could and did 
mislead a number of people, they are fraught with danger for the future of the party and 
the People's Liberation Army".51 
Mao's intention to purge P'eng was very obvious, it was a problem of the primacy of the 
political role. P'eng assertedly negated "politics in command" and declared training and 
50"Mao Tse-tung's speech at the Eighth Plenary Session of the CCP's Eighth Central Committee", 
ISSUES AND STUDIES, Vol. VI, No. 7, (April 1970), pp. 80-86 
5 1 "Central Committee Resolution on P'eng Te-huai (16 August 1959)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 755; NEW CHINA NEWS 
AGENCY, 15 August 1967. 
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military science the key to army building. He was further accused of discarding PLA 
traditions and instead slavishly copying "Soviet revisionist" methods. P'eng allegedly even 
sought to replace the collective leadership of party committees with one man leadership 
and also to abolish political commissars. Moreover, he reportedly claimed modern 
warfare made "Mao Tse-tung's military thinking...out of date and no longer applicable". 
He assertedly opposed Mao's 1958 program of greatly expanding the militia under the 
slogan "everyone a soldier".52 An editorial of the Liberation Army's Daily clearly pointed 
out the reason for Peng's fall from power, it stated "the chief members of the anti-party 
group that were exposed by the Party in the Lushan conference, making use of their seized 
posts from the army, attempted to abolish the absolute leadership of the party in the army 
and the political works, abolish the army's participation in socialist construction and the 
tasks for the masses, abolish local forces and militia, and fundamentally negating Mao's 
people's army and the ideology of the people's war".53 
After P'eng fell from power, Lin Piao replaced him as Minister of National Defence and 
was promoted to the post as the First Vice-chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission, 
and handled its day-to-day works. Shortly after his rise to power, Lin made the following 
comments directed against P'eng's modernised army building: In the stage of building up 
modernised armed forces when our armed forces are constantly improving their technical 
equipment, and attaching greater importance than before to learning and improving their 
skills... Some cadres are of the opinion that modern warfare is different from that of the 
past. When our troops fought with very backward arms and equipment, they depended 
primarily upon men, relying on the bravery and wisdom of men to win battles. Modern 
warfare involves technology, iron and steel, and machinery. In the face of these things, the 
52NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 30, July and 19, Aug. 1967; Frederick C. Twiwes, POLITICS AND 
PURGES IN CHINA, (Kent: Dawson & Son Ltd., 1979), p. 425. 
53LIBERA TION ARMY'S DAILY, 1, June 1966. 
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function of man should retreat to a position secondary in importance. They hold in esteem 
only machines and also attempt to change revolutionary soldiers into mechanical men 
devoid of their revolutionary spirit of initiative. We are different from these. In our 
opinion, while equipment and technology are important, nevertheless, the factor of man is 
even more important. Technology itself is to be mastered by man. Man and things should 
be united, with man the leading factor.54 
Lin's emphasis of the importance of man in modern war in fact reflected Mao Tse-tung's 
military thinking. As early as December 1929, the resolution drawn up by Mao for the 
Ninth Party Assembly of the Fourth Army of the Red Army On Correcting Mistaken 
Ideas in the Party, indicated that a purely military viewpoint is one of the mistaken 
ideas.55 The article Long Live the Victory of the People's War subsequently delivered by 
Lin Piao in September 1962 pointed out, "The essence of comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory 
of army building is that in building a people's army prominence must be given to politics, 
that is, the army must first and foremost be built on a political basis. Politics is the 
commander, politics is the soul of everything. Political work is the lifeline of our army. 
True, a people's army must pay attention to the constant improvement of its weapons and 
equipment and its military technique; but in its fighting it does not rely purely on weapons, 
and technique, it relies mainly on politics".56 
After Lin Piao became the Minister of National Defence and took charge of the CCPCC 
54Ta Kurtg Daily, 30, Sep. 1959; Lin Piao, "March Ahead under the Red Flag of the Party's General Line 
and Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking", RED FLAG, No. 19, Oct. 1959, pp. 16-25; "Lin Piao on the 
Maoist Line in Military Affairs (29 Sep. 1959)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979- A 
DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 781; PEOPLE'S DAILY, 29, Sep. 1959. 
5S"On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec, 1929)", THE SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-
TUNG, Vol. 1(1975), op. cit., p. 105. 
S6"Peking's Defence Minister States the Maoist Line on Vietnam (3 Sep. 1965) ", (also known as Lin Piao, 
"Long Live the Victory of People's War"), THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A 
DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 1229. 
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Military Commission, he began to enhance the political role of the army in accordance 
with Maoist lines, and rectify basic party organisation of the army so as to strengthen 
party's control over the army. The Enlarged Meeting of the CCPCC Military Commission 
which was held in Peking from 14 September to 20 October 1960, took up Lin Piao's 
proposal to strengthen political and ideological works as its central topic of discussion, 
with the concern and guidance given to it by the central authorities of the party and Mao. 
The meeting then passed the "Resolution on Strengthening the Political and Ideological 
Works in the Army", which stated clearly: Mao Tse-tung's thought, whether in the past, at 
present , or in the future, serves always as the guide for the building up our army and 
consequently also for the conduct of political and ideological work there.... In the 
important period of building a new, modernised revolutionary army, and having criticised 
and corrected the bourgeois military line advocated by P'eng Te-huai and Huang K'e-
ch'eng, we made another new development in the political work of our army.57 In 
addition, the first article of the resolution was "hold high the red flag of Mao Tse-tung's 
thought, and to know it thoroughly" for the reason that "Mao Tse-tung is the guiding 
force of the Chinese people's revolution and of socialist construction, a powerful 
ideological weapon against imperialism, revisionism, and dogmatism. Mao Tse-tung's 
thought not only provides a steadfast political direction for our army, but also the only 
correct line for the building of our army. Hence to raise high the red flag of Mao Tse-
tung's thought, to fill the minds of all commanding officers with Mao's thought, to insist 
on its supremacy in all departments of work in the most fundamental task of political and 
ideological in our army".58 
57"Reindoctrinating the People's Liberation Army (October 1960), THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 882; J. Chester Cheng, (ed.), THE 
POUTICS OF THE CHINESE RED ARMY: A TRANSLATION OF THE BULLETIN OF ACTIVITIES OF 
THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (Stanford University: Hoover Institution Press, 1966), p. 480 
58"The Reindoctrinating the People's Liberation Army (October 1960)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 884. 
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The fall of P'eng Te-huai and the rise of Lin Piao formally marked the end of the PLA's 
army-building program of professionalisation and regularisation, the PLA once again 
returned to the same old road determined by the Kutien resolution. The PLA's new tasks 
was once again aimed at building up a political army at the time when the last group of 
"Chinese people's volunteers" retreated from North Korea on 16 October 1958, and when 
General Yang Young, who suceeded Peng as the commander of "Chinese people's 
volunteers", reported to the Standing Committee of National People's Congress and the 
Enlarged Joint Conference of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and 
the Standing Committee of National Committee Conference on 30 October, stating that 
"the great victory of the struggle to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea is in fact the 
victory of the Party's and Chairman Mao's brilliant decision-making, it also means the 
victory of chairman Mao's thought".59 Mao was marching to the climax of his career. 
59Yang Ytlng, "The Work Report on Eight Year's Experience of Chinese People's Volunteers to Resist U.S. 
Aggression and Aid Korea", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 31, Oct. 1958. 
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II. The Impact of Sino-Soviet Conflicts on the Development of the 
Political Role of the PLA 
Before the establishment of the PRC's regime, Mao's policy of "leaning to the side of 
Soviet Union" was determined in his paper On People's Democratic Dictatorship in July 
1949, which clearly stated, "We are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and 
consolidate it we must lean to one side. In the light of the experience, all Chinese without 
exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on 
the fence will not do, nor is there a third road".60 "It was through the Russians that the 
Chinese found Marxism. .. The salvoes of the October Revolution brought us Marxism-
Leninism. October Revolution helped progressives in China to adopt the proletarian 
world outlook as the instrument for studying a nation's destiny and considering anew their 
own problems. Follow the path of Russians - that was my conclusion".61 
Mao visited the Soviet Union from 16 December 1949 to 17 February 1950 and signed the 
following - "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet 
Union and the People's Republic of China"; "Agreement between the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China on the Chinese Changchun 
Railway, Port Arthur and Dairen"; and "Agreement between the Government of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Central People's Government of the People's 
Republic of China on Granting Credits to the People's Republic of China".62 By it terms: 
60"On the People's Democratic Directorship (30 June 1949) - In Commemoration of the Twenty-eighth 
Anniversary of the Communist Party of China", THE SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. IV 
(1969), op. cit, p. 415. 
61lbid., p. 413 
62"Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the Soviet and the People's Republic of 
China (14 Feb. 1950)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY 
SURVEY, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 123-126; Michael B. Yahuda, CHINA'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS", 
(London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 51-52; Ho Kan-chih, THE HISTORY OF MODERN CHINA'S 
REVOLUTION, (Shanghai: People's Press, 1985), p. 341 
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(1) The Soviet Union was to maintain its special privileges in Machuria with regard to the 
Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dairen until a peace treaty was signed with 
Japan or until 1952, whichever came sooner; (2) The Soviet Union would advance to 
China a credit of 300 million American dollars, taking 35 American dollars to one ounce 
of fine gold, over five years as from 1 January 1950; (3) The independence of Mongolia 
was recognised; (4) Certain property acquired by the Soviet Union from the Japanese in 
Manchuria would be returned to China without charge, as would some property in Peking. 
On 17 February 1950, Mao delivered a farewell speech in Moscow, and said, "It is 
obvious to see that the unity between the two nations bound by the treaties is solid and 
unbreakable. Such unity not only will ensure the prosperity of our two major powers, but 
also will influence the future of mankind, and the peace and justice of the world".63 
Khrushchev visited Peking between September and October 1954 for the PRC's Fifth 
Anniversary Celebrations, and made two declarations and four Sino-Soviet communiques. 
The two declarations were "Joint Declaration of the Government of China and the 
Government of the USSR" and "Sino-Soviet Joint Declaration on Relations with Japan", 
and the four Sino-Soviet communiques included "On the Withdrawal of Soviet Armed 
forces from Port Arthur", "On Transfer of Soviet Shares in Joint Stock Companies to 
China", "On Scientific and Technical Co-operation Agreement", and "On Construction of 
Lanchow-Urumchi-Alma Ata Railway"; and one "Sino-Soviet-Mongolian Joint 
Communique on Construction of Chiling-Ulan Bator Railway".64 They stipulated that: (1) 
The Soviet Union agrees to increase economic aid to the PRC; (2) The Soviet Union 
agrees to the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from port Arthur, and would return it to 
63Ho Kan-chih, op. cit., p. 341 
64"Communiques and Joint Declaration by China and the Soviet Union (12 October 1954)", THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1979, A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, I, op. cit., pp. 139-142, or 
see NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 12 October 1954. 
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the PRC without charge; (3) The two sides will provide each other with technical data, 
exchange related information and send specialists to give technical assistance and acquaint 
each other with their achievements in the fields of science and technology. 
During the 20th conference of party representatives convened by CPSU in Moscow in 
February 1956, Khrushchev openly criticised Stalin, his predecessor, accused him of 
brutally murdering Red Army generals, alleged that over 70 percent of the party 
representatives elected by the political commissars at the 17th conference of party 
representatives was secretly executed by him, and castigated Stalin for developing a 
personality cult in his later years which had seriously jeopardised the development of 
Soviet socialism.65 
Meanwhile, Khrushchev asserted that a war is avoidable, "peaceful coexistence" and 
"peaceful competition" were possible in countries of different social systems, and that 
"peaceful transition" from a capitalist to a socialist society was workable through 
parliamentary struggles. This meant that the idea to "regard violent and civil war as the 
only means leading to the socialist re-construction" in the course of transition from a 
capitalist to a socialist society was wrong, while political power could be obtained through 
the parliamentary elections, and socialist construction could then proceed. Khrushchev's 
sum-up report delivered at the 20th conference of party representatives had seriously 
struck at Mao's personal leadership and Maoist revolutionary viewpoints. 
In response to this report, an enlarged conference of the CCPCC Political Bureau was 
convened in April, and passed the resolution on some questions concerning the struggle of 
65Nikita Khrushchev, "The Sum-up Report on the 20th Conference of Party Representatives of the 
CPSU", THE COLLECTIONS OF THE ORIGINAL DATA OF SINO-SOVIET CONFLICTS, (Taipei: 
Institute of International Relations, 1964), pp. 1-56. 
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Stalin. The People's Daily published an article On the Historical Experience of the 
Proletariat6 in the name of the editorial department, stating that Khrushchev's struggle 
against Stalin could not be fully approved, and that Stalin's achievements were greater 
than his faults. Subsequently in December of the same year, Stalin's merits and 
achievements were restated in the paper On the Historical Experience of Proletarian 
Dictatorship Once Again.61 
Nevertheless, the criticism of Stalin at the 20th conference of party representatives 
convened by the CPSU had brought about a chain reaction in the PRC. In spite of a series 
of criticism against the struggle of Stalin by the official media, the Eighth CCP National 
Congress adopted a resolution to remove Mao Tse-tung's thought as the guiding principle 
for the Party from the Party Constitution of the Seventh CCP National Congress under the 
initiation of Liu Shao-ch'i. This laid a remote course for the subsequent inner-party power 
struggle. It also influenced the development of the political role of the PLA. From then 
on, The struggle against Khrushchev was aimed at Liu Shao-ch'i for Liu was called the 
agent of Soviet revisionism. Similarly, P'eng Te-huai's army-building program to learn 
from the Soviet army came to an end with the deteriorating of Sino-Soviet relationship. 
Furthermore, the Peitaiho conference, an enlarged meeting of the CCPCC politburo held 
at Peitaiho between 17 and 30 August 1958, passed the resolution to establish "People's 
Communes". To ensure this policy would be consistent with communist theory, the 
CCPCC asserted that the "people's communes is the best organisational form to expedite 
socialism and to transit to communism. The implementation of People's Communes is 
aimed at expediting socialist construction in the first place, followed by seeking a practical 
66"On the Historical Experience of Proletariat", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 5, April, 1956. 
67"On the Historical Experience of Proletariat Once Again", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 29 Dec. 1956. 
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route to transfer to the communism via the people's commune".68 The CCPCC regarded 
the people's commune as an organisation that would avoid any winding roads to transfer 
to a communist society. In other words, it implied that Mao had successfully resolved the 
issue of communist construction in backward countries, and that it had a profound 
significance on the development of the entire international communist movement. This 
argument was tantamount to the discarding of Soviet experience in socialist construction 
and proved a challenge to the Soviet leadership. 
A series of counter-measures was taken by the CPSU to cope with the ideological 
challenge of CCPCC. In response to the implementation of People's Communes, the 
CPSU issued the programme of "Seven Year Plan" in November 1958, which according to 
Khrushchev, the realisation of "seven year plan" meant the completion of fundamental 
tasks of communist construction of Soviet Union.69 Such behaviour was clearly a 
manifestation of disapproval by using the arguments of CPSU's communist society against 
that of CCPCC's people's commune. Furthermore, the CPSU leadership condemned the 
impropriety of people's commune, for it had made the mistakes of a "small bourgeois 
fever" and run counter to scientific laws, attempting to construct socialist society in 
haste.70 Khrushchev had clearly expressed this viewpoint by saying when H. H. 
Humphrey, U.S. senator visiting Moscow on 1 December 1958, that "the people's 
commune is not only out of date, but also reactionary".71 
Moreover, In a report at the 21st representative conference convened by CPSU in 
Moscow on 27 January 1959, Khrushchev promoted the slogan "transition to 
68"The Resolution on Some Issues about the Establishment of People's Commune in the Rural Area", 
PEOPLE'S DAILY, 10 Sep. 1958. 
69Nikita Khrushchev, "Report on the 21st conference of party representatives of CPSU", PEOPLE'S 
DAILY, 1 Feb., 1959. 
70PEOPLE'SDAILY, 1 Feb., 1959 and 27 April 1964. 
7 1 LIFE, 12 Jan. 1959, pp. 80-91. 
140 
communism", which he indicated "no society can leap from capitalism to communism 
without passing through the stage of social development. The realisation of communism 
can only be advanced gradually according to productive conditions, not by leaping".72 
Khrushchev implied that the construction of communist society by implementing the 
"Great Leap Forward" was against the pattern of historical development". 
In response to the criticism of the CPSU, the CCP struck back by quoting the theory of 
Marx, Lenin and Stalin. They argued that the people's commune was a "new-born 
phenomenon", it manifested itself as "the struggle between old and new, between decline 
and progress - and it is the foundation of our development".73 The People's Daily also 
reaffirmed the by saying "the Great Leap Forward is the transition from socialism to 
communism and is the manifestation of the theory of continuous revolution and the stage 
of revolutionary development".74 
As Soviet Union did not agree with the PRC's "Three Red Banners" movement, at the 
21st representative conference in January 1959, Khrushchev gave strong condemnation on 
Mao's people's commune policy for its lack of material foundation, and on the retarded 
economy and backward industry and agriculture brought about by the "Great Leap 
Forward" movements. On 6 September of the same year, Soviet Union unilaterally tore 
up "the agreement of new technology in national defence" concluded with PRC in October 
1957.75 The Peking government was aware of the seriousness of this matter, and 
therefore strongly opposed the coming U.S.- Soviet talks in Camp David openly. The 
72Nikita Khrushchev, "Report on the 21st conference of party representatives of CPSU", PEOPLE'S 
DAILY, 1 Feb. 1959. 
73"How should Marxists Treat the Newborn Object", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 29 Feb. 1960. 
74"On Continuous Revolution and On the Stage of Revolutionary Development", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 27 
July, 1959. 
7 5 "The Origin and Development of the Difference between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves", 
THE POLEMIC ON THE GENERAL UNE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, 
PEOPLE'S DAILY, 6 Sep., 1963. 
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second day after his return from Camp David, Khrushchev immediately flew to Peking to 
explain the purpose of his visit to the States, and clearly advised the Peking leadership that 
they "should not misuse armed force to test the stability of capitalist system",76 he also 
reaffirmed the Soviet position, and indicated that the policy of peaceful coexistence was a 
means of struggle in a peaceful way, such a struggle was political or economic, but not 
military. 
Mao could not tolerate compromise between the Soviet Union and capitalism. He began 
to launch ideological attacks from April 1960 in the name of commemorating the 90th 
anniversary of Lenin's birth and published a series of article in Red Flag and the People's 
Daily to denounce the Soviet Union, which included On Imperialism as the Source of 
Contemporary War and the Road to Peace that Chinese People Strive for, Long Live 
Leninism, Advance along the Footpath of the Great Lenin, Unite under the Revolutionary 
Banner of Lenin and The Theory of Peace and War.11 
In addition to the use of Lenin's writings to attack Khrushchev's policy in a planned way, 
the CCPCC issued a succession of 9 comprehensive statements78 to criticise the CPSU's 
open letter in the name of the editorial department of People's Daily and Red Flag 
76"How Does the Differences Begin?", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 27 Feb., 1963. 
77"On Imperialism Is the Source of Contemporary War, And the Road to Peace that Chinese People 
Strive for", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 1 April, 1960; "Long Live The Leninism", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 16 April, 
1960; "Advance along the Footpath of Greatest Lenin", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 22 April, 1960; "Unite under 
the Revolutionary Banner of Lenin", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 23 April, 1960. 
78The 9 comprehensive statements include: The origin and development of the differences between the 
leadership of the CPSU and ourselves (3 Sep. 1963); On the question of Stalin (13 Sep. 1963); Is 
Yugoslavia a socialist country? (26 Sep. 1963); Apologists of neo-colonialism (22 Oct. 1963); Two 
different lines on the question of war and peace (19 Nov. 1963); Peaceful coexistence - two diametrically 
opposed policies (12 Dec. 1963); The leaders of the CPSU are the greatest splitters of our times (4 Feb. 
1964); The proletarian revolution and Khrushchev's revisionism (31 Mar. 1964); and On Khrushchev's 
phoney communism and its historical lessons for the world (14 Jul. 1964). For details refer to THE 
POLEMIC ON THE GENERAL LINE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, (Peking: 
Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 55-467; or see Peking Review No. 37, 1963, pp. 6-20; No. 38, 1963, 
pp. 8-15; No. 39, 1963, pp. 14-27; No. 43, 1963, pp. 6-15; No. 47, 1963, pp. 6-16; No. 51, 1963, pp. 6-
13; No. 6, 1964, pp.5-21; No. 14, 1964, pp. 5-21; No. 29, 1964, pp. 7-27, 
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between 6 September 1963 and July 1964. 
In PRC's viewpoints that "Khrushchev and his followers have clearly betrayed 
international proletariat and world revolutionary people, degenerated themselves to the 
extent of colluding with imperialists and all reactionaries to work together against people's 
revolutionary struggles of each nation",79 and that it was Khrushchev, who took one-sided 
criticism on the labour party of Albania at the 22nd representative conference, and CPSU 
headed by Khrushchev to stir up an "unfriendly and insulting" open polemic in the first 
place; and further intensified the polemics in the movement of communist internationalism 
by issuing "The Open Letter of CPSU to All Party Organisations and All Communists of 
Soviet Union" on 14 July 1963, to attack Chinese Communist Party unilaterally. The 
leadership of CPSU should take all the responsibilities.80 
The ideological disputes between Peking and Moscow was not only over the general line 
of international communist movement, but, under the mask, it was used by Mao as a 
means of power struggle. The struggle of Stalin by the CPSU alluded to the fact that 
Mao's position in the party would face a challenge. Mao's opposition to Khrushchev was 
in fact to protect himself, and to recognise Stalin's achievements was to consolidate his 
position in the party. Moreover, Khrushchev disapproved of the movement of People's 
Communes and regarded it as the "small bourgeois fever", however, he didn't realise that 
Mao's People's Communes was not really aimed at quickly transmitting to communism. It 
was only one of Mao's army-building programs to turn "everyone a soldier". This 
program was an important means for carrying out Mao's "people's war", and in Mao's 
view, the "people's war" carried strong political flavour, the general picture of this can be 
""Comment on the Selected Works of Khrushchev, Vol. V", RED FLAG, No. 4, 1965, pp. 14-15. 
80"Comment on the conference convened by the Leadership of CPSU Started from 1 March", RED FLAG, 
No. 4, 1965, pp. 27-28. 
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clearly seen in Mao's early writings. 
In the course of the deteriorating relationship between China and Soviet Union, the 
Chinese inner-party struggle was already in full progress. At Lushan conference in 1959, 
P'eng Te-huai, Minister of National Defence, wrote a "letter of opinion" to Mao, stating 
his disapproval of the Great Leap Forward. Mao thereby arranged the removal of P'eng 
and his replacement by Lin Piao as the Minister of National Defence. 
In the 60s, when the breach between China and Soviet Union became complete, the PRC 
fell into a strategic predicament, facing a possible pincer attack from the United States and 
the Soviet Union as two potential enemies. This was the biggest threat to the PRC's 
national security which Lin had to encounter after he becoming the Minister of National 
Defence. On one hand, Lin had to pacify the army's morale and eradicate Peng's influence 
in the army, terminate the army-building policy of learning from the Soviet Union and 
avoid any Soviet influence, and brought the army back to the traditional line of Maoist 
"political army building"; on the other hand, Lin had to find a way to deal with the military 
threat from the United States and the Soviet Union, two superpowers, for the safeguard of 
it's national security. Within these circumstances, the relationship between the military line 
and politics was in practice a kind of compromise. 
In politics, immediately after Lin Piao assumed power, he delivered the paper March 
Ahead under the Red Flag of the Party General Line and Mao Tse-tung's Military 
Thinking*1, in which he stressed the following: 
8 1 "Lin Piao on the Maoist Line in Military Affairs (29 September 1959)", (also known as Lin Piao, 
"March Ahead under the Red Flag of the Party's General Line and Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking), 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 
777-784; PEOPLE'S DAILY, 29 September 1959. 
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Firstly, "In the new historical era, political work and ideological work in the armed forces 
are extremely important and under no circumstances should this work be neglected. 
"Political work is the vital line of our armed forces' is a truth which has been proven by our 
armed forces through practice in revolution in the past several scores of years... In the 
course of modernising our armed forces, the most important side, not to forget politics 
and to emphasise the importance of political work. Our armed forces are military 
organisations serving politics and socialism. We must use politics to command and guide 
military affairs as well as other daily routine tasks, politics is the fundamental factor; we 
cannot talk about other work if we fail to carry out political and ideological work 
properly".82 
Secondly, "We mentioned above that the PLA is an instrument of political struggle, 
revolutionary military personnel should not divorce themselves from politics but pay 
attention to and study politics. Mass movements and practice in socialist struggle are rich 
in politics. We must constantly maintain our connections with the masses and absorb the 
valuable experiences from revolutionary mass movements... Experience has repeatedly 
shown that participation by the armed forces in the mass campaign has always been the 
most vital, most intensive, and richest political lesson for the officers and men of the 
armed forces".83 
Thirdly, "The absolute leadership of the party over the troops and the strong party 
character of the broad masses of cadres in our armed forces constitute the greatest 
assurance of victory for the undertakings of national defence in the socialist construction 
of our country. In his article on The Question of War and Struggle, comrade Mao Tse-
tung said: 'From the viewpoint of Marxist theory concerning the state the armed forces 
82lbid., p. 779; RED FLAG, No. 19, 1959, p. 19. 
™Ibid, p. 781. 
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constitute an essential part of the political power of a state. Whoever intends to seize the 
political power of a nation and to maintain it should have powerful armed forces'84... In 
the same article, he also said: 'Members of the communist party will not fight for their own 
personal power over the troops (they must never fight for that and never follow the 
example of Chang Kuo-t'ao). However, they should fight for the power of the party over 
the troops, and the power of the people over the troops... Our principle is to have the 
party directing the guns, and never allow the guns to direct the party'".85 
And Finally, "Party character is not an abstract thing. To the communist party members 
and the cadres who are working in the armed forces, a resolute party character should 
express itself in the form of determination to defend the unity of the party at any time and 
under any circumstances, and in wholeheartedness in carrying out the struggle for the 
program and line of the party".86 
Moreover, Lin attacked P'eng, although not by name, for his army-building line, and 
"promptly criticised and firmly corrected these mistaken viewpoints, continuously 
developed the long-standing glorious tradition of our army, capable of carrying out three 
tasks at the same time namely, fighting, holding mass campaigns campaign and 
participating in production".87 Lin ordered PL A to support mass movements in all aspects 
in accordance with the needs of socialist reform and socialist construction in different 
period of time. 
^"Problems of War and Strategy (6 Nov. 1938)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. II 
(1965), op. cit., p. 219. 
8i"March Ahead under the Red Flag of the Party's General Line and Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking), 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 
783; ibid, p. 224. 
S6Ibid., p. 783. 
87TaKung Daily, 30 Sep. 1959. 
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Lin redeveloped the tradition of "politics" which had long been neglected by the PLA in 
the era of P'eng Te-huai, strengthening the supremacy of Mao Tse-tung thought 
throughout the PLA within the system of the "party commands the gun", and demanding 
every member of the PLA to "study Chairman Mao's writing, follow his teachings and act 
according to his instructions, be chairman Mao's good fighters",88 "no matter what kind of 
'authority' there may be, whoever opposes Mao Tse-tung's thought should be punished by 
the party members and the people of the whole nation".89 The enlarged meeting of the 
CCPCC Military Commission was convened by Lin Piao from 14 to 20 September 1960, 
and passed the resolution "On Strengthening the Political and Ideological Works among 
the Army". It made the following points concerning the contents of ideological education 
in every day life: (1) Party line and policies as well as the directives of the central 
authorities of the party and chairman Mao; (2) The international and domestic situation 
and the task of the struggle; (3) Different tasks of various army units, such as the various 
military arms, various branches of service, the border and coastal defence forces, the 
people's armed forces, scientific research units, hospitals, military bases, warehouses, etc.; 
(4). Different ideological problems of different types of persons, such as veteran soldiers, 
new soldiers, the wounded, young intellectuals, those who have been punished, etc.; (5) 
The glorious tradition of PLA. Such as the purpose of building PLA, the system of 
leadership, the political system, the three-eight working style, the three main rules of 
discipline and the eight points for attention, the history of the PLA and its heroic events; 
(6) Festivals celebrating the revolution; (7) Commendation of good persons and good 
deeds, and criticism for bad tendencies, bad persons and bad deeds; (8) The various kinds 
of practical ideological problems.90 
88"The Cadres at All Levels Should Take the Lead to Put Mao's Tse-tung's Thinking in Command of 
Everything", RED FLAG, No. 8, 1966, p. 3. 
89"Mao Tse-tung's Thought is the Telescope and Microscope of Our Revolutionary Undertakings", 
LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, 7 June, 1966 
90"Reindoctrinating the People's Liberation Army (Oct. 1960)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBUC OF CHINA 
1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 889 
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The resolution laid down the following on the method of conducting living ideological 
teaching: (1) Combine political movements with regular education, simultaneously giving 
attention to the movements and to education; (2) The political organs at the divisional 
level and above should from time to time write some lectures and slogans to be recited at 
the time of roll call according to the state of conditions and the nature of duties in their 
respective units; or they can call preparatory meetings to arrange programs for practical 
ideological education; (3). Strengthen PL A viewpoints about the masses and labour, 
promote class awareness, advance the level of theoretical and policy understanding, 
broaden thought, and enrich intelligence through such activities as participating in mass 
movements; (4) Extensively and flexibly make use of such means as blooming, contending, 
debating, arguing, and big-character newspapers for posting on bulletin boards; (5) The 
form of political education must be varied. Adopting such forms as inviting leaders to 
give lectures; recalling incidents of the past as compared with the present; calling slogans 
at the time of reveille and retreat; issuing wall bulletins and big character newspapers; (6) 
All literacy and art work as well as cultural activity in army units, such as the plays of the 
cultural work troupe, amateur literary activities, motion pictures, broadcasting, arts, and 
library work, should serve the purpose of enhancing the proletariat and exterminating the 
bourgeoisie in combination with the state of ideological conditions and the nature of duties 
in the army units.91 
Furthermore, the resolution not only stressed that "The basic aim of our political 
education is to raise high the red flag of Mao Tse-tung's thought...in the course of 
teaching, we must elevate all practical problems arising from the revolutionary struggle to 
the level of Marxism-Leninism and explain them accordingly",92 but also demanded the 
91lbid. 
92Ibid., pp. 889-890 
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party committees "to strengthen the leadership of political work in the army unit" which 
included the following: (1) "The party committee must spend most of its energy in taking 
hold of problems involving policies and principles. It should frequently check the work of 
various departments and units in terms of party policies and principle. It must resolutely 
struggle with all those thoughts and kinds of behaviour which are in violation of the party 
line and policies". (2). "Party committees at various levels must put political and 
ideological work in the place of primary importance, frequently analyse and study the 
ideological tendency of the army units, hold special discussions in regard to political and 
ideological work, and check and direct the party's construction of ideology and 
organisation". (3) "It must carry through thoroughly the system of dual leadership of the 
military system and the local party committee over the army units under the unified 
leadership of the central authorities of the party". (4) "In order to strengthen the 
collective leadership within the leadership organs at various levels, it shall establish party 
committees in the headquarters and political departments at the army (provincial military 
district) level and above".93 
Lin Piao regarded this resolution as the one following and manifesting the spirit of the 
Kutien conference, it marked a new milestone in the progress of the PL A. Lin ordered the 
party committees and political organs at various levels to carry out promptly and 
thoroughly the resolutions of the Enlarged Meeting of the CCPCC Military Commission 
down to the primary level. All headquarters, military arms, branches of service, military 
regions and districts, and academics and schools should make a careful examination every 
six months of the results as shown in the attempt to carry out this resolution and report the 
result of the examination to the CCPCC Military Commission and General Political 
Department. The CCPCC Military Commission will check every year the results gained in 
93Ibid, pp. 895-896 
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carrying out this resolution. 
Since this Enlarged Meeting of the CCPCC Military Committee, political conferences have 
been held by the General Political Department of the PLA approximately once a year.95 A 
series of slogans and campaigns have been popularised, of which the most important are 
the "five-good" campaign for the rank-and-file soldier, the parallel "four-good" campaign 
for army companies, the "three-eight" working style, the "seven measures in improving 
leadership over companies", the "twelve basic experiences in company building", and the 
"company management and education" campaign.96 
Behind these slogans and campaigns, political education was through efforts to secure the 
loyalty of the individual rank-and-file soldier, and in particular the younger element in the 
PLA. Young soldiers were encouraged to join their local branch of the young communist 
league (YCL), or the soldiers club, and to compete in the five-good movement, which 
calls for good performance in political thinking, military training, style of work, fulfilment 
of tasks, and physical education, this movement extolled all the simple virtues and basic 
principles by which the personal behaviour of the individual soldier should be governed if 
he was to be truly "revolutionary". He should study Mao's writings, adroitly use and 
protect his weapons and equipment, obey orders promptly and agilely, acquire good habits 
of cleanliness and hygiene, etc.97 In accordance with the precept of Lin Piao that "one 
who knows nothing about exploitation knows nothing about revolution",98 young soldiers 
94lbid., p. 897 
95PLA political work conferences had been held in March 1961, 18 Oct. -11 Nov., 1961, February 1963, 
January 1964 and January 1966. See John Gittings, THE ROLE OF CHINESE ARMY, op. cit., p. 246. 
96For the test of these and other formulae, see "Terms of PLA Political Work", LIBERATION ARMY 
DAILY, 22 Jan. 1964. 
97John Gittings, THE ROLE OF CHINESE ARMY, op, cit., p. 249. 
98Quoted in "Comrade Hsiao Hua Dwells on Important Work of Company - Building at PLA Political 
Work Conference", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 15 November 1961; John Gittings, THE ROLE OF CHINESE 
ARMY, op. cit., p. 249. 
150 
were invited to re-create in their imaginations the bitter days of pre-liberation - a process 
known as the "recollection of past revolutionary songs, interviewed veterans, visited 
exhibitions of revolutionary relics, and read the memoirs of wartime heroes. 
The successful completion of rooting Maoist ideological works in the army encouraged 
Lin Piao to proceed to another even greater movement of God creation. On New Year's 
Day, 1964, he firstly called upon the people of the whole nation to learn from the 
experience of political works of the People's Liberation Army in the editorial of People's 
Daily." It constituted approval of commissar efforts to rectify the PL A and warned 
society of a new era that would bring the PLA into renewed contact with every aspect of 
economic, intellectual, and ultimately even political life in communist China. Within the 
military, the role of the commander was also in transition, his authority was eroded during 
this period as commissar responsibility increased at all levels. 
Subsequently, on 1 February, an article The Whole Country Must Learn from the People's 
Liberation Army was published in the editorial of People's Daily.100 It demanded that 
party and government leadership organs at all levels, all industrial and mining units, all 
business organisations, people's organisations, should strengthen their political-ideological 
works, and like the PLA, ensure that political-ideological work is truly and thoroughly 
implemented by the basic levels and should carry out ideological work in a painstaking and 
delicate manner, so as to lay a solid and secure foundation. The editorial also regarded 
that the reasons for the whole country placing political work in the first position in the 
same manner in which the PLA correctly handles the relationship between various tasks 
"PEOPLE'S DAILY, 1 Jan. 1964 
J00"The Whole Country Must Learn from the People's Liberation Army", PEOPLE'S DAILY, I Feb. 1964; 
LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, 1 Feb. 1964; and see "An Exhortation to Learn from the People's 
Liberation Army (1 February 1964)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A 
DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit.pp. 1010-1014 
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and political works was because politics is the supreme commander and the social, 
political work is not only the lifeline of the PLA, but also the lifeline of all revolutionary 
work and a basic guarantee for all other work. And, most importantly, the editorial once 
again stressed that the PLA could become an army of an extremely high proletarian and 
combat character, was mainly due to the fact that it has always raised high the great red 
banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought and put his ideas in command in carrying out all its 
tasks. 
Lin Piao carried out political and ideological works in a planned way, he firstly cast the 
PLA into the model for learning from Maoist ideological works, and further called upon 
the people of the whole nation to learn from the Liberation Army through the movement 
The Hole Country Must Learn from the People's Liberation Army, studying how to carry 
out the liberation of political ideology. The PLA became Lin Piao's major tool 
consolidating Mao's thought and once more played an important example of a political 
role in the idol worship of Mao. 
While the military, in view of the facts that a large amount of soldiers retired from the 
army after the Korean war, which had seriously jeopardised army's fighting capability, and 
that the PLA did not win the Taiwan Strait war and recover Taiwan, Penghu, and 
Quemoy, Matsu islands as it had planned, Lin Piao had to confess that "the situation has 
changed after the end of the movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, our 
soldiers have not gone through the test of a battle in recent years even for those who had 
war experience in the past", and therefore "politics is of the first and major importance in 
terms of the relationship between military and politics, while the military is of the first 
importance and should make more efforts than political training in terms of training" . 1 0 1 
1 0 1 WORK CIRCULAR, Vol. I, p. 9 
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After the Sino-Soviet split, several subsequent developments had additional adverse 
implications for the earlier emphasis on military technology. Commissars received 
increasing authority to supervise the economic drive and there was a revival of interest in 
an expanded militia and in the implementation of the "four-first" movement: the priority of 
man over weapons, of political work over other work, of ideology over administrative 
routine, and of living ideas over book ideas.102 As the economic crisis deepened, 
however, the concept of the role of the military shifted perceptibly from a former emphasis 
on orthodox combat to a concern for internal stability and mass mobilisation. 
In the early stage when Lin Piao took the post as the Minister of National Defence, he 
promoted a series of army rectification movements. These movements, however, was by 
no means aimed at the entire negation of military objectives that Peng set up in his days, 
because Lin had to handle the opposition force and firmly control the army. On the one 
hand, Lin Piao reduced total man hours devoted to non-professional activities such as land 
reclamation, and established a new training cycle for all regular units. On the other hand 
he encouraged commissars to devote more time to political indoctrination. There wasn't a 
great deal of difference between Lin and Feng in the goal of seeking the limited 
modernisation of PL A. 
In fact, the fundamental character of the PLA in the sixties was that it simultaneously 
proceeded with the development of weapon modernisation and they paid attention to the 
expansion of the political role of the army in the country. Above all, the value of nuclear 
weapons as a means of war deserved more attention and had political and military 
significance. In politics, the achievement of nuclear weapons had realised an historical 
l02Warren Kuo (ed.), A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY F CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, 
op. cit., p. 539. 
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pride in being suzerain state especially in the diplomatic arena, the PRC became the 
"hegemony" which the third world had to rely on. While in the military, Mao gradually 
developed the most important structure of the PLA's defensive strategy by integrating 
people's war with nuclear deterrence, and satisfying professional army officers' needs for 
modern military technology. 
Professional army officers, many of whom experienced overwhelming U.S. firepower 
during the Korea war, stressed the importance of nuclear weapons and modern military 
technology. Their arguments could be concluded as follows:103 
1. Military professionals believe that it is China, and not the Soviet Union that is a "paper 
tiger" doubting the ability of the PLA to respond effectively to an attack by superior 
Soviet force. 
2. They realise that, in the event of war with Moscow, China can do very little against the 
Soviet Union's deadly nuclear strike force combined with a quick and massive armoured 
and conventional attack. 
3. They believe that the Maoist military doctrine of guerrilla warfare is not now the 
"magic" formula for defeating Moscow. They believe that to speak strong but empty 
language when the country is in reality not strong would invite immediate danger and 
extinction.104 They accuse Mao of underestimating Soviet military strength with easy 
pride, optimism, and arrogance and also of treating military affairs in their nuclear age as 
something to toy with. 
mTai Sung-an, THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 
1973), pp. 144-147. 
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4. They believe that the PL A is too weak to allow Mao to talk lightly of war with 
Moscow, unless and until Peking develops a sophisticated and credible nuclear capability. 
I f such an effective military posture is acquired they believe that Peking should defuse the 
current tense boundary conflict with Soviets, enter into protracted diplomatic negotiation, 
or even seek a compromise with Moscow on outstanding boundary and other issues.105 
5. They resent or even oppose excessive political interference in their command by the 
party and its political commissars. They argue that modern warfare is too scientific 
technical and complex for political commissars to comprehend, and that the principle of 
having politics in command of military affairs is incompatible with the important 
requirement of functional, technical, and organisational efficiency in modern warfare. 
They favour a single chain of command and control rather than the present dual political 
and military command structure in the PLA. 1 0 6 
6. They dislike the intensive political indoctrination program for the armed forces. They 
assert that their splendid revolutionary past and their membership in the party should 
exempt them from all ideological reforms and indoctrination and that they should be left 
alone to improve their own military proficiency.107 
7. They oppose the Maoist idea of "a multipurpose army", i.e., the employment of troops 
for non-military purpose, such as farming, operating factories, constructing roads and 
dikes, digging canals, and doing political propaganda work. They contend that such 
employment depresses army morale, dissipates troops' energy, and interferes with the 
mNEWCHINA NEWS AGENCY, 18 Dec. 1967; PEKING REVIEW, 3 Jan. 1968, p. 41. 
106LIBERA TION ARMY'S DAILY, 1 Aug. 1965. 
107PEOPLE'S DAILY, 7 Feb. 1967. 
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military training program. They resent having the talents and energies of their man 
diverted to non-military tasks at a time when they are charged with the responsibility of 
preparing for a possible conflict with the Soviet Union, which has superior military 
hardware. 
8. They disagree strongly with Mao on the idea as well as the utility of the militia.108 
They argue that the militia is professionally deficient in military training and technology, 
economically wasteful, and military useless in times of war. 
9. They strongly dislike Mao's policy, in effect since May, 1965, of abolishing all military 
ranks and badges in the PLA. They feared that this policy affects the authority and 
prestige of the officers, weakens army discipline, and impedes the work of the military 
command, thereby leading eventually to a sharp decline in professional standards as well 
as combat effectiveness of the armed forces.109 
10. They request up to date armed forces equipped with ultramodern military weapons as 
a deterrent to Soviet attack on their country, they place the highest priority on the 
development of a strong nuclear capability, even at the expense of economic 
development.110 
While Mao held different viewpoints with military professionals on the possibility of 
Soviet attack. Mao feared that the Soviet Union would or might attack the China as a 
result of escalation of the boundary conflict. For such an eventuality, the Maoist military 
doctrine presupposes the feasibility of a protracted guerrilla-type "defence in depth" of the 
108NEW CHINA NEWSAGENCY, 16 Sep. 1967; PEKING REVIEW, 24 Nov. 1967, p. 14. 
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vast territory of China, the outcome of which would be decided by close-range hand-to-
hand combat, day and night, with two hundred metres between soldiers, using primitive 
conventional weapons such as bayonets, grenades, knives, and axes.111 
Mao insists that the Soviet Union would not be able to defeat China solely by a massive 
nuclear attack, because of China's large territory and population and its complicated 
terrain. For final victory, therefore, Soviet ground forces would still have to invade and 
occupy the Chinese mainland, and Soviet invasion would only plunge the enemy into "the 
escape-proof net of a great, just people's war against aggression".112 
In the eventuality of a Soviet nuclear attack on the China, Mao expected about 300 million 
Chinese to be killed, leaving about 500 million survivors, who would "dare to lure the 
enemy deep into a battle of annihilation". The surviving highly mobilised Chinese masses -
regular forces, a massive militia, and local forces - would attack the Soviet invaders in 
caves, bunkers, mountains, forests, ditches, tunnels, and houses - that is to say, practically 
from all sides.113 They would combine mobilised, large, and set piece conventional battles 
with well-coordinated, widespread, intensive and independent guerrilla warfare, and the 
invading Soviet enemy forces would be "bogged down in endless battle" and "drowned in 
a hostile human sea". Their readiness to fight with primitive conventional weapons at the 
close range of two hundred meters would nullify the Soviet advantage in military 
technology and weapons systems. In such an event, the Maoist Chinese assert, the 
"people's war" magic taught by Mao Tse-tung during the previous war against Japanese 
invasion would certainly be able to exhaust and, finally, defeat the Soviet Union.1 1 4 
1 "LIBERATIONARMY'S DAILY, 25 Nov. 1965, and 23 Aug. 1966. 
n2PEOPLE'SDAILY, andLIBERATION ARMY'SDAILY, 1 Oct. 1969. 
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Generally speaking, Mao had his own appraisal of nuclear weapons and modernised army 
building, he commented: The atomic bomb is a paper tiger which the reactionaries use to 
scare people, it looks terrible, but in fact it isn't... the outcome of a war is decided by the 
people, not by one or two new types of weapon.115 Mao had always criticised the 
so-called purely military viewpoints on the grounds that "war is the highest form of 
struggle for resolving contradictions, when they have developed to a certain stage, 
between classes, nations, states, or political groups",116 "war is the continuation of 
politics, in this sense, war is politics and war itself is a political action, since ancient times 
there has never been a war that did not have a political character".117 "It is, however, not 
a smooth road for the weak to defeat the strong and a reborn force to triumph over 
decayed force" and thus one must "fight, fail, fight again, fail again, fight again... till 
victory, that is the logic of the people".118 Mao further indicated that "weapons decide 
everything", "which constitutes a mechanical approach to the question of war and a 
subjective and one-sided view. Our view is opposed to this; we see not only weapons but 
also people. Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is 
people, not material, that are decisive".119 
To speak in terms of people's war and class struggles, the advancement of nuclear 
weapons had not and could not change the pattern of social development of mankind, and 
us"Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong (Aug. 1946)", SELECTED WORKS OF 
MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. IV(1969), op. cit., p. 100. 
U6"Strategy in China's Revolutionary War (Dec. 1969)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. 
I (1975), op cit., p. 184. 
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p. 143. 
158 
that of class struggle; it hadn't or couldn't change the fact that capitalist system is doomed 
to be replaced by socialism; it hadn't and couldn't change the army's political position and 
its influence in non-military tasks. 
The possession of nuclear weapons, in Mao's view, couldn't possibly minimise imperialist 
and reactionary aggression and exploitation, nor could it change the nature of their 
oppression of the broad masses of labours, and thus Mao actively carried out the policy of 
"all people are soldiers" in the course of the implement of "People's Communes". 
The policy of "all people are soldiers" was an important reflection of his strategic 
viewpoint that military and politics are a unit in Maoist people's war. Mao was a typical 
intellectual of Chinese agricultural society, he learned the Chinese classical novel and 
historical warfare of each dynasty very well, and perceived the fact that policy of "all 
people are soldiers", making no distinguish between soldiers and peasants, was usually the 
omen for social unrest on the eve of dynastic changes. Nevertheless, Mao advocated the 
movement of "all people are soldiers" in the fifties, at the time when China did not posses 
the requisites for revolution. His secret inward wish was to balance the inner-system 
power operations including the suppression of a potentially professional army, involving 
no political affairs, which was being brought about by P'eng Te-huai's regularised army 
building program, while outwardly, Mao's intention was to show his disapproval of the 
Soviet Union, and create his own way. In addition, the PRC faced a possible nuclear 
threat after breaking with Soviet Union. In such an inferior position, Mao had to 
emphasise the importance of "people" in the event of modern war. Mao copied Lenin's 
idea from his paper "the army and revolution" in 1905, attempted to turn every soldier into 
a citizen and every sound citizen into a soldier. The paper pointed out, "when there exists 
the opposed and the deprived in the world, it is the whole nation in arms, not the liberation 
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of weapons, that we should strive for". 1 2 0 Mao fulfilled the conscious of "the whole 
nation in arms", and was ready to fight a perfect people's war when the Soviet Union 
invaded China. 
Generally speaking, "people's war" and "nuclear deterrence" were contradictory to each 
other and were two extremely different strategic ideas. When Mao advocated the theory 
that the "atomic bomb is a paper tiger", but conversely, started developing the atomic 
bomb, the following accounted for a great change in Mao's military doctrine: 
In the early 1950s, the PRC adopted the policy of "lean to the side of the Soviet Union" in 
its foreign affairs, hoping to safeguard its national security under the protection of the 
Soviet nuclear umbrella by means of people's war. Since the PRC considered that people's 
war was based on the full co-ordination of people and weapons, and on the foundation 
that people should be valued more than weapons, the slogan the "atomic bomb is a paper 
tiger" was repeatedly propagated to belittle the value of nuclear weapons, and the 
principle "the factor of people is of the first importance" was constantly emphasised to 
increase the importance of people in the nuclear war. The Chinese leadership at that time 
held the view that any large-scale nuclear attacks could not destroy China thoroughly 
because of China's unique agricultural society structure. For final victory, the hostile 
country would still have to dispatch traditional ground forces to invade and occupy the 
Chinese mainland. The people's war was thereafter developed to counter such a situation. 
They also believed when co-ordinated the protracted war of "lure the enemy in deep" with 
the policy of all people are soldiers, and the favourable conditions of vast territory and 
broad masses of people, any hostile country that dared to invade China would follow the 
same disastrous road of Japanese aggression, and would be "drowned in a hostile human 
120Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, "The Whole Nation in Arms", RED FLAG, No. 10, 1958, pp. 22-23. 
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sea". 
In order to stabilise the situation in Pacific area and to suppress the PRC's ambitious 
military attempt when the Taiwan Strait crisis emerged between 1954 and 1955, President 
Eisenhower of the United States indicated in a press conference on 16 March 1955, that 
"the United States does not exclude the possibility of using atomic weapons to attack 
military targets along the Chinese coast".121 Subsequently when the PRC bombarded 
Quemoy offshore island on 23 August 1955, United States reaffirmed its stand to 
safeguard the peace over the Taiwan Strait, and the issue about the use of nuclear 
weapons was once again mentioned at the White House conference on 25 and 29 of 
March.122 On 2 September, John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, and the members of 
Joint Chiefs of Staff held a conference to discuss possible emergency measures if the PRC 
should dispatch troops to attack Taiwan offshore islands, Dulles indicating after the 
conference that there was no need for the U.S. to use nuclear weapons at this moment, but 
that they would not afraid to use it when it was necessary.123 
Dulles met with Eisenhower on Rhode island to discuss this matter on 4 September. 
Dulles expressed his view about handling the crisis in one paper. He commented that the 
U.S. would lose its influence in the Far East if Taiwanese off-shore islands should fall into 
the hands of the PRC, and that nuclear weapons would be applied unless the U.S. could 
effectively obstruct the PRC's attempt by issuing a statement before PRC launching its 
attack or by proceeding with a bombardment immediately after the PRC's attack.124 
1 2 1 Lin Cheng-i, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS TAIWAN DURING THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS 
OF 1958, (Taipei: Shang-wu Publication, 1985), p. 24. 
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Dulles issued a statement after the meeting, in which he proclaimed that the U.S. had an 
obligation to defend Taiwan from armed attacks, and indicated that the Taiwan resolution, 
passed by the Congress, had authorised President the power to use force for safeguarding 
the off-shore islands of Quemoy, Matsu etc.125 
To counter with the threat of U.S. nuclear weapons, Mao criticised the U.S. in a meeting 
of the State Council on 8 September 1958, said "Taiwan - the territory of China, Lebanon 
and other U.S. military bases abroad is the rope hanging around the American imperialist 
neck, it isn't anyone else but the U.S. itself has produced this rope and placed it around its 
own neck".126 He also said, "United States has monopolised the capitalist bloc, she is 
bound to be hanged by the people of the whole world if she continued to insist on carrying 
out its aggression and war policies". ^ 7 
As the result of the inability to gain Soviet agreement, either in offering national security 
or in providing any anti-nuclear deterrence against U.S., the PRC applied no any 
counterattack other than an emotional rebuke, yet, Khrushchev's attitude towards the 
Taiwan Strait crisis further strengthened the PRC's determination to develop its own 
nuclear weapons. 
The PRC had concluded the following two points from Korea war and the crisis of Taiwan 
Strait. Firstly, no matter how many militia and conventional forces the PRC possessed, it 
was always nuclear deterrence that produced the greatest influence at the time of crisis. 
Secondly, Although the Soviet Union, the big brother of the communist camp, was a 
nuclear superpower, it would never risk the danger of nuclear war to directly attack the 
12SDEPARTMENT OF STA TE BULLETIN 39 (22 Sep. 1958), pp. 445-446. 
J26"On Current Situation - Chairman Mao's Speech at the Supreme Meeting of State Affairs", HSINHUA 
Semi-monthly, Vol. XVIII, (Peking: People's Publication, 1958), p. 14; RED FLAG, No. 8, 1958, p. 3. 
127lbid. 
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U.S. for the precaution of the PRC's national security. Based on the above-mentioned 
facts, the PRC had to develop and produce its own nuclear weapons if she wished to play 
a leading role in international politics. 
The deteriorating relations between Soviet Union and PRC due to Soviet inability to offer 
any support to the PRC during the Taiwan Strait crisis, and because of Khrushchev's 
disapproval of Mao's radical economic and political measures, were worsened by the 
controversy over the orthodoxy of communist ideology. This brought about unilateral 
termination of the "agreement on new technology for national defence" by Soviet Union in 
June 1959. One can reasonably believe, the lesson from the Taiwan Strait crisis had 
helped the PRC to expedite the development and production of nuclear weapons. 
Nevertheless, prior to the creation of a reliable nuclear deterrence, the only means for self-
defence was the use of the primitive ecology of mankind, applying "people's war" to 
counter the threat of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. To the PRC, the most effective 
means to stress the value of "people's" war is through the mould of leader's charisma so as 
to become the idol for the people to follow fanatically and guide the people with his own 
will. 
Accompanied by the conflicts between the PRC and the Soviet Union and the PRC's 
determination to produce its own nuclear weapons, were a series of important political 
movements launched by Mao. These included the "Rectification campaign" in April 1957, 
a movement aimed at oppressing intellectuals to give up all non-proletarian conscious and 
anti-Maoist thought by carrying out "ideological construction" among communists 
through education and study;128 and instruction "On Preparing Organisational Force to 
Counterattack Rightists" was issued by CCPCC in June 1957 to carry out a nation-wide 
128THE EXPLANATION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY (Taipei, China Publishing 
Company, 1971), p. 425. 
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anti-rightist struggle, and the movement of "Three Red Banners" approached its climax in 
1958, and at an enlarged meeting of the CCPCC Military Commission the same year, Mao 
criticised Feng Te-huai for his army-building line, voiced his indignation of the policies of 
regularisation and modernisation, and opposed the departing of the PLA from the masses 
and politics.129 This series of political campaigns, however, did not impede the progress 
of nuclear development. 
It was noteworthy that soon after the "Agreement on New Technology for National 
Defence" was unilaterally torn up by Soviet Union in June 1959, the CCPCC held the 
"Lushan conference" between July and August, and reached the decision to criticise P'eng 
Te-huai and dismiss him from the post of Minister of National Defence. Although the 
purge of P'eng was due to P'eng's fierce attack on the movement of the "Three Red 
Banners", and yet, his pro-Soviet policy and the Mao's disapproval of his "purely military 
viewpoint" were other faults that could not be overlooked. 
In fact, Mao had believed, as early as 1936, that China's revolutionary war had specific 
laws of its own. He commented, "Some people hold wrong view, which we refuted long 
ago. They say that it is enough merely to study the experience of revolutionary war in 
Russia, or, to put it more concretely, that it is enough merely to follow the laws by which 
the civil war in the Soviet Union was directed and the military manuals published by 
Soviet military organisations. They do not see that these laws and manuals embody the 
specific characteristics of the civil war and the Red Army in the Soviet Union, and that i f 
we copy and apply them without allowing any change, we shall also be "cutting the feet to 
fit the shoes" and be defeated".130 
J 2 9 WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, op. cit, p. 398. 
130"Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War (Dec. 1936), SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-
TUNG, Vol. I (1975), op. cit., p. 180. 
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In addition, on 15 November 1956, Mao spoke at the Second Plenum of the Eighth 
CCPCC. When commenting on Sino-Soviet relations, Mao pointed out: Some comrades 
simply don't pay attention to dialectics and are not analytical. They say all things Soviet 
are good and they transplant them mechanically, and it still persists among a considerable 
number of comrades. They take a one-sided view of things and think everything Soviet is 
good and transplant it indiscriminately, bringing in quite a few things which should not 
have been transplanted. Among our cadres of higher and middle rank there are a few who 
maintain illicit relations with foreign countries, this kind of business must stop.131 
Although Mao didn't mention the name in this speech, he attacked P'eng violently for his 
transplanting of the Soviet army-building line, considered this act as proof of his 
maintaining illicit relations with foreign countries, and it was a true moral degeneration. 
Such an accusation signalled the re-appearance of Chinese traditional anti-foreign 
sentiment. As a consequence, the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations had, in fact, laid 
down a remote cause for the removal of P'eng Te-huai at the forthcoming Lushan 
conference in 1959. From the viewpoint of military policy, the movement to purge P'eng 
was, to a certain extent, a big revision of the PLA's pro-Soviet line. While from the 
political viewpoint, the fall of P'eng represented the return of the PLA to the main trend -
that was "putting red in command of expert" or "red" above "expert". 
Generally speaking, from the time when Lin Piao became Minister of National Defence at 
the Lushan conference to the PLA's overall intervention in power struggle of the Cultural 
Revolution, apart from employing army to carry out a series of political campaigns, Lin 
Piao's policy within that period was to expedite the work of weaponry modernisation for 
1 3 1 "Speech at Second Session of Eighth Central Committee (15 Nov. 1956)", SELECTED WORKS OF 
MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. V (1977), op. cit., pp. 339-340. 
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maintaining favourable conditions to win a "people's war", and for developing nuclear 
weapons at full-speed so as to gain a reliable capability of nuclear deterrence. His aims 
were: 
Firstly, to consolidate his own political position through the moulding of Mao's supreme 
leadership in the army under the system of "party commands the gun" and the glorious 
tradition of "politics takes the lead". To start with, Lin first made the PL A the model for 
the movement to learn from Maoist thought in a planned way, following the movement 
"The Whole Country Must Learn from People's Liberation Army", appealing to the 
masses' to learn to study Maoist thought from the People's Liberation Army, and finally 
propagandist Mao's charisma to a climax through the constant use of mass media. In 
order to strengthen people's attachment to Mao, Lin used every opportunity to prove the 
myth of Mao's omnipotent power and his sacred mission bestowed by God. When Lin, in 
his capacity as the Minister of National Defence, proceeded with "missionary works", a 
movement to worship Mao, he had many chances to accompany Mao on public 
appearance, and thus promoted his personal prestige. The term "Comrade Mao Tse-tung 
and his close comrade-in-arms Lin Piao" could best describe their growing intimate 
relationship, and the CCPCC was then called "the CCPCC led by Chairman Mao and 
Vice-chairman Lin" 
Finally, when Sino-Soviet relations were deteriorating, the PRC had to expedite the 
modernisation of national defence through its own efforts so as to gain sufficient self-
defensive capability in the deployment of its defensive strategy. Consequently, the 
development of nuclear weapons followed the policy of professionalisation, and the navy 
as well as the air force began a new stage of army building based on the same policy. In 
the early 1960s, the PRC promoted a five-year plan of modernisation for the air force and 
began to build their fighter planes in the style of the MIG-21 in 1965 and produce bombers 
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modelled after "TU-16" in the late 1960s.132 With regard to the navy, a shipbuilding plan 
was also in progress and the focus was placed on the production of missile-firing 
speedboats and submarines.133 
It was obvious that Lin Piao would satisfy most of the army's needs when this series of 
arms development was carried out. These were prime measures to balance politics and 
military, and a temporary compromise between Soviet threat and the political control over 
the army. However, as the inner-party struggle was brought into the open and the army's 
intervention in politics grew, such compromise gradually began to disappear and was 
finally replaced by the army's overall interventionism in politics. With the advent of the 
Cultural Revolution and the incident of Liu Shao-ch'i, the political role of the army 
reached its climax step by step. 
On 9 December 1969, the Liberation Army's Daily published an important article written 
by its editorial department, which, by the brilliant use of double-talk, coded works, and 
veiled allusions - the Aesopian mode of communication - unmistakably gave support to a 
"treasonable" professional military viewpoint. Asserting that the United States and Soviet 
Union threatened the PRC with a "large scale aggressive war", this article called for 
greater attention to military preparation in order to "defend the socialist motherland". In 
so doing, it paid token obeisance to Mao's military thought that ideology is more 
important than weapons, but it also stressed, "We should not think that by putting politics 
in command, military affairs can be neglected... We must not think that being good in 
political and ideological work is everything". Accordingly, it underlined the need for "daily 
practical training" in military techniques in order to harden troops for "fighting big and 
132Richard M. Bueschel, COMMUNIST CHINESE AIR POWER, (New York: Praeger, 1968), Chapter II 
and III. 
133John R. Dewenter, "China Afloat", FOREIGN AFFAIRS, No. IV, (July, 1972), pp. 738-751. 
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fierce battles and fighting under the most difficult circumstances". In an obvious thrust at 
the Maoist ideologies, who insist on intensive political indoctrination of the army, it said: 
"It will not do to rely solely on political lectures, more time must be given to professional 
military training.134 
This article represented that military professionals had been reinforcing their voice within 
the military establishment headed by Lin Piao when the nation faced a threat from the 
Soviet Union and the United States. Nevertheless, the Maoist response to the Liberation 
Army's Daily article of 9 Dec. 1969 had been swift, direct, and intense - a renewed major 
broadside against military professionalism. The Maoist press and Chinese internal 
broadcasts, since 10 Dec. 1969 had renewed the campaign to canonise Mao's military 
thought and had levelled severe attacks on the "bourgeois military viewpoint" advocated 
previously by P'eng. One Maoist publication said bluntly. "Chairman Mao's military 
thinking is the magic weapon in defeating the enemy".135 The dispute between Mao and 
the modernising military professionals about how best to deal with the Soviet menace or 
possible attack, it was, in fact, the related problem of political control of the army versus 
exclusive military professionalism. 
The professionally-minded military officers attempted to turn the PLA's line from "politics 
takes the lead" back to that of professional army building, but they did not succeed. The 
PLA had to stick to the political road, this situation remained unchanged until the death of 
Lin Piao. 
It was noteworthy, however, at the time when the PLA was extensively intervening in the 
Cultural Revolution, Sino-Soviet border clashes rose sharply. Long-simmering Sino-
134Tai Sung-an, THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL DISPUTE", op. cit., pp. 142-143. 
13SPEKING REVIEW, 9 Jan. 1970, p. 15. 
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Soviet hostility exploded on 2 March 1969, in a brief but bloody battle over a disputed 
obscure island in the icebound Ussuri River, called Damansky by the Russians and 
Chenpao (Treasure) by the Chinese. 
169 
III. Sino-Soviet Chenpao Island Military Clashes 
Around 9:00am on 2 March and 4:00am on 15 March 1969, Chinese and Soviet military 
units clashed on a disputed Chenpao island. There is a reason for thinking that the Sino-
Soviet border clashes of 1969 were undertaken in order to overcome unrest in domestic 
politics and to create unifying atmosphere for the forthcoming Ninth CCP National 
Congress rather than to deal with a territorial dispute that was a non emergency issue. 
After Chenpao island clash on 2 March, a series of large-scale demonstrations against 
"Soviet revisionist renegade clique" was quickly spread out throughout the PRC. "The 
works, peasants commanders and fighters of PL A, students, government functionaries and 
city dwellers taking party in the demonstrations on 4 March 1969, numbered form over 
100,000 to several millions. Demonstrations were held in all the 29 cities... The mammoth 
demonstrations showed that the 700,000,000 Chinese people, the army men and civilians 
throughout China, guided by the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung, 'are united as one' 
against the enemy and are determined to safeguard the sacred territory of the 
motherland".136 
It is noteworthy that in less than a month after the Chenpao island military clash, the 
CCPCC convened the Ninth CCP National Congress in Peking between 1 and 24 April, 
Lin Piao delivered a "political report" in which he revealed the CCP's position on Sino-
Soviet boundary question. Lin pointed out, "Like boundary questions between China and 
some of her other neighbouring countries, the Sino-Soviet boundary question is historical, 
as regards these questions our party and government have consistently stood for 
negotiations through diplomatic channels to reach a fair and reasonable settlement... The 
136"The Sino-Soviet Border Incident", SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, BBC, part 3, 6 March 
1969FE/3017/A2/1. 
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Sino-Soviet boundary question is the product of Tsarist Russian imperialist aggression 
against China,... We still maintained that these treaties be taken as the basis for the 
settlement of boundary question".137 
Since the CCP decided to maintain the old treaties as the basis for the settlement of 
boundary question, and prior to 2 March 1969, there had been many cases of military 
encounters in the same area between the two nations, as the CCP proclaimed, "between 23 
Jan. 1967 and 2 March 1969, Soviet frontier guards intruded into the area of Chenpao 
island on 16 occasions and on several occasions wounding Chinese frontier guards... 
Between the end of Nov. 1967 and 5 Jan. 1968, Soviet frontier guards on 18 occasions 
intruded into the area of Chilichin island (north of Chenpao island, Heilungkiang 
province), on many occasions killing and wounding Chinese people... Soviet frontier 
guards also intruded into the area of Kapotzu island (south of Chenpao island)... on many 
occasion, and , on a still greater number of occasions, Soviet military planes intruded into 
Chinese air space over Heilungkiang province".138 I f Sino-Soviet border clashes could 
arouse nation-wide anti-Soviet movements, then this should have been in the 1967 case or 
even earlier. 
Furthermore, from the military point of view, Chenpao island did not possess a major 
strategic position. Yet, according to the scale of fighting, which "with two armoured 
vehicles, a lorry and a command car, sent by the Soviet frontier authorities, flagrantly 
intruded into the area of Chenpao island on 2 March "; 1 3 9 "the Soviet sent dozens of tanks 
137"Lin Piao Report to the 9th Party Congress (1 April 1969)", CHINESE POLITICS - DOCUMENTS 
AND ANALYSIS, Vol. II, (South Carolina: Uni. of South Carolina Press, 1986), pp. 70-82. 
138"Chinese View of Frontier Incident", SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, BBC, Part 3, 4 March 
1969, FE/3015/A2/2-3; Feng Ying-chun & Huang Wei-min, "We Witnessed the New Tsar's Anti-China 
Atrocities", CHINA RECONSTRUCTS, Vol. XVIII, No. 8, Aug. 1968, pp. 28-29. 
mlbid., FE/3015/A2/2. 
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and armoured vehicles intruded into the Chenpao island on 15 March ", 1 4 0 it neither 
possessed any strategic or tactical significance. Nevertheless, from the political point of 
view, it is undoubtedly that the Chenpao island military clashes have special significance, 
that is, Mao seized on the event, arousing the masses to "safeguard the territory of the 
motherland", to create a unifying atmosphere for the convene of Ninth CCP National 
Congress and, more important, to solve the social upheaval and soothe chaos situation 
brought by the Cultural Revolution and the purge of Liu Shao-ch'i.141 
Unity, Mao said in his remarks to the first Plenum of the Ninth CCPCC, on 28 April 1969, 
was indeed the theme of the congress. The desire to avoid further chaos may have been 
made more urgent by the tense situation which existed on China's Northeast border with 
the Soviet Union,... In order to attain victory, it is necessary to have more people... 
people from all quarters no matter which mountain stronghold they are from, no matter 
which province they are from, and no matter which direction,.... It is always better to 
unite more people, there are people who do not necessarily share our opinions.142 
Mao recognised, "Our foundation is not solid... neither all nor the absolute majority, but, 
I'm afraid, a considerable number of factories are not under the leadership of genuine 
Marxists and the masses of workers".143 
Furthermore, from the "July 23 Notice" and "The August 28 Directive of the CCPCC" 
could also realise the political importance of the Chenpao island military clashes. It was 
140"Chinese Account of 15th March Incident on the Ussuri River", SUMMARY OF WORLD 
BROADCASTS, BBC, Part 3, 18March 1969, FE/3027/A2/1. 
141The 12th Plenum of 8th CCPCC between 13 and 31 Oct. 1968 ratified the "Report on the Examination 
of the Armies of the Renegade, Traitor, and Scab Liu Shao-chi". See James T. Myer (ed.), CHINESE 
POLITICS-DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS, Vol. II, op cit., p. 389. 
142Mao Tse-tung, "Speech to a Central Committee Meeting (28 April 1969), THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 2216. 
143Ibid., p. 2215. 
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quite obvious that Mao attempted to seize Sino-Soviet border clashes to re-establish social 
order and to soothe discord situation. 
"July 23 Notice", which was personally approved by Mao, was one of many reasons for 
believing that the crisis was started and kept in being by Peking for the purpose of 
promoting domestic unity. The notice indicated a series of extremely serious 
counterrevolutionary crimes as follows: 
1. "Organising professional teams for armed struggle to engage in beating, smashing, 
robbing, and unwarranted arrest, thus endangering the life, property, and security of the 
people and destroying the order of the social revolution". 
2. "Refusing to implemented the Central Committee's policy of great revolutionary 
alliance and the revolutionary 'three-in-one' combination... by creating mountain 
strongholds and splinter groups; putting forward the counterrevolutionary slogan of 
'seizing political power by arms' to launch a counter-power seizure struggle against the 
proletariat". 
3. "Attacking PLA organs and troops, seizing PLA's weapons and equipment, and beating 
up, kidnapping, and killing PLA commanders and fighters". 
4. "Sabotaging railways, highways, and bridges, mounting armed attacks on trains; seizing 
transportation facilities; robbing the travellers of their property". 
5. "Robbing without permission,... Seizing the state property in large quantities". 
6. "Occupying areas by force, constructing position for armed struggles". 
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7. "Inciting and threatening workers into work and production stoppage, inciting peasants 
to come to cities for armed struggle"144. 
Soon after the "July 23 notice", the CCPCC issued a directive, also known as "The August 
28 Directive", to Revolutionary Committees at all level in the provinces, municipalities, 
and autonomous regions along the border; revolutionary people of all national minority 
groups; all commanders and soldiers of the PLA in border area. The Directive pointed 
out: "In order to safeguard our mother country, our border, and the great achievement of 
our Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution... the Central Committee of the party commands 
you:" 
1. "Resolutely respond to chairman Mao's great call to safe guard the mother country and 
prepare for war". 
2. "In the face of powerful enemies, unite all the army and the people as one person,... 
strengthen the unity within the army, between the army and the people, the army and the 
government, among revolutionary people of different national minority groups, and 
consolidate the leadership of the revolutionary committee, all actions disrupting unity, 
bourgeois factionalism, and to firmly and thoroughly attack and eliminate all class enemies 
who instigate and disrupt unity between the military and the people and unity of the 
national minority groups... no violation of discipline is allowed in the army; no one is 
allowed to leave his post without the consent of his superiors; no one is allowed to travel 
to exchange revolutionary experience. Those who will not correct themselves in spite of 
persuasion shall be punished severely". 
I44"The Central Committee's 23 July 1969 Notice", PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1969 - A 
DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. IV, op. tit., p. 2218. 
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3. "All mass organisations which have membership of different professions shall be 
disband membership, any organisation which tries to rebuild a "mountaintop" or recruit 
new rank and file should be disbanded at once". 
4. "Resolutely and thoroughly implement the 'July 23 Notice1 stop factional armed 
struggle, immediately and unconditionally, disband professional armed struggle pots, and 
confiscate weapons, if armed struggle troops offer persistent resistance at points which 
they have occupied by forces, the PLA should encircle them, launch political warfare 
against them and confiscate their weapons by force". 
5. "No one is allowed to attack the PLA; no one is allowed to loot weapons, military 
equipment, and vehicles". 
6. "Any disruption of railway, highway or waterway transportation or telecommunications 
should be regarded as counterrevolutionary acts and should be investigated and punished 
accordingly". 
7. "Resolutely grasp revolution and stimulate production and support the war front,... all 
who left their production and work posts should return to their units to grasp revolution, 
stimulate production, promote work and war preparedness". 
8. "Landlords, the rich, traitors, bad elements, and rightists who have not yet been 
properly reformed should be corrected through labour under the strict control of the 
revolutionary masses"145. 
145"The 28 Aug. 1969 Directive on Preparations for War", PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1969 
-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 2219-2220. 
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The "July 23 Notice" and the "August 28 Directive" had, in fact, revealed the true state of 
Chenpao Island military clashes. Mao used "safeguard motherland " as a card to 
"safeguard great achievements of Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution". With the 
exception of item one, all regulation was formulated to steady social order in view of the 
social and army turmoil since the Cultural Revolution. The real aim behind the border 
clashes was "for the purpose of promoting domestic unity". 
Not surprisingly, the PLA's elite did not express their military standpoint in Chenpao 
island military clashes. However, the PLA joined the masses and openly supported the 
Mao and Lin Piao's foreign policy against "Soviet revisionist renegade clique". For lack of 
direct evidence, it is not possible to say that the Sino-Soviet military clashes on 2 and 16 
March were incited by Mao Tse-tung, but, it was undoubtedly that Mao seized this 
opportunity to conduct political campaigns throughout the country to achieve his political 
purpose. 
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IV. The Crisis of the Vietnam War and the Development of the Section 
Army's Role 
During the developing crisis of the Vietnam War in 1965, a controversy over a military 
with strong political flavour broke out among the PL A leadership. 
In February 1965, the Vietnam war crisis began when the U.S. bombarded North Vietnam 
on a large scale and dispatched more troops to aid South Vietnam. In view of the fact that 
the situation was deteriorating and the possibility that the war could extend to mainland 
China, an article The People of Vietnam Are Bound to Win, whereas U.S. imperialism Is 
Bound to Lose was published by Red Flag in the name of "commentator". It indicated 
that "China and Vietnam are two closely related and mutually dependent neighbouring 
countries. The U.S imperialist invasion of Vietnam means the invasion of the People's 
Republic of China, the Chinese people would neither ignore such provocation nor sit back 
and watch without going to the rescue. Six hundred and fifty million Chinese people have 
made all the necessary preparations to aid Vietnam against U.S. imperialism with a 
counter-attack in self-defence".146 
In the meantime, the Red Flag carried five articles about revolution in Asia from the 
viewpoint of Lenin, including Asia is the New Source of World Revolutionary Storm, The 
Awakening of Asia, The Backward Europe and Advanced Asia, The People of All East 
Nations Begin to Intervene in the World's Destiny, and The Masses of the Labour of All 
Colonial Countries Will Definitely Bring About a Gigantic Revolutionary Influence at the 
Next Stage of World Revolution }A1 
146"The People of Vietnam Is Bound to Win, whereas U.S. imperialism Is Bound to Lose", RED FLAG, 
No. 2, 1965, p. 11. 
}47RED FLAG, No. 2, 1965, pp. 3-8. 
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In addition, Red Flag carried an article entitled Expel U.S. aggressor from Vietnam, again, 
in the name of "commentator", it indicated that "The U.S. imperialist invasion of Vietnam 
is an important step for carrying out its global counterrevolutionary strategy. The 'specific 
war' that U.S. imperialism conducted in the south of Vietnam was not only for enslaving 
the southern Vietnamese, but for strengthening the suppression of national liberation and 
the people's revolutionary movement in other areas of the world". 1 4 8 
Unlike previous articles, this paper also made a serious condemnation of the Soviet Union. 
It pointed out "the modern revisionists mixed up with the rest of the world in the line of 
supporting the Vietnamese by raising the flag of'supporting the Vietnamese', nevertheless 
they still insisted on the general line that the world is dominated by two superpowers. 
Their act towards the Vietnamese patriotic struggle to resist U.S. aggression was a false 
support, and real betrayal. The real intention was agitating against U.S. imperialism to 
conduct an aggressive war policy".149 
There was great divergence in the policy to aid Vietnam among the high-ranking 
leadership of the PLA. Lo Jui-ch'ing, Chief of the General Staff, issued a paper 
Commemorate the Victory over German Fascism, Carry the Struggle against U.S. 
Imperialism through to the End150 in May of the same year, Lo asserted in this paper that 
the PRC should adopt vigorous line in dealing with Vietnamese issues, he pointed out: 
The Chinese people resolutely support the struggle of the Vietnamese to resist U.S. 
aggression, and save the nation and the people of all other countries against U.S. 
148"Expel U.S. Aggressor out of Vietnam", RED FLAG, No. 4, 1965, p. 10. 
149lbid., pp. 12-13. 
JS0Lo Jui-ch'ing, "Commemorate the Victory over German Fascist, Carry the Struggle against U.S. 
Imperialism through to the End", RED FLAG, No. 4, 1965, pp. 1-14; "Peking's Chief of Staff Urges a 
Hawkish Line on Vietnam (10 May 1965)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A 
DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 1205-1213. 
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imperialism. We not only fully support these struggles politically and morally, and help 
them materially to the limit of our capabilities, but are also prepared to send our men to 
fight together with the people of Vietnam when they need us. This attitude of ours is firm 
and unshakeable. We will go on supporting and aiding the Vietnamese people, whether or 
not it enlarges the war, we are not frightened by the U.S. imperialists bombing threats or 
their clamour for enlarging the war. Our opposition to U.S. imperialism has always been 
clear-cut.151 History has taught us that fear cannot prevent wars, to say nothing of 
eliminating them. In order to eliminate wars, it is necessary to wage wars. In order to 
eliminate counterrevolutionary wars, it is necessary to wage revolutionary wars.152 
What deserves most attention is that in this paper, Lo stressed: The historical experience 
of the anti-fascist war also teaches us that it is imperative to distinguish enemies from 
friends, make use of contradictions, win over the majority, unite with all the forces that 
can be united, and form the broadest possible united front against the main enemy.153 
Lo did not express clearly that the pro-Soviet line would be reapplied to oppose U.S. 
imperialism as the main enemy, but what it implied was the intention to unite with Soviet 
forces and form the broadest united front against the main enemy. Lo indicated: Holding 
aloft the banner of Lenin and Stalin, the Soviet Red Army fought valiantly in an 
indomitable revolutionary spirit, advanced wave upon wave, and brilliantly performed 
immortal deeds in playing its glorious role as the main force against fascism. 
The people of the world will always honour the heroic exploits of the Soviet people and 
army, who reared such heroes as Zoya Kosmodemiyanskaya and Aleksandr Matrosov. 
1 5 1 Ibid., p. 14, and ibid., p. 1212. 
J52lbid.,p. 10, and ibid., p. 1210. 
mlbid.,p. 6, and ibid, p. 1208. 
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They will always honour that valiant record of the CPSU headed by Stalin in leading the 
war.154 
One of Stalin's major contributions was that he correctly analysed the current situation in 
the international class struggle, identified the principal contradictions in the world arena 
and the principal enemy of the world's people, and was therefore able to advance the 
correct slogan of an anti-fascist united front and to rally all the anti-fascist forces in a 
united force. As a result, the imperialist anti-Soviet alliance was shattered with the 
establishment of an anti-fascist alliance, and the imperialist encirclement of the Socialist 
Soviet Union was broken with the achievement of counter-encirclement of the fascist 
forces of aggression by the world-wide forces against aggression; thus a fundamental 
change was brought about in the strategic situation which became favourable to ourselves 
and unfavourable to the enemy. This was a vitally important factor in the great victory of 
the anti-fascist war.155 
Since Lo Jui-ch'ing implied that the PRC should form a united front with Soviet forces, he 
therefore manifested his resolution to fight in Vietnam war crisis. Lo reaffirmed one of 
Mao's principles, "We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will 
certainly counterattack". "We shall wipe out anybody who dares to attack us. On 
whatever scale the United States attacks us, we will reply on the same scale".156 
When Lo published this paper, the People's Daily also carried an article The Historical 
Experience of Anti-fascist War under the name of the "editorial department", and 
reprinted Lo's article Commemorate the Victory over German Fascism! Carry the 
1S4lbid., p. 2, and ibid., p. 1206. 
155Ibid, p 6, and ibid., p. 1208. 
1S6lbid.,p. 14, and ibid., p. 1212. 
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Struggle against U.S. Imperialism through to the End. The former had a most critical 
condemnation of "Khrushchev's revisionists" by saying, "they don't mean to unite with all 
the forces in the world against U.S. imperialism, but on the contrary, unite with U.S. 
imperialism wholeheartedly against the people of the whole world", "what Khrushchev is 
yelling now - the slogans such as 'unite to oppose the enemy' and 'make joint actions' - is 
sheer lies", "Khrushchev's revisionists flattered Khrushchev in a great deal, and try very 
hard to deny and belittle Stalin's influence in the anti-fascist war", "they turn Khrushchev 
the clown into the hero of the anti-fascist war"157. 
Lin Piao, in his capacity as Minister of National Defence issued an article Long Live the 
Victory of People's War15* in September of the same year. Outwardly, this article was in 
commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the victory of anti-Japanese war, but inwardly 
it had substantial political significance. It was directed against Lo's paper Commemorate 
the Victory over German Fascism! Carry the Struggle against U.S. Imperialism through 
to the End, and explicitly stated PRC's official stand. The focal points of this article 
included: 
1. The war of resistance against Japan constituted a historical stage in China's new 
democratic revolution. The line of our party during the war of resistance aimed not only 
at winning victory in the war but also at laying the foundation for the nation-wide victory 
of the new democratic revolution making it possible to carry out socialism. 
2. The concrete analysis of concrete conditions and the concrete resolution of concrete 
157"The Historical Experience of Anti-fascist War", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 9 May 1965; RED FLAG, No. 5, 
1965, pp. 15-25. 
J58Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War (3 Sep. 1965) ", RED FLAG, No. 12, 1967, pp. 17-47; 
"Peking's Defence Minister States the Maoist Line on Vietnam (3 September 1965)", THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 1222-1239. 
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contradictions are the living soul of Marxism-Leninism. Mao Tse-tung has invariably been 
able to single out the principal contradiction from among a complexity of contradictions, 
analyse the two aspects of this principal contradiction concretely, and, "pressing on 
irresistibly from this commanding height", successfully solve the problem of understanding 
and handling the various contradictions. 
3. Correctly apply the line and policy of the united front. Within the united front the 
communist party must maintain its ideological, political, and organisational independence, 
adhere to the principle of independence and initiative; and insist on its leading role. 
4. To rely on the peasants, build rural base areas, and use the countryside to encircle and 
finally capture the cities. As far back as the period of the first revolutionary civil war, 
Mao Tse-tung had pointed out that the peasant question occupied an extremely important 
position in the Chinese revolution, that the bourgeois-democratic revolution against 
imperialism and feudalism was in essence proletariat and the bourgeois-democratic 
revolution was to give leadership to the peasant struggle. 
5. During the anti-Japanese war, the PL A staunchly performed the three tasks set out by 
Mao Tse-tung, namely, fighting, mass work, and production, and it was at the same time a 
fighting force, a political work force, and a production corps. The essence of Mao Tse-
tung's army building is that in building a people's army prominence must be given to 
politics, that is, the army must first and foremost be built on a political basis. Politics is 
the commander, politics is the soul of everything. Political work is the lifeline of the PLA. 
6. Carry out the strategy and tactics of people's war, Mao Tse-tung enumerated the basic 
tactics of guerrilla warfare as follows: "The enemy advance, we retreat; the enemy camps, 
we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue". Mao has provided 
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a masterly summary of the strategy and tactics of people's war. You fight in your way and 
we fight in ours; we fight when we can and move away when we can't. 
7. Adhere to the policy of self-reliance. The liberation of masses is accomplished by the 
masses themselves - that is a basic principle of Marxism-Leninism. Revolution or people's 
war in any country is the business of the masses in that country and should be carried out 
primarily by their own efforts; there is no other way. The people of the world invariably 
support each other in their struggle against imperialism and its lackeys. Those countries 
which have won victory are duty bound to support and aid the peoples who have not yet 
done so. Nevertheless, foreign aid can only play a supplementary role. To make a 
revolution and to fight a people's war and be victorious, it is imperative to adhere to the 
policy of self-reliance, rely on the strength of the masses in one's own country. 
8. The international significance of the theory of people's war. Mao's theory of the 
establishment of a rural revolutionary base area and the encirclement of the cities from the 
countryside is of outstanding and universal practical importance for the present 
revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed nations and peoples, and particularly for the 
revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and people in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America against imperialism and its lackeys. The Chinese revolution provides a successful 
lesson for making a thoroughgoing national-democratic revolution under the leadership of 
the proletariat; it likewise provides a successful lesson for the timely transition from the 
national-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution under the leadership of the 
proletariat. 
9. The Khrushchev revisionists are now actively preaching that socialism can be built 
without the proletariat and without a genuinely revolutionary party armed with the 
advance proletarian ideology, and they have cast the fundamental tenets of Marxism-
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Leninism to the four winds. The revisionists' purpose is solely to divert the oppressed 
nations from their struggle against imperialism and sabotage their national-democratic 
solution, all in the service of imperialism. The Khrushchev Revisionists are betrayers of 
people's war. The fundamental reason why the Khrushchev revisionists are opposed to 
people's war is that they have no faith in the masses and are afraid of U.S. imperialism, of 
war, and of revolution. 
10. Defeat U.S. imperialism and its lackeys by people's war. History has proved and will 
go on proving that people's war is the most effective weapon against U.S. imperialism and 
its lackeys. All revolutionary people will learn to wage people's war against U.S. 
imperialism and its lackeys. They will take up arms learn to fight battles, and become 
skilled in waging people's war though they have not done so before. 
Lin Piao adhered to the anti-superpowers policy, i.e., anti-US. and anti-Soviet Union. Lin 
said: "U.S. imperialism proclaimed that they have replaced Germany, Japan and Italian 
Fascism after World War I I , attempting to build a great Empire of United States of 
America and put the whole world under their enslavement and control", "they are the most 
arrogant aggressors and the most fierce common enemy to the people of the whole 
world". As for "Soviet revisionists", Lin Piao accused them of being "the accomplices of 
imperialist bandit", "closely colluding with U.S. imperialism", he also argued "the 
substance of Khrushchev's revisionist general line is nothing but asking the oppressed 
people and oppressed nation to disarm themselves, and asking the nation which had 
already obtained independence to disarm itself, allowing themselves to be killed by the 
fully armed U.S. imperialists"159. The strongly worded criticism against the Soviet Union 
revealed that there was no possibility of the PRC compromising with the Soviet Union in 
l59Ibid. 
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any way. 
Lin also reaffirmed the PRC's determination to wage a people's war against U.S. 
imperialism. He indicated, "Chinese people have their own ways to resist U.S. imperialist 
aggression, our ways have no secret really. The most important one is to mobilise and rely 
on the people, to carry out the policy of the whole nation in arms and to conduct a 
people's war". To counter the U.S. nuclear threat, Lin made the following comments, 
"What U.S. imperialism use to scare people is no more than its nuclear weapons", 
"nuclear weapons should never be applied without deliberate consideration", "U.S. 
imperialism no longer controls the monopoly of nuclear weapons, she has it, so have 
others. I f she should threat others with nuclear weapons, this means she also puts herself 
under the threat of nuclear weapons from others"160. As a matter of fact, Lin Piao had 
expressed explicitly that the PRC would wage the defensive strategic plan of people's war 
against possible U.S. aggression. 
Apparently there was a great divergence between the viewpoints of Lo Jui-ch'ing and that 
of Lin Piao. Lo asserted, "The historical experience of the anti-fascist war also teaches us 
that the strategy of active defence is the only correct strategy for socialists countries in 
fighting imperialist wars of aggression".161 Lo applied the definition "active defence" from 
Mao's article The Strategic Issue of Chinese Revolutionary War to support his own 
argument. According to Mao's classification of defensive operations, "active defence is 
also known as offensive defence or defence through decisive engagement. Passive defence 
is also known as purely defensive defence or pure defence. Passive defence is actually a 
l60ibid. 
161Lo Jui-ch'ing, "Commemorate the Victory over German Fascist, Carry the Struggle against U.S. 
Imperialism through to the End", RED FLAG, No. 12, pp. 6-7; "Peking's Chief of Staff Urges a Hawkish 
Line on Vietnam (10 May 1965)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A 
DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit.,p. 1208. 
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spurious kind of defence, the only real defence is active defence, defence for the purpose 
of counterattacking and taking the offensive".162 Lo further pointed out "Operationally, 
the strategy of active defence should not have the holding or capturing of territory as its 
main objective. It should be to concentrate superior forces to destroy the enemy's 
effective".163 "The strategy of active defence does not stop with driving the aggressor out 
of the country, but requires strategic pursuit to destroy the enemy at his standing point, to 
destroy him in his nest".164 
In comparing Lo Jui-ch'ing and Lin Piao's different arguments. Lo believed that once war 
between the PRC and the U.S. broke out because of the Vietnamese issue, PRC should 
learn from Soviet experience of how she counterattacked Germany during World War I I 
so as to carry out the strategic pursuit and bring the battlefield to U.S. territory when the 
situation was turned. Whereas Lin Piao argued that the eight years experience that the 
PRC had accumulated in the anti-Japanese war would be a valuable weapon to fight 
against the U.S. In his paper Long Live the Victory of People's War, Lin gave a wide 
coverage in analysing the environment and condition at the time of the anti-Japanese war, 
and introducing the strategy and tactics of people's war in depth, Lin advocated 
proceeding with the struggle line of a "united front" and relying on peasants' strength to 
build the bases of agricultural society, organising a new style of people's army and carrying 
out the strategy and tactics of "people's war", insisting on self-reliance and waging 
"people's war" against "U.S. imperialism and its lackeys".165 What's more, Lin indicated: 
162Ibid, p. 7; "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War (Dec. 1936J", SELECTED WORKS OF 
MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. I (1965), op. cit., p. 764; "Peking's Chief of Staff Urges a Hawkish Line on 
Vietnam (10 May 1965)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY 
SURVEY, op. cit., p. 1209. 
163Ibid, p. 7, and ibid, p. 1209. 
164Ibid,p. 7, and ibid, p. 1209. 
mLin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War (3 Sep. 1965)", RED FLAG, No. 10, 1967, pp. 12-
13; "Peking's Defence Minister States the Maoist Line on Vietnam (3 September 1965), THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 1229-1230. 
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"Why were the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies able to grow big and strong from 
being small and weak and to score such great victory in the war of resistance against 
Japan? The fundamental reason was that the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies were 
founded on comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of army building. The were armies of a new 
type, a people army which wholeheartedly serves the interests of the people... The 
essence of comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of army building is that in building a people's 
army, prominence must be give to politics, that is, the army must first and foremost be 
built on a political basis, politics is the commander, politics is the soul of everything. 
Political work is the lifeline of our army... The experience of the people's war in China 
shows that a people's army created in accordance with comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of 
army building is incomparably strong and invincible... Guided by comrade Mao Tse-tung's 
theory on building a people's army, our army was under the absolute leadership of the 
CCP and most loyally carried out the party's Marxist-Leninist line and policies"166. 
While Lo Jui-ch'ing asserted, based on strategic considerations, that the PRC should 
reconcile with Soviet Union to a certain extent to avoid the inferior strategic position of 
making enemies with both sides in the course of the increasing crisis of the Vietnam war. 
Lo also asserted that instead of waging a people's war to lure the enemy in deep, the PRC 
should take the offensive initiative, dispatching troops to Vietnam to prevent the war from 
spreading to mainland China. This was the main reason why Lo didn't mention a word of 
people's war in the entire paper. However, if the PRC should follow the example of the 
Korea war to aid Vietnam against U.S. aggression, it would be of the first importance that 
the military training must be reinforced in the army to increase its fighting capacity. In 
that case, the army would treat the handling of external threat as a task of top priority, and 
166lbid. 
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correspondingly reduce their non-military affairs in the domestic realm. It was predicated 
that this development would raise military professionalism and weaken the political role of 
the PLA. 
While Lo Jui-ch'ing issued the paper Commemorate the Victory over German Fascism! 
Carry the Struggle against U.S. Imperialism through to the End, Lin Piao had been 
promoting the "movement to learn from Mao Tse-tung's thought" for a long time and 
setting off a nation-wide movement "the whole nation should learn from the liberation 
army". The purpose of these two non-military political campaigns were not only for the 
establishment of the supreme authority of Mao himself, but for the strengthening of Lin's 
own political position. By publishing the article Long Live People's War in his capacity as 
the Minister of National Defence, Lin was in fact negating the assertion of Lo Jui-ch'ing, 
the Chief of General Staff. Lin's reaffirmation of Mao Tse-tung's theory of political army 
building revealed that the army would continue to play an important role in non-military 
affairs and to carry out its political tasks. 
At the day when Lin issued the article Long Live the Victory of People's War, Lo also 
delivered a talk The People Have Defeated Fascism And Will Certainly Triumph Over 
U.S. Imperialism at the conference in celebration of the 20th anniversary of the anti-
Japanese war,1 6 7 nevertheless, departing from his usual stand, Lo approved Lin's 
viewpoints and highly praised his article Long Live the Victory of People's War. He 
indicated: In his (Lin Piao's) article Long Live the Victory People's War written in 
commemoration of the 20th anniversary of victory in the war of resistance against Japan, 
Lin Piao has given a systematic and penetrating explanation of the rich experience gained 
167Lo Jui-ch'ing, "The People Defeated Japanese Fascism and They Can Certainly Defeat the U.S. 
Imperialism Too (3 Sep. 1965)", NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 4 SEP. 1965; "The Chief of Staff 
Compromises (3 Sep. 1965)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY 
SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 1239-1246. 
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by the Chinese people in their more than 20 years of people's war and of comrade Mao 
Tse-tung's theory of people's war and its profound international significance. In connection 
with the present struggles against U.S. imperialism and modern revisionism, he has shown 
that the Khrushchev revisionists are betrayers of people's war and that the people's war 
waged by the revolutionary peoples is the victorious path for defeating U.S. imperialism 
and its lackeys. We should all study his article seriously. We must firmly oppose the 
Khrushchev revisionists perfidy in trying to deceive the people of the world. 
This talk of Lo's in fact had abandoned his earlier arguments in the paper Commemorate 
the Victory over German Fascism! Carry the Struggle against U.S. Imperialism through 
to the End. As a matter of fact, the controversy between Lo and Lin over the policy of the 
Vietnam war stemmed from their conflict over political power as early as 1960 when Lin 
Piao put forth the "Summit Theory" and leftist slogans about the "Highest and Liveliest", 
Lo disputed these as saying "In that case, Marxism-Leninism and Maoism won't develop 
any more. I f we regard the revolutionary theories of leaders as summits, this will go 
against Maoism. I f say anything is the highest and liveliest, then it means there is second 
to it. I don't think Chairman Mao will agree with this".168 Lin emphasised politics and the 
theory that the "pen is mightier than the sword", while Lo laid emphasis on military 
training and strategy by saying, "It is significant to do well in military training. We are 
now depending on military training for the preparation of war". Lin denigrated the "Grand 
Military Contest" in 1964, saying it had negative effect on politics. He trumpeted that 
politics should take command. Lo refuted the proposition that with politics in the lead, 
and military mission could be completed. "Otherwise", Lo said, "if we talk about the 
prominence of politics and have no progress in our work, then that brand of politics is no 
168Yen Chia-ch'i and Kao Kao, THE TEN-YEAR HISTORY OF THE CHINESE CULTURAL 
REVOLUTION, (Taipei: Institute of Current China Studies, 1988), p. 176. 
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good".169 
Outwardly, the conflict between Lin Piao and Lo Jui-ch'ing could be regarded as the 
conflict between two different directions of army building, i.e., Lin laid the stress on 
revolutionisation, while Lo emphasised the importance of modernisation. But, inwardly, it 
was the conflict of their personalities and of power distribution. When Lin Piao was 
appointed by Mao Tse-tung to replace P'eng Te-huai as the Minister of National Defence 
for expediting the army-building program, Lo Jui-ch'i also succeed Huang K'e-ch'eng as 
the Chief of General Staff at the same time. In addition, Lo had enjoyed the trust of Mao 
Tse-tung for he was in charge of Mao's personal security affairs for a long time, which 
made Lin feel insecure in his climbing up the political ladder. Lo once said, "just because I 
don't care a damn of what Lin Piao said, I become the stumbling block in his seizure of 
power, he tried to suppress me a few times, but he failed, so he has made up his mind to 
destroy me" . 1 7 0 However, the final arbitration of their conflict did not lay in how the army 
should be built up, but whose course of action could better meet the political goal of Mao 
Tse-tung and who could be most beneficial to Mao's control over the army. Lo ran 
counter to Lin Piao and closely collaborated with Liu Shao-ch'i, this laid himself open to 
the fate of elimination. Mao considered that military power was all for himself to 
monopolise and that the military commander should be his reliable cadet who would never 
collude with the enemy. And thus the tragic lot of Lo was doomed at the time when Liu 
Shao-ch'i openly expressed that "Lo Jui-ch'i is the successor to the Minister of National 
Defence". Lin Piao was a pawn that Mao used to control and reorganise the army, Mao 
relied on him for bringing a strong political colour to the army in order to ensure that the 
army would carry out the political task Mao entrusted. Above all, one of his targets was 
to overthrow Liu Shao-ch'i. Since Lo opposed Lin, Mao had no other choice but to 
l69Ibid, pp. 192-193. 
'^Commemorate the Respectful Comrade Lo Jui-ch'ing", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 1 Sep. 1978. 
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sacrifice Lo. The big debate over the military policy of the Vietnam war was merely 
another confrontation in the power struggle. 
In March 1966, Lo Jui-ch'ing was eliminated under the charge of "being opposed and 
hostile to Maoist thought, slandering and attacking comrade Mao Tse-tung", "promoting 
the military line of the bourgeoisie to go against that of Chairman Mao's, and launching 
the "grand military contest" without authorisation to resist putting politics in 
command".171 Lo's fall from the power proved the fact that the influence of 
professionalism advocated by the army had once again being suppressed after the fall of 
P'eng Te-huai. 
Lin set off the "movement to learn from Lei Feng" among soldiers beginning in 1963. The 
so-called "to learn from Lei Feng" was in fact designed to conduct a series of propaganda 
campaigns such as "study Chairman Mao's writing, follow his teachings and act according 
to his instructions, be chairman Mao's good fighters" etc., - a campaign to follow Mao 
Tse-tung blindly. Subsequently in early 1964, Mao appealed to the movement "the whole 
nation should learn from the Liberation Army". This series of movements was aimed at 
achieving the goal that the PLA emulate Lei Feng and the whole nation emulate the PLA 
in a way of political socialisation in the hope that the entire army and the people of the 
whole country could be Chairman Mao's good fighter like Lei Feng. After Lin took the 
post of Minister of Defence, in addition to the political tasks that the army executed had 
increased by greatly, the army's system of political work was introduced to schools, 
factories, enterprises, and even to the party and political organisations, and military cadres 
were sent to these newly established departments of political work, 1 7 2 thus military 
171"The CCPCC's Report about the Faults ofLo Jui-ch'ing (30 April, 1966)", THE COLLECTIONS OF 
THE ORIGINAL DATA OF CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, (Taipei: Chinese Communist Studies 
Press, 1979), pp. 67-77. 
^PEOPLE'SDAILY, 7 June 1964. 
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influence expanded throughout the whole country. This trend would inevitably bring the 
army to the road of universal politicisation, which was in conflict with Lo Jui-ch'ing's 
attempt of promoting the "grand military contest" among the army. The army-building 
policy during that period was "red commands expert", the importance of "expert" fell 
more dramatically when the military rank system was abolished in May 1965. Since Lo 
Jui-ch'ing could not understand the real intention of Mao Tse-tung regarding the role of 
army, his fate of being eliminated was inevitable. 
When the power-seizure struggle and the debate over "red" and "expert" between Lin Piao 
and Lo Jui-ch'ing reached an end, at the time of the rising Vietnam war crisis, an 
incomparable "political storm" was brewing inside the PRC, that was the world-famous 
"Great Cultural Revolution". Mao Tse-tung was able to set off this movement precisely 
because that the PRC didn't send troops to aid Vietnam against U.S. aggression, he used 
the army as a means to intervene in the Cultural Revolution for achieving the supreme 
political aim of purging dissidents, and thus the army's political influence expanded 
unprecedentedly during the period of the Cultural Revolution. Mao allied himself with Lin 
Piao, and the army became the most powerful weapon for the seizure and preservation of 
power. 
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Chapter IV. The Party Line and the Political Power and Role 
of the PLA 
Since an obvious hierarchical character existed in the PRC's structure, the elite's decision-
making and the behaviour of the army and party were closely linked with the transition of 
the political system. It brought about a change of political regime to a certain degree, 
when a vehement factional conflict occurred and different viewpoints emerged among the 
elite, and vice versa. The transitional changes in the political system also influenced the 
elite's viewpoint and their behaviour. 
In a communist society, wealth, privilege and power were always connected to one 
another. Discrepancy of power distribution also reflected the distribution of wealth and 
privilege. After their success in revolution, the communists transformed themselves into a 
new class by the use of their special status, usurping state property and turning it into that 
of the party's and those of the bureaucratic clique gathering around the party. This direct 
link between wealth, privilege and power meant that the power pursuers in the communist 
society had stronger motivation than the politicians in multi-societies. 
The high risk competitiveness of the political structure meant that the degree of conflict 
and violence among the PRC elite or political line reached an astonishing level. Once the 
elite's demand for power was greater than their conscious and objective judgement, the 
line struggle became inevitable. Since there was no so called rule of "power competition" 
in the PRC regime, it became very risky to win power, because the price paid when losing 
power could be everything, even a person's life. The situation was complicated at the time 
when the power struggle confronted political right of succession or involved the 
possession of final and supreme authoritative leadership. 
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The PRC was a state with a rudimentary political system and primitive structure 
differentiation. This characteristic restricted the development of the rule of law and 
judicial review of arbitration organs or groups, and yet the arbitrator of the state was cast 
into a moral authority by rigid ideological dogmatism. Consequently, given the lack of 
arbitration organs or groups, line conflict or struggle in the PRC relied on a supreme 
moral authority (Mao Tse-tung, the "wise leader", the "greatest teacher" and the "great 
helmsman") to be the final arbitrator. The character of such decision-making carried a 
strong personal colour in solving the internal conflict. The standard between right and 
wrong was controlled by the personal opinions of Mao or the authorities led by Mao. 
After the establishment of PRC's regime, Mao possessed a dual role of arbitrator and 
competitor in the Chinese Communist Party.1 Generally speaking, Mao almost singly 
played the sole role of arbitrator from the Seventh CCP National Congress to the 
commencement of the Lushan conference in July 1959. After the Lushan conference, the 
function of Mao's status as arbitrator began to fall, whereas his status as competitor 
assumed importance. After Mao played the role of the inner-Party competitor, he became 
the factional leader and allied temporarily with other elites of the party and army to carry 
out power-seizure struggles against those who threatened his leadership. 
The outstanding positions that the leaders of revolutionary generation possessed in the 
party and army and the power they had was not given by Mao, but gained by their own 
outstanding personal achievement during the revolutionary period, when they were 
basically in equal position with Mao before the Seven CCP National Congress which 
brought Maoist thought into the Party Constitution. However since that conference, Mao 
was cast as an "ideological authority", and because of the special function of ideology in 
'The so-called "dual role" was a classification of an ideal type, and in the actual political campaign this 
dual role overlapped. 
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China, as argued in the Third section of Chapter One, this enabled Mao to occupy a 
dominating position in confrontation with inner-party elite. No rivals could attack Mao in 
the ideological superstructure for this would have caused the destruction of the 
"ideological authority" and would have shaken the structural legitimacy of the PRC's 
regime. This accounted for Mao's unshakeable position even at the time when he faced 
counterattack from the inner-party elite. Under this form of political structure, any 
specific line, faction or power struggle could not have totally defeated Mao. 
Moreover, because of the specific characteristics of China's peasant society, the attitude of 
keeping aloof from all political affairs characteristic of the intellectuals, and the blind 
worship of Mao's personal charisma by the low educational broad masses gave Mao great 
opportunity to play politics. Apart from the above-mentioned reasons, another more 
important reason giving Mao the power to set off a nation-wide political campaign, 
manipulating the PLA and arousing the masses to carry out power-seizure struggle during 
the Cultural Revolution, was that the PRC's elite of the party and army offered Mao this 
opportunity to do so for they wanted to maintain structural legitimacy and attempted to 
obtain some personal interest from it. 
According to Mao Tse-tung's discussion with responsible local comrades during his tour 
of inspection between mid-August and 12 September 1971, there were ten major line 
struggles in the history of Chinese Communist Party. These discussions were later 
conveyed to the following units in the name of Chung-fa No. 12 top-secret document of 
the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist - each province, municipality (directly 
under the Central Government), autonomous region, party committee of each military 
region, provincial military district and field army, party committees of each general 
department of the Military Affairs Commission and each service branch, leading groups of 
each department and ministry under the Central Committee and the State council, and core 
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groups of the party. 
The ten major line struggles3 in the history of Chinese Communist Party were stated by 
Mao as follows: 
1. Ch'en Tu-hsiu's right opportunism. After the "7 August" conference in 1927 "Ch'en 
and people such as Liu Jen-ching and P'eng Shu-chih organised a 'Leninist left-wing 
opposition clique'. Eighty-one people published a statement in order to split our party". 
2. Chu Ch'u-pai who made a mistake in line. In Hunan they seized a small pamphlet 
which had in it statements of mine like "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun". 
They got very excited and asked how political power could grow out of the barrel of a 
gun. 
3. Li Li-san, from June to September 1930, promoted the Li-san line for over three 
months. He advocated attacking the big cities and achieving victory first in one or several 
provinces. I didn't approve of his method. 
4. Lo Chang-lung rightist clique, from 1930 to 1931, established a separate central 
committee in an attempt to split the party. 
5. Wang Ming. He began his sectarianism in Moscow, where he organised the "twenty-
eight Bolsheviks". Relying on the strength of the "Third International", they seized power 
2 "Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks To Responsible Local Comrades During his Tour of Inspection 
(Mid-August to September 12, 1971)" - Document of the central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party, Chung-fa, 1972, No. 12, THE UN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, 
(New York: International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., 1975), p. 55. 
3Ibid, pp. 57-61 
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of the party for four years, from 1931 to 1934. I had no right to speak in the Central 
committee. 
6. Chang Kuo-t'ao. In the course of the Long March, after the First and Fourth Armies 
had joined up, Chang Kuo-t'ao tried to split the party by establishing another separate 
Central Committee, but he failed. 
7. Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih. After we achieved a nation-wide victory, Kao Kang and 
Jao Shu-shih formed an anti-party alliance in order to seize power, but they failed. 
8. P'eng Te-huai. At the Lushan conference of 1959, P'eng Te-huai maintained contacts 
with foreign countries and tried to seize power. Huang K'e-ch'eng, Chang Wen-t'ien4 and 
Chou Hsiao-chou5 also popped up in opposition to the party. They set up a military club, 
but never talked about military affairs, they said things like "the communes were set up 
too early", "the gain didn't make up for the loss", etc., P'eng Te-huai even wrote a letter, 
which amounted to an open challenge to seize power, but he did not succeed. 
9. Liu Shao-ch'i and his company also tried to split the party, but they didn't make it 
either. 
10. Lin Piao clique. 
4Chang Wen-t'ien, often known by his pen name Lo Fu, was awakened to an interest in Marxism during 
the May Fourth movement. Before becoming a highly influential polemicist for the CCP, he worked in 
the USA and studied in Moscow during the 1920's. In the Soviet Union he became a leader of the "28 
Bolshevik" group, which played so important a role in the political controversies which led to Mao Tse-
tung's becoming the head of the CCP. See Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark (ed), BIOGRAPHIC 
DICTIONARY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM, 1921-1965, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 61. 
5He was serving as a personal secretary to Mao Tse-tung when the communists moved to Yenan in 1936. 
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Mao had always firmly believed in the necessity of class struggles, which could be clearly 
seen in his paper On Contradiction. Mao stated, "Opposition and struggle between ideas 
of different kinds constantly occur within the party; this is a reflection within the party of 
contradictions between classes and between the new and the old in society. I f there were 
no contradictions in the party and no ideological struggles to resolve them, the party's life 
would come to an end".6 With regard to the phenomena of contradiction in the 
Communist Party, Mao explained as follows: "Contradictions between correct and 
incorrect ideas in the Communist Party are reflections within the party of class 
contradictions. At first, with regard to certain issues, such contradictions may not manifest 
themselves as antagonistic, but with the development of class struggle, they grow and 
become antagonistic".7 
Since "contradiction", "struggle" and "antagonism" were defined by Maoist thought and 
Mao possessed the ideological authority in the Party, no one could dispute it when the 
ideological authority judged who had correct and who had incorrect ideas. Therefore, 
whether a basic line was correct or not was largely decided by Mao's personal opinion. 
Mao himself was the independent variable of line struggle, while the ten major struggles 
over line was merely dependent variables. 
I f one interprets these ten struggles over line as an aspect of power struggle, then the 
political opposition in the Chinese Communist Party could be classified into four kinds, 
namely, structural opposition, line opposition, fundamental opposition, and specific-event 
opposition.8 "Structural opposition" was directed against the system itself.9 "Line 
6"On Contradiction (August. 1937)", THE SELECT WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. I (1975), op. cit, 
p. 317. 
7lbid, p. 344 
8Skilling H. Gorden, "Background to the Study of Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe", Leonard 
Schapiro (ed.), POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN ONE PARTY STATE, (London: The MacMillan Press, 
1972), pp. 75-79. 
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opposition" was the struggle among decision-making groups in the government and in the 
high level organisation of the party, it usually appeared in a form of power struggle, and 
each side possessed abundant political and social resources and had regular supporters. 
"Fundamental opposition" was to oppose or criticise most of the governing authorities' 
major domestic and foreign policies, but not to oppose the system itself, this kind of 
opposition would not necessarily challenge any leading class, but when the scope of 
opposition expanded, it was likely to transform into "structural opposition". "Specific 
event opposition" refers to the opposition of a single or specific policy only, not against 
any leading class, or the system itself. 
The above-mentioned four kinds of opposition were not a mechanised but an organic 
classification. One thing that could be certain was that the situation of "structure 
opposition" did not exit in the PRC's political and military struggle. As a matter of fact, 
the following movements - the Liquidate and Suppress Counterrevolutionaries 
movement10 in 1950, the Ideological Remoulding movement11 in 1952, the Three-anti 
movement1 in December 1951 and June 1952, the Five-anti movement13 in 1952 and , the 
9Robert A. Dahl (ed.), POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1966), p. 332. 
10The movement launched in 1950 to liquidate anti-Communist elements and opposition parties 
immediately after the take-over of the mainland by the communists; See Warren Kuo (ed.), A 
COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, op. cit., p.554. 
nIn 1952, the ideological remoulding movement was widely pushed forward in educational, literary and 
art, scientific and technological circles. The three basic activities of the movement were: 1. Study the 
basic theory of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought which integrates Marxism-Leninism and 
the Chinese revolution so as to understand the prospect of the revolution in China and to correctly grasp 
revolution and idea; 2. Study government policies such as the common program (1949) and important 
documents of the central organs and of various administrative regions; 3. Carry out criticism and self-
criticism so as to rectify the erroneous idea and behaviour which do not benefit the state, the people and 
the revolution. See Warren Kuo (ed.), A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST 
TERMINOLOGY, Ibid., p.525. 
J2A movement against corruption, waste, and bureaucratism carried out between Dec. 1951 and June 
1952. See Warren Kuo (ed.), A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST 
TERMINOLOGY, Ibid., p. 428. 
13The Five-anti movement developed from the Three-anti movement. It was first presented to the 
"congress of the cadres of the CCP, government, PLA, and mass organisations at their first level" by Po 
I-po, Minister of Finance, on 2 Jan. 1952. Five-anti were the action against "capitalist bribery of 
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Socialist Transformation of Agriculture movement14 in 1955 - carried out at the early 
stage of PRC's regime had eradicated five black elements of "landlords, kulaks, counter-
revolutionaries, bad elements and Rightists" left by the Kuomintang government, and thus 
secured the structure of the system and purified the communist society. 
It is noteworthy that the above-mentioned four kinds of opposition were easily dominated 
by the subjective viewpoints of the authorities. In order to destroy the opposition 
completely, it was very likely that governing authorities positioned the opposition at the 
level of "structural opposition" and classified it as "the contradiction between ourselves 
and the enemy". This was the means used by the winning part to acquire the legitimation 
of power in all past PRC's power-seizure struggles. 
In fact, even the most violent power struggle among the leading class of the Chinese 
Communist Party since 1949 only involved the level of "fundamental opposition", the 
"structural opposition" remained untouched. In other words, the recognition of the 
legitimation of the leadership of Chinese Communist Party remained the proposition of all 
power struggles among the leading class. Their real aim was directed at power 
redistribution. 
government workers, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts and stealing 
economic information form government sources". Warren Kuo (ed.), A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY 
OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, Ibid., p. 671. 
14Socialist reform in the rural areas in the shop of co-operation and collectivisation. Agriculturally 
backward communist China chose to push ahead with social revolution at top speed, with technical 
revolution to follow later. See Warren Kuo (ed.), A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE 
COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, Ibid., p. 379; DECISIONS ON DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCERS' CO-OPERATIVES ADOPTED BY THE CCPCC AND OTHER RELATED DOCUMENTS, 
(Peking: People's Publishing House, 1965), p. 34. 
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I. Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih Anti-Party Clique 
Of the ten big struggles over line that Mao mentioned, four had direct links with the army, 
namely, "Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih Anti-party Clique", "P'eng Te-huai and Huang K'e-
ch'eng Anti-party Clique", "The Case of Liu Shao-ch'i" and "Lin Piao Incident". The 
nature of "Kao Kang and Jao shu-chih anti-party Clique" ought to be categorised at the 
level of "specific-event opposition". The Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih case was the first 
major inner-party conflict leading to the expulsion and dismissal of members of the top 
military hierarchy since 1949. The first intimation of it came at the fourth plenary session 
of the Central Committee in February 1954, when Liu Shao-ch'i made a report. It 
contained three parts in all, the most important one was "The Fight to Strengthen Party 
Unity",15 in which he indicated, "The greatest danger to the party is the danger of the 
enemy creating divisions and causing sectarian activities inside the party, and making use 
of a faction in the party.... Among some of our cadres, even certain high ranking cadres 
within our party, there is still a lack of understanding of the importance of party unity... 
They exaggerate the role of the individual and emphasise individual prestige. They think 
there is no one equal to them in the wide world. .. They even regard the region or 
department under their leadership as their individual inheritance or independent 
kingdom".16 
The national conference of the Chinese Communist Party between 21 and 31 March 1955 
heard a report from Teng Hsiao-p'ing, on behalf of the Central Committee, concerning the 
"Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih anti-Party alliance", and unanimously passed the "Resolution 
J5The other two parts were: 'Work of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee Since the Third 
Plenary Session" and "Concerning the Convening of A Party Conference". See THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. I, op. cit., 156. 
16"Communiqui of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Communist Party of China Central 
Committee (Feb. 1954)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY 
SURVEY, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 157-158; PEOPLE'S DAILY, 18 Feb. 1954. 
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on Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih Anti-party Alliance" in 31 March 1955.17 This agreed that 
the measures taken by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee after the Fourth 
Plenum session of the Seventh CCPCC in regard to the question of this anti-Party alliance. 
The main points of the resolution are as follows: 
1. "From 1949 Kao Kang engaged in conspiratorial activities aimed at seizing the power 
of leadership of the party and the state. In Northeast China and other places, he created 
and spread many rumours slandering the Central Committee of the Party and lauding 
himself, to sow discord and dissension among comrades and stir up dissatisfaction with the 
leading comrades of the Central committee of the Party, engaged in activities to split the 
party and in these activities formed his own anti-party faction". 
2. "Kao Kang's anti-Party faction violated the policy of the Central Committee of the 
Party in the work in the Northeast area, trying its utmost to belittle the role of the Party, 
undermining party solidarity and unity and making the Northeast area the independent 
kingdom of Kao Kang". 
3. "Kao Kang tried to instigate Party members in the army to support his conspiracy 
against the Central Committee of the Party. For this purpose he raised the utterly absurd 
'theory' that our party consisted of two parties -one, the so-called 'party of the 
revolutionary bases and the army', the other, the so-called 'party of white area'18 - and that 
17WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, (Shanghai: 
People's Press, 1983), pp. 377-378; Wang Yuan, PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE, (Taipei: 
Department of East Asia Studies, National Cheng-chi University, 1982), pp. 149-150; "Resolution on the 
Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih Anti-party Alliance (31 March 1955)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 1949-1979-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. I, pp. 160-161; NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 4 
April 1955. 
l*White area means the area was controlled by Kuomintang government. The most active branch of the 
CCP in the white area before the war of Sino-Japan war in 1937 was the North China Bureau. The CCP 
secret organisation in the White area also called "undergroundparty". 
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the party was created by the army. He claimed himself as the representative of the so-
called 'party of the revolutionary bases and the army' and claimed that he should hold the 
major authority, that the Central Committee of the Party and the Government should 
therefore be reorganised in accordance with his plan and that he himself should for the 
time being be General-secretary or Vice-chairman of the Central Committee of the Party 
and the Premier of the State Council". 
4. "Jao Shu-shih was Kao Kang's chief ally in his anti-Party conspiratorial activities. It is 
fully established that in the ten years between 1943 and 1953 Jao Shu-shih on many 
occasions resorted to shameless deceit in the party to seize power. After his transfer to the 
Central Committee in 1953, he thought that Kao Kang was on the point of success in his 
activities to seize power in the Central Committee. Therefore, he formed an anti-Party 
alliance with Kao Kang and used his office as Director of the Organisation Department of 
the Central Committee to start a struggle aimed at opposing leading members of the 
Central Committee and he made a conscious effort to split the Party". 
5. "Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih anti-Party alliance have deep historical and social roots, 
the activities of the Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih anti-Party alliance are a reflection of the 
growing complexity and sharpening class struggle in China"19. 
Moreover, the "resolution" raised Kao and Jao's opposition to the level of "anti-Party" and 
accused them of attempting to "overthrow the long-tested nucleus of leadership of Central 
Committee of the Party headed by comrade Mao Tse-tung" so as to "seize power of 
leadership of the Party and the State. Their anti-Party activities undoubtedly conformed to 
the wishes of the imperialist and bourgeois counter-revolutionaries. In fact they became 
19Ibid. 
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the agents of the bourgeoisie within our party". The characteristic of Kao Kang and Jao 
Shu-shih anti-party alliance was the fact that "they never openly put forward program 
against the Central Committee of the Party in any party organisation or at any party 
meeting or among the public. Their only program was to seize the supreme power of the 
Party and the State by conspiratorial means. They did their utmost to cover up their true 
character before the party organisations and party meetings, and changed their methods at 
different times and under different circumstance while carrying out their conspiratorial 
activities".0 
Teng Hsiao-p'ing made a summary of "Kao-Jao anti-Party clique", entitled "Remarks on 
Successive Drafts of the *Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party 
Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China1", in which he indicated that "It was 
correct to expose Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih. Whether this struggle can be regarded as 
one between two lines is something that can be looked into further. I am quite clear about 
the whole story. After comrade Mao Tse-tung proposed at the end of 1953 that the work 
of the Central Committee was to be divided into a 'front line' and a 'second line', Kao Kang 
became very active... At that time, he was in charge of Northeast China, while Lin Piao 
was in charge of Central-south China and Jao Shu-shih of East China, so far as Southwest 
China was concerned, he tried to win me over and had serious talks with me in which he 
said that comrade Liu Shao-ch'i was immature. He was trying to persuade me to join in 
his effort to topple comrade Liu Shao-ch'i... Kao Kang also approached comrade Ch'en 
Yun and told him that a few more vice-chairmanships should be instituted, with himself 
and Ch'en each holding one of them. At this point, comrade Ch'en Yun and I realised the 
20Wang Yuan, PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE, op. cit., pp. 150-151; "Resolution on the Kao 
Kang and Jao Shu-shih Anti-party Alliance (31 March 1955)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. 1, op., cit., p. 161; Tseng Yung-hsien, "An Analysis of 
Kao-Jao Anti-Party Event", Yao Meng-Hsuan (ed.), A SUMMARY OF INNER-PARTY STRUGGLE OF 
THE CCP, (Taipei: National Cheng-chi University, 1975), p. 208. 
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gravity of the matter and immediately brought it to comrade Mao Tse-tung's attention. It 
was highly irregular for Kao Kang to engage in behind-the-scene deals and conspiracies in 
his attempt to bring comrade Liu Shao-ch'i down. .. But so far as Kao Kang's real line is 
concerned, I can't actually see that he had one, so its hard to say whether we should call it 
a struggle between two lines".1 
Teng's remarks on the "Kao-Jao anti-Party Clique" only revealed a fraction of the truth. 
Indeed, Kao Kang did try to topple Liu Shao-ch'i and did assert to divide the Chinese 
Communist Party into two parts - "party of the revolutionary bases and the army" and 
"party of the white areas" as it was stated in the "Resolution on the Kao Kang and Jao 
Shu-shih Anti-Party Alliance". Kao's assertion, however, was aimed at using "the party of 
the revolutionary bases and the army" to appeal for the PLA's support and to show his 
intimate relationship with Mao, and thus crippled the "party of the white areas". Until 
1945, out of the five secretaries of the Central Secretariat, Mao Tse-tung, Chu Te and 
Kao Kang had never conducted any espionage in the white areas, while Liu Shao-ch'i and 
Chou En-lai had long worked in the white areas. Kao's assertion of the "party of the white 
areas" undoubtedly was directed at either Liu Shao-ch'i or Chou En-lai. Since Kao didn't 
consider Chou as chief contender for the supreme leadership, the possibility of directing it 
at Chou decreased. As far as Liu Shao-ch'i was concerned, there had long existed 
discord between Kao and Liu as early as 1945 when Kao Kang and Lin Piao worked in 
Northeast China. At this time, P'eng Chen, Liu's confidant, was sent there in his position 
as secretary of Northeast Bureau of the CCPCC, but was soon transferred in 1946 for not 
getting along well with Kao and Lin. 3 Kao intentionally ruined Liu's personnel 
2 1 "Remark on successive Drafts of the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since 
the Founding of the People's Republic of China' (March 1980-June 1981)", THE SELECT WORKS OF 
TENG HSIAO-P'ING (1975-1982), Vol.1, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), pp. 278-279. 
22Hu Sheng (ed.), THE SEVENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, (Peking: The 
History of Chinese Communist Party Press, 1991), p. 365. 
2 3 Wang Yuan, PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE, op. cit, pp. 155-156. 
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deployment in Northeast China, and moreover, in spite of lacking manpower in the PLA, 
Liu occupied a high position as vice-chairman of the Party. This annoyed Kao, and such 
resentment caused Kao-Lin relations to deteriorate. Consequently, Kao's assertion of 
"party of the white areas" was really aimed at Liu Shao-ch'i. 
Although Kao advocated that he was one of the leaders of the "party of the revolutionary 
basses and army", this could only have had limited appeal to the army. Kao had been a 
guerrilla leader in Shensi between 1928 and 29 and did not take part in the Long March. 
During the Yenan period he held important party posts, including the Secretaryship of the 
Shenkanning Party Committee. He was especially concerned with economic mobilisation 
and cadre training, but did not hold a military office until 1946, when he became both 
commander and political commissar of the Northeast Military Region. At this stage, his 
appeal to the army, if it was made, could thus only be directed towards his former guerrilla 
associates in Shensi or towards his colleagues in the Northeast Military Region. Kao was 
not a first rank army leader, and was unlikely to have won particular loyalty outside the 
units and staff under his own command. This also applied to Jao Shu-shih. 
It should be noted that in the Kao-Jao incident, as Liu's position in the party at that time, 
coupled with his disapproval of Kao's theocratic assertion of "party of the revolutionary 
bases and the army" and the "party of the white areas", which referred to the power 
distribution, the purge of Kao Kang was, undoubtedly, initiated by Liu Shao-ch'i, while 
Mao only used the struggle of Liu and Kao to weaken the influence of local military 
leaders and to profit from it. 
The Kao-Jao incident also revealed that there existed discord between Liu Shao-ch'i and 
Chou En-lai. Jao Shu-shih was originally from the Southern Bureau under the leadership 
of Chou En-lai. The reason that he could succeed Liu Shao-ch'i as political commissar of 
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New Fourth Army was because of Chou's support, and until 1953, Jao had been promoted 
all the way by the arrangement of Chou.24 During that period Jao held many important 
posts. These included being a member of the Central People's Government, and of the 
People Revolutionary Military Commission, chairman of the East China Military-
Administrative Committee, and political commissar of East China Military Region (Third 
Field Army). In October 1952, Jao was chief representative of Chinese delegates led by 
Liu Shao-ch'i attending the 19th conference of party representatives of the CPSU. Shortly 
after his return, he became the director of the Central Committee's Organisation 
Department, which had been vacant for three years since the death of Jen Pi-shih, and by 
1953, he became chairman of the Administrative Committee of Eastern China, Chairman 
of the State Planning Committee, and member of the Drafting Committee for the 
Constitution. 
It was noteworthy, however, that since the death of Jen Pi-shih, the role of director of the 
Central Committee's Organisation Department had been partially enacted by An Tsu-
wen3, originally from Liu Shao-ch'i's Northern Bureau, in his capacity as the deputy 
director from 1950 to 1952.6 After Jao became the director, many of his personnel 
24SMh Chia-lin, THE PURGE OF KAO KANG & JAO SHU-SHIH, (Hong Kong: Freedom Press, 1955), 
p. 36. 
lAn Tsu-wen is one of the party's top organisational specialists. He worked in north China during the 
Sino-Japanese war and since the PRC was established in 1949 he has devoted most of his time to the CCP 
Organisation Department, becoming the director in 1957. He headed the Ministry of Personnel from 
1950 to 1954 and was elected a party Central Committee member in 1956. Although a member of the 
elite, An does not appear to be a policy maker, but he frequently serves as the party's spokesman at 
important meetings, particularly during important ideological campaigns. Some of An's more important 
speeches an articles are: "Strengthen the Work of Party Reform and Party Expansion on the foundations 
of the Victory in the Three-anti and Five-anti Movement (1 July 19952)", "Collective Leadership Ensures 
the Victory of the CCP (July 1957)", "Refutation of the Rightists over the Question of Cadres' Policy (20 
Sep. 1957)", "Further Strengthen the Directing Role of Party Organs in People's Communes (16 Dec. 
1959)", "The Cultivation of Successors to the Revolutionary Cause in a Strategic Task of the Party (23 
Sep. 1964). See Donald W. Klein &Anne B. Clark (ed.), BIOGRAPHIC DICTIONARY OF CHINESE 
COMMUNISM, 1921-1965, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 3-5. 
26Michael Y. H. Kau (ed.), THE WRITINGS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 1946-1976, Vol. I, (New York: M.E. 
sharpe Inc., 1986), p. 543. 
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arrangements conflicted sharply with Liu Shao-ch'i.7 Soon after Jao Shu-shih was 
purged, An Tsu-wen was dismissed from his concurrent post as director of the Personnel 
Department of the State Council, under the leadership of Chou En-lai, at the time when 
the State Council was reorganised in 1954. 
On the whole there were many doubts in the CCP concerning the Kao-Jao anti-Party 
alliance. These were, "Is there, after all, such an alliance? or perhaps it is not really an 
alliance, but rather two separate independent kingdoms, two-go-it-aloners? They have not 
seen any document, and if they were an alliance, they should have had an agreement of 
some sort and with the agreement there would be documents, and what is the conspiracy 
of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih?"8 
In view of the above, Mao spoke at the National Conference of the CCP in 31 March 
1955, in which Mao clarified the doubts with the following: "Indeed, there were no-
written agreements; we were not able to discover any. We say, however, that Kao Kang 
and Jao Shu-shih did form an alliance. First, in the joint activities of Kao Kang and Jao 
Shu-shih at the time of the conference on finance and economic work (12 June - 11 
August 1953). Second, from the collaboration between Jao and Chang Hsin-shan9 in 
carrying out anti-party activities at the time of the conference on organisation work 
(March - April 1951). Third, in Jao Shu-shih own words, 'From now on the Centre's 
Organisation Department should have Kuo Kang30 as it core', the Organisation 
Department had Jao Shu-shih as its director, and then Kao Kang's confidant, who made up 
27Shih Chia-lin, THE PURGE OF KAO KANG &JAO SHU-SHIH, op. cit., pp. 36-37. 
28Michael Y. M. Kau (ed), THE WRITINGS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 1949-1976, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 534, 537. 
29Chang Hsin-shan, in the early 1950s he held several posts in the Northeast administration then under 
Kao's direction. In 1955 he was second secretary of the Northeastern Bureau of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China. 
30Kuo Feng participated in the occupation of the Northeast under the command of Kao Kang in 1947 and 
returned to the region in 1951 as director of the Northeast People's Administrative Affair Office. 
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its nucleus. Fourth, we can see it from the fact that Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih 
distributed everywhere a slate of candidates for the political bureau, put together in private 
by An Tsu-wen, An Tsu-wen was given a disciplinary warning for this. Kao Kang, Jao 
Shu-shih, and their people distributed this list of names to everybody who attended the 
conference on organisation work and to each of the southern provinces. What was their 
motive for distributing this thing everywhere? Fifth, from Kao Kang's expression to me on 
two occasions of his desire to protect Jao and Jao's insistence on protecting Kao to the 
very last. Kao Kang told me that Jao was in big trouble and asked me to bail him out. I 
said to him, why are you speaking on Jao's behalf? I'm in Peking, so is Jao; why should he 
want you to represent him and not come directly to me? He has legs, doesn't he? The 
second time was on the day before Kao Kang was exposed (6-10 Feb., the Fourth Plenum 
of the Seventh Central Committee). Kao was still expressing his desire to protect Jao 
Shu-shih. To the very last, Jao Shu-shih wanted to protect Kao Kang, he wanted to 
redress the injustice against Kao Kang. So, I said that there were two headquarters in 
Peking. One was a headquarters led by myself; we blew a Yang (open) Wind and set a 
Yang fire. The other was a headquarters commanded by someone else; it blew Yin 
(conspiratorial) Wind, set a Yin fire, and was a subterranean stream... It can be seen that 
they had an anti-party alliance and were not two unrelated independent kingdom or 'go-it-
aloners'".31 
As for the doubts concerning the "document" and "conspiracy", Mao explained: "Do you 
need a written agreement when you are forming a conspiracy?... It was through the 
Finance and Economy Work conference, the conference on Organisational Work and the 
various problems prior to the Finance and Economic conference that one could see that 
they were abnormal... People can understand the essence of the thing only through the 
31Michael Y. M. Kau (ed.), THE WRITINGS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 1949-1976, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 534. 
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analysis and study its appearance." 
The above explanation on the doubts concerning the Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance, in fact, 
did not justify the real truth of it, especially in so far as the "document" and "conspiracy" 
are concerned. Mao explained the whole thing from metaphysics, this would only further 
expose his real motive. 
Mao acknowledged the fact that Kao and Jao had never openly acted against the Central 
committee of the Party on any occasion, but he maintained his subjective belief that they 
had a program to seize the supreme power of the Party and the State. As a consequence 
of this, it was natural that Mao classified Kao and Jao as "anti-Party alliance". His 
intention was to "execute one as a warning to hundred of people" and to establish his 
authoritative leadership in the Party. This was all very obvious. Nevertheless, It was Kao 
Kang's attempt to "made the independent kingdom" and "to overthrow Mao so as to seize 
power of leadership of the party and the State" that caused Mao's greatest dissatisfaction 
and concern. Mao could never allow Kao and Jao and similar people to live if he wished 
to establish an absolute leadership of the Party. Another significant impact of this event 
was Mao's obvious attempt to remould non-Maoist factions. As stated in the National 
Conference of the CCP, Mao indicated, "There were two headquarters in Peking", said 
Mao, "one was a headquarters led by myself, the other was a headquarters commanded by 
someone else".33 Mao intentionally raised Kao Kang's issue from the level of "specific-
event opposition" to that of "line or factional opposition". Since Mao subjectively 
believed "the appearance of the Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih alliance was not an accidental 
phenomena but a incisive manifestation of violent struggle in our country at the current 
3 ibid, p. 537. 
33"Study the Speech at the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party", RED FLAG, No. 5, 
1955, p. 56. 
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stage",34 he therefore had to purge all those persons who had close relationship with Kao 
and Jao for eradicating Kao-Jao's faction. Persons who were purged on the charge of 
involvement in the Kao-Jao anti-Party clique included Hsiang Ming and six others.35 
However, the command of Kao Kang was in itself the least important of the six military 
regional commands. Apart from local forces, it possessed no armies of its own. As of 
March 1954, only one army group was stationed in the Northeast, and two of its four 
armies were in Kwangtung province. This army group, the Fourteenth, formed party of 
the Fourth Field Army, whose commander was Lin Piao, with its headquarters and staff in 
Kwangtung. The positions held by the seven officials named with Kao as implicated in the 
plot suggested that his power depended on the party rather than on military support. 
To sum up, the incident of "Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance" had the following impact on the 
development of the political role of the PLA: 
Firstly, Mao took the first step of weakening the regional commanders so as to 
34lbid., p. 51. 
35(1) Hsiang Ming: 2nd secretary, Shantung Sub-bureau, 1950-54; vice governor, Shantung, 1951-55. (2) 
Chang Hsin-shan: deputy secretary, NE Bureau, 1952-54; director, NE Organisation Dept., 1950-53; 
Chairman, NE Supervision Com., 1950-54; secretary, NE Discipline Inspection Com., 1950s; deputy 
political commissar, NE Military Region, early 1950s. (3) Chang Ming-yuan: 3rd deputy secretary and 
secretary general, NE Bureau, 1952-54; vice-chairman, NE Govt., 1953-54; secretary-general, NE Govt, 
1952-54; vice-chairman, NE supervision Com., 1950-52. (4) Chao Te-tsun: Secretary, Heilungkiang, 
1950-54; governor, Heilungkiang, 1952-53; deputy director, NE Organisation Dept., 1951; director, NE 
Rural Work Dept., 1954. (5) Mao Hung: deputy Secretary-general, NE Bureau, 1952; member and 
secretary-general. State Planning Com., 1952-53. (6)Kao Feng: Secretary, Liaosi, 1950-54; deputy 
directory, NE Organisation Dept., 1952-53; director, NE Organisation Dept., 1953; director, NE 
Personnel Dept., 1952; deputy secretary, NE Discipline Inspection Com., early 1950s. (7) Ch'en Po-tsun: 
2nd secretary, port Arthur-Dairen, 1952-53; deputy secretary, NE Organisation Deputy., 1950-51; 
director, NE personnel dept., 1952; deputy secretary, NE Discipline Inspection Com., early 1950s; 
member, NE Procurator's Office, 1951 
See Frederick C. Twiwes, POLITICS & PURGES IN CHINA, (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1979), p. 185; 
John Gittings, THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE ARMY, op. cit., p. 278; Wang Yuan, PRC'S STRUGGLE 
OF POWER AND LINE, op. cit., p. 105; and "Resolution on the Kao Kang & Jao Shu-shih Anti-Party 
Alliance (31 March 1955), THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY 
SURVEY, Vol. I. op. cit., p. 161. 
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consolidate his control over the local armies. There was a close relationship among 
military headquarters, regional districts and administrative committees between 1949 and 
1953. In that period the Central party organisations were apprehensive about the rise of 
warlordism. The party was especially alarmed by the potential of the field armies to 
establish regional independence. Up to the end of 1953 the commanders of the four field 
armies also headed the regional military-administrative committee. 
When the Kao-Jao anti-Party Clique was purged, Mao, at the same time, successively 
abolished six great regional administrations and six central bureaux - North China, East 
China, Northeast, Northwest, Southwest and Central-South from June 1954, and in 
September, Mao deactivated and reorganised the six great military regions (under the 
occupation of the field armies, namely 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, North China and Northeast 
China), into ten first level military regions - Peking, Shenyang, Tientsin, Nanking, 
Foochow, Wuhan, Kwangtung, Kunming, Chengtu and Lanchow, and three autonomous 
military regions - Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang.36 These regions were dominated by 
united and military leaders from the following field armies.37 
Military Region Dominant Field Army System Military Districts 
Kwangtung 4th Field Army Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan 
Chengtu 1st & 2nd Field Armies Szechuan 
Foochow 3rd Field Army Fukien, Kiangsi 
Kunming 2ndFieldArmy Kweichow, Yunan 
Lanchow 1st Field Army Tsinghai, Kansu, Ninghsia, Shensi 
Nanking 3rd Field Army Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsu 
Peking 5th Field Army Hopei, Shansi 
"William W. Whitson, THE CHINESE HIGH COMMAND - A HISTORY OF COMMUNIST MILITARY 
POLITICS 1927-1971, (London: The MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1973), p. 507; John Gittings, THE ROLE OF 
THE CHINESE ARMY, op. cit., pp. 307-308; Yeh Hsiang-chi, "The PLA and the Organisations of the 
Party and Government", CHINESE COMMUNIST STUDIES, Vol. IX, (Taipei: Chinese Communist 
Studies Press, 1975), p. 10; Chiang I-shan, THE MILITARY AFFAIRS OF THE CCP - THE FIRST 
DECADE OF THE CCP, (Hong Kong: Yiu Lien Press, 1960), p. 372. 
37William W. Whitson, THE CHINESE HIGH COMMAND - A HISTORY OF COMMUNIST MILITARY 
POLITICS 1927-1971, op. cit., pp. 506-507; John Gittings, THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE ARMY, op. 
cit., p. 308. 
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Shenyang 4th Field Army Kirin, Liaoning, Heilungkiang 
Tsinan 3rd & 5th Field Armies Shantung 
Wuhan 2nd Field Army Honan, Hupeh 
Inner Mongolia 1st & 5th Field Armies 
Sinkiang 1st Field Army 
Tibet 2nd Field Army 
One of the reasons for increasing the number of military regions was to decentralise the 
military power from the original 5 to 13 persons. Mao's aim was to disperse the 
controlled regions of the field armies so as to avoid the over-expansion of local military 
commanders with the possible result of the gun commands the party. 
In addition to the decentralisation of factional force brought by the field armies in the 
PLA, Mao ordered that no commander or political commissar of military regions or 
military districts was to be allowed to take any concurrent post in the local party or local 
government with the exception of the three autonomous military regions of Sinkiang, 
Inner Mongolia and Tibet where ethnic minorities were concentrated. However the first 
secretary of the regional party committee must also be the concurrent first political 
commissar of the military region or various positions of equal status38 to ensure the party's 
control over the army. 
By 1954, with the convening of the National Defence Council (NDC) and Ministry of 
National Defence,39 Mao was made concurrent chairman of the NDC; P'eng Te-huai, the 
vice-chairman of State Council, was made concurrent Minister of National Defence; Chu 
Te, P'eng Te-huai, Lin Piao, Liu Po-ch'eng, Ho Lung, Ch'en I , Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Lo Jung-
huan, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, Yeh Chien-ying, Nieh Jung-chen, Chang Chih-chung, Fu Tso-i, 
38Yeh Hsiang-chi, "The PLA and the Organisations of the Party and Government", CHINESE 
COMMUNIST STUDIES, Vol. IX, op. cit., p. 10. 
^"Constitution of the People's Republic of China (20 September 1954) ", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 102, and NEW CHINA NEWS 
AGENCY, 20 September 1954. 
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Ch'eng Ch'ien and Lung Yun were made Vice-chairmen of the NDC. 4 0 The Council was 
mainly composed of responsible leaders of the various field armies. This was because 
Mao intend to group them together in Peking by offering a vice-chairmanship so as to 
weaken their military power. It was a refurbished version of "depriving one's military 
power with the temptation of high position and handsome salary in return" applied by the 
founding emperor of successive dynasties.41 
Secondly, Liu Shao-ch'i was classified by Kao Kang as the representative of "party of the 
white areas", this had, indeed, seriously damaged Liu's prestige in the PLA. Until 
September 1954, the chairman of People's Revolutionary Military Council (PRMC) was 
Mao Tse-tung, with five vice-chairmen under him, Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai were 
both named.4 However, in September 1954, the NDC assumed the role of the PRMC, 
Mao remained the chairman of NDC, with fifteen vice-chairmen under him, but both Liu 
and Chou fail to be named this time. It is noteworthy that the investigation of the "Kao-
Jao anti-Party alliance" by the CCP was also conducted during this period. Mao took this 
opportunity to deprive Liu and Chou of their leadership in the army. Liu occupied 
important posts in the CCP, but he had never had an intimate relationship with the PLA. 
Apart from the party representative of the Red Eighth Army Regiment and of Red Fifth 
Army Regiment, and the political commissar of the New Fourth Army, Liu occupied no 
important posts in the army. In the CCP, Liu had been promoted from the organisational 
system of the party. His party background was far stronger than that of his military 
background. The assignment as vice-chairman of the PRMC since 1949 was his best 
opportunity to build up organisational affiliation in the PLA, however, this opportunity 
40Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, THE PLA IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, (Peking: The History of the 
CCP Press, 1989), p. 538. 
4lChen K'uan-ch'iang, THE FATE OF FOUNDERS OF PAST DYNASTIES, (Taipei: Chiao Hsin Cultural 
Press, 1966). 
42Shih Chia-tin, THE PURGE OF KAO KANG &JAO SHU-SHIH, op. cit., p. 27. 
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was lost because of Kao Kang's attack on him. The PLA chose Mao Tse-tung and Lin 
Piao to side with immediately after the advent of the Cultural Revolution. This explained 
how enormously Liu was affected by the incident "Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance". 
Finally, Lin Piao successfully got away from the incident of "Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance" 
and preserved the actual strength of the Fourth Field Army which was led by him. This 
contributed to his rise because Mao had to rely on him and the PLA's force to carry out 
the struggle against Liu Shao-ch'i. The rise of Lin Piao also put an end to the professional 
army-building program promoted by Peng Te-huai in his tenure as Minister of National 
Defence. 
As mentioned before, Kao Kang had most intimate relations with Lin Piao's Fourth Field 
Army, and the seven who were purged with Kao and Jao were all promoted by Lin Piao 
during the period in the Northeast. Strictly speaking, Lin was responsible for the incident 
of Kao and Jao, but eventually he escaped the consequences. Three reasons could 
account for this. 
First, Kao Kang was only an unimportant regional leader, with no close relations with the 
PLA. Mao could tolerate Kao occupying a high position as chairman of the Northeast 
People's Government because it was only a temporary arrangement based on the concern 
of political stability. Sooner or later, Mao would have to purge figures like Kao Kang if 
he wished to consolidate centralised leadership. While Lin Piao was Mao's direct line of 
descent, and possessed real military power, Mao relied heavily on him to secure his 
political power. Mao just wouldn't sacrifice Lin Piao because of Kao for Lin was much 
more important than Kao at this stage. 
Second, according to the five-point explanation on the doubts concerning the "Kao-Jao 
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anti-Party alliance" that Mao reported to the National conference of the CCP in 31 March 
1955, none of the points were made through Mao's personal understanding with the 
exception of the fifth point. It was to be believed that apart from Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao 
played an important role in the supply of relevant information. The CCPCC was 
convinced that Kao Kang's final attempt was to draw the army over to his side and "to 
instigate Party members in the army to support his conspiracy against the Central 
committee of the Party". Nevertheless, Lin Piao's power-seizure ambition was far greater 
than Kao could provide. In this incident, Lin didn't support Kao with his Fourth Field 
Army, but instead he sacrificed Kao to gain the trust of Mao Tse-tung, from which was 
the core interest Lin could benefit from. 
And the last, at that time, Liu Shao-ch'i's position in the CCP was below that of Mao Tse-
tung, but higher than Lin Piao. Mao could agree with Liu in the purge of regional leaders 
like Kao Kang, but would not agree to involve Lin Piao in this. As mentioned before, Liu 
had few supporters and close followers in the PLA. if he insisted to purge Lin Piao, he 
would have to face possible resistance from the Fourth Field Army or from the PLA. 
Although there existed many factional problems in the PLA, they could only be regarded 
as internal affairs in the closed system of the PLA. As for their political stand, they would 
unanimously pledge their loyalty to Mao instead of Liu Shao-ch'i. 
The incident of the "Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance" was the first important power-seizure 
struggle since the founding of the PRC. In this high-ranking power struggle, the PLA 
wasn't involved in any political operations, on the contrary, Mao seized the opportunity to 
reorganise military regions and deactivate administrative regions. Moreover, with the 
establishment of Ministry of National Defence and National Defence Council, Mao 
transferred responsible leaders of the field armies to Peking. This series of measures, in a 
sense, was a prerequisite for the professional and regular army-building program, but this 
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was not Mao's real aim. The series of measures was aimed at depriving the military power 
of regional commanders and consolidating the army-building principle of the absolute 
leadership of the party over the armed forces. The political role of the army remained the 
same as defined by the resolution of the Kutien conference. After the incident of "Peng-
Huang anti-Party alliance" (to be discussed shortly), Mao's attempt to apply the army as a 
political means for his power-seizure struggle was exposed entirely. 
Although members involved in the "Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance" were confined to regional 
cadres who had close relations with Kao and Jao, the event of "Kao-Jao anti-Party 
alliance" had profound significance for it was Mao's first step to establish the "Maoist 
Dynasty". Mao eradicated all elements that would threaten his authority starting from a 
local level. He personally believed there were many people like Kao and Jao inside the 
Party, and therefore he should make full use of this opportunity to purge Kao and Jao so 
as to warn the others. 
It was noteworthy that since this event, Mao always linked his opponents with "Kao-Jao 
anti-Party Alliance" in every power struggle to reveal the wild ambition or conspiracy of 
his opponents and the inevitable of power struggle. For instance, in August 1958, when 
Mao purged the "P'eng Te-huai and Huang K'e-ch'eng anti-Party Clique", P'eng was 
denounced and it was said that "his behaviour at the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC 
was a true continuation and development of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih anti-Party 
Alliance";43 in the beginning of Cultural Revolution, when the Red Guards criticised Chu 
Te on 10 Feb., 1967, Chu was accused of "having participated in the conspiracy of Kao 
4 3 "Resolution of the 8th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
Concerning the Anti-Party Clique Headed by P'eng Te-huai (16 August 1959)", RED FLAG, No. 13, 
1967, pp. 18-20; "Central Committee Resolution on P'eng Te-huai (16 August 1959)", THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit, pp. 754-756; NEW 
CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 16 August 1967. 
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Kang and Jao anti-Party alliance" and "having advocated that everybody should in turns be 
the leader".44 Moreover, at the later stage of the Cultural Revolution, the so-called "Gang 
of Four" were accused of the following crime: "not only had they carry forward the 
reactionary legacy of Kao-Jao and Lin Piao, but that they further developed it viciously 
and acted more vigorously" . 4 5 
44Wang YUan, THE PRCS STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE, op. ext., P. 156. 
4S"Study the Speech at the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party", RED FLAG, No. 5, 
1977, p. 53. 
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II . P'eng-Huang Anti-Party Clique 
The "Feng (Te-huai) and Huang (K'e-ch'eng) anti-Party Clique" should be classified as a 
combination of "specific-event opposition" and "line opposition". P'eng's "specific-event 
opposition" was outwardly directed against the movement of the "Three Red Banners" but 
inwardly was expressed his dissatisfaction of involving the Army in non-military affairs. 
P'eng's line opposition was referred to as the conflict between members of military 
professional system and that of the party system over the nature of PLA's political role. 
In February 1956, the "programme enforcing the army's participation and support in 
agricultural collectivisation and agricultural production" promulgated by the PLA's 
"General Political Department" regulated that "All armies, military organs and schools 
should contact Party Committee and People's Council of the same base, according to their 
own condition to spare few labour days in each year to participate in socialist construction 
in a planned way".46 
Since the Eighth CCP National congress, the political commissars deliberately increased 
compulsory labour days. According to data, the PLA carried out a total of 20 million 
people's labour days,47 and in 1958 PLA proclaimed that "The number supporting the 
Great Leap Forward in agricultural production will increase to 30 million people's labour 
days".48 In the meantime, the CCPCC Military Commission also reached the decision that 
the "army should spare one or two months of each year to participate in production", 
saying that "the army may spend about half of its service participating in local construction 
works of various kinds, but the rest of its time should engage in the industrial and 
46"Programme Enforcing the Army's Participation and Support in Agricultural Collectivisation and 
Agricultural Production", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 9 February, 1956. 
47lbid. 
48Ibid. 
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agricultural production".49 This policy of enforcing the army to support the Great Leap 
forward movement had an important political significance, in that it represented the party 
system which overwhelmed the army professionalists. 
After the convening of the Lushan conference on 2 July 1959, P'eng spoke to the 
Northwest group 7 times between 3 and 10 July consecutively, criticising the failure of 
the Great Leap Forward movement. The focal points of his speeches were as follows: 
First, the establishment of People's Communes is too hasty. Second, the campaign of 
refining steel by the whole people, conducted after the Peitaiho conference (also known as 
Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo of the CCPCC, held between 17 and 30 Augst 1958), 
was too much a "left" deviationist line. Third, the realistic problems for increasing 
industrial production by the whole people. Fourth, tt is difficult for every region to 
accomplish on industrial system in just one or two five-year plans. Fifth, tt is easy to 
correct "Right", but difficult to correct "Left" in the Party. Sixth, there are quite a few 
faults in the "Great Leap Forward" policy. Seventh, everyone including Chairman Mao 
has to take responsibility for the failure of the "Great Leap Forward" policy. And finally, 
nowadays, the decision-making is done by one individual, instead of the party's collective 
leadership. .. It is very unusual and also dangerous to establish only individual's prestige, 
but collective prestige is usual.50 The last two points of P'eng's speech obviously launched 
a fatal attack on Mao. 
On 14th July 1959, P'eng Te-huai wrote a personal letter to Mao, setting out his views in 
his capacity as Minister of National Defence in the early stage of the Lushan Conference. 
However, P'eng's personal letter was entitled "Comrade P'eng Te-huai's Letter of Opinion" 
49PEOPLE'S DAILY, 26 February, 1959. 
50LiJui, THE TRUE RECORDS OF LUSHAN CONFERENCE, (Taipei: Hsin Jui Publication, 1994), pp. 
110-111. 
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in big-sized characters by Mao and made public and distributed to all participants in the 
conference on 17th July.51 P'eng once asked the conference to recall this "personal letter" 
which had been made public, but on 23rd July, Mao criticised P'eng's letter of opinion as 
being the program of anti-Party and the program of the Rightist opportunists, it was a well 
prepared, planned, organised, and purposeful. Mao also castigated P'eng for making 
mistakes on warlordism, great-power chauvinism and line.5 Mao further pointed out 
"Some people will not give their views. It will go on for one year, two years, three to five 
years. It won't do if you cannot listen to strange sayings. You must get accustomed to 
them. I myself always listen to them with a stiff upper lip. They cannot do more than 
throw dirt at your past three generation, don't blame them ... I never attack others if I am 
not attacked. I f others attack me, I always strike back. Others attack me first, I attack 
them later. I have never given up this principle until this very day".53 
Mao attacked P'eng by saying, "Historically, there have been four lines, the Li-san line, the 
Wang Ming line, the Kao-Jao line, and now again this line. .. These people (meaning P'eng 
Te-huai) do not mention adventurism, but they just smell opposition to adventurism. For 
instance, they say that 'there have been losses and gains', to place 'gains' in the second 
position is obviously done after much deliberation. .. Under the pressure of imperialists 
and the bourgeoisie, they tend to become rightists".54 
Finally, Mao threatened, "If we have done ten things, nine of which have been bad, and are 
reported in the papers, we must perish, and if we deserve to perish, then I shall go, I shall 
then go to the countryside to lead the peasants to overthrow the government. I f you from 
5 1 THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF P'ENG TE-HUAI, (Peking: People's Press, 1981), pp. 269-270. 
"Ibid, pp. 270-276. 
53Jurgen Domes, P'ENG TE-HUAI - THE MAN AND THE IMAGE, (London: C. Hurst & Company, 
1985), p. 94. 
S4Ibid, p. 95. 
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the PLA do not follow me, I shall find myself a Red Army".55 In addition, as his guards 
remembered, Mao told Lushan "If P'eng Te-huai's army won't follow me then I will go 
down to the countryside, reorganise the guerrillas and reorganise my army".56 This 
revealed Mao's great disapproval of P'eng Te-huai. 
Moreover, Mao opposed Feng's viewpoint about "petty-bourgeoisie fanaticism" in the 
meeting. He said, "You are all criticising me although not by name. I admit I have two 
crimes. First, it was my idea to set an output target for steel production to ten million and 
seven hundred thousand tons, and thus some ninety million labour force were thrown into 
production, and four billion yuan was lost. Second, the whole world even the Soviet 
Union are against the establishment of People's Communes. I know there are many 
voices against it as well in China. Your attack on me are quite enough. I f anyone should 
take the responsibility, it is I whom should be blamed. I used to blame someone for the 
mistake he made, and now it is my turn to be blamed. There is a saying, 'The one who 
takes the lead in doing evil only to end up without male offspring'. I had two sons but 
now look, one is killed (An-ying, elder son, was killed in a bombardment in Korea War), 
the other is mad (An-ch'ing, second son, was mad for an unknown reason), I am doomed 
to have no male offspring. I am the one who took the lead and should end up this way".37 
In this speech, Mao explicitly expressed his disapproval of P'eng Te-huai. He forced the 
participants to declare their stands by threatening to go to Chinkang mountain and fight as 
a guerrilla. He further evoked participants towards anti-P'eng's sentiment by making 
caustic remarks of himself about no offspring. The background of this accusation was 
because when the Korea war broke out in 1950, Mao sent his elder son, Mao An-ying, to 
55Ibid. 
56Harrison E. Salisbury, THE NEW EMPERORS - MAO & TENG: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY, (London: 
Harper Collins Publishers, 1992), p. 183. 
"LiJui, THE TRUE RECORDS OF THE LUSHAN CONFERENCE, op. cit., p. 155, 158. 
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follow Peng Te-huai. His intention was to build up political prestige for his son. P'eng, 
however, did not fulfil his duty to protect Mao's son, and let him be killed in one UN 
bombardment on 25 November 1950.58 
In his conversation with Chou En-lai on 23 June afternoon. P'eng expressed his 
disapproval of Mao's talk on that morning and commented "it is against the fundamental 
principle of the Communist Party if the Party can not be criticised".59 On 26 July, Mao 
gave a new order, that was, the criticism of P'eng's "letter of opinion" should not only be 
directed at the letter, but also directed at the person who wrote it. From then on, the 
Lushan conference entered into a new stage, the atmosphere to struggle against P'eng was 
elevated. The "letter of opinion" that P'eng wrote to Mao became an issue of the person 
rather than that of the letter itself, which suggested it was not done by one individual and a 
loosen attack, but that it was a well-organised and programmed attack directed at the 
P^y 60 
From then on, a series of attack on P'eng were made in the meeting by all groups, the 
points of their attack can be summarised as follows: First, P'eng always vacillated his 
stand whenever the Party faced a fatal crisis. Second, P'eng is a heroic individualist, he 
opposes Mao's military command. Third, P'eng has always dampened the spirits of the 
masses movements, and acted wilfully. Fourth, P'eng's attack on the Party was neither a 
matter of the stand, nor for the interest of the Party, his attack was to set off a inner-Party 
struggle to oppose the General Line and attack Chairman Mao. Fifth, his speech at the 
conference and the "letter of opinion" carried strong anti-Party nature, it was directed at 
the Party authority and Chairman Mao. Sixth, Mao instructed that the party must refrain 
5*THE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF P'ENG TE-HUAI, op. at, p. 428. 
S9LiJui, THE TRUE RECORDS OF THE LUSHAN CONFERENCE, op. cit, p. 163. 
^Ibid, p. 164. 
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from being split both at the second meeting of the Eighth CCP National Congress and 
Shanghai meeting (December 1957), his remarks were actually directed at Feng Te-huai. 
Seventh, P'eng's disapproval of building up only individual's prestige was aimed at 
attacking Chairman Mao. And the last, P'eng had illicit relations with foreign countries.61 
Presided over by Mao Tse-tung, two meetings of the Standing Committee of the CCPCC 
Political Bureau were held in the proceedings of the Lushan conference on 31 July and 1 
August respectively. The participants included Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Lin 
Piao, P'eng Te-huai, P'eng Chen and Ho Lung, persons in the visitors' seats included 
Huang K'e-ch'eng, Chou Hsiao-chou, Chou Hui and Li Jui6. The two meetings formally 
declare the nature of P'eng Te-huai's crime. Some important points of Mao's talk about 
P'eng's crime are as follows: First, we must oppose right opportunism. Second, P'eng has 
always vacillated his stand in all previous line struggles in the party. This is because he 
had been criticised and thus held a grudge against Mao and the Party Third, the 
relationship between Mao and P'eng is 30 percent co-operation and 70 percent 
opposition, and the Fourth, P'eng's open letter to Mao is a purposive action. His aim was 
to assemble the masses and organise the army.63 
The important points of Mao's talk about P'eng at the second meeting included, First, 
what P'eng called the "petty-bourgeois fanaticism" was directed at attacking the leading 
organs of the Party. .. It was to oppose the Party. Second, the aim of P'eng's open letter 
was to assembly the masses, organise the party and reconstruct the Party and the world 
according to his will. Third, P'eng is and has always been obsessed with ambition. 
Fourth. I am 66 and you (P'eng) are 61, I will be dead soon. Many comrades are scared 
61LiJui, THE TRUE RECORDS OF LUSHAN CONFERENCE, op. cit, pp. 188-189. 
6 Li Jui, Mao's personal secretary during the period of "Great Leap Forward" movement. 
63LiJui, THE TRUE RECORDS OF LUSHAN CONFERENCE, op. cit., pp. 201-209. 
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of you. You are difficult to tackle and they feel dreadful. Fifth, Among all six billion 
Chinese people, You are the fiercest person. You called me teacher and yourself the 
pupil, this hypocrisy. And the final, Mao restated his relationship with P'eng as 30 percent 
co-operation and 70 percent opposition.64 
All participants made their attacks on P'eng in the two meetings. Chou En-lai criticised 
that Peng's open letter as "a fierce onslaught on the Party's General Line and a right 
deviationist line". It was aimed at "attacking the Party authority and Chairman Mao". He 
also claimed that P'eng's activity "is well programmed and can trace back to a long 
history".65 Lin Piao criticised P'eng as "a careerist, conspirator and a double dealer", he 
commented, "Nobody tries to be a hero, Chairman Mao is the only hero in China".66 
The "letter" that P'eng wrote to Mao on 14 July was called a "letter of opinion". In it 
P'eng systematically criticised the policy of "Three Red Banners". Some of the focal 
points were as follows: 
Firstly. "It now seems that some projects for capital construction in 1958 were too hasty 
or excessive with the result that a portion of capital was tied up and some essential 
projects were delayed". 
Secondly, "In the course of refining steel by the whole nation, a number of small blast 
furnaces were unnecessarily built, and thus a certain amount of resources (material, 
financial, and in terms of manpower) was wasted, two billion yuan tuition fee were spent". 
Mlbid., p. 219. 
65Ibid., p. 250. 
66lbid, p. 221. 
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Thirdly, "The habit of exaggerating, spread rather universally. Last year, at the time of the 
Peitaiho Conference, a higher estimate of grain production was made than was warranted. 
This created a false impression: everybody felt that the problem of food had been solved, 
and that our hands were free to engage in industry,... At that time, from reports sent in 
from all directions, it would seem that communism was just around the corner". 
Fourthly, "Petty-bourgeois fanaticism. Strategic planning was often confused with 
concrete measures, long term policies with immediate steps, the whole with the part, and 
the big collective with the small collective". 
Finally, "In the view of some comrades, putting politics in command could be a substitute 
for everything,... putting politics in command is no substitute for economic principles, 
much less for concrete measures in economic work, equal importance must be attached to 
putting politics in command and to effective measures in economic work, neither should 
be over-stressed or neglected".67 
The defects of "capital construction" indicated by P'eng's "letter of opinion" on 14 July had 
indeed reflected the real situation at that time. However, in his status as Minister of 
National Defence, P'eng did not discuss many problems in defence affairs at the 
conference instead he criticised on the policies of "Great Leap Forward" and opposed 
Mao "openly". The motives for his action can be concluded as follows, Firstly, P'eng the 
former peasant's son had been deeply moved by what he had seen on his inspection tour 
(Oct., 1958) particularly in Kansu and in his home village in Hunan, and he felt 
emotionally compelled to act as spokesman for the suffering Chinese peasantry.68 
Secondly, P'eng the politburo member convinced that he spoke for many, i f not the 
67THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF P'ENG TE-HUAI, op. cit., pp. 281-287. 
Mjurgen Domes, P'ENG TE-HUAI - THE MAN AND THE IMAGE, op. cit., p. 93. 
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majority, of his colleagues, and that Mao himself wanted open criticism in order to 
ameliorate the crisis of the PRC which became ever more obvious.69 Thirdly, and the 
more important one was that P'eng had realised that a continuation of the Three Red 
Banner movement would lower the morale of the men serving in the Army, since most of 
them came from the villages,70 and that the movement of army professionalisation would 
be influenced by the politics and thus bring about the phenomena of imbalance. 
Feng's view was in contrast with Mao's, and yet P'eng couldn't realise that the campaign 
of "the whole nation in arms" carried out vigorously by Mao during the movement of 
"people's communes" was aimed at suppressing P'eng's professionalised army building. 
Even worse, P'eng trusted what Mao said at the opening speech of the Lushan Conference 
on 2 July, where Mao exhorted the audience to "criticise and offer opinion on the mistakes 
and shortcomings which still exist in our party's work" and at the same time promised that 
he would not "put a hat (scapegoat)" on anybody for any criticism.71 
Although P'eng expressed his dissatisfaction with the point of "putting politics in 
command" in his letter to Mao, "the letter of opinion" basically was a kind of "opposition 
in policies". P'eng's "specific event opposition" was in fact a kind of loyal dissent, while 
Mao personally believed that "At the Lushan conference of 1959, P'eng Te-huai 
maintained contacts with foreign countries and tried to seize power. Huang K'e-ch'eng , 
Chang Wen-t'ien and Chou Hsiao-chou also popped up in opposition to the party. They 
set up a military club, but never talked about military affairs; rather, they said things like 
'the communes were set up too early', 'the gain didn't make up for the loss', etc., P'eng Te-
huai even wrote a letter, which amounted to an open challenge to seize power, but he did 
69lbid. 
70lbid. 
7Jlbid, p. 89, and Huang K'e-ch'eng, "Please, Give Comrade P'eng Te-huai his Reputation back" - Letter 
to the Organisation Department of the CCPCC, 29 November, 1978. 
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not succeed",7 "The struggle of Lushan conference is the kind of class struggle. It is the 
continuation of a life-and-death struggle between bourgeois and proletariat the two 
contrasting class in the course of socialist revolution of the last decade".73 
On 2 Aug., Mao spoke at the Eighth Plenary of the Eighth CCPCC, held in Lushan 
between 2 and 16, 1959, in which he indicated that the Lushan conference was an anti-
Rightist instead of anti-Leftist struggle. It was an attack directed at the Party leading 
organs made by the right opportunists. From then on, all speeches made by the 
participants were aimed at struggling against P'eng in accordance with Mao's talks on that 
day. Their attacks are summarised as follows: Firstly, the aim of P'eng's disapproval of 
"politics takes the lead" was directed at Chairman Mao. Secondly, P'eng's open letter 
made a notorious attack on Mao, it was an anti-Party programme. Thirdly, P'eng's 
negation of the General Line was aimed at nullifying the Party's leadership. Fourthly, 
P'eng plotted to reorganise the Party, party authority and the army. Fourthly, The inner-
Party struggle this time was in fact a class struggle in the Party And Finally, P'eng 
revealed his viewpoints to foreign countries during his visit abroad. He maintained illicit 
relations with foreign countries.74 
Prior to the Lushan conference on 24 April 1959, while the National People's Congress 
(April 18-28), was still in session, P'eng started on a "military good will" mission to the 
capitals of the Warsaw Pact powers, which was to keep him out of the country for some 
seven weeks. On arrival in Moscow, and again on 2 June, P'eng met Marshal 
7 2 "Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks To Responsible Local Comrades During his Tour of Inspection 
(Mid-August to September 12, 1971)" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party, Chung-fa, 1972, No. 12, THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS ND MILITARY COUP, op. 
cit., p. 59. 
n"A Interrogation of P'eng Te-huai", YEARBOOK OF THE PRC, 1969, Vol. I, (Taipei: Bureau of 
Military Intelligence, Ministry of National Defence, 1970), p. 84. 
7 4 p. 266. 
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Moskalenko, on 25 May, P'eng had a cordial meeting with Khrushchev in Tirana, when he 
got back to Peking, via outer Mongolia, on 13 June, having travelled from Moscow to 
Ulan Bator in the company of Marshal Koniev.75 
When P'eng criticised the fault of Mao's "Great Forward Leap", Nikita Khruschev, in 
Moscow, also chose this moment to make same pungent remarks about the Great Leap 
Forward.76 Mao suspected that P'eng colluded with Soviet Union in this matter, and that 
P'eng "contacted with foreign countries and tried to seize power". The participants of the 
Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC had showed no objection to this condemnation. Liu 
Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai, in principle, respected P'eng's right to "express his viewpoints 
at the party meeting", but they couldn't refute Mao's accusation of P'eng's being "in 
contact with foreign countries". In Mao's view, he suspected P'eng not only was against 
him but was allied with his foe in Moscow. 
On 11 August, Mao spoke at the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC, again he not only 
didn't loosen his attack on P'eng, but further accused P'eng of the following charges: 1. 
P'eng is a Capitalist instead of Marxist. 2. P'eng colluded with the Kao Kang anti-Party 
clique and took Kao Kang's line. His act in this meeting was even worse than those of 
Kao Kang and Li Li-san. 3. The Kao-Jao anti-Party clique was developed between 1951 
and 1953, P'eng involved himself deeply in it. Is it a Kao-Jao anti-Party clique or a Kao-
P'eng anti-Party clique? The most serious mistake P'eng made was involving himself with 
the Kao-Jao anti-Party clique. 4. P'eng's disapproval of "putting First Secretary in 
command of everything" was, in fact, attempting to put his thoughts in command of 
75DavidA. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Te-huai", THE CHINA QUARTERLY, No. 8, Oct-
Dec. 1961, pp. 66-67; John Gittings, SURVEY OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE, (London: Oxford Uni. 
Press, 1968), p. 105. 
76Harrison E. Salisbury, THE NEW EMPERORS - MAO & TENG: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY, op. cit, p. 
179. 
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everything. The "collective leadership" Peng proclaimed was in fact the leadership under 
his command. S. The meeting must have reached certain resolutions. First, the resolution 
on the campaign to raise production and practice economy. It should be made known to 
the public. Second, the resolution to struggle for defending the party's General Line and 
against right opportunism. It would not be published openly, but would be put to the 
Party for discussion.. Third, the resolution on the anti-Party clique headed by P'eng Te-
huai. This would not be discussed in the party, and should be distributed only to the 
leading cadres of the county in the Party and those of the regiment in the army.7 7 
It was noteworthy that only three among the twenty full politburo members (Ch'en Yun, 
Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Ch'en I ) 7 8 and six alternates didn't attend the politburo meeting of 
the Eighth Plenary Session of the Eighth CCPCC concerning the issue of P'eng Te-huai. 
Of the remaining twenty-three, Mao could safely reckon on the support of seven: himself, 
Lin Piao, Lo Jung-huan, K'e Ch'ing-shih, T'an Chen-lin and the politburo alternate Ch'en 
Po-ta79, and K'ang Sheng. It seemed that P'eng was fully supported by the politburo 
members Chu Te and Lin Po-ch'u, and the alternate Chang Wen-t'ien - not forgetting 
himself. This meant the decision of punishing P'eng was depended on the remaining 
twelve: the politburo members Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, P'eng Chen, L i Fu-ch'un, Tung 
Pi-wu, L i Sien-nien, Ho Lung, Liu Po-ch'eng, L i Ch'ing-ch'uan and the alternates Lu Ting-
77LiJui, THE TRUE RECORDS OF THE LUSHAN CONFERENCE, op. cit, pp. 330-345. 
78Ch'en Yun, who was on vacation in Talien; Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who had left the conference because of 
his "ailing legs". 
19Ch'en was born into a poor peasant family in Hui-an Hsien in the mid-twenties. Ch'en worked as a 
clerk in Fukien army units and in 1927 engaged in political work during the Northern Expedition among 
forces led by KMT General Chang Chen. That year he joined the CCP and went to Moscow where he 
enrolled in Sun Yat-sen University (redesignated the Communist University of the Toilers of China during 
his stay there), the leading interpreter of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung". He was relatively obscure 
professor and a member of the Communist underground in north China in the thirties, but he emerged as 
a leading Maoist ideologue and polemicist in the early forties. A key figure in the propaganda 
Department since then. One of Ch'en's major tasks in the early PRC years was to interpret Mao's 
contributions to Marxism, and in particular to reconcile them in light of Stalin's writings and policies. 
See Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark (ed), BIOGRAPHIC DICTIONARY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM, 
1921-1965, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 122. 
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i , Po I-po and Ulanfu. 
With the exception of Mao's 7 votes and Feng's 4 votes, the remaining all gave priority to 
preserving the outward unity of the party, thus avoiding the split which Mao had 
threatened to create, and wanted to make further revisions to the Three Red Banner 
policies. Consequently, Feng was punished and forced to undergo self-criticism. 
However, Mao couldn't remove P'eng from all his positions in the party and army, he was 
even to officially remain a member of the politburo and of the CCPCC. 
The Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC closed on 16 August. It passed three 
resolutions in accordance with Mao's instruction, namely the "Resolution on the Struggle 
for Defending the Party's General Line and for Opposing Right Opportunism", the 
"Resolution on the Campaign to Raise Production and Practice Economy", and the 
"Resolution of the Eighth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China Concerning the Anti-Party Clique Headed by P'eng Te-huai".80 
In the "Resolution of the Eighth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China Concerning the Anti-Party Clique Headed by P'eng Te-huai" 
passed on 16 August 1959, Mao further pointed out the following few points: 
Firsly, "During the Lushan meeting, a fierce onslaught on the party's general line, the 
Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes was made inside our party by the right 
opportunist anti-Party clique which was headed by P'eng Te-huai and which included a 
handful of others. This onslaught came at a time when the reactionary forces at home and 
abroad were exploiting certain transient and partial shortcomings in our great movement 
S0LiJui, THE TRUE RECORDS OF THE LUSHAN CONFERENCE, op. cit.„ pp. 363-365. 
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to intensify their attack on our party and people... The Eighth Plenary Session of the 
Eighth Central Committee of the Party holds that to take resolute action and crush the 
activities of the right opportunist anti-Party clique headed by P'eng Te-huai is absolutely 
necessary not only for safeguarding the party's general line, but also for safeguarding the 
leadership of the party's Central committee headed by comrade Mao Tse-tung". 
Secondly, "P'eng Te-huai aims at splitting the party have been going on for a long time. 
The letter setting out his views which P'eng wrote to Mao on 14 July 1959, in the early 
stage of the Lushan meeting and his speeches and remarks in the course of the meeting 
represented the platform of the right opportunists in their attack on the Party. P'eng was 
against the party, against the people, and against socialism". 
Thirdly, "The facts brought to light at Eighth Plenary Session of Eighth Central 
Committee prove that activities of the anti-party clique headed by P'eng Te-huai prior to 
and during the Lushan meeting were purposive, prepared, planned and organised. They 
represent a continuation and development of the case of the anti-Party alliance of Kao 
Kang and Jao Shu-shih, of which they were important members... P'eng's activities could 
and did mislead a number of people; they were fraught with danger for the future of the 
party and the People's Liberation Army". 
Fourthly, "P'eng Te-huai's present mistake was not accidental. It had deep social, 
historical, and ideological roots. He and his accomplices and followers were essentially 
representatives of the bourgeoisie who joined the Party during the democratic revolution. 
P'eng joined the Party and the Revolutionary Army led by the Party with the idea of 
'investing in a share'. He only wanted to lead other, to lead the collective, but did not 
want to be led by others, to be led by the collective... Indeed, his anti-Party activities 
reflected the kind of class struggle in which the Chinese bourgeoisie opposes the 
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proletarian socialist revolution in an attempt to mould the party, the army, and the world 
in its own bourgeois image". 
Finally, "The true nature of their attack on the party represented as they did the interests 
of the bourgeoisie and the upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie. They sought to sabotage 
the dictatorship of the proletariat and undermine the socialist revolution by splitting and 
demoralising the vanguard of the proletariat and organising opportunist factions".81 
At the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CCPCC, Mao classified 
P'eng's behaviour at the Lushan conference as a "class struggle". Taking P'eng to be the 
leader of the right opportunist anti-Party clique, it was considered that he was the 
representative of the bourgeoisie, that he represented a continuation and development of 
the case of the anti-Party alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, and that his mistake was 
not accidental, it had deep social historical and ideological roots. 
Moreover, the "Communique of the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC" pointed out 
that "The imperialists and hostile elements within the country will continue to slander and 
try to sabotage the socialist construction of our country. Nevertheless, this will only serve 
to stimulate the whole of our people to raise their revolutionary enthusiasm to a higher 
level, and impel our whole party and the people of all our nationalities to strengthen unity. 
Finally it would uphold the brilliant banner of the general line, and steadily develop, the 
great socialist cause of our country", "the principle danger now confronting the 
achievements of a continued leap forward this year is the arising right opportunist ideas 
among some cadres. They underestimate the great achievements made by hundreds of 
8 1 "Resolution of the 8th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
concerning the anti-Party clique headed by P'eng Te-huai", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 754-756; RED FLAG, No. 13, 1967, pp. 
18-24; PEOPLE'S DAILY, 16 August, 1967. 
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millions of working people and revolutionary intellectuals in the Great Leap Forward 
movement and the people's commune movement, and overemphasise the seriousness of 
certain defects which occurred in the two movements owing to lack of experience and 
which have been overcome quickly. They slander as 'petty bourgeois fanaticism' the great 
leap forward and the People's Communes movement, in which hundreds of millions of 
working people have been vigorously engaged under the leadership of the party".8 2 The 
communique did not say a single word about the convening of the enlarged meting of the 
Political Bureau between 2 June and 1 August. 
On 17 September, P'eng was removed from his post as Minister of National Defence and 
replaced by Lin Piao. Along with P'eng, Huang K'e-ch'eng was dismissed as Chief of the 
General Staff, with General Lo Jui-ch'ing, the former Minister of Public Security, being 
appointed as his successor. Also dismissed and criticised including Chang Wen-t'ien and 
11 others.83 
During the course of Eighth Plenum, on 16 August 1959, three resolutions were passed. 
One of them, published only on 16 August 1967,84 condemned the "anti-Party clique 
8 2 "Central Committee Communique on the 'Readjustment' of Claims and Targets (26 August 1959)", THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, p. 758, and RED 
FLAG, Vol. XVII, 1958, p. 3. 
83Chang Wen-t'ien, Vice-minister of foreign affairs and alternate member of the Politburo; Hsi Chung-
hsttn, Vice-premier, Secretary General of the State Council, and member of the CCPCC (in 1960); 
General Tan Cheng, Director of the PLA's General Political Department and member of the CCPCC (in 
1960 or 1961); General Hsiao K'e, Vice-minister of National Defence and member of the CCPCC; 
General Teng Hua, Commander-in-Chief of the Shenyang Military area and member of CCPCC; Chou 
Hsiao-chou, First Party Secretary of the CCP's Hunan provincial party committee and alternate member 
of the CCPCC; General Hung Hsueh-chih, director of the PLA's General Rear Services Department and 
alternate member of the CCPCC; General Li Ta, Vice-minister of National Defence; Lieut-general Nieh 
He-ting, Vice-commander of the PLA armoured troops; Lieut.-general Han Chen-chi, Military Attach to 
the Soviet Union; Lieut.-general Wan I, director of Staff Operations, PLA; Lieut-general Ch'en Chang-
hsiang. 
See Jurgen Domes, P'ENG TE-HUAI - THE MAN AND THE IMAGE, op. cit, pp. 99-100; Wang Yuan, 
THE PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE, op. cit p. 162. 
*4LiJui, THE TRUE RECORDS OF THE LUSHAN CONFERENCE, op. cit.p. 366. 
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headed by P'eng Te-huai" and called for Feng's removal from his position as Minister of 
National Defence and first Vice-chairman of CCPCC's Military Commission, while 
preserving his membership in the CCPCC and the politburo. The "Resolution on the 
Struggle for Defending the Party's General Line and for Opposing Right Opportunism" did 
not make public. 
The other resolution which was soon to be published, concerned the "development of the 
campaign to increase and practice economy". I t again paid lip-service to the Three Red 
Banners, but in fact confined the authority of the rural communes to administrative and 
planning duties, while the centre of gravity of social policy for the countryside now shifted 
to the production brigades, which was entrusted with the ownership of land and became 
the "basic accounting unit". 8 5 
The substance of these two resolutions revealed the nature of the factional compromise, 
The first point of significance was that Mao's attack on P'eng was accepted. P'eng was to 
be removed from his positions and forced to undertake self-criticism at the forthcoming 
Eighth Plenum. However, P'eng was not to be expelled from the party, as Kao Kang and 
Jao Shu-shih had been in 1955. He was even to remain officially a member of politburo, 
although he was to be excluded from its meetings. Finally, Mao accepted the revisions of 
the Three Red Banners policies proposed by the civilian leaders in the Party machine 
leaders and the economists. 
On 17 August, the next day after the close of the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC, a 
Working Conference of the Central Committee was presided over by Mao at the same 
place as the Lushan conference. At the conference, Lin Piao was appointed Minister of 
85lbid., p. 97. 
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National Defence and the First Vice Chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission. Liu 
Shao-ch'i strongly sided with Mao with the following remarks: 1. The best and most 
accurate leadership is under Mao's command, even Marx could not perform better. 2. 
P'eng Te-huai opposed the cult of the individual, refused to sing "East is Red" and hail 
"Long Live Chairman Mao", while I myself vigorously engaged in promoting the 
personality cult of Mao. Prior to the convening of the Seventh CCP National Congress, I 
propagated the prestige of comrade Mao Tse-tung with all my efforts, and thus the 
General Program of the Party Constitution of the Seventh CCP National Congress 
embodied Mao Tse-tung thought as the guiding principle for the Party. 4. After the 20th 
CPSU Party Congress, some comrades disputed the personality cult of Mao, while I think 
such actions is absolutely wrong. It is sabotage of the Party.86 Liu Shao-ch'i learned 
lessons from the case of P'eng Te-huai and thus anxiously tried to express his support of 
Mao. 
The conflict between Mao and P'eng revealed that there existed a high degree of risk in the 
CCP when formulating a policy, and that there was no space for the so-called "loyal 
opposition". Basically, prior to the Lushan conference, the CCP could still maintain its 
harmony inside the party, the removal of the remainder of the Kuomintang and the 
reformation of Chinese society into a socialist society remained its consistent goals. While 
after the Lushan conference, the structure of upper strata's power struggle was formed, 
Mao successfully purged the "P'eng-Huang anti-Party clique" by making compromises, but 
this move towards purges undermined the completeness of the CCP and blocked the 
possibility of allowing discussion on policy at later days. 
Mao's greatest achievement at the Lushan conference was P'eng's removal from the post 
%6lbid., p. 369. 
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as Minister of National Defence and his replacement by Lin Piao. Lin, closer in spirit to 
the party leadership, and also personally popular with the rank and file of the army, was in 
a better position to modify the more extreme policies which had affected the PLA. The 
major task facing Lin was to restore the PLA's political morale, to strengthen party control 
over it, and to resolve the "struggle between bourgeois and working class ideology" which 
resulted from military concern about the effect of the Great Leap Forward policies upon 
its own position. In his first major policy speech Lin called for intensified political 
education, stricter party control, and more contact with the masses, attacking those who 
took a "materialistic" view of modern warfare, he nevertheless emphasised the importance 
of technique and modernisation.87 
From the year 1960 onwards a determined and uninterrupted drive has been under the 
close supervision of Lin Piao and Mao Tse-tung himself, to raise the PLA's political 
loyalty and ideological commitment from the low level to which it had sunk at the time of 
the dismissal of P'eng Te-huai. 
An extraordinary conference of the enlarged meeting of the CCPCC Military Committee, 
was held from 14 September to 20 October 1960. It was at this meeting that Lin Piao 
called for a "breakthrough" in ideological work. "It is impossible to fight other battles 
well", he said, " i f the ideological battle is not fought victoriously". He propounded four 
basic principles -subsequently know as the "Four firsts" - which provided the theoretical 
foundation for the renewed emphasis upon political work. These were: 
First, the relation between weapons and men. "Human and political ideological factors are 
87Lin Piao, "March Ahead Under the Red Flag of the Party's General Line and Mao Te-tung's Military 
thinking", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 29 September, 1959; RED FLAG, No. 12, 1959, pp. 16-25; "Lin Piao on the 
Maoist Line in Military affairs (29 September 1959)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 
-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, op. cit., pp. 777-784. 
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primary factors affecting fighting strength". 
Second, the relation between political work and other work. "Politics is the soul and 
supreme command. Political work is the life line of the army". 
Third, the relation between routine political work and ideological work. "Special emphasis 
should be placed on ideological work... to establish proletarian thinking and wipe out non-
proletarian thought". 
And Fourth, the relation between theory and practice. "Education from books must be 
combined with reality". 
The "Four firsts" were formulated by Lin Piao after criticism of the "capitalistic military 
road of P'eng Te-huai". By 1960, according to the "Resolution of the Enlarged Military 
Committee" of 20 Oct. 1960,88 there were no party branch committees in approximately 
one-third of all PLA campaigns. Party control was even faultier below company level, 
where most platoons had no party cells, and most squads had no party members. 
In April 1961, the party branch had been restored to all companies, 30 percent of the 
platoons had organised party cells, and over half of the squads had party members. About 
2000 unreliable regular and probationary party members in the PLA had been dismissed 
and 229,000 new party members had been recruited.89 
88"Resolution of the Enlarged Military Committee Concerning the Strengthening of Political and 
Ideological Work (20 October 1960", BULLETIN OF ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION 
ARMY, Vol. IV, 1961, p. 219; J. Cheng (ed), THE POUTICS OF THE CHINESE RED ARMY: A 
TRANSLATION OF THE BULLETIN OF ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S UBERATION ARMY, 
(California: Stanford University, 1966), pp. 480-487; "Reindoctrinating the People's Liberation Army 
(October 1960), THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARYSURVEY, Vol. 
II, op. cit., pp. 882-897. 
89Ralph L. Powell, POLITICO-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IN COMMUNIST CHINA, (U.S. Dept. of 
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With Lih Piao, Mao dragged the army into the road of "politics takes the lead". Lin 
initiated a series of political campaigns based on the PLA, and henceforth, the army took 
part in the political arena of the PRC. The fall of P'eng Te-huai, the representative of 
professional army building, marked an end of one stage of the PLA, and the beginning of 
another. 
After Mao entrusted Lin Piao with all the routine duties of the CCPCC Military 
Commission, Lin launched a series of political campaigns under Mao's instruction and 
ordered the PLA to "march ahead under the red flag of the party's general line and Mao 
Te-tung's military thinking",9 0 and resolutely support the leadership of the party and Mao, 
and serve as the most faithful and reliable tool in implementing the party line and policy, 
and the most resolute defender of the people's democratic dictatorship of the socialist 
cause under the party leadership. In addition to this, the PLA itself, possessed a high 
degree of political consciousness and resolute party character. To the Communist Party 
members and cadres who were working in the armed forces, a resolute party character 
was to express itself in the form of determination to defend the unity of the party at any 
time and under any circumstance, and in wholeheartedness in carrying out the struggle for 
the program and line of the party. This would call for constant concern for and attention 
to the political situation, policy, line, and other such matters pertaining to decision. 
Mao reversed the adverse circumstances, successfully turned the anti-Leftist struggle into 
the anti-Rightist struggle at the Lushan conference. By doing this he won the final victory. 
State: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1963), pp. 7-8. 
^Lin Piao, "March Ahead Under the Red Flag of the Party's General Line and Mao Te-tung's Military 
thinking", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 29 September, 1959; RED FLAG, No. 19, 1959, pp. 16-25; "Lin Piao on the 
Maoist Line in Military affairs (29 September 1959)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 
-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 783. 
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However, the consequence did not represent the end of struggle, but the beginning of 
another even bigger struggle. 
The situation at that time seemed very good for Mao, but Mao was aware of the fact that 
Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai had posed a political threat to him and that they were two 
important rivals in the power-seizure struggle. 
Since Liu Shao-ch'i did not try his best to save P'eng Te-huai at the Lushan conference, it 
meant that he lost his best ally against Mao. Liu was destined to failure when he 
contended against Mao at the early stage of the Cultural Revolution. 
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III . The Case of Liu Shao-ch'i 
The nature of "the case of Liu Shao-ch'i" could not be categorised as "structural 
opposition", although it was above the level of "line opposition". Mao Tse-tung and Liu 
Shao-ch'i had no conflicts in their socialists belief, but there existed a serious controversy 
on the major policies of how to carry out this ideology. 
It was Liu Shao-ch'i's suggestion that the Seventh CCP National Congress in May 1945 
brought Maoist thought into the Party Constitution. On 14 May, Liu made a report on the 
revision of the Party constitution, in which he indicated the following few points: 
First, having adopted Mao Tse-tung thought - the theory which integrates Marxism-
Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution - as the guide in all its works, our 
party has formulated a revolutionary programme and revolutionary policies which fully 
represent the interests of the Chinese nation and people.... It is under the guidance of the 
great Mao Tse-tung thought that our party has gathered together the most loyal, 
courageous, politically conscious and well-disciplined representative of Chinese working 
class and labouring people.91 
Second, Mao Tse-tung thought is communism and Marxism applied to China.9 
Third, Mao Tse-tung thought is the development of Marxism with regard to the national-
democratic revolution in the colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal country of the present 
period. It is an outstanding example of how Marxism is applied to a given nation.9 3 
9 1 "On the Party (14 May 1945)", SELECTED WORKS OF UU SHAO-CH'I, Vol. I, (Peking: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1984), p. 315. 
92lbid.,p. 331. 
93lbid., p. 332. 
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And the last, Mao Tse-tung thought has evolved through the application of the Marxist 
world outlook and social outlook, specifically, dialectical materialism and historical 
materialism. In other words, it has evolved through careful, scientific analysis of the 
exceedingly rich experience of all modern revolution.94 
However, 11 years after Mao Tse-tung thought was included in the 1945 Party 
Constitution, the Eighth CCP National Congress, held in September 1956, adopted Liu 
Shao-ch'i's opinion to remove "Mao Tse-tung thought as the guiding principle for our 
Party" from the Party Constitution. The General Program of new Party Constitution 
stated: 
"The Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism as its guide to action. Only 
Marxism-Leninism correctly sets forth the laws of development of society and correctly 
charts the path leading to the achievement of socialism and communism". "The 
organisational principle of the communist party of China is democratic centralism, which 
means centralism on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralised guidance. 
The party must take effective measures to promote inner-party democracy, encourage the 
initiative and creative ability of all party members and of all local and primary party 
organisations and strengthen the lively contact between the higher and lower party 
organisation".95 
Furthermore, in article 2 entitled "party members have the duties", it specified "to study 
Marxism-Leninism" instead of "to study Mao Tse-tung thought". The authority of Maoist 
"Ibid 
9 5 "Constitution of the Communist Party of China (26 September 1956), THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 406-407; NEW CHINA NEWS 
AGENCY, 26 September 1956. 
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ideology faced a serious challenge in the new Party Constitution. 
At any Communist Party Congress, the major document used is the report to the congress 
on the work of the outgoing central committee. It is normally delivered by the first or 
second ranking figure in the party leadership. Liu Shao-ch'i had been the second ranking 
figure, at least de facto, since 194S. 
Liu's "Report on the work of the Central Committee, 16 Sept. 1956" contained far fewer 
references to Mao and his "thought" than had his report on the Party Constitution to the 
Seventh Party Congress in the Spring of 1945. Liu indicated in one section of his report, 
entitled "international relation", that "The 20th congress of the communist party of the 
USSR held last February, was an important political event of world significance. I t 
repudiated the cult of the individual which had grave consequences inside the party".9 6 
The other section, "The Leadership of the party", of his report also pointed out the 
following: 
First, "The line followed by the party since its seventh congress has been correct and this 
has been proved by facts. But it must be admitted that, in shouldering the increasingly 
heavy tasks of today, the party is not without difficulties, nor free from mistakes. One of 
the tasks confronting the party leadership is to study and analyse past mistakes, draw 
lessons from them, so as to be able to make fewer mistakes and as far as possible, avoid 
repeating past mistakes, and prevent small mistakes from developing into big ones... To 
enable our party to continue to maintain its correct and sound leadership in the future, the 
main thing is to see to it that party organisation and party members make fewer mistakes 
stemming from ideological understanding. .. I f a person does not understand that a correct 
96Liu Shao-ch'i, "Report on the work of the Central Committee (16 September 1956)", THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 381. 
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view can only be based on an objective and all-round reflection of reality, but insist on 
doing things according to his own subjective and one-sided approach to things, then he 
will go on making mistakes". 
Second, "In order to bring the party's role of leadership in line as much as possible with 
the objective realities, to facilitate the summing up of the experience and opinions of the 
masses, and to reduce the possibility of making mistakes, party organisation at all levels 
must, without exception, rigidly adhere to the party's principle of collective leadership and 
broaden democratic life within the party. All important questions must be thoroughly 
discussed by the proper collective bodies before decisions are taken, and argument and 
debate on diverse viewpoints must be allowed without any restraint, in order that various 
opinions from the masses, both inside and outside the party, may be more or less fully 
reflected - in other words, in order that the various aspects present in the course of 
development of objective realities will be more or less fully reflected". 
Third, "Every leader must be good at listening patiently to and taking into deliberate 
consideration, opinions contrary to his own, in order to resolutely approve opposing views 
i f reasonable, or whatever is reasonable in them; he must continue to work amicably with, 
but never turn his back on, any comrade who, with the correct motives and in accordance 
with normal procedure, may have put forward any opinion contrary to his own. Only in 
this way can we achieve collective leadership and party unity indeed, and not in name only, 
and assure greater flourishing of its organisation and cause". 
Fourth, "The question of thorough application of the party's principle of collective 
leadership and the extension of inner-party democracy is given full attention in and new 
draft of the constitution of the communist party of China put forward by the Central 
Committee. The draft constitution makes some new provisions in respect of the rights of 
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party members and of party organisations at lower levels. It is provided in the draft 
constitution that party members have the right to give full play to their creative ability in 
work and, while unconditionally carrying out party decisions, have the right to reserve and 
submit their own views to a leading body of the party, in case they should disagree with 
them". 
And finally, "A correct attitude toward comrades who have committed mistakes is one of 
the necessary conditions of correct party leadership. It is very easy to take severe 
disciplinary measures against comrades who have committed mistakes up to expelling 
them from the party. But i f the ideological cause of those mistakes is not removed, severe 
disciplinary measures not only cannot insure that the party members will not again make 
the same mistakes, but may lead to their making even greater mistakes"97. 
The formulation of the General Program of the Party Constitution by the Eighth CCP 
National Congress had serious crippled Mao's power, and relatively increased Liu Shao-
ch'i's power. Furthermore, Mao was forced to resign from his post as the chairman of 
State at the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC in December 1958 because of the failure 
of "Three Red Banners" movement. The chairmanship of the State was relieved by Liu 
Shao-ch'i at the forthcoming "Fourth National People's Congress" in April 1959, which 
also appointed Teng Hsiao-p'ing as General-secretary of the CCPCC and stipulated that 
the "central secretariat" was directly under the leadership of the Political bureau and its 
standing committee, no longer responsible to Mao alone. Mao therefore retreated to the 
"backbenches" of politics. 
In May 1961, Liu Shao-ch'i approved the Inspection Report on Certain Questions of 
97lbid., pp. 384-387. 
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Propaganda Concerning Mao Tse-tung Thought And His Revolutionary Deeds proposed 
by Lu Ting-i, who was then the chief of the Propaganda Department of the CCPCC. The 
report indicated that the movement to study Mao Tse-tung's writings at that time was 
indeed very "simplified", "vulgar" and "nominalistic".98 Subsequently in July 1963, the 
Propaganda Department's Report on Certain Questions Concerning the Situation of 
Seminar on Publishing Works And the Improvement of Publishing Works was approved 
and then issued to localities by Liu Shao-ch'i in the name of CCPCC. It stipulated that all 
localities were prohibited to compile and publish Mao Tse-tung's writings, and were asked 
to control the printing of copies and to distribute only inside government units, not to the 
public". In February 1964 the Notification on the Procedures of Approval to Compile 
and Publish Chairman Mao's Writings was again issued, which indicated "All selected 
works of Mao Tse-tung, if published, should be reported to the central committee. 
Without the central committee's approval, any printing is forbidden".99 
In addition, the Ninth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC, held in January 1961, discussed the 
Report on the Achievements of the J960 National Economic Plan and the Main Targets 
for the 1961 National Economic Plan,100 and was critical on some economic issues. It 
started that the economic adjustment was aimed at overcoming the left adventurism of 
agricultural and industrial policies, and further encouraged the policy of "three freedoms 
and one contract" - the three freedoms were (1) extension of plots of land for private 
production; (2) free market; (3) increase of private enterprise, and one contract required 
each household to assume a contracted obligation toward the state to produce a fixed 
quantity of grain - which in fact had nullified Mao's "general line for socialist 
construction". In September, the Central Decision Concerning the Cadre's Training of 
98WangYQan, THE PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE, op. cit, p. 167. 
"ibid., p. 168. 
100WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, op. cit., p. 407. 
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the Whole Party was stipulated under Liu's guidance. It clearly laid down allowing "free 
thinking", "free discussion", and "three no's"101 - "no seizure on mistake", "no putting on 
hat (scapegoat)" and "no punishment", in the hope of reducing the impact on the 
movement of the idol worship of Mao which was initiated by Lin Piao. 
Strictly speaking, prior to the establishment of PRC's regime, Liu Shao-ch'i held a different 
viewpoint on "socialist society" to that of Mao, which could be seen in his Report on 
Some Issues of Current Situation delivered on 1 February 1946. Liu argued in his report 
that "the new stage of peaceful democracy" was "through parliament the legal struggle 
road", "the trend of major struggle of Chinese revolution has turned into a peaceful and 
parliamentary struggle", said him, "It is a legal mass struggle and parliamentary struggle". 
"The entire party works have to be changed, and all organisations have to be changed, 
change into a form based on non-armed struggle...., able to do propaganda, to make 
speech, and to carry on a election campaign, persuading everyone to vote for you".10 
However, Liu Shao-ch'i's viewpoint of "legal struggle and parliamentary road" in 1946 
was serious criticised and was raised to the level of the struggle between bourgeoisie and 
proletarian and the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism in the paper, The 
Bankruptcy of Chinese Parliamentary Enthusiasts,™ issued by CCPCC in August 1967 
at the early stage of Cultural Revolution. The paper quoted Lenin as saying, "if class 
struggle is restricted to only parliamentary struggle, or even to think parliamentary 
struggle is the supreme, decisive and dominating struggle of all. This is tantamount to 
shifting to the side of bourgeoisie and opposing the proletarian".104 The paper therefore 
concluded that "parliament is only an ornament or a screen of bourgeois control. By no 
101Wang Yuan, THE PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE, op. cit., pp. 176-177. 
102"The Bankruptcy of Chinese Parliamentary Enthusiasts", RED FLAG, No. 13, 1967, p. 29. 
mlbid., pp. 29-34. 
104Ibid, p. 30. 
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means should the proletarian substitute parliamentary struggle for armed revolution". 
The question "whether the power seizure of the proletarian should be through armed 
struggle or through parliamentary road" was the fundamental difference between 
Marxism-Leninism and revisionism. "The historical movement of international 
communism has showed us that all revisionists have always been the 'parliamentary 
enthusiasts'. They all deny the fact that without exception armed revolution is the general 
way of proletariat revolution. They also use the bourgeois parliament as a place to do the 
dirty deal of betraying the fundamental interests of the proletarian, and become the most 
shameful traitors to the working class".105 
Mao also gave serious condemnation to Liu Shao-ch'i's assertion of "parliamentary road", 
but, in reality, his purpose was to defend the prevailing myth of "political power grows out 
of the barrel of a gun". This was created by him, to eliminate the heretical viewpoints of 
non-Maoist ideology, and to consolidate his absolute leadership". The paper The 
Bankruptcy of 'Chinese Parliamentary Enthusiasts' had clearly expressed Mao's concern 
by saying, "While advocating 'parliamentary road', China's Khrushchev also opposed 
armed struggle openly, and urged that the guns to be handed over to the Kuomintang (the 
ruling party in Taiwan) and that the reorganisation of army was necessary. He attempted 
to reorganise our army into a national defence army, a security troop and self-defence 
troop, to abolish party organisation in the army, and to terminate army under the direct 
leadership, command and unity of the Ministry of National Defence".106 
At the beginning of the fifties, Liu Shao-ch'i promoted the slogan "Consolidate the new-
democratic system". However, Mao considered this to mean "consolidating" and 
mIbid., p. 29. 
J06Ibid, p. 30. 
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developing the forces of capitalism and taking the capitalist road instead of carrying out 
the socialist revolution, Mao promptly criticised this slogan and pointed out that it was an 
error in the nature of a bourgeois program. He published On the Question of Agricultural 
Cooperation and other works to criticise the view of Liu Shao-ch'i, which was 
"mechanisation before cooperation" and of expanding the rich-peasant economy.107 
By 1956, with the basic completion of the socialist transformation of the ownership of the 
means of production, Liu Shao-ch'i commented, "In China, the question of which wins, 
socialism or capitalism is already settled", "the contradiction between the proletariat and 
the bourgeoisie has been basically resolved", and the principal internal contradiction "is the 
contradiction between the advanced socialist system and the backward social productive 
forces".108 Mao pointed out that Liu Shao-ch'i and his gang inserted "this sinister trash" 
into the resolution of the Eighth National Congress of the Party in their attempt to impose 
on the whole party the line of taking the capitalist road. The words that Liu Shao-ch'i and 
his gang had inserted into the resolution were wrong and anti-Marxist. Shortly 
afterwards, Mao made his work public On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among 
the People, which systematically answered the question of class, class contradictions, and 
class struggle in socialist society. Mao pointed out: In China, although on the whole 
socialist transformation has been completed with respect to the system of ownership... 
there are still remnants of the overthrown landlord and comprador class. There is still a 
bourgeoisie, and the remoulding of the petty bourgeoisie has only just started. The class 
struggle is by no means over. The class struggle between the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the different political forces, and the class struggle 
107"Commemorate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Communist Party of China", RED FLAG, No. 7/8, 
1971, p. 12; PEOPLE'S DAILY & LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, Uuly, 1971; "The Communist Party's 
Fiftieth Anniversary (1 July 1971)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A 
DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. V, op. cit., pp. 2329-2330 
m"The Communist Party's Fiftieth Anniversary (1 July 1971)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. V, op. cit., p. 2330. 
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in the ideological field between proletariat and the bourgeois will continue to be long and 
tortuous and at times will even become very acute., the question of which will win out, 
socialism or capitalism, is still not really settled.109 
An enlarged works conference was held by the CCPCC in Peking between 11 January and 
7 February 1962, and was attended by more than 7,000 cadres representing certain 
departments and bureaux of the CCPCC, central committees, various provinces, 
municipalities and autonomous regions, and the Liberation Army. At the conference Liu 
Shao-ch'i delivered a written report on behalf on CCPCC, in which he made a preliminary 
summary on the fundamental experiences and lessons from the socialist construction since 
1958 and analysed the major errors and mistakes in the works of the recent years.110 
However, in the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, the editorial From the Failure of 
P'eng Te-huai to the Bankruptcy of China's Khrushchev directed against Liu Shao-ch'i's 
report at the enlarged works conference of the CCPCC starting from 11 Jan. 1962 was 
published by the Red Flag in 1967. The editorial denounced "China's Khrushchev, Liu 
Shao-ch'i, was the chief boss of the bourgeois headquarters. He openly tried to reverse 
verdict on P'eng Te-huai, and spoke in defence of P'eng by indicating that some of P'eng's 
anti-party program 'conformed to reality', other statements included 'it should not be 
regarded as a mistake' and 'the struggle against P'eng Te-huai anti-Party clique is a 
erroneous and excessive struggle".111 
At the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC, held on 24 and 27 September 1962 in Peking, 
Mao delivered the speech, Never Forget Class Struggle. In this he appealed to the people 
of the whole nation to attack bourgeois headquarters under the leadership of Mao's class 
109lbid. 
110WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, op. cit.,p. 410. 
1 1 1 "From the Failure of P'eng Te-huai to the Bankruptcy of China's Khrushchev", RED FLAG, No. 13, 
1967, p. 23. 
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struggle and class contradiction.11 Shortly afterwards, Mao intentionally turned the aim of 
"socialist education movement" from the original economic level of "consolidating the 
collective economy of People's Communes" to the political level of "purging those power 
holders within the party who take the capitalist road", thereby attempting to eradicate Liu 
Shao-ch'i's "reactionary forces" by means of mass movements. Mao further expressed in 
the Directive on the Socialist Education Movement in May 1963 that he would "never 
fight a war which has not been prepared for. This fight is a nation-wide revolutionary 
movement", shortly after, a new regulation was added to this directive. It was the 
"Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the Present Rural Works", which emphasised 
the "question of which will win out, socialism or capitalism? Marxism-Leninism or 
revisionism?"113 
By July 1964, the struggle between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao ch'i had been raised to the 
theoretical level. In his speech On the Philosophical Issue delivered on 18 July 1964, 
Mao repudiated Yang Hsien-chen114, the principal of the Advanced Party School, of his 
viewpoint "Two Combine into One" as saying: 
"Yang derived from a classic novel of the Ming Dynasty Tung-hsi-ch'un written by Fang I -
tl2lbid., p. 22, and "Mao Tse-tung's Speech at the 10th Plenary Session of the 8th CCPCC", LONG LIVE 
MAO TSE-TUNG'S THOUGHT, (Taipei: National Cheng-chi University, 1974), pp. 430-436. 
ll3Wang Yuan, THE PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE, op. cit., p. 182. 
n*He was an important party philosopher and ideologue until the early 1960's when he was removed 
from the presidency of the higher party school and denounced. He studied at the Russian Language 
Institute and Peking Normal University. In 1936, he was head of the China Department of the Soviet 
Unions foreign Language Press, where he was in charge of translating Soviet ideological works into 
Chinese. Throughout the 19S0's Yang seems to have been engaged principally in writing and lecturing 
on Marxism, Yang's most important article in these years "Collective Leadership is the Highest Principle 
of Party Leadership". In May 1954 he was identified as deputy-director of the Party Propaganda 
Department's Theoretical Education Division. In December 1954 Yang was appointed a member of the 
preparatory Committee of the Academy of Science's Research Institute of Philosophy, which was 
established in 1955. In May 1959 he attended three academic forums sponsored by the China Philosophy 
Association, where problems in logic and philosophy were discussed. Donald W Klein & Anne B. Clark 
(ed.), BIOGRAPHIC DICTIONARY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM, 1921-1965, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 973-
974. 
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chih the idea of combining two opposites into one whole and he applied this traditional 
idea to the analysis of dialectics. He holds that things that oppose each other also 
complement each other; that is, things opposed to each other can be united into one. 
Things that contain no contradictions may later develop two contradictory aspects and 
then again be united into one"115. Opposed to Mao's theory of "one divided into two", 
Yang's theory recognises the universality and absoluteness of unity rather than 
contradiction. Moreover, Yang applied his theory to analysis of social phenomena, thus 
opening prospects for the conciliation of classes and the unity of opposites. 
In August of the same year, the Red Flag carried a report of the New Polemic on the 
Philosophical Front, and pointed out that Yang's theory of "Two combine into one" "is a 
struggle between those who are for and those who are against materialist dialectics". It 
stated the following: "Philosophy is a part of social ideology. It has its distinct party 
character, that is, class character. The struggle on the philosophical front invariably 
reflects class struggle on the economic and political fronts. In class struggle, different 
classes, proceeding from their respective class interests, are bound to put forward different 
points of view and make philosophical generalisations of these viewpoints, which are 
either revolutionary or reactionary. There is the revolutionary philosophy of the 
proletariat, and there is the reactionary philosophy of the bourgeoisie. Thus, the struggle 
between the two antagonistic groups is reflected on the philosophical front. Those 
individuals within the ranks of the proletariat who have a bourgeois world outlook or who 
are influenced by the bourgeois world outlook, like wise often use bourgeois philosophy 
to oppose the revolutionary philosophy of the proletariat".116 
115"0ne Divides into Two Combine into One", KWANG MING DAILY, 29 May, 1964; Warren Kuo (ed.), 
A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, op. cit., pp. 152-153. 
116One of the signs of Mao's efforts to raise the level of ideological and political militancy in China in 
1964 was a propaganda campaign against the philosopher Yan Hsien-chen, who held the conciliatory and 
allegedly nondialectical view that "two combine into one", as against the allegedly correct and struggle-
oriented view that "one divides into two". See "New Polemic on the Philosophical Front", RED FLAG, 
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The Red Flag further emphasised the following "At present time, the central question in 
the debate is whether or not to recognise the law of the unity of opposites as the 
fundamental law of objective things, and materialist dialectics as the world outlook of the 
proletariat".117 "Yang Hsien-chen has done this with the aim and plan of pitting the 
reactionary bourgeois world outlook against the proletarian world outlook of materialist 
dialectic" "The concept that 'One divides into two' is the kernel of the revolutionary 
philosophy of materialist dialectics, the world outlook of the proletariat. Using this world 
outlook to apprehend things, the proletariat recognises that contradictions are inherent in 
both of unity and struggle, and that contradiction is the motivation force in the 
development of things. While the identity of opposites is relative, their struggle is 
absolute. Therefore, the task of materialist dialectics has never been to cover up 
contradictions, but to disclose them, to discover the correct method for resolving them, 
and to accelerate their transformation, in order to bring about the revolutionary 
transformation of the world. Using the world outlook of materialist dialectics to analyse 
class societies, the proletariat recognises class contradiction and class struggle; it 
recognises class struggle as the motivation force of social development; it firmly maintains 
that the proletariat must carry the class struggle through to the end and so bring about the 
transformation of society".118 
Yang Hsien-chen applied the theory of "Two combines into one" to oppose Mao's "One 
divides into two" with the aim of attacking the myth of "struggle" philosophy and of 
"continuous revolution" advocated by Mao so as to support Liu Shao-ch'i's theory of 
No. 16, 1964, pp. 7-11; PEKING REVIEW, No. 37, 11 September, 1964; "A Reaffirmation of Dialectics", 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, pp. 1293-
1296. 
u7"New Polemic on the Philosophical Front", RED FLAG, No. 16, 1964, pp. 9-10. 
118Ibid. 
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"class reconciliation". 
A lecture on How To Be A Good Communist119 (also known as Communist Self-
cultivation) was delivered by Liu Shao-ch'i at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Yenan 
as early as July 1939, and was later included in the Documents for the Rectification 
Movement. The paper pointed out in its Section 7, "Examples of wrong ideology in the 
party", and said that "Fairly strong individualism and selfishness are still to be found in 
some members of our party.... This type of self-seeking individualism often manifests 
itself inside the party in unprincipled quarrelling, factional struggle, sectarianism and 
departmentalism; it manifests itself in disrespect for and wilful violation of party discipline. 
Most unprincipled struggles originate in personal interests. Those who go in for factional 
struggle and are given to sectarianism usually place their own individual interests, or the 
interests of a small minority, above those of the party".120 The paper continued, "A small 
number of comrades are deeply imbued with the ideology of the exploiting classes. They 
are usually unscrupulous in dealing with comrades and in handling problems inside the 
party, and are utterly devoid of the great and sincere proletarian communist spirit of 
mutual help and solidarity.... People with this ideology always want to climb over the 
heads of others in the party and, to this end, resort to attacking others and doing them 
harm.... They always try to pull down those who are moving ahead of them".11 
Furthermore, in Section 9 "Attitudes towards wrong ideology in the party and towards 
inner-party struggle", Liu advocated "Do not take mechanical and extreme viewpoints 
combine irreconcilability and clarity properly in matters of principle with flexibility and 
J19"How to Be A Good Communist (July 1939)", SELECTED WORKS OF UU SHAO-CH'I, Vol. I, op. 
tit, pp. 107-168; "Communist's Self-cultivation - A Speech at Yenan Marx-Lenin Academy In July 1939", 
RED FLAG, No. 15/16, 1962, pp. 1-38. 
J20Ibid., p. 144. 
121Ibid., p. 148. 
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patient persuasion in methods of struggle; in the course of prolonged struggles, educate, 
criticise, temper and remould comrades who have committed errors but who are not 
incorrigible. Such inner-party ideological struggles on matters of principle as are 
necessary at different periods should be waged in a concrete and proper way; inner-party 
struggles should not be waged undiscriminatingly, subjectively, mechanically or on 
shadowy pretexts, do not become 'struggle addicts'".1 
Basically, Liu Shao-ch'i objected to a subjective and mechanical inner-party struggles. 
However, the Red Flag where the messages of the power holder were carried reached a 
conclusion on Yang Hsien-chen's theory of "Two combines into one" in saying "the 
contradiction and struggle between Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism are 
irreconcilable".13 
The Red Flag's criticism of Yang, in fact, was to open fire on Yang's puppet master - Liu 
Shao-ch'i. Mao had showed explicitly that the struggle between he and Liu Shao-ch'i was 
irreconcilable. 
Mao convened a working conference of the Central Committee in December 1964, he 
pointed out that the direction of struggle was aimed at "rectifying those power holders 
within the party who take the capitalist road".124 It was Mao's attempt to purge this 
power holder who took the capitalist road but who also had strong party background. 
However, this attempt would be rather difficult to achieve in that period if Mao applied 
the party's own force to carry forward a party rectification because, for one reason, Liu 
was then chairman of the PRC, with his prestige in the party, He was capable of uniting 
122lbid., p. 159. 
123ttA Reaffirmation of Dialectics (August 1964) ", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A 
DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, p. 1294. 
124Wang Yiian, THE PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE, op. cit., p. 182. 
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the power of party's system to oppose Mao's attack if he intended to launch one. An other 
reason was that, the criticism of Liu Shao-ch'i taking the wrong line was the main pretext 
of Mao's attack on Liu, however, this criticism wouldn't be generally recognised without a 
long-term ideological education. Under such circumstances, Mao had to resort to "the 
barrel of a gun" to secure his power. He took two steps, the first, to put Lin Piao in an 
important position, having him employ military as a backup force, to reinforce political 
and ideological works among the army, and to spread the slogan "raise high the great red 
banner of Mao Tse-tung thought" throughout the country; the second, to set off nation-
wide political campaigns to seize power from Liu Shao-ch'i. 
An editorial Never Forget Class Struggle15 was carried by the Red Flag and Liberation 
Army's Daily at the same time on 4 May 1966. It pointed out, "The noteworthy thing is 
that in the present new situation of class struggle, the attacks launched against us by this 
handful of anti-party and anti-socialist elements have new features. They are waving 'red 
flags' to oppose the Red Flag and donning the cloak of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-
tung's thought to oppose Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought".16 "Our 
struggle with them is a life and death one. We must be fully aware of this and maintain 
sharp vigilance".17 "We must keep the teaching of chairman Mao Tse-tung's firmly in our 
minds and never forget the class struggle. We must never ignore the battle against the 
enemies without guns". "Let us hold ever higher the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's 
thought, resolutely destroy the black anti-party and anti-socialist line of the bourgeoisie 
and the revisionists".18 
12S"Never Forget Class Struggle", LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, 4 May, 1966; RED FLAG, No. 7, 1966, 
pp. 20-23; "The PLA Implies Intervention Against P'eng Chen (4 May 1966)", THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. Ill, pp. 1435-1438. 
126lbid, p. 23, and Ibid., p. 1436. 
J27Ibid. 
1 *Ibid. 
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In addition, Lin delivered the paper Long Live the Victory of People's War - In 
Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of the Victory of Chinese People's Anti-
Japanese War.19 The paper emphasised the following: 
First, "The special feature of the Chinese revolution was armed revolution against armed 
counterrevolution. The main form of struggle was war and the main form of organisation 
was the army which was under the absolute leadership of the CCP".130 Second, "Guided 
by comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory on building a people's army, our army was under the 
absolute leadership of the CCP and most loyalty carried out the party's Marxist-Leninist 
line and policies. It had a high degree of conscious discipline and was heroically inspired 
to destroy all enemies and conquer all difficulties".131 And the last, "The essence of 
comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of army building is that in building a people's army 
prominence must be given to politics, that is, the army must first and foremost be build on 
a political basis. Politics is the commander, politics is the soul of everything. Political 
work is the lifeline of our army". "Communists do not fight for personal military power 
but must fight for military power for the party and for the people" . 1 3 
Mao's conflict with Liu Shao-ch'i was very obvious. In order to actually control "the 
barrel of a gun", Mao had to remove all obstacles in front of him, such as Kao Kang, Peng 
Te-huai, Huang K'e-ch'eng and many more were eliminated by Mao since 1949. Liu 
Shao-ch'i occupied such a high rank as chairman of the PRC and was in charge of party's 
works, but Mao would never allow himself to be second to Liu. Besides, Mao remained 
J29"Long Live the Victory of People's War - In Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of the Victory of 
Chinese People's Anti Japanese War", RED FLAG, No. 10, 1965; "Peking's Defence Minister States the 
Maoist Line on Vietnam (3 September 1965)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A 
DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, pp. 1222-1239. 
mlbid., p. 1228. 
mlbid., p. 1229. 
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the chairman of the party and military committee of the CCPCC, and realised the 
importance of the belief that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" in a power 
struggle. The result of the struggle between Mao and Liu could be foreseen when P'eng 
Te-huai was removed from the post as Minister of National Defence and relieved by Lin 
Piao. 
On 1 April 1969, Lin Piao delivered the Report to the Ninth National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China.m In this report, Lin Piao made a final judgement on Liu 
Shao-ch'i on behalf of CCPCC and Mao Tse-tung which formally put Liu's political career 
to an end. 
One of the main subjects contained in his report to the Ninth CCP Congress was "On the 
preparation for the great proletarian cultural revolution". The article indicated the 
following points: 
First, "Every single victory of chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line, every victory 
in every major campaign launched by the party against the bourgeoisie, was gained only 
after smashing the revisionist line represented by Liu Shao-ch'i, which either was Right or 
Left in form but Right in essence".134 
Second, "Now it has been proved through investigation that as far back as the First 
Revolutionary Civil war period Liu Shao-ch'i betrayed the party, capitulated to the enemy, 
and became a hidden traitor and scab, that he was a lackey of the imperialists, modern 
revisionists, and Kuomintang reactionaries, and that he was the arch-representative of the 
133Lin Piao, "Report to the 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China", RED FLAG, No. 5, 
1969; THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR-POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit.,pp. 518-562. 
nAlbid.,p. 530. 
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persons in power taking the capitalist road. He had a political line by which he mainly 
attempted to restore capitalism in China and turn her into an imperialist and revisionist 
colony. In addition, he had an organisational line to serve his counterrevolutionary 
political line. For many years, recruiting deserters and turncoats, Liu Shao-ch'i gathered 
together a gang of renegades, enemy agents, and capitalist-roaders in power. The covered 
up their counterrevolutionary political records, shielded each other, colluded in doing evil, 
usurped important party and government posts, and controlled the leadership in many 
central and local units, thus forming an underground bourgeois headquarters in opposition 
to the proletarian headquarters headed by chairman Mao. They collaborated with the 
imperialists, modern revisionists, and Kuomintang reactionaries and played the kind of 
disruptive role that the U.S. imperialists, the Soviet revisionists, and the reactionaries of 
various countries were not in a position to do".135 
Third, "Chairman Mao was the first to perceive the danger of the counterrevolutionary 
plots of Liu Shao-ch'i and his gang. At the working conference of the Central Committee 
in January 1962, Chairman Mao pointed out the necessity of being on guard against the 
emergence of revisionism. At the working conference of the Central Committee at 
Peitaiho in August 1962 and the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee 
of the Party in September of the same year, chairman Mao put forward more 
comprehensively the basic line of our party for the whole historical period of socialism. 
Chairman Mao pointed out. Socialist society covers a fairly long historical period. In the 
historical period of socialism, there are still class, class contradictions and class struggle 
which exist. There is the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road, and 
there is the danger of capitalist restoration. We must recognise the protracted and 
complex nature of this struggle. We must heighten our vigilance. We must conduct 
asIbid, pp. 523-524. 
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socialist education. We must correctly understand and handle class contradictions and 
class struggle, distinguish the contradiction between ourselves and the enemy from those 
among the people and handle them correctly. Otherwise a socialist country like ours will 
turn into that which it opposes and degenerate, and a capitalist restoration will take place. 
From now on we must remind ourselves of this every year, every month, and every day so 
that we can retain a rather sober understanding of this problem and have a Marxist-
Leninist line. This Marxist-Leninist line advanced by chairman Mao is the life line of our 
party".136 
Fourth, "Following this, in May 1963, under the direction of chairman Mao, the 'Draft 
Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Certain Problems 
in Our Present Rural Work' (also known as the Ten-point Decision) was worked out, 
which laid down the line, principles, and policies of the party for the socialist education 
movement, chairman Mao again warned the whole party: I f classes and class struggle 
were forgotten and if the dictatorship of the proletariat were forgotten, then it would not 
be long, perhaps only several years or a decade, or several decades at most, before a 
counterrevolutionary restoration on a national scale would inevitably occur. The Marxist-
Leninist party would undoubtedly become a revisionist party or fascist party, and the 
whole of China would change its colour. Comrades, please think it over. What a 
dangerous situation this would be! Chairman Mao thus still more sharply showed the 
whole party and the whole nation the danger of the restoration of capitalism".137 
And the Fifth, "All these warnings and struggles did not and could not in the least change 
the reactionary class nature of Liu Shao-ch'i and his gang. At the end of 1964, chairman 
Mao convened a working conference of the Central Committee and , under his direction, 
l36Ibid., p. 526. 
Mlbid., pp. 526-527. 
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the document 'Some Current Problems Raised in the Socialist Education Movement in the 
Rural Areas' (also known as the Twenty-three Point Document) was drawn up. He 
denounced Liu Shao-ch'i's bourgeois reactionary line which was 'Left' in form but Right in 
essence and repudiated Liu Shao-ch'i's absurdities, such as 'the intertwining of the 
contradictions inside and outside the party', and 'the contradiction between the four cleans 
and the four uncleans'138. For the first time chairman Mao specifically indicated: 'The main 
target of the present movement is those party persons in power taking the capitalist 
road'".139 
To sum up, Liu Shao-ch'i's elimination was decided as early as the Eighth CCP National 
Congress when he proposed the removal of "Mao Tse-tung thought as the guiding 
principle for our Party" from the Party Constitution. The Eighth CCP National Congress 
was undoubtedly the start of CCP attempting to take the road of collective leadership. 
Mao of course could not bear this growing trend of "fundamental opposition". After the 
Eighth CCP National Congress, Mao began the deployment of power-seizure struggles, 
preparing to seize back the barrel of a gun, which laid the ultimate grounds for P'eng Te-
huai being dismissed from his post. 
To Mao, the Eighth CCP National Congress was a challenge of power. The Lushan 
conference in 1959, where Mao successfully turned the original anti-Left struggle into the 
anti-Right struggle, and where P'eng Te-huai's destiny was decided, had clearly confirmed 
Mao peerless prestige in the army and party. While Mao did not feel conceited because of 
1 3 8 F o « r cleans, a socialist education movement, began in late 1962. Its specific purpose was to clean 
away capitalist influence, cadre corruption, and other malpractice through propaganda and education of 
peasants and basic-level cadres, stressing cleaning up cadres' undesirable work style in handling 
accounts, granaries, property, and work points. The contents of the movement were confusing and 
differed from place to place. See "Premier Chou en-lai Reports on the Work of the Government", Peking 
Review, No. 1, 1965, p. 13. 
n9Lin Piao, "Report to the 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China", RED FLAG, No. 5, 
1969; THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR-POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., p. 527. 
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this, the sense of power insecurity impelled Mao to expand militarists' political influence to 
a even larger extent. Consequently, by Mao's appeal, the militarists had expanded their 
political role, provided they subordinated to the absolute leadership of Mao. Basically, the 
political power of the militarists should never endanger the authority of Mao's supreme 
leadership, otherwise the fate of the purge was inescapable. 
However, at the time when Mao entrusted Lin Piao to launch a series of political 
campaigns to increase his personal leading authority in the army and to expand the 
political role of militarists, a resisting force incited by Lo Jui-ch'ing, then the Chief of the 
General Staff of the PLA, emerged from the army itself. While Lo's motivation was not 
directed against the authority of Mao's supreme leadership, but aimed at increasingly 
overwhelming the power of Lin Piao. In fact, to analyse the fall of Lo Jui-ch'ing fully, one 
should take into consideration the whole political situation of Mao's consolidating political 
power. Mao realised that he could not firmly control the barrel of a gun although he had 
possessed it. Mao couldn't tolerate any military commanders to run counter to his orders 
openly even though the orders weren't carried out by himself, but through Lin Piao. 
Since the conflict between Lo and Lin was a big threat to Mao in his consolidation of 
military power, the fate of Lo was therefore sealed. This can be proved when Lin Piao 
held criticism campaigns against Lo on the following ground on 8 and IS December 1966, 
in that he was first, antagonistic to and attacking Mao Tse-tung's thought; and secondly, 
conducted a "grand military contest" among the entire army without authorisation; thirdly, 
disregarded law and discipline, and ran his personal independent kingdom; fourthly, held 
the strong mentality of opportunism and individualism; and finally, turned to the party for 
help, forcing Lin Piao to resign from his post and to give up his power, and carrying out 
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activities to usurp military power. 
From the fall of Lo Jui-ch'ing to the purge of Liu Shao-ch'i in the period of Cultural 
Revolution, represented an important period of political activity. This centred on the 
significance of the military role in the power struggles. The failure of Liu Shao-ch'i was 
due to his neglect of a decisive role of the military in politics; being a professional 
revolutionist, Liu underestimated the importance of the military. By contrast, Mao held 
fast to his principle of "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun". The other 
reason which accounted for Liu's failure was because of his weakness. Not daring to 
diametrically oppose Mao in the political struggles especially after Mao was cast into a 
charismatic leader by Lin Piao who was then the Minister of National Defence, however, 
at the 1959 Lushan conference when the situation was unfavourable to Mao, Liu did not 
wholly support P'eng Te-huai's stand, the loss of Feng also meant the loss of the army set 
up by P'eng's professionalised army building. Since Liu had no intimate relations with the 
army and since he did not try his best to save P'eng Te-huai at the Lushan conference, it 
was even more difficult to control the army after the fall of P'eng Te-huai. While 
Mao had controlled the army for a long time and had even directed Lin Piao to endow the 
army with political colour after the Lushan conference. 
Liu Shao-ch'i incident was not the struggle between "bourgeois headquarters" and 
"proletariat headquarters" as Mao had said. Liu's being purged and being labelled as "a 
power holder who took the capitalist road, a defector, hidden traitor, and scab, and a 
lackey of the imperialists, modern revisionists, and Kuomintang reactionaries", was purely 
a result of power struggle between him and Mao. 
140Ting Wang (ed.), "The Crime ofLo Jui-ch 'ing - An Anti-Revolutionist and Revisionist", SUMMARY OF 
THE PRC'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION, Vol.I, (Hong Kong: Ming Daily Press, 1967), pp. 578-584. See 
Chapter III, Section IV and Chapter V, Section I for details of the Lo Ju-ch'ing incident. 
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The struggle between Mao and Liu was above the level of "line opposition", and close to 
the fringe of "structural opposition". Their struggle stemmed from fundamentally different 
viewpoints in revolutionary transition. Mao firmly affirmed the value of revolution. Mao 
asserted, "socialist revolution is day-to-day revolution", "it must stress continuous 
revolution, one after another, take advantage of this favourable situation, and don't let it 
cool down".141 
Even after entering into socialist society, it by no means represented the end of revolution, 
the continuous revolution must go on. Mao's argument was that class struggle was the 
motivating force of revolution. When there was still class, the class struggle must carry 
on, and revolution must continue. As the consequence of this, when the main socialist 
transformation had been completed with respect to the ownership of the means of 
production and the economic structure of class basis which was changed in 1956, Mao 
continued to proclaim that there was still class and therefore class struggle. Continuous 
revolution must, therefore, carry on in the course of socialist revolution and 
construction.14 
"Organisational cadres" led by Liu Shao-ch'i discarded revolutionary dialectics after the 
successful completion of revolution. This could be confirmed by Liu's argument as he 
said, "In China, the question which wins out, socialism or capitalism is already settled", 
"the system of class exploitation is basically over", and current "principal contradiction is 
the contradiction between the advanced socialist system and the backward social 
1 4 1 "Mao Tse-tung's Speech at Supreme State Conference (28 January 1958", LONG LIVE THE MAO 
TSE-TUNG'S THOUGHT, op. cit., p. 157. 
142"On the Correct Handling of Contradiction Among the People (27 February 1957)", SELECTED 
WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. V, (1977), op. cit., pp. 384-396. 
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productive forces". Such contradiction could be resolved "through peaceful road".143 
Since each side evaluated revolutionary transition differently, their viewpoints on the role 
that a person or a organisation should play in the revolutionary transition would also be 
different. Mao stressed the potential and power of the masses, and set a high value on the 
role of workers and peasants in the course of revolution. He thus not only advocated 
movement of the masses, but also encouraged leaders to go deep into the masses and 
become a part of them. Party organisation played an important and decisive role in the 
revolutionary movement, but it was the revolutionary movement and the masses itself that 
allowed the party to exist and to develop. 
While Liu Shao-ch'i didn't posses the quality of a revolutionary leader or the charisma to 
attract the masses, although he too stressed the importance of the masses, he took a more 
cautious attitude towards revolutionary transition, paying more attention to the 
organisations, discipline and elite's influence in the political course. However, when he 
applied the "individual achievement", instead of the "equalitarianism" which had the nature 
of masses' revolution, as the standard of social value, it of course ran counter to Mao's 
principle. In addition to the unbridgeable gap between the ideology of Mao Tse-tung, and 
Liu Shao-ch'i, their past experience during the period of civil war also differed greatly. 
The environment of continuous power conflicts during the period in Yenan or the long-
march period formed Mao's struggle philosophy, the inner-party conflicts were regarded 
as an essential means to seize power or to preserve power. While Liu's experience in the 
"White Areas", drove him to pay more attention to the party's organisation and discipline. 
Since the situation was unfavourable to Liu in the structure of China's political culture, it 
1 4 3 "A Political Report to the 8th National Congress On Behalf of Central Committee of the CCP (15 
September 1956)" & "The Third Time of Self-criticism", THE SPECIAL REPORT ON THE ISSUE OF 
LIU SHAO-CH'I, (Taipei: Chinese Communist Studies Press, 1970), p. 267, 272, 629. 
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was quite commendable that Liu could have the situation under his control until the 
Cultural Revolution. 
266 
I . The Lin Piao Incident 
The nature of "Lin Piao incident" should be labelled as "line opposition". Lin Piao had 
been the number one political lackey who always "raised high the great red banner of Mao 
Tse-tung's thought" before he was purged. There were many causes of the rise of Lin 
Piao. His naked political ambition was supreme in bringing about the close link with Mao 
Tse-tung. Lin Piao was the "trump card" that Mao used to firmly grasp the barrel of a 
gun. With his support, Lin Piao carried out Mao's political line and cleared away all 
hindrances that might jeopardise Mao's power seizure. In May 1966 Mao convened the 
"Enlarged Meeting of the CCPCC Politburo" and published the "May 16 Circular of the 
CCPCC" which disbanded the Cultural Revolution Five-Man Group and established a new 
"Cultural Revolution Group".144 Shortly after, Lin Piao delivered a summarised speech to 
the Enlarged Politburo Meeting on 18 May, which appealed to the whole party and the 
army by saying that "We must never forget the class struggle, and the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. We must not forget to bring politics to the fore, to hold high the great red 
banner of the thought of Mao Tse-tung".145 As for political issues, he stressed, "The 
fundamental problem of revolution is the problem of political power", "Never forget 
political power and always have it in mind", "Among the areas of the superstructure -
ideas, religion, arts, law, and political power, the least is the very centre".146 With regard 
144WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, op. cit., p. 430; 
Warren Kuo (ed.), A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, op. 
cit., p. 678; "Circular of the CCPCC", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 17 May, 1967. 
1 4 5 "Address to the Enlarged Session of the Politburo of the Central Committee", THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR 
- POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., pp. 326-345; "Lin Piao's Speech to an enlarged 
Politburo Meeting (18 May 1966)" & "The People's Liberation Army Proclaims Support for Mao (1 
August 1966)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. 
Ill, op. cit., pp. 1438-1444 & p. 1453; "Hold High the Great Red Banner of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung, 
Carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Through to the End", LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY & 
PEOPLE'S DAILY, 6 June 1966. 
146"Lin Piao's Speech to an enlarged Politburo Meeting (18 May 1966)" & "The People's Liberation 
Army Proclaims Support for Mao (1 August 1966)", THE PEOPLE'SREPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 -
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to the thought of Mao Tse-tung, he interpreted as follows, "Mao Tse-tung's thought is the 
lighthouse of mankind; it is the sharpest weapon of world revolution", "Mao Tse-tung's 
thought stand erect. It is genuine Marxism-Leninism. It is Marxism-Leninism combined 
with realities. It is the ideological basis of the unity and revolution of the nation's labours, 
and the guideline of the actions of the nation's people", "Mao Tse-tung's thought is an 
everlasting universal truth, everlasting guideline of our actions, the common property of 
the Chinese people and the revolutionary people of the world, and is always resplendent. It 
was not meritorious but a 'must' that the PLA should take Chairman Mao's works as the 
textbook for cadres and warriors. Using Mao Tse-tung's thought to unite the armed 
forces and the entire party can solve any problem. Every sentence of chairman Mao's 
works is a truth, one single sentence of his surpasses ten thousand of ours".147 
The Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC, held between 1 and 12 August 1966 was 
presided over by Mao Tse-tung. In addition to the adoption of the "Resolution of the 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution", Lin Piao played his political role to the full throughout the session. 
It was at this session that Mao decide to launch an all-out attack on Liu Shao-ch'i, 
attempting to eradicate Liu's influence in the party. Lin Piao, as Mao anticipated, played a 
positive role, and suppressed those responsible cadres in the army who were ready to 
carry on disruptive activities at this vehement political struggle. In the morning and 
afternoon of 10 August, Lin twice inspected the responsible cadres in the army, and 
frankly pointed out that "Our cadre policy from now on should be that whoever opposes 
chairman Mao will be discharged. It does not matter how much ability he may have".148 
In addition to this, Lin also gave instructions on the political attitude of army's cadres 
^Ibid., p. 1444. 
148"On the Question of the Cadre Line (10 August 1966)", THE UN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS 
AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit, p. 352. 
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saying: Two policies and two lines, one is to raise high the great red banner of Mao Tse-
tung thought, to give prominence to politics, and to exhibit revolutionary zeal. The other 
is not to raise high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung thought and not give prominence 
to politics. It represents the purely military viewpoint, the technical viewpoint, and 
emphasis on the petty and small. We do not want to transform our military forces into a 
spiritually corrupt army; we do not want our army to wither and stop developing. We 
should educate and struggle against the cadres in error whenever possible. Those who are 
incurable should be dismissed.149 
At this session, Mao published a well-known big-character poster, entitled "Bombard the 
Headquarters - My Personal Big Character Poster", and made it public on 5 August, 1966. 
In it he expressed his determination to overthrow Liu Shao-ch'i and personally unveiled an 
unprecedented power struggle. The full text of Mao's poster reads thus: 
"China's first Marxist-Leninist big-character poster and commentator's article on it in the 
People's Daily are indeed superbly written! Comrades, please read them again. But in the 
last fifty days or so some leading comrades from the central down to the local levels have 
acted in a diametrically opposite way. Adopting the reactionary stand of the bourgeoisie, 
they have enforced a bourgeois dictatorship and struck down the surging movement of the 
great cultural revolution of the proletariat. They have stood facts on their head and 
juggled black and white, encircled and suppressed revolutionaries, stifled opinions 
differing from their own, imposed a white terror, and felt very pleased with themselves. 
They have puffed up the arrogance of the bourgeoisie and deflated the morale of the 
proletariat. How poisonous! Viewed in connection with the Right deviation in 1962 and 
the wrong tendency of 1964 which was Left in form but Right in essence, shouldn't this 
149Ibid., p. 353. 
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make one wide awake?" 
When Lin Piao became Mao's successor and the number two figure in the party after the 
Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC, he vigorously and faithfully carried out the 
movement to criticise and struggle against Liu Shao-ch'i. As the power struggle carried 
on, the political role of Lin Piao and his followers grew extensively. By 1969, the Cultural 
Revolution entered a new stage. Mao had successfully struck down Liu Shao-ch'i as 
expected, no one could threaten his political position any more. Nevertheless, Mao was 
quite concerned about a fairly large number of military cadres rising in the political arena 
and the overexpansion of political power of Lin Piao. As the result of long standing army 
politics and social unrest, which provided the best breeding ground for the military to 
expand their political role, the army became the only well-organised political power at the 
local level. However, in the PRC's political system, such development had seriously 
destroyed the principle that the "Party commands the gun" which Mao had always insisted 
upon. Moreover, the result of the election at the Ninth National CCP Congress which was 
held between 1 and 24 April 1969 went so far as to strengthen Mao's concern because 
among the 170 full members and the 109 alternate members elected to the Central 
Committee, the army occupied 71 and 48 seats respectively.151 
This meant that the powerful local military moved to the central arena and expanded then-
political influence to the extent of central level through the congress, and once they 
possessed the title of "full member of CCPCC" or "alternate member of CCPCC", they 
could conversely reinforce their political authority at the local level. Obviously, such 
situation had run counter to the basic principle of Mao Tse-tung for the policy of army 
150"Bombard the Headquarters - My Personal Big Character Poster", RED FLAG, No. 13, 1967, p. 3; 
PEOPLE'S DAILY, 5 August, 1967. 
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building - that was, "the party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to 
command the party". 
Since Lin Piao took over the post of Minister of National Defence, he had been arranging 
some of his trusted followers in different levels of the PLA to consolidate and expand both 
his political and military influence. His status as Mao's successor was clearly stated in the 
Party Constitution adopted by the Ninth CCP National Congress which stated that 
"Comrade Lin Piao consistently held high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung thought 
and has most loyally and resolutely carried out, and defended comrade Mao Tse-tung's 
proletarian revolutionary line. Comrade Lin Piao is comrade Mao Tse-tung's close 
comrade-in-arms and successor".15 However, Lin Piao continued to have some 
difficulties in having full control of the operation of political power. 
Firstly, among the 21 full members and 4 alternate members of the Politburo, full politburo 
members Hsu Shih-yu, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Yeh Chien-ying, Liu Po-ch'eng, Chu Te, Li Hsien-
nien, Tung Pi-wu and alternate members Chi Teng-k'uei, Li Te-sheng and Wang Tung-
hsing were not part of Lin's faction; while politburo members, Chiang Ch'ing, Chang 
Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yuan, K'ang Sheng and Hsieh Fu-chih were Cultural Revolutionary 
Leftists, who took only Mao's orders. It seemed Lin Piao could only rely on seven: full 
members Huang Yung-sheng - Chief of the General Staff, Yeh Ch'un - Lin Piao's wife and 
director of the administrative office of the CCPCC Military Commission, Wu Fa-hsien -
Air Force Commander-in-chief, Li Tso-p'eng - first political commissar of the Navy, Ch'iu 
Hui-tso - director general of the Logistics Department, Ch'en Po-ta, and alternate 
politburo member Li Hsiieh-feng. 
152"The 1969 party Constitution (14 April 1969)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979-A 
DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. W, op. cit., p. 2239; NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 28 April 1969. 
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Secondly, although Lin was in charge of the daily affairs of the CCPCC Military 
Commission, he could only command Li Te-sheng, while the rest of the vice-chairmen 
including Liu Po-ch'eng, Ch'en I , Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, and Nieh Jung-chen were out of his 
control. Mao's personnel arrangements among the CCPCC Military Commission had 
balanced the over-expanded military power of Lin Piao. 
Thirdly, since peasants formed the basis of the majority of the PL A, and they possessed 
strong moral value of "loyalty" in the social structure of China, this traditional morality 
reflected by the PLA was its absolute loyalty to the supreme authority. As a result of this, 
Lin Piao's prestige was only limited to the Fourth Field Army although he also held an 
important post as Minister of National Defence. The other non-Fourth Field Army 
continued to pledge their loyalty to Mao, and yet, Mao's political prestige and his leader's 
charisma made Fourth Field Army reluctant to oppose him in public. Therefore Lin Piao's 
expansion of military power was limited to a certain extent, which meant that all his efforts 
to expand the military power was not a great enough to threaten Mao's position. 
Finally, the power of Lin Piao was based on the army's system, and not on the party's 
system. Thus at the time when he struggled against Liu Shao-ch'i who had long-standing 
party background, he also destroyed the possible influence he had in the party system, 
while Mao could remain control both the party and army because of his supreme position. 
The only way that Lin could succeed was to ally himself with Chou En-lai. However, 
given Chou's position in the party, he would never take a subordinate position as Lin's 
helper. In addition, Chou was recorded as having always joined the stronger side in any 
intro-elite conflict where he was involved.153 Furthermore at the Lushan conference in 
1959 at the time when Mao was facing the most unfavourable situation because of the 
153Jurgen Domes, P'ENG TE-HUAI - THE MAN AND THE IMAGE, op. cit., p. 96. 
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failure of "Three Red Banners" movement, Chou didn't even want to oppose Mao in order 
to save P'eng Te-huai. Why would he possibly want to ally himself with Lin against Mao? 
Lin Piao's military ambition and vigorous political power expansion, in essence, had run 
counter to Mao's basic principle. His status as "Mao's close comrade-in-arms and 
successor" and as Minister of National Defence enabled him to possess power both in 
name and in reality, and thus enlarge his real forces. The fact that "political power grows 
out of the barrel of a gun" was exactly what Mao was afraid of. 
The overthrow of Liu Shao-ch'i was the one of the important common goals which 
accounted for the unification of Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao after the Lushan conference in 
1959. However, after the fall of Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao took his chance to seize power. 
This brought about a change in the relationship between Mao and Lin. To analyse it from 
the viewpoint of "alienation" which came from Marxist doctrine, Lin Piao, as an object, 
was transformed into an alienating force and conversely threatened the subject Mao's 
position. Judging from Mao's political ambition and dictatorial personality, he simply 
refused to accept this fact. Mao decided to fight back. However, since Lin was Mao's 
close command-in-arms and successor which clearly stated in the "Party Constitution" of 
Ninth CCP National Congress, and Lin was the chief person who set off the nation-wide 
personality cult of Mao, Mao found it was hard to launch an attack on Lin. However, to 
make a first step, Mao adopted the strategy of public opinion. Some signs revealed that 
the rupture between Mao had Liu had emerged prior to the Ninth CCP National Congress. 
On 1 January 1969, an article entitled Place Mao Tse-tung's thought in Command of 
Everything15* was carried in the editorial of "two newspapers and one periodical", it 
154"Place Mao Tse-tung's thought in Command of Everything", PEOPLE'S DAILY, LIBERATION 
ARMY'S DAILY & RED FLAG, Uanuary, 1969; "New Year Editorial (Uanuary 1969), THE PEOPLE'S 
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placed special emphasis on "unified leadership" as indicated in the following: 
First, "We must consciously use Mao Tse-tung's thought to achieve unified thinking, 
policies, plans, command, and actions ... We should wage a resolute struggle against all 
erroneous ideas and actions that run counter to chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary 
line, and we must have absolutely no attitude of liberalism. Provided we act in this way, 
every scheme and trick of the class enemies will fail completely". 
Second, "A handful of counterrevolutionaries in society often use the tactics of 
supporting an erroneous trend from behind the scenes, to confuse the difference between 
the two types of contradictions, provoke splits, and create confusion, for the purpose of 
undermining the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution". 
Third, "We should investigate and study sufficiently, and grasp ironclad evidence of 
crimes, so that the counterrevolutionaries, no matter how sly, cannot escape but their true 
features are exposed". 
And lastly, "Mao Tse-tung's thought should be used to overcome various kinds of 
erroneous ideas and close unity should be built on the principled basis of Mao Tse-tung's 
thought. If one has something to say, one must say it promptly to people to their faces 
and not gossip behind their backs. They must not indulge in petty and mean actions".135 
On 24 August of the same year, an article entitled Firmly Grasp Revolutionary Mass 
Criticism was carried in a joint editorial. It denied that "the movement of mass criticism 
had nearly reached to an end", and clarified what the target of revolutionary mass criticism 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 2307-2309. 
15SIbid, pp. 2208-2209. 
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should be aimed at: these were, firstly, to criticise revisionism in more depth; secondly, to 
criticise any tendency towards mistakes and any mistaken ideas in the party and army that 
ran counter to chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line and policies. On no account 
should the viewpoint of factionalism be allowed to distort the Party's policies, complying 
in public but opposing in private, and seizing the opportunity to grab everything; thirdly; 
to criticise factionalism and mountaintopism, the "small group" mentality and anarchism, 
and liberalism and individualism, insisting on putting the Party's and people's interests in 
the foremost. On no account should the factionalism (or bourgeois) interests be given 
priority.156 
Furthermore, on 1 October 1969, in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of PRC's 
regime, the Red Flag, the Liberation Army's Daily, and the People's Daily published a 
joint editorial, Carry out the tasks of Struggle for Further Consolidating the Dictatorship 
of the Proletariat. It stressed once more that "We must study and apply the mass 
movement of Mao Tse-tung's thought in a lively way, and firmly grasp the revolutionary 
criticism to carry the socialist revolution of superstructure through to an end."157 On the 
National Day, the people of the whole nation were guided to shout slogans. There were 
29 slogans in total in these were two which reasserted these instructions; These were, the 
Seventh, "Carry out the tasks of struggle - criticism -transformation conscientiously! 
Further consolidate the doctorship of the proletariat!", and the Eighth, "Firmly grasp 
revolutionary mass criticism! Carry the socialist revolution through to the end!".158 
On 8 March 1970, Mao Tse-tung advanced the idea to call for a Fourth National People's 
J56"Firmfy Grasp Revolutionary Mass Criticism ", PEOPLE'S DAILY & LIBERA TION ARMY'S DAILY, 24 
August 1969; RED FLAG, No. 9, 1969, pp. 5-8. 
157"Carry out the tasks of Struggle for Further Consolidating the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", 
PEOPLE'S DAILY & LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, I October 1969; RED FLAG, No. 10, 1969, pp. 5-8. 
JS8"Slogans for the Twentieth National Day (16 September 1969)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 1949-1979-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 2258. 
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Congress and to revise the Party Constitution. Meanwhile, he also put forward the 
proposal of not establishing a new State Chairman,159 thereby attempting to suppress the 
power expansion of Lin Piao. While Lin Piao regarded the forthcoming Fourth National 
People's Congress as his chance to extend his power, he attempted to take advantage of 
this Congress and of revising the Party Constitution to have himself established as the new 
State Chairman.160 This matter was revealed by Yeh Ch'un, Lin Piao's wife and the 
director of the administrative office of the CCPCC Military Commission, as she had secret 
discussion with Wu Fa-hsien, Air Force commander-in-chief, in July 1970. "Just what 
would happen", she said, "if Lin Piao failed in his intentions to have himself established as 
the new State Chairman, and what recourse could they then have?"161 In spite of the fact 
that Mao had expressed his resolution of not establishing a State Chairman many times, 
Lin Piao confined to advance formally the idea of having Mao appointed as State 
Chairman on 11 April. However, this suggestion was turned down by Mao the following 
day as he remarked, " I can't be the State Chairman again, this proposal is inappropriate". 
Mao once more affirmed his resolution not to establish the State Chairman and refused to 
take the post at the Politburo Conference of CCPCC in late April. 1 6 On 2 July, the Red 
Flag published a special article, Carry Out the Struggle for Strengthening the Party's 
Ideological Construction, which carried strong political instruction. The article reaffirmed 
that people were to "place emphasis on the guidance and the command of Mao Tse-tung's 
thought".163 
159Hu Sheng (ed), THE SEVENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, op. cit., p. 
514. 
160lbid. 
J61Ibid, and Yen Chia-ch'i & Kao Kao, "The Ten Year History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution", 
(Taipei: Institute of Current China Studies, 1988), p. 309. 
162Hou Meng-hwa & Yin Hou-jan, THE SIXTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, 
Vol. II, (Peking: Liberation Army's Press, 1984), p. 613. 
163"Carry Out the Struggle for Strengthening the Party's Ideological Construction", RED FLAG, No. 7, 
1970, pp. 11-18. 
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On 12 July, the CCPCC set up a "Committee for the Draft Revision of the Constitution", 
Mao Tse-tung was appointed the chairman and Lin Piao vice-chairman. For the fourth 
time Mao insisted that the State Chairman must not be established, and instructed, "The 
establishment of State Chairman is only nominal. It must not be set up just because of a 
particular person". Shortly before the Second Plenum of the Ninth CCPCC, the members 
of CCPCC politburo held a meeting, in which Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta again suggest the 
establishment of the State Chairman, and asked Mao to take the post. Mao refused, and 
said, "anyone who wishes to be the State Chairman, please go ahead".164 Mao began to 
take an uncompromising stand. 
On 3 August, Mao demanded that the PLA study the resolution of Ninth Party Congress 
of the Fourth Army of the Red Army of December 1929 - On Correcting Mistaken Ideas 
in the Party165 all over again. 
In the section "On Individualism", the resolution mentioned that "correcting mistaken 
ideas of 'small group' mentality is because 'small group' mentality only considers the 
interests of their own small group and ignores the party's interest at large. Although on 
the surface this does not seem to be the pursuit of personal interests, in reality it 
exemplifies the narrowest individualism and has a strong corrosive and centrifugal 
effect".166 
Nevertheless, in spite of Mao's disapproval and dissatisfaction with him, Lin Piao still 
carried on his attempt of establishing the post of the State Chairman. On the day when the 
164Hou Meng-hwa & Yin Hou-jan, THE SIXTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, 
Vol. II, op. cit., p. 614. 
1 6 5 "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (December 1929)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-
TUNG, Vol. I (1975), op. cit., pp. 105-116. 
166Ibid, p. 112. 
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"Draft Revision of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China" was submitted to 
the Second Plenum of the Ninth CCPCC for examination and approval, Ch'en Po-ta put 
forward the proposal to establish the Chairman of the State again on behalf of Lin Piao. 
He also delivered the "Theory of Genius" at the conference, in which he not only 
honoured Mao as a "genius", but also described Lin Piao as a incredible genius. "He (Lin 
Piao) should be listed", said Ch'en, "among Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin as one of the 
great leaders of the revolution," "for Marx, Lenin and Mao Tse-tung, Engels, Stalin and 
Lin Piao served as their great assistants, and Lin was the most outstanding of these 
assistants".167 
In the evening of 23 August, the Central Politburo held a meeting and discussed national 
economic problems. Wu Fa-hsien, Commander-in-chief of the Air Force, ignored the 
schedule and did not hold the meetings according to the proposals of Mao Tse-tung, 
which they had previously approved. At this meeting, Wu had proposed that all members 
should start trying to learn the ways of Lin Piao, and that they should change the schedule 
according to Lin's proposal. 
On 24 August, Lin's faction including Ch'en Po-ta, Yeh Ch'un, Wu Fa-hsien, L i Tso-p'eng, 
Chou Huai-tso who all spoke to their respective groups of North China, Central South 
China, South West China, and North West China, pushing forward the proposal of setting 
up a State Chairman.168 
Among them all, the No. 6 brief bulletin of the North China group which carried the 
speech of Ch'en Po-ta concerning his resolution to support the re-establishment of the 
J67Yen Chia-ch'i & Kao Kao, "The Ten Year History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution", op. cit.p. 309. 
168Hu Sheng (ed), THE SEVENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, op. cit, p. 
515. 
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State Chairman169 and was distributed to all groups in the meeting. 
On 25 August, Mao called a meeting of the enlarged politburo of the Central Committee. 
At it they decided to stop all debate on the speech delivered on the 23 by Lin Piao, to 
recall all of the briefs that were distributed at the North China group, and to begin an 
investigation on Ch'en Po-ta. Mao Tse-tung personally sought out Lin Piao to talk with 
him, and Chou en-lai sought Wu Fa-hsien, L i Tso-p'eng, and Ch'iu Hui-tso. These people 
were told to prepare for an investigation by the Central Committee".170 
The confrontation between Mao and Lin manifested itself in the question of the 
establishment of the State Chairman which was in reality a matter of power, not a matter 
of constitution. Mao was forced to resign from his post of State Chairman under pressure 
from the failure of the Great Leap Forward. It would now damage his personal authority 
i f he agreed to re-establish himself as the new State Chairman". I f he had considered this 
rationally and had now agreed to re-establish the post of State Chairman, judging by the 
situation at that time, Lin Piao was the only person suitable for that position. Once Lin 
became the State Chairman, his power would certainly have increased dramatically and 
thus would directly pose a threat to Mao's position. 
After the Lin Piao incident, the document of the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party, Chung-Fa, 1972, No. 12, "Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks To 
Responsible Local Comrades during His Tour of Inspection (Mid-August to September 
12, 1971)"1 7 1 revealed that "At the 1970 Lushan conference, they (the Lin Piao anti-Party 
169Yen Chia-ch'i &Kao Kao, "The Ten Year History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution", op. cit., p. 310. 
170lbid.,p. 311. 
1 7 1 "Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks to Responsible Local comrades during His Tour of Inspection 
(Mid-August to September 12, 1971)" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party, Chang-fa, 1972, No. 12, LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., 
p. 55-66. 
279 
clique) engaged in surprise attacks and underground activities."17 Mao was quite 
shocked by this sudden attack. He stated that "At the Lushan conference of 1959, P'eng 
Te-huai even wrote a letter, which amounted to an open challenge to seize power".1 7 3 
While at the 1970 Lushan conference, the Lin Piao clique "first concealed things then 
launched a surprise attack. They deceived three of the five standing members (Mao, Chou 
En-lai, K'ang Sheng) and the majority of comrades in the politburo, except for the big 
generals. The big generals, including Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, Yeh Ch'un, L i 
Tso-p'eng, Ch'iu Hui-tso, and also L i Hsueh-feng and Cheng Wei-shan, maintained 
complete secrecy and suddenly launched a surprise attack.... Their coup didn't just last a 
day-and-a-half, but went on for two-and-a-half days, from 23 and 24 August to noon on 
the 25. They certainly had a purpose in doing all that!"1 7 4 Mao believed that "P'eng Te-
huai set up his military club and issued a challenge, but they didn't even match up to P'eng; 
so you can see how base their style was,"1 7 5 In addition, Mao pointed out, "their surprise 
attacks and underground activity were planned, organised, and programmed. Their 
program was to set up a State Chairman, advocate "genius," oppose the line set forth by 
the Ninth Party Congress, and overthrow the three items on the agenda of the Second 
Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee. A certain person was very anxious to become 
State Chairman, to split the Party, and to seize power."1 7 6 
Mao's resentment and dissatisfaction towards Lin Piao was understandable. He remarked, 
"The struggle at the 1959 Lushan conference with P'eng Te-huai was a struggle between 
two headquarters. The struggle with Liu Shao-ch'i was also a struggle between two 
headquarters. The struggle at this Lushan conference was again a struggle between two 
172Ibid, p. 59. 
mlbid. 
174lbid. 
17SIbid. 
]76Ibid.,pp. 59-60. 
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headquarters."177 
As a matter of fact, at the Second Plenum of Ninth CCPCC, Lin Piao was given a political 
death penalty. Mao had firmly classified him as a class enemy. The struggle against Ch'en 
Po-ta was a prelude to Mao's purge of Lin Piao. At the Second Plenum of the Ninth 
CCPCC on 31 August, Mao wrote a paper entitled Some of My Opinions, in the article he 
wrote "Is history created by heroes, or created by slaves? Is what man knows 
predetermined by heaven, or does it come through genius? Is man's knowledge and 
wisdom born in us or do we develop it through our lives in the material world? We can 
only stand on the side of Marxism-Leninism and we must not listen to the rumours being 
spread by Ch'en Po-ta or fall into the traps he has set for us." 1 7 8 
After the event, Mao commented, "Some of my opinions was meant to specifically criticise 
the theory of genius. I certainly don't want to talk about genius. Genius does not depend 
on one person or a few people; it depends on a party."1 7 9 Mao furthermore commented on 
the Lin Piao clique's behaviour at the Second Plenum of the Ninth CCPCC as saying, 
"Their courage was enough to level Lushan or stop the earth's turning." 1 8 0 
On 6 September, the last day of the Second Plenum of Ninth CCPCC, the CCPCC 
demanded that the errors committed by Ch'en Po-ta brought up within the whole party for 
open criticism, but Lin Piao expressed his opposition, whereas Huang Yung-sheng, Wu 
Fa-hsien, Yeh Ch'un, L i Tso-p'eng and Ch'iu Hui-tso all remained silent. As a result, the 
1 1 1 Ibid., pp. 60-61. 
mYen Chia-ch'i & Kao Kao, "The Ten Year History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution", op. cit., p. 311. 
J 79"Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks to Responsible Local comrades during His Tour of Inspection 
(Mid-August to September 12, 1971)" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party, Chang-fa, 1972, No. 12, UN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., 
p. 60. 
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politburo of the CCPCC was unable to make a decision agreeing to criticise Ch'en Po-
ta. 1 8 1 
In view of the situation at that time, Mao decided to take a preemptive attack against Lin 
Piao. Mao revealed the following afterwards: 
"After the Lushan conference (1970), I adopted three methods. One was to throw stones, 
one was to mix in sand, and the third was to dig up the cornerstone. I criticised the 
material that Ch'en Po-ta had used to deceive many people, and I commented on reports 
of the 38th Army and of the Tsinan Military District on opposing arrogance and 
complacency. I also made critical comments on a document of the long forum of the 
Military Affairs Commission, which didn't criticise Ch'en at all. My method was to get 
hold of these stones and make critical comments, and then let everyone discuss them - this 
was throwing stones. When dirt is too tightly packed, no air can get through, but i f a little 
sand is mixed in, air can circulate. When work groups of the Military Affairs Commission 
did not have enough people mixed in, more were added - this is called mixing in sand. 
Reorganising the Peking Military Region is called digging up the cornerstone."18 
Mao flexibly applied his three methods, - "throwing stones", "mixing in sand" and "digging 
up the cornerstone". He first convened a "North China conference" (enlarged conference 
of politburo) at Peitaiho in December 1970. Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, L i Tso-
p'eng, Yeh Ch'un and Ch'iu Hui-tso were forced to make a self-criticism because of the 
1 8 1 "Communique of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Lin-Ch'en 
Anti-party Clique" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chung-fa, 
1971, No. 61, THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR-POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit.p. 72. 
J82"Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks to Responsible Local comrades during His Tour of Inspection 
(Mid-August to September 12, 1971)" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party, Chang-fa, 1972, No. 12, LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. tit., 
p. 62. 
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Ch'en Po-ta incident. Even so, Mao continued to think that "After the North China 
conference was concluded, Lin Piao, while not doing his regular work under the pretext of 
poor health, held secret meetings with Ch'en Po-ta. He also summoned Huang, Wu, L i 
and Ch'iu many times hold black meetings in preparation for a counterrevolutionary armed 
coup d'etat, with the intention of usurping the party, army and Government and restoring 
capitalism in China."183 "Lin Piao and Yeh Ch'un also sent Lin Li-Kuo, their son, to 
Shanghai, Nanking, Hangchow, Kwangtung, and other places to engage in 
counterrevolutionary liaison activities."184 
One month after the Second Plenum of Ninth CCPCC was concluded, the Red Flag 
published an article against Lin Piao entitled Reinforce the Party Nature of Proletariat 
Class. The article stressed, "oppose the pursuit of only personal interest or interest of 
their own small group, and oppose class factionalism and individualism", and considered 
that "correcting any impure party nature is for the continuation of the revolutionary road, 
preventing it from going stagnant."185 This article echoed the instruction of studying the 
paper On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party given by Mao on 3 August before the 
Second Plenum of Ninth CCPCC. Mao's resolution to purge Lin Piao was very clear. 
On 24 January 1971, Mao not only reorganised "the Peking Military Region" and 
dismissed Ch'en Wei-shan and L i Hsueh-feng who supported Lin from their post as 
commander of the Peking Military Region and as second political commissar respectively, 
he also transferred Lin's clique the 38th Army away from the Peking Military Region. On 
15 April 1971, Mao presided over a "Ninety-nine-man conference", this was a conference 
1 8 3 "Communique' of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Lin-Ch'en 
Anti-party Clique" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chung-fa, 
1971, No. 61, THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR-POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit.p. 72. 
184lbid., p. 73. 
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called by the Chinese Communist party to exchange results of the "criticise Ch'en Po-ta 
rectification campaign".186 Attending the conference were ninety-nine responsible cadres 
from the Central government, local government, and the armed forces. At the end of 
conference, Chou En-lai made a summary on behalf of the CCPCC.1 8 7 
On 14 September 1971, the CCPCC issued an open letter written by Mao to the whole 
party. It demanded that the whole party immediately organised reading, discussion, and 
went to transmit and report the results back to the central authorities. Mao indicated in 
his open letter, "Ch'en Po-ta is a sham Marxist-Leninist. For a long time Ch'en Po-ta has 
been arguing with me on the question of genius, holding that a genius is born with natural 
talents rather than deriving his talents form practice or form among the masses. He wants 
me to recognise him as a genius, and in so doing he covets nothing less than the 
chairmanship of the State. In my opinion, he is a careerist. .. For a long time he did not 
report to the party Central Committee on his work and was engaged in secret manoeuvres 
behind the scene and in splitting activities in its party Central Committee. With regard to 
his mistakes, the party has conducted criticism in good time. .. The question of Ch'en Po-
ta must be brought up before and transmitted to the whole party for criticism, this letter 
has been shown to comrade Lin Piao. comrade Lin Piao basically agrees with my 
suggestion."188 
Outwardly the struggle carried out by Mao was directed against Ch'en Po-ta, but inwardly 
it was Lin Piao that Mao aimed at. The struggle between Mao and Lin had been 
186"Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks to Responsible Local comrades during His Tour of Inspection 
(Mid-August to September 12, 1971)" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party, Chang-fa, 1972, No. 12, UN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MIUTARY COUP, op. cit., 
p. 62. 
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188"Chairman Mao's Open Letter to the Whole Party (1971) " - Document of the Central committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party, Chang-fa, 1971, No. 57, UN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POUTICS AND 
MIUTARY COUP, op. cit., p. 68. 
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converted to an open struggle. 
On 1 July 1971, the Two Newspapers and One Periodical published a combined article, 
entitled Commemorate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Communist Party of China,1*9 
calling the people of the whole nation to bear in mind "the few bourgeois conspirators, 
careerists, renegades, and enemy agents, who have concealed themselves in the party, and 
the hidden traitors who have illicit relations with foreign countries". In addition, the 
article also made the following summary drawn from the historical experience of PRC's 
struggles, and asked the whole nation, the entire army, and the people of the whole nation 
to take it as a warning and to learn from it. 
First, it is necessary to adhere to "the consistent ideological principle of our party", 
namely, integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of 
the Chinese revolution. In accordance with chairman Mao's teaching people were to "read 
and study seriously and have a good grasp of Marxism." This meant combining reading 
with investigation and study and with the summing up of experience, combining the study 
of historical experience with the present-day struggle and criticism of opportunism in the 
past with the criticism of modern revisionism. It is our party's duty to continue the 
exposure and criticism of modern revisionism with Soviet revisionism at its centre and 
carry the struggle through to the end. 
Second, it is necessary to wage inner-party struggle correctly. It is thoroughly essential to 
expose the bourgeois conspirators, careerists, renegades, and enemy agents, who have 
concealed themselves in the party, and the hidden traitors who have illicit relations with 
foreign countries. Bad people invariably disguise themselves and resort to conspiracy and 
189"Commemorate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Communist Party of China", PEOPLE'S DAILY & 
LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, I July, 1971; RED FLAG, No. 7/8, 1971, pp. 5-25. 
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double-dealing. But since they are engaged in evil-doing, they are bound to expose 
themselves. 
Third, efforts must be made to guard against arrogance. Modesty helps one to go 
forward, whereas conceit makes one lag behind. This is a truth we must always bear in 
mind. 
Fourth, we should follow the theory of two points, not the theory of one point. While 
paying attention to the main tendency, we should take note of the other tendency which 
may be covered up. We must take full notice and firmly grasp the principal aspect and at 
the same time solve one by one the problems arising from the non-principal aspect. We 
should see the negative as well as the positive aspects of things. We should see the 
problems that have already arisen and also anticipate problems which are not yet perceived 
but which may arise. 
Fifth, it is necessary to adhere to the mass political line. Mao regards perseverance in the 
mass line as fundamental to perseverance in the dialectical-materialist theory of 
knowledge, and regards working for the interests of the vast majority of the people of 
China and the world as a requirement for successors to the revolutionary cause of the 
proletariat. 
Sixth, it is necessary to uphold democratic centralism. Party committees at all levels must 
institute and strengthen the party committee system, strengthen centralised leadership, 
prevent excessive decentralisation, and the practice of "many centres", that is , no centre, 
and must achieve unity in thinking, policy, plane, command, and action on the basis of 
Mao Tse-tung thought. 
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Seven, Mao opposes telling lies and advocates speaking the truth. He makes it a 
requirement for successors to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat to be hold in 
making criticism and self-criticism. 
And the last, The Chinese People's Liberation Army created and led by great leader 
chairman Mao. Our principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun must never 
be allowed to command the party. 
This article was a clear sign of forthcoming struggle against Lin Piao. Mao made this 
intention quite explicit in his article which he stressed once more, "the principle is that the 
party commands the gun." and indicated, "We should see the problems that have already 
arisen and also anticipate problem which are not yet perceived but which may arise". On 
the surface, this article was directed against Liu Shao-ch'i, but inwardly it alluded to Mao's 
dissatisfaction and criticism of Lin Piao. 
It was no doubt a blow to Mao when Ch'en Po-ta turned his coat on him and went to Lin 
Piao for shelter at the Lushan conference during Second Plenum of Ninth CCPCC. Ch'en 
had long been Mao's personal secretary, and was one of the most important theoreticians 
in the PRC. He did his best to carry out the plot of power-seizure for Mao at the early 
stage of the Cultural Revolution. However, things changed when Ch'en viewed the brutal 
nature of Mao when he purged the "May 16 corps"1 9 0 in the second half of 1967 for the 
consolidation of his power. Ch'en seemed to perceive that Mao would easily sacrifice him 
when the situation called for it. He was frightened and decided to seek a defence. 
Judging from his unfavourable backgrounds, he had no imitate relationship with Mao as 
190For the details of "May 16 Corps" refers to Warren Kuo (ed.), A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF 
CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, op. cit, pp. 677-678; "Closely Follow Chairman Mao's Great 
Strategic Plan, Firmly Grasp the General Line of Revolutionary Struggles" & "Comments on T'ao Chu's 
Two Books", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 3&8 September 1967. 
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Chiang Ch'ing had, although he was a leader of "Cultural Revolution Groups"; he was an 
"intellectual" lacking in strong political background; and he had no backing of the armed 
forces as had Lin Piao. The only way he could save himself and preserve his political 
strength was to resort to the improvement of the unfavourable situation at that time, so he 
turned to Lin Piao for he thought Lin Piao, Mao's successor as stated in the Party 
Constitution, was the only person who could provide the protection that he needed at that 
time. 
Ch'en Po-ta didn't intend to betray Mao at the time when he turned to Lin Piao. However, 
he had to make his stand clear in order to win Lin's trust, and therefore he vigorously 
encouraged the establishment of the State Chairman at the Lushan conference in 1970. He 
spoke "openly to oppose the Central Committee and refuted and rejected the resolution of 
the Central Committee not to establish a State Chairman"191 at the meeting for the draft 
revision of the Constitution. 
Mao couldn't tolerate Ch'en's offence at the Second Plenum of Ninth CCPCC and 
considered it to be a most vicious attack. It was thus understandable that Mao became 
determined to purge Ch'en. Otherwise, considering Ch'en's insignificant position in the 
party, Mao need not struggle against Ch'en so hard. Besides, there were many others 
more powerful who supported Lin - such as Huang Yung-sheng, Chief of the General 
Staff, Wu Fa-hsien, Air Force Commander-in-chief, L i Tso-p'eng, first political commissar 
of the Navy, Ch'iu Hui-tso, director general of the Logistics Department. Considering the 
way Mao valued the army, these persons were more obvious targets than Ch'en as an 
object of Mao's attack the struggle between him and Lin Piao. 
191"Communique of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Lin-Ch'en 
Anti-party Clique" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, chung-fa, 
1971, No. 61, THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR-POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. tit., p. 72. 
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After the Lin Piao incident, the CCPCC not only published Chung-fa, 1972, No. 4 
"Outline of Project 571" 1 9 to announce Lin Piao's anti-party crimes, but also distributed 
the following six secret documents to the whole party and the army, declaring CCPCC's 
attitude towards Lin Piao incident and the way of handling it: The first, Chung-fa, 1971, 
No. 60 "Communique of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
concerning Lin Piao's 'September 12' anti-party incident".193. The second, Chung-fa, 
1971. No. 61 "Communique of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
concerning the Lin-Ch'en anti-party clique".1 9 4 The third, Chung-fa, 1971, No. 62 
"Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the Lin-
Ch'en anti-party clique".1 9 5 The fourth, Chung-fa, 1971, No. 64 "Notice of the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist party concerning the discarding of the 'four- good' 
and 'five-good' movements and the turning in to higher authorities of the epitaphs and 
portraits of Lin Piao".1 9 6 The fifth, Chung-fa, 1972, No. 24 "Struggle to smash the 
counterrevolutionary coup d'etat of the Lin Piao anti-party clique".1 9 7 And the last, 
192"Struggle to smash the Lin-Ch'en Anti-party Cliques Counterrevolutionary Coup" - Document of the 
Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chung-fa, 1972, No. 4, THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR -
POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., pp. 78-95. 
"Communique of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning Lin Piao's 
'September 12' anti-party incident" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party, Chung-fa, 1971, No. 60, THE UN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POUTICS AND MIUTARY COUP, 
op. cit., pp. 69-70. 
I9* "Communique" of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the Lin Piao's 
'September 12' anti-party incident" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party, Chung-fa, 1971, No. 61, THE UN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POUTICS AND MIUTARY COUP, 
op. cit., pp. 71-73. 
1 9 5 "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the Lin-Ch'en anti-
party clique" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chung-fa, 1971, No. 
62, THE UN PIAO AFFAIR-POWER POUTICS AND MIUTARY COUP, op. cit., pp. 74-75. 
196"Notice of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party concerning the discarding of the 
'four- good' and 'five-good' movements and the turning in to higher authorities of the epitaphs and 
portraits of Lin Piao" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chung-fa, 
1971, No. 64, THE UN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POUTICS AND MIUTARY COUP, op. cit., pp. 76-77; 
A COMPILATION OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS ON THE UN PIAO AFFAIR, (Taipei, Mainland China 
Studies, 1973), p. 31. 
"Struggle to smash the counterrevolutionary coup d'ttat of the Lin Piao anti-party clique" - Document 
of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chung-fa, 1972, No. 24, THE UN PIAO 
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Chung-fa, 1973, No. 34 "Report on the investigation of the counterrevolutionary Chinese 
of the Lin Piao anti-party clique".1 9 8 
No. 61, 1971, document condemned Lin Piao as having "colluded with Ch'en Po-ta and 
took the lead in organising a counterrevolutionary clique in a wild attempt to oppose the 
Central Committee, to split the party, and to establish another mountaintop."199 
No. 24, 1972 document claimed that "The sinister goal of the Lin Piao anti-party clique in 
launching a counterrevolutionary coup d'etat was to divide our party, to seize the top 
power of the party and the state by conspiratorial measures ... the line adopted at the 
Ninth Party congress, fundamentally change the party's basic line and policy during the 
historical stage of socialism, overthrow the proletarian dictatorship, and restore capitalism. 
They wanted to revive the landlord-bourgeois class that our party, our army, and all 
people of our nation under the leadership of chairman Mao smashed with their own hands. 
Inside the country, they wanted to exercise a landlord-comprador-bourgeois fascist 
dictatorship in alliance with the landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, 
undesirable, and rightists; internationally, they wanted to capitulate to the Soviet 
revisionist social-imperialism, to joint hand with the Soviet Union and the United States to 
oppose China and communism".00 
AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., pp. 96-105; YEARBOOK ON CHINESE 
COMMUNISM, Sec. VII, 1973, pp. 8-10. 
J 9 8 "Report on the investigation of the counterrevolutionary Chinese of the Lin Piao anti-party clique" -
Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chung-fa, 1973, No. 34, THE LIN 
PIAO AFFAIR-POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., pp. 110-117. 
"Communique' of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the Lin Piao's 
'September 12' anti-party incident" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party, Chung-fa, 1971, No. 61, THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, 
op. cit., p. 72. 
^"Struggle to smash the counterrevolutionary coup d'etat of the Lin Piao anti-party clique" - Document 
of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chung-fa, 1972, No. 24, THE LIN PIAO 
AFFAIR-POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., pp. 97-98. 
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The No. 24, 1972 document was distributed to the Party Committees of provinces, 
municipalities, and autonomous regions; party committees of military regions, military 
districts, and field armies; Party Committees of headquarters of the Military Affairs 
Committee and service branches;; leading groups of Party Committee of ministries and 
commissions of the State Council; and core groups of the party, covering a wide range of 
areas. 
Mao seized on this incident to deny the resolution and the line of Ninth CCP National 
Congress, and obstinately asserted that Lin Piao clique colluded with the Soviet Union and 
the United States as he referred to the Liu Shao-ch'i and the P'eng Te-huai incidents which 
he connected Liu with the Soviet Union. Mao provoked xenophobia so as to reduce his 
personal responsibility in the Lin Piao incident. 
In addition, to the army, Mao gave them the following special instructions: "The army 
must be unified, must be put in order, I just don't believe that our army would rebel. I just 
don't believe that you, Huang Yung-sheng, could lead the Liberation Army to rebel. Each 
army includes divisions and regiments, and also command and political and logistics 
department - i f you order troops to do evil things, will they listen to you?" "You must be 
concerned with military affairs; can't just be a civilian official, but must also be a military 
official. Grasping military affairs means studying the line, rectifying and emphasising 
unity. The army has always stressed strict discipline, and I agree. But in solving questions 
of ideology one can't use strict discipline; rather, fact and reasoning must be relied on". 0 1 
Mao explicitly stated that only he could control the army. Huang Yung-sheng, Chief of 
2 0 1 "Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks to Responsible Local comrades during His Tour of Inspection 
(Mid-August to September 12, 1971)" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party, Chung-fa, 1972, No. 12, LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. tit., 
p. 63. 
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the General Staff, meant nothing to him. Mao also warned that the only way to avoid 
mountaintopism and sectarianism was that army must be unified under his leadership. 
Mao didn't think that the army's professional training could solve the questions of ideology 
although he didn't mention that the army should place politics in command of everything 
either. This was because he was strongly affected by the Lin Piao incident, and thus 
intentionally understated the importance of politics in the army, but still he continued to 
believe the importance of ideology in the army. 
The rise and fall of Lin Piao manifested the real political and military strength of Mao Tse-
tung. In fact, no matter how much Lin had expanded his political and military power, he 
was still subjected to Mao's control. Once Mao withdrew his support, the power Lin Piao 
had was the kind of dependent power structure which would be terminated immediately 
and return to square one. However, it was noteworthy that the expanded political role of 
the PLA accompanied by the rise of Lin Piao wouldn't possibly return to its original 
position in a short period of time. This was because from the beginning of the P'eng Te-
huai incident in 1959, Mao had intentionally controlled the army through Lin Piao to 
complete the tasks of purging Liu Shao-ch'i and other cadres in the army and party who 
advocated reforms and for the consolidation of his supreme authority. After the Lin Piao 
incident, Mao once more launched a series of political campaigns to remove all of Lin's 
remaining political and military influence, and to restore the tradition of "party commands 
the gun". 
To begin with, Mao first placed Yeh Chien-ying in charge of the daily routine of the 
Military Affairs Commission of the Central Committee.0 He then set off a nation-wide 
202"Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the Lin-Ch'en anti-
party clique" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chung-fa, 1971, No. 
62, THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR-POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., p. 75. 
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"movement of criticism in the Lin Piao rectification campaign" to eradicate Lin Piao's 
political and military influence. Furthermore, the CCPCC resolved that copies of the 
Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, Documents of the Ninth Party Congress, 
and Long Live the Victory of the People's War be turned in to the central authorities for 
disposal. Other works about Lin Piao were to be collected by the low levels and 
submitted to the country authorities for disposal.03 In these, the 1969 Constitution of the 
Chinese Communist Party described Lin Piao as Mao's "close comrade-in-arms and 
successor", as the General Program of 1969 Constitution stated clearly, "Comrade Lin 
Piao consistently held high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung thought and has most 
loyally and resolutely carried out, and defended comrade Mao Tse-tung's proletarian 
revolutionary line. Comrade Lin Piao is comrade Mao Tse-tung's close comrade-in-arms 
and successor".04 And the "political report" Lin Piao delivered at the "Ninth Party 
Congress", and Long Live the Victory of the People's War05 which wrote by Lin Piao 
represented the summit of Lin's political influence and Lin's important position in the army. 
All these documents together with Lin's influence were to be removed at once. 
At the fall of Lin Piao, some 60 people of Lin's faction were involved and purged. 
However, since Lin had been in the position of Minister of National Defence for more than 
a decade, and the PLA's system hadn't turned out to be a united body as Mao wished. 
This was clearly indicated by Lin, as he said, "Because of B-52's (code name for Mao) 
divide and rule policy, the army's internal contradictions are fairly complex; which makes it 
2 0 3 "Notice of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party concerning the discarding of the 
four- good' and 'five-good' movements and the turning in to higher authorities of the epitaphs and 
portraits of Lin Piao" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chung-fa, 
1971, No. 64, THE UN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., p. 76; A 
COMPILATION OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS ON THE UN PIAO AFFAIR, op. cit., p. 31. 
204"The 1969 Party Constitution (14 April 1969)", THE PEOPLE'SREPUBUC OF CHINA 1949-1979 -
A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 2239. 
2 0 5 "Long Live the Victory of People's War (September 1965)", UN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POUTICS 
AND MIUTARY COUP, op. cit., pp. 265-319; RED FLAG, No. 10, 1965, pp. 1-28. 
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difficult to form a united force which we can control. .. The army has been oppressed; its 
middle-and higher-level cadres show no respect and are dissatisfied".06 
The PLA's expanded political role did not fade out because of Lin's death. Another reason 
which accounted for Mao's slow pace in reorganising the army was because he had to 
have support and assistance from the high-level commanders other than Fourth Field 
Army. Before the Tenth CCP National Congress, regional military heads still occupied 
many seats in the regional "Central Committee", and in early 1972 the PL A continued to 
control 20 first secretaries of the CCPCC in the provincial level, and among the 118 
directors and deputy directors, 63 were from the military.07 This situation lasted until 
after "Tenth CCP National Congress". 
The Tenth CCP National Congress was held in Peking between 24 and 29 August 1973. 
At the congress, Chou En-lai delivered the political speech on behalf of the CCPCC, in 
which he criticised Lin Piao as the following: "Who never showed up without a copy of 
Quotations in hand and never opened their mouths without shouting 'long live' and who 
spoke nice things to your face but stabbed you in the back";08 "Who were capitalist-
readers in power working only for the interests of the minority and whose ambition grew 
with the rise of their positions, overestimating their own strength and underestimating the 
strength of the people, could no longer remain under cover and therefore sprang out for a 
trial of strength with the proletariat. When under the baton of Soviet revisionism he 
attempted to have his 'decisive say* in order to serve the needs of domestic and foreign 
206"Struggle to smash the Lin-Ch'en Anti-party Cliques Counterrevolutionary Coup" - Document of the 
Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chung-fa, 1972, No. 4, THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR -
POWER POUTICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., pp. 84-85. This passage was purely Lin's own 
opinion. 
207Paul H. B. Godwin, "The PLA and Political control in China's Provinces", COMPARATIVE 
POUTICS, 9:3 (October, 1976), pp. 9-15. 
208"Report to the Tenth Party Congress (24 August 1973)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. V, op. cit., p. 2464; RED FLAG, No. 9, 1973, pp. 5-17. 
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class enemies, he exposure and bankruptcy became complete";09 "He is bourgeois 
careerist, conspirator, double-dealer, renegade and traitor".10 
Both Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta were expelled from the Party at the congress, and Ch'en 
was dismissed from all posts inside and outside the party.11 Among the 195 full members 
and the 124 alternate members elected to the Central Committee of the Tenth CCP 
National Congress, 58 full members and 36 alternate members were professional 
militarists, which occupied 29.4 percent of total membership of the CCPCC, less than the 
result of Ninth CCP National Congress (42.6 percent). The army's political influence were 
suppressed. In the following First Plenum of Tenth CCPCC, among the elected 25 full 
members and alternate members of politburo, only 9 were from the military including Yeh 
Chien-ying, Li Te-shen, Wei Kuo-ch'ing, Hsu Shih-yu, Liu Po-ch'eng, Chu Te, Wang 
Tung-hsing, Ch'en Hsi-lien, and alternate member Su Cheng-hua,1 all of them supported 
Mao. 
The Communique of the Tenth party congress had the following instructions concerning 
purging works about Lin Piao: At present, we should continue to put the task of 
criticising Lin Piao and rectifying our style of work, we should make full use him as a 
negative example, the Lin Piao anti-party clique, to educate the whole party, army, and 
people in class struggle and two-line struggle, and should study Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Tse-tung thought and criticise revisionism and the bourgeois world outlook.213 
209lbid., p. 2465. 
2Wlbid., p. 2463. 
2 1 1 "Communique of the Tenth Party congress (29 August 1973)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
1949-1979-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. V, op. cit., p. 2477; NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 29 
August 1973. 
212WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS INTHE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, op. cit., p. 696. 
2 1 3 "Communique of the Tenth Party congress (29 August 1973)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
1949-1979-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. V, op. cit., p. 2477. 
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Mao had learned a lesson from the Lin Piao incident. He transferred the commanders of 
eight great military regions immediately after the Tenth party congress in late 1973 to 
suppress the military political influence instantly. His aim was quite obvious: one was 
preventing military heads from forming the mountain-stronghold mentality which was 
harmful to Mao's supreme authority; the other was reducing army's political influence in 
the localities so that party bureaucratic system could reorganise party committees at the 
local and restore the unified leadership of the party. 
Teng Hsiao-p'ing became a member of the Standing Committee of the politburo, Vice-
chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission and concurrently Chief of the General Staff 
on 5 January 1975. Teng delivered a speech entitled The Army Needs to Be Consolidated 
at a meeting of officers of regimental level and above at the Headquarters of the General 
Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. 
Teng stressed once more that "With this army of ours, the party commands the gun, and 
not vice versa", he also came to a conclusion on the present situation of the army by 
saying, "It was thrown into considerable chaos after Lin Piao was put in charge of army 
work in 1959, and especially in the later period under him. Now, many fine traditions 
have been discarded and the army is seriously bloated organisationally. The size of the 
armed force has increased substantially and military expenditures take up a larger 
proportion of the state budget than before, with a lot of money being spent just on food 
and clothing.... The Headquarters of the General Staff, the General Political Department 
and the General Logistics Department bear major responsibility, they should be the first to 
be consolidated".14 
214nThe Army Needs to Be Consolidated", THE SELECTED WORKS OF TENG HSIAO-P'ING (1975-
1982) Vol. I (1984), op. cit., p. 11. 
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In addition, Teng argued, "Our army has been confronted with a major new problem, 
factionalism, which is quite serious in some units. It is mainly the officers who are 
involved... They engage in factional activities both inside the army and in the civilian units 
where they go to work. In order to achieve stability and unity, we must eliminate 
factionalism and enhance party spirit". "The discipline in the army is too bad", "An army 
should act like an army... So to consolidate the army we must both enhance party spirit 
and eliminate factionalism, and strengthen discipline".13 
One could conclude from Teng's speech that since Lin Piao became the Minister of 
National Defence in 1959, the party spirit in the PLA was low, factionalism was strong, 
and discipline was bad. Teng laid most of the blame on Lin Piao ignoring the fact that 
Mao Tse-tung controlled the army, politics and the party during that period. 
On 14 July 1975, Teng spoke at an enlarged meeting of the CCPCC Military Commission. 
The following comments were made in accordance with the current situation of the army. 
Teng started, "There are quite a few problems besetting our army... to sum them up in 
five words: bloating, laxity, conceit, extravagance and inertia".16 As far as "laxity" and 
"conceit" are concerned, "This is chiefly manifested in factionalism and inadequate sense 
of organisational discipline... 'Army support the left', many persons became involved in 
factional activities, some siding with one faction, some with another, since the army had 
great authority, they became the real power behind the different factions. Later they 
brought the same attitudes into the army, and in many of its units this led to the rise of two 
opposing factions. Now, nine years after the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, a fairly 
large number of comrades in our army have yet to shake off faction".17 
215Ibid, p. 12. 
216nThe Task of Consolidating the Army (14 July 1975)", THE SELECTED WORKS OF TENG HSIAO-
P'lNG, Vol. I (1984), op. cit., p. 27. 
2 1 1 Ibid., p. 28. 
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"The lack of a sense of organisational discipline is related to factionalism, those who 
disobey orders have the interests of their own factions in mind instead of the overall 
interests of the revolution. They place personal and factional interests above everything 
else. They seek fame, gain and position, and when they fail to secure them, they take 
offence, and even refuse to obey of transfer".18 
"During the Cultural Revolution, since the army was given the task of'supporting the left', 
it wielded great power. Together with other factions, this engendered conceit among a 
number of army comrades, some of whom became arrogant and overbearing... At present 
there is not sufficient unity inside the army itself, between the army and the government 
and between the army and the people. In some cases, relations between some army units, 
between the army and the government and between the army and the people are rather 
strained".19 
In view of the serious problem inside the PLA, Mao conducted another large-scale 
transfer involving 83 military commanders in the autumn of the same year. 0 This transfer 
was aimed at rebuilding the relationship between the army and the party and attempting to 
eliminate factionalism inside the army. 
The Lin Piao incident was brought to a close with Lin's being labelled as a "bourgeois 
careerist, conspirator, double-dealer, renegade and traitor". Nevertheless, the 
confrontation between Mao and Lin, in reality, was stemmed from the fact that Lin was 
extremely anxious to replace Mao, and from Lin's disapproval of Mao's ideology. The 
218Ibid, p. 29. 
219Ibid., p. 30. 
220Hsiung Juai, "To Analyze PLA Inner Affairs From the Viewpoint of PLA's Personnel Arrangement", 
THE MONTHLY REPORT OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, 18:7, (Taipei), pp. 28-32. 
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biggest mistake Lin made was that he really considered himself as Mao Tse-tung's close 
comrade-in-arms and successor, and the number two figure of the whole nation, 
expanding his military and political influence without reservation. Lin ignored Mao's real 
intention and his belief that "political power grow out of the barrel of a gun". 
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Chapter V. The Influence of Special Events on the Political 
Role of the PLA at the Early Stage of the Cultural Revolution 
The purge of Lo Jui-ch'ing, the event of the February adverse current and Wuhan incident 
have profound significance in the development of the PLA's political role at the early stage 
of the Cultural Revolution. 
From Lo Jui-ch'ing's allying himself with Lin Piao to gain military power in 1959 till Lo's 
suicide1 following his being purged in 1966 unfolded the true appearance of PLA's inner-
struggle among the leading class for the seizure of political interests and the process of 
zero-sum game. Lo's pursuit of "grand military contest" was not a military training to 
increase the combat effectiveness of the PLA, but, in fact, a political rivalry with Lin Piao. 
The "February adverse current" was another factional struggle in the PLA. With Mao's 
support, Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army monopolised all powers in the PLA after the event. 
The motive for Mao's support of Lin was very straightforward. It was because Lin was 
Mao's political alley and Lin's political army-building program accorded with Mao's 
political interests at that stage. 
The "Wuhan incident" in mid 1967 was an important case that the regional military leaders 
fight against the Central Government at the early stage of the Cultural Revolution. As the 
proceeding of the Cultural Revolution, the regional military leaders gradually expanded 
their political power, and by 1969, before the convening of the Ninth CCP National 
Congress, their control of Provincial Revolutionary Committees had reached to the climax 
and the relationship between the army and party became "army commands the party" 
lLo committed suicide by jumping out of a window on 18 Mar. 1966. He survived, however, but broken a 
leg. 
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which had serious destroyed the tradition of "party commands the gun". This warning 
sign had forced Mao to re-establish the party organisations in the locality after the Ninth 
CCP National Congress, and carry out another power-seizure struggle - this time, the 
target was directed at Lin Piao, Mao's close comrade-in-arms and his successor. 
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I . The Purge of Lo Jun=chfing 
Lo Jui-ch'ing2 and Lin Piao were very close as Lo was Lin's old colleague. During the 
period of Long March, Lin Piao was the commander of the Red First Army, and Lo was 
the director of the Bureau of Security of the Red First Army and of the Red First Front 
Army; during the period in Yenan, Lin was the Principal of Red Army College and the 
Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political College, Lo was the Dean of 
Instruction and then the Vice-principal. When Lin Piao replaced P'eng Te-huai as the 
Minister of National Defence and took charge of the CCPCC Military Commission, Lo 
was the commander of the Public Security Force of the State Council, Lin Piao transferred 
Lo Jui-ch'ing to the army and appointed him as the Secretary-general of the Military 
Commission and the chief of general staff of the PL A. 
The real intention behind Lin Piao's promoting Lo Jui-ch'ing was obvious. At that time 
among the 8 deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lin was only fully supported by Li T'ien-
yiu and Han Hsien-ch'u, who were from Lin's Fourth Field Army and would take his 
orders, while the remaining six: P'eng Shao-huei, Chang Tsung-hsun, Chang Ai-p'ing, 
Yang Ch'eng-wu, Yang Yung, and Wang Hsin-t'ing were opposed him. Lin hoped that Lo 
Jui-ch'ing could help him to expand his personal influence among the army by making him 
2Lo Jui-ch'ing, one of the earlist members of the Red Army. He took part in the Communist uprising at 
Nanchang on 1 Aug. 1927. Lo was at Chingkang mountain in 1928. Serving there in the fourth Red 
Army, led by Chu Te and Mao. Lo made the long march when the march was ended in the autumn of 
1935. Lo became political department director of the first column of a unit known as the Shensi-Kansu 
Detachment, which was under Lin Piao's First Army Corps. After 1948, Lo was then director of the 
political department of the North china PLA and political commissar of the 19th Army Group. The 
operation in which he participated were carried out in coordination with Lin Piao. In Sep. 1959, 
following the political downfall of Peng Te-huai and Huang Ko-cheng, Lo was appointed and ranking 
vice-minister of National Defense and Chief of the General Staff under the new Defense Minister Lin 
Piao. See Donald W. Klein (ed.), BIOGRAPHIC DICTIONARY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM, 1921-
1965, Vol. 11, (Massachusetts: Harvard Uni. Press, 1971), pp. 642-645; Warren Kuo, A 
COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, op. cit., pp. 732-733; Ho 
Yu-wen, THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRC'S INTELLIGENT EMPIRE, (Taipe: Shu Hwa Publishing Co., 
1994), pp. 121-132. 
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Chief of the General Staff. However, Lo disobeyed Lin often bypassing him and reported 
to Mao Tse-tung in his capacity as the Secretary-general of the CCPCC Military 
Commission and the Chief of General Staff of the PLA, while kept close contacts with 
other generals. This deeds of Lo's was considered by Lin as disloyalty, and thus Lin's 
disapproval of Lo could be anticipated. In addition, there had been many disputes in 
between the two. 
When debating the Lin Piao's speech at the "7000-men conference" in December 1961,3 
Yeh Ch'un, Lin Piao's wife, asserted that the content of "genius" should be added, while 
Lo disapproved and considered it as inappropriate. Disputes occurred again when 
discussing Lin Piao's foreword to the Second Edition of the Quotation from Chairman 
Mao Tse-tun, Lin Piao pointed out that "the works of chairman Mao shall be regarded as 
the supreme guide to all our military undertakings", Lo opposed and contended that "this 
is not compatible with the system of our country". When Lin Piao suggested that "the 
thought of Mao is Marxism-Leninism at its highest and most active stage in our world 
today", Lo countered by stating that "this is not the way to say it, highest - is it possible to 
have a second highest? Can't it be any higher? Most active - Can there be a next most 
active? Highest and most active are no easily comprehended, and can not be easily 
translated by foreigners". When Lin Piao suggested that "We must study Chairman Mao's 
writing, follow his teachings and act according to his instructions, be chairman Mao's 
good fighters", Lo opposed the publication of this suggestion and its introduction to 
foreigners. When Lin Piao wanted that "Mao Tse-tung's thought now represents the 
zenith of Marxism-Leninism", Lo said that "this is no way to put it, it would not 
favourably influence foreigners", Lo forbade the contention that "personal genius" was a 
3The 7000-men Enlarged Central Work conference called by Liu Shao-ch'i in Jan. 1962 to revile Mao's 
policy of the Three Red Banners. See A COLLECTION OF MATERIAL CONCERNING LIU SHAO-CH'I, 
(Taipei: The Institute for the Study of Chinese Communism, 1970), p. 524. 
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factor in the formation of Mao thought, saying, "Nowadays no one dares mention personal 
genius".4 
In November 1965, Lin Piao put forth the five-point principle for giving prominence to 
politics as follows: First, "To study and apply chairman Mao's works creatively and, in 
particular, to do one's utmost to apply them; to regard chairman Mao's works as the 
highest instruction on all aspects of the work of our army". Second, "To persist in the 
'four firsts' and, in particular, make the greatest effort to grasp living ideas". Third, "To 
have leading cadres go to the basic units and give energetic leadership in the campaign to 
produce 'four good' companies and ensure both that the basic units do their work 
effectively and that a good style of leadership by the cadres is fostered". Fourth, "To 
promote boldly really good key posts of responsibility". And fifth, "To train hard and 
master the finest techniques of close-range and night fighting tactics"5. 
Among the five-point principle, Lo contended that "to regard chairman Mao's works as 
the highest instruction on all aspects of the work of the PLA" did not conform to a 
nation's institution.6 
At the end of 1965, Chiang Ch'ing planned to promote the movement of Cultural 
Revolution throughout the whole nation by applying the force of the PLA, she suggested 
to held a symposium on the literature and art in the army, but Lo refused. Nevertheless, 
Chiang Ch'ing met with Lin Piao on 21 January 1966 at Soochow, Lin Piao ordered the 
4 "A Report on the Purged Chief of Staff (30 Apr. 1966)". THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-
1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. Ill, op. cit, p. 1473; Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, THE 
PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, (Peking: The History of the CCP 
Press, 1989). p. 16. 
5 "On the Purge of Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing (Jan. 1966), THE PEOPLE'SREPUBLIC OF CHIN 1949-
1979-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. Ill, op. cit., p. 1405. 
6Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 
op. cit., p. 16. 
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General Political Department to send Liu Chih-chien, the deputy director; Hsieh T'ang-
chung, chief of the Cultural Division; and Ch'en Ya-ting, the deputy chief; and Li Man-
ts'un, chief of the Propaganda Division to attend the "symposium on the literature and art 
in the armed force" convened by Chiang Ch'ing.7 After the meeting, an article, entitled 
Abstract of the symposium on the Literature and Art in the Armed Forces Convened by 
Chiang Ch'ing on Behalf of Lin Piao, which cast an extreme left line on literature and art, 
was sorted out and was examined and revised by Mao Tse-tung, and then distributed to 
CCPCC for seeking opinions in the name of the CCPCC Military Commission. 
On 19 March Chiang Ch'ing forwarded the "abstract", revised three times by Mao, to Lin 
Piao, on 22 March, Lin directed the CCPCC Military Commission to carry out thoroughly, 
and on 10 April, the "abstract" was approved and issued by CCPCC. The editorial 
department of the Liberation Army's Daily published an article, entitled Hold High the 
Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought and Actively Participate in the Grate 
Socialist Cultural Revolution,9 to strongly criticise the "black line on literature and art" in 
the PLA, and reaffirm the political role of the PLA by pointing out. 
"A black anti-party and anti-socialist line running counter to Mao Tse-tung's thought has 
existed in our literary and art circles. This black line is a combination of bourgeois ideas 
on literature and art, modern revisionist ideas on literature and art... The struggle between 
the roads on the front of literature and art in society is bound to be reflected in the armed 
forces... Our armed forces are the chief instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat... 
Inevitably, therefore, the enemy will try every means to undermine our armed forces form 
all sides; and they will inevitably use literature and art as a weapon to corrupt our armed 
7Ibid, p. 10. 
8"Hold High the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought and Actively Participate in the Grate 
Socialist Cultural Revolution", LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, 18 April 1966. 
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forces. We must be very much on our guard against this"9. 
In addition to this article, the Liberation Army's Daily also published the full text of the 
"abstract".10 And, in accordance with spirit of the "abstract", the PLA's General Political 
Department held a "conference on creative works in the army" between 8 April and 11 
June in Peking. During the conference, Lin Piao ordered to carry out criticism on those 
who suspected and resisted the "abstract", and who held different viewpoints against it. 
The conference seriously criticised six persons including Lo Jui-ch'ing, and some 56 
persons were attacked in group meetings.11 After the conference, all units of the PLA 
carried out similar meetings, many of military cadres of Lo's followers were attacked. Lin 
Piao and revolutionary leftists attempted to destroy Lo's influence in the PLA by criticising 
the so-called "black line on literature and art". 
In July 1966, the Red Flag published a paper, entitled The Compass of the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution, in the name of its editorial department. It indicated, 
"Under the control and influence of this black line came a spate of absurd theories and a 
profusion of poisonous weeds, creating a miasma in literary and art circles. They turned 
literature and art into tools to attack the dictatorship of the proletariat and into means to 
restore capitalism".12 Lo Jui-ch'ing was thus classified "the black line of restoring 
capitalism and of attacking the dictatorship of the proletariat". This charge, in other 
words, was what Mao said, "the class struggle between the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the different political forces, and the class struggle 
9"The PLA Enters the Campaign Against P'eng Chen (J8 Apr. 1966)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. Ill, op. cit., pp. 1430-1431. 
10Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 
op. cit., p. 13. 
nIbid., p. 14. 
12"The Compass of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", RED FLAG, No. 9, 1966, p. 26. 
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in the ideological field between the proletariat and bourgeoisie".13 And as in all the inner-
party struggles in the PRC history, when charged with the above, his fate could be 
anticipated. 
Furthermore, Lo Jui-ch'ing decided to hold a "grand military contest" in the army in 
January 1964. This move largely increased his prestige in the army but opposed the army-
building principle of giving prominence to politics. While Lin considered it had seriously 
jeopardised the progress of carrying out political movement of the cult of Mao Tse-tung 
among the army. In the second half year of 1964, Lin took a counter-measure by sending 
Yeh Ch'un and many other senior cadres to "squat on the spot"14 at grass roots and in the 
army. On 29 Dec. 1964, Lin Piao wrote Comrade Lin Piao's Directive on Army's Current 
Tasks in accordance with Yeh Ch'un and many others' reports, and forwarded it to Lo Jui-
ch'ing, Lo, however, revised it 8 times before issuing it to all units in the army, and 
strongly disapproved of Lin's negation of "grand military contest" by saying, "The grand 
military contest were of prime importance". When Lin indicated, "Unless politics is done 
well, the troops will run backward in war", Lo disputed, "If you cannot shoot accurately, 
the other side will advance on you. Where else would you run but backwards". In 
addition, Lo also spoke of "the military training work in 1964 as its best year since the 
founding of the PRC... and enthusiasm must be enhanced, not dampened... Without good 
military training, the party and country are doomed when war breaks out".15 
When Lin Piao set forth five principles for giving prominence to politics, Lo was against 
1 3 "The PLA Enters the Campaign Against P'eng Chen (18 Apr. 1966), THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. Ill, op. cit., p. 1249. 
14"Squat on the spot" - A practice of requiring senior cadres to spend certain periods of time at the grass 
roots, living and working among the masses in order to obtain a broad and realistic understanding of the 
conditions a lower levels. The practice of "Squat" is on the one hand aimed at rectifying ranking cadres 
and, on the other, at strengthening control over the basic level units. 
15"A Report on the Purged Chief of Staff (30 Apr. 1966)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-
1979-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. Ill, op. cit., p. 1476. 
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making Mao's books the supreme guide for all the tasks of the PLA. Lo regarded the five 
principles only the principle concerning techniques derived from hard training and 
techniques of close and night combat was the most important, the others were useless.16 
Lo also refused to put Yeh Ch'iin's name in the "directive" to whole army for whom 
occupied no army post. Moreover, before issuing "Comrade Lin Piao's Directive on 
Army's Current Tasks" to all units in the army, Lo requested to enumerate "The Work 
Group of the General Political Department" instead of Liu Chih-chien and Yeh Ch'un's 
name from the following passage of the "directive", "Comrade Lin Piao read few reports 
written by Liu Chih-chien, Yeh Ch'un and many others, and heard reports from comrade 
Yeh Ch'un"17. 
In early 1965, the struggle between Lin Piao and Lo Jui-ch'ing had become apparent. In 
November 1965, a joint report signed by Li Tso-p'eng, First Political Commissar of the 
Navy, Wang Hung-k'un, Vice-commander-in-chief of the Navy, and Chang Hsiu-ch'uan, 
Director of the Political Department of the Navy was submitted to Mao Tse-tung by Yeh 
Ch'un, indicating that Lo plotted to sabotage the navy.18 The enlarged conference of the 
Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCPCC (Shanghai conference) was 
thereby convened by Mao between 8 and 15 December of the same year to criticise Lo 
Jui-ch'ing. The conference distributed the joint report signed by Li Tso-p'eng and others, 
in addition, Wu Fa-hsien, Commander-in-chief of the Air Force also publicised a reference, 
which indicated: 
14 and 15 February 1965, under instructions from Lo Jui-ch'ing, Liu Ya-lou, former 
16Ibid; Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL 
REVOLUTION, op. cit., p. 17. 
17Ibid. 
18lbid., p. 18. 
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Commander-in-chief of the Air Force presented a four-point proposal to comrade Yeh 
Ch'iin to be forwarded to Lin Piao for his acceptance. The four points were: First, 
"Sooner or later a person high on the political stage has to bow out. Personal will does not 
matter. Comrade Lin also will have to leave the political stage n the future". Second, 
"Comrade Lin's physical health must be well cared for. This has to depend upon you". 
Third, "Hereafter, comrade Lin need not bother too much about military affairs. Let other 
people take care of the troops, the troops today have all they need, the principal problem 
is to do everything properly". And the final, " I f it should prove necessary to entrust Lo 
with the administration of military affairs, give him more respect, and give him a free 
hand".19 
Lo's four points undoubtedly were to send out an open challenge to seize power from Lin. 
It was, however, offensive to Mao for Lin was his proxy to carry out Maoist army-
building program. Lo not only failed to carry out political army-building program, but 
attempted to seize power from Lin. This seriously ruined Mao's overall power 
deployment and thus his fate to be purged was doomed. Mao once wrote the following 
comments on a report: "Everyone must guard against those who do not believe 'giving 
prominence to polities', or those who overtly agree but covertly promoting 'the theory of 
compromise' (opportunism)".20 After the Shanghai conference, Lo was removed from 
Chief of the General Staff of the PLA and replaced by Yang Ch'eng-wu, acting 
commander of the Peking Military Region. 
PLA convened an Army's Political Works Conference from the end of December 1965 to 
January 1966. This conference not only continued to carry out struggles against Lo Jui-
ch'ing in the spirit of Shanghai conference, it even intensified its attack on Lo and 
J9Jbid, pp. 1478-1479. 
20Ibid., p. 19. 
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classified the struggle into "the line struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie". The 
conference also restated the importance of Lin Piao's "five-point principle of giving 
prominence to politics". 
Hsiao Hua, Director of the General Political Department of the PL A, delivered a speech at 
the conference, entitled Hold High the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought and 
Resolutely Adhere to the Five Point Principle of Giving Prominence to Politics. The 
focal points of the speech were as follows: 
First, "Classes exist in socialist countries and class struggle definitely exists. Throughout 
the whole stage of socialism, there exist class contradictions, class struggle between 
proletariat and bourgeoisie, and the struggle between the two roads of socialism and 
capitalism. Politics is class politics. I f the political-ideological battle area is not occupied 
by the proletariat, it will definitely be occupied by the bourgeoisie". 
Second, "Some people say: Military affairs are polities', Military affairs and politics are of 
equal importance1, and 'military affairs and politics should be given first place in turn'. 
Such views are absolutely wrong, and such purely military views, which hold that i f 
military affairs are perfected, politics will naturally be perfected and i f military affairs are 
imperfect politics will also be imperfect, were criticised by chairman Mao 36 years ago in a 
resolution adopted by the fifth plenary session of the CCP Central Committee. Chairman 
Mao said: Military affairs are merely one of the instruments which fulfil political tasks. 
The Chinese Red Army was an armed group which carried out the political task in the 
revolution'". 
Third, "The five-point principle of giving prominence to politics by comrade Lin Piao 
constitutes a long term plan for building our army, general principle and task for all 
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aspects of work of the whole army, comrade Lin Piao's five-point principle was put 
forward in accordance with Chairman Mao's theory and line of building the army, the 
historical experience of our army, and the current practical situation. It is a brilliant 
example for creatively studying and applying Mao Tse-tung's thinking". 
And fourth, "We must understand that the relationship between politics and military affairs 
is that of the commands to the commanded; it is the relationship between the leader and 
the follower. Politics commands military affairs, and military affairs serve politics. Only 
by giving prominence to politics and doing political work well will the other work be well 
done and military training be effective. Giving prominence to politics is the foundation on 
which to strengthen the revolutionisation and modernisation of the army".21 
CCPCC held a group meeting between 4 March and 18 April 1966 to discuss Lo Jui-
ch'ing's issue. The group meeting was conducted in two phases, the first phase lasted 13 
days and the participants, totalling 42 persons included responsible comrades from the 
various headquarters of the CCPCC Military Commission, the Public Security Ministry, 
the National Defence Ministry departments, the National Defence Science Commission, 
the Military Science Academy, most of the Military Regions, and the different branches of 
the armed services. Lo Jui-ch'ing himself also attended this phase of the meeting. On 22 
March the meeting entered upon its second phase. A total of 53 persons joined the 
meeting on instructions from the Central Committee. These additional participants were 
responsible comrades from the Central Committee, the concerned departments and 
agencies in the State Council, and the various bureaux of the Central Committee. The 
total number of participants in the second phase of the meeting was 95. 2 2 Mao and Lin 
Piao enlarged the level and sphere of struggling Lo Jui-ch'ing, and Lo was accused of 
2,lbid., pp. 1405-1412. 
22lbid., p. 1473; Ibid, p. 20. 
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"plotting to usurp military power and oppose the party". 
Yet, there was another purpose behind Mao and Lin's expansion of their struggle against 
Lo. They hoped that the struggle against Lo could lure Lo's followers into a trap, smash 
non-Lin's faction in the PLA, and eradicate all dissidents in the party who were against 
Lin's "politics takes the lead" so as to boost the development of Cultural Revolution. For 
instance, Feng Chen, the mayor of Peking, spoke for Lo Jui-ch'ing when discussing Lo's 
issue at the group meeting, he requested, "only to point out the facts with good grounds, 
don't make any conjectures on those utterly groundless, name one when there is a one, 
don't exaggerate... speak only Lo's issue, don't involve other people". Ho Long who had 
close relations with Lo, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing objected to the handling of Lo's issue, 
others like Yang Shang-k'un, Shang Hsiang-jung, Director of Administrative Office of the 
CCPCC Military Commission, Liang Pi-yeh were also involved. Lin Piao reorganised a 
power group headed by him through the struggle of Lo. Lin Piao considered a person's 
loyalty judging by his attitude towards the purge of Lo, people like Wu Fa-hsien, L i Tso-
p'eng and Ch'iu Hui-tso became the core of Lin's faction for they took vigorous attack 
against Lo. Wu and Ch'iu were appointed the commander in the army and became the 
major force to carry out Mao's political army-building, they shared the victory of power-
seizure struggle with Lin Piao and became a member of the Political Bureau of the 
CCPCC at the Ninth CCP National Congress. 
On 30 April 1966, the Work Group of the CCPCC made a Report on the Issue 
Concerning the Mistakes of Lo Jui-ch'ing, which indicated five major mistakes of Lo as 
follows: First, "Hostility and opposition to Mao Tse-tung's thought, slandering and 
attacking comrade Mao Tse-tung". Second, "Pushing the bourgeois military line in 
opposition to chairman Mao's military line and arbitrarily deciding to hold a grand military 
contest in the entire army in opposition to giving prominence to politics". Third, "Total 
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absence of organisation and discipline, arbitrary acts, and schemes for an independent 
kingdom all disrupting the party's centralised democracy". Fourth, "Vicious and low 
quality; an opportunist clinging steadfastly to the standpoint of the exploiting class; the 
zenith of bourgeois individualism". And the final, "Solicits favours from the party; forces 
comrade Lin Piao to 'give way to a better man1 and 'give up his power1; conducts 
treacherous activities to usurp army powers and oppose the party".23 
On 16 May of the same year, the CCPCC approved and issued the "report", and pointed 
out again the mistakes of Lo, which were the mistake of putting the bourgeois military line 
in opposition to the proletarian military line; of putting revisionism in opposition to 
Marxism-Leninism; of opposition to Mao Tse-tung's thought; of opposition to Party's 
Central; of opposition to Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao; and of plotting to usurp military 
power and oppose the party. Thus, the Party's Central reached the following decision: (1) 
Strip and Cancel all the positions held by Lo Jui-ch'ing in the military system; (2) Strip Lo 
Jui-ch'ing of his position as vice premier of the State Council; (3) Strip Lo Jui-ch'ing of his 
position as secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the party; (4) Make a 
statement, politically and organisationally, concerning the errors committed by Lo Jui-
ch'ing; (5) Circulate this report of the Central Work Group and certain major speeches 
made at the group meeting to an appropriate extent so that the evil influence of Lo Jui-
ch'ing in the various field will be thoroughly eliminated.24 
In six months time, Lo was completely excluded from the CCPCC and removed from all 
his posts in the party, government and military. Lo was the first leading commander being 
purged before the advent of the Cultural Revolution. Lo occupied such a high position as 
Chief of the General Staff of the PLA. Only Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao had the power to 
23Ibid., pp. 1473-1478. 
24Ibid., p. 1480. 
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remove him from the office at that time. Lin Piao, however, was only a pawn that Mao 
placed in the army. He would never dare to go ahead and attack Lo without Mao's 
consent. Consequently, it was quite obvious Mao intended to remove all obstacles that 
would impeded Mao's plan of power seizure during the Cultural Revolution. For Lo 
occupied six important posts in the party, government and military at that time, - namely, 
Secretary of the Secretariat of the CCPCC, Secretary-general of the CCPCC Military 
Commission, Vice premier of the State Council, Vice minister of Ministry of National 
Defence, Director of the Office for the National Defence Industry, and Chief of the 
general Staff of the PLA, - i f Mao wished that Lin should control the PLA, Lo's influence 
must be eliminated completely. A series of power struggles against leading commanders 
were thereafter carried out during the Cultural Revolution. Many high-ranking generals 
like Chu Te, P'eng Te-huai, Ho Long, Ch'en I , Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, Nieh Jung-chen, and 
Yeh Chien-ying and many others were affected, for holding different viewpoints to Mao's, 
or for the disapproving vigorous attacks on the military organs during the Cultural 
Revolution. 
Apart from Mao's influence, we can attribute the following few points to the fall of Lo Jui-
ch'ing: 
Firstly, the fall of Lo was not because he promoted the so-called bourgeois military line or 
plotted to restore capitalism behind Mao and Lin, but because of his attempt to divide 
power with Lin Piao. This was clearly mentioned in the Report on the Issue Concerning 
the Fault of Lo Jui-ch'ing. Lo contended with Lin for the favour of Mao Tse-tung, but he 
neither realised the importance of Lin Piao to Mao, nor the political tasks that Lin 
shouldered at that phase. 
Secondly, the reason why Lin promoted Lo to the position of Chief of the General Staff of 
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the PL A and secretary-general of Military Commission of the CCP was because Lin hoped 
that Lo would be grateful and therefore pledge his loyalty to Lin and help Lin to 
consolidate his political influence in the army. However, Lo couldn't understand this, his 
really thought he was the Chief of the General Staff of the PLA with military power and 
could do whatever he liked. Lo wanted to pledge his loyalty direct to Mao, but failed to 
understand Mao's real intention. 
And finally, unlike P'eng Te-huai, Lo didn't devote himself to the idea of professional army 
building. His "grand military contest" was in fact for the seizure of political gains. This 
can be seen from two things. First, during Lo's term of office as Chief of General Staff of 
the PLA, he often bypassed Lin and reported to Mao directly. This behaviour was not 
professionally orthodox; second, in the course of a debate between Lo and Lin on the 
issue whether to send troops to aid North Vietnam or not, Lo easily changed his stand and 
followed Mao's opinion when he understood Mao's real intention. 
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II. The Eight Articles of the CCPCC Military Commission and The 
Event of the February Adverse Current 
After the Cultural Revolution, Mao felt threatened from two sides. One was the 
mountain-stronghold mentality at locality, the other is from Lin Piao and his "Fourth Field 
Army". At the early stage of Cultural Revolution, many purges of the high-ranking cadres 
of the party and army that Lin Piao carried out were in fact with Mao's tacit consent in the 
hope that he could gain some support from Lin to overthrow Liu Shao-ch'i together. This 
"befriend with distant states while attacking those nearby" or "draw secondary enemy over 
to his side to attack prime enemy" was the typical tactic of Mao. In addition, the 
elimination of the commanders other than Fourth Field Armies carried out by Lin also 
involved historical factional and power struggle among the army and personal ambitions. 
On 8 August 1966, the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC passed the "Decision of 
the CCPCC concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", the well-known 
sixteen articles of the Cultural Revolution, details are as follows: 
1. "A new stage in the Socialist Revolution. - at present, our aim is to knock down those 
power holders who take the capitalist road, criticise the bourgeois reactionary academic 
'authorities', criticise the ideologies of the bourgeoisie and all exploiting classes". 
2. "The main stream and twists and turns - the broad masses of workers, peasants and 
soldiers, revolutionary intellectuals, and revolutionary cadres constitute the main force in 
this great Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution, being a revolution, will 
unavoidably meet with resistance, which stems mainly from those power holders who have 
sneaked into the party and who take the capitalist road". 
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3. "Put the word 'Dare' above everything else, boldly arouse the masses - The Party 
Central Committee requires Party Committee at various levels to uphold correct 
leadership, be courageous, mobilise the masses with a free hand, change their state of 
weakness and impotency, encourage those comrades who have made mistakes but who 
are willing to make amends to lay down their packs and join the battle, and dismiss the 
power holders who take the capitalist road, so as to let the leadership return to the hands 
of proletarian revolutionaries". 
4. "Let the masses educate themselves in the movement - in the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution, it is the masses who must liberate themselves. We cannot do the things for 
them which they should do themselves. We must trust the masses, rely on them, and 
respect their creative spirit. We must get rid of the word 'fear'. We must not be afraid of 
trouble. Chairman Mao has always told us that revolution is not an elegant, gentle, kind, 
and genial thing. In this great revolutionary movement, the masses must be told to 
educate themselves". 
5. "Party's class line must be executed with resolve - focus should be concentrated on 
attacking a handful of extremely reactionary bourgeois rightists and counterrevolutionary 
revisionists. Their anti-party, anti-socialist, and anti-thought of Mao Tse-tung crimes 
must be fully exposed and criticised and they must be isolated to the maximum extent. 
The focus of this movement is on the purge of those power holders within the party who 
take the capitalist road". 
6. "Contradictions among the people must be correctly handled - it is necessary to strictly 
separate the two kinds of contradictions of different character - those among the people 
and those between the enemy and ourselves. Contradictions among the people must not 
be treated as contradictions between enemy and ourselves or other way round. That 
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differing opinions are found among the people is a normal phenomenon. In the course of 
debate, people may argue with one another but must not use their fists". 
7. "Be on guard against those who brand revolutionary masses as 'counterrevolutionaries' -
in order to prevent the shifting of the main target of struggle, it is not permissible to use 
any excuse to instigate the masses to struggle against the masses and students to struggle 
against students. Even in the case of real rightists, they should not be dealt with in the 
light of prevailing circumstance at a late period in the movement". 
8. "The cadre question - anti-party and anti-socialist rightists must be fully exposed and 
knocked down. Their influence must be eliminated". 
9. "Cultural revolutionary groups, cultural revolutionary committees, and cultural 
revolutionary congresses - cultural revolutionary groups, cultural revolutionary 
committee, and cultural revolutionary congresses should not be temporary organisations 
but should be permanent mass organisation". 
10. "Teaching reform - in schools of all types, it is imperative to carry out the policy, 
advanced by comrade Mao Tse-tung, of making education serve proletarian politics and 
having education integrated with productive labour". 
11. "The question of written criticism in the press - in carrying out the cultural 
revolutionary mass movement it is essential to combine the dissemination of the 
proletarian world outlook, Marxism-Leninism, and the thought of Mao Tse-tung with the 
criticism of the bourgeois and feudal ideologies. Criticism by name in the press must first 
be discussed by the party committee at the corresponding level and in some cases 
approved by the higher party committees". 
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12. "Policy toward scientists technicians, and working personnel in general - scientists and 
scientific and technical personnel who have made valuable contributions should be 
protected. They may be assisted in gradually transforming their world outlook and styles 
of work". 
13. "The question of arrangements for integrating the socialist education movement in 
town and country - the Great Cultural Revolution has made the socialist education 
movement in town and countryside even richer in content and better. It is necessary to 
combine the two. However, questions raised by the present proletarian cultural 
revolutionary movement must at a suitable moment be handed over to the masses for 
discussion, so that the proletarian ideology may be made to flourish and the bourgeois 
ideology destroyed". 
14. "Grasp the revolution and promote production - provided the masses are fully 
mobilised and satisfactory arrangements are made, it is possible to guarantee that the 
Cultural Revolution and production will not impede each other and that a high quality of 
work in all fields will be attained". 
15. "The army - the cultural revolutionary movement and the socialist education 
movement in the armed forces should be conducted in accordance with the directives of 
the military commission of the party central committee and the general political 
department of the PL A". 
16. "The thought of Mao Tse-tung is the guide to action for the Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution - in the course of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, it is necessary to 
hold high the great red banner of the thought of Mao Tse-tung and to place proletarian 
319 
politics in command. The thought of Mao Tse-tung must be regarded as a compass to the 
Cultural Revolution. Party committee at various levels must all the more earnestly 
undertake creative study and application of chairman Mao's works". 2 3 
On 10 August, Lin Piao delivered a speech at the conference of central work in his 
capacity as Vice-chairman and announced "cadre policy", which he indicated, "In judging 
cadres we first of all want to see whether they support or oppose chairman Mao, whether 
they emphasise politics, and whether their revolutionary vigour is high, we look at their 
main current and tributaries.... The cadre policy has no room for men of peace and 
harmony. Popular persons are afraid of offending people in their work. We cannot 
choose this kind of cadre. We must select those cadres who support the Chairman, give 
prominence to politics, and have revolutionary vigour. Our cadre policy from now on 
should be that whoever oppose chairman Mao will be discharged. Whoever does not give 
prominence to politics will be discharged. It does not matter how much ability he may 
have".26 
Later in his speech at the first Red Guard rally on 18 August, Lin expressed, "we will 
energetically eradicate all the old ideas, culture, customs, and habits of the exploiting 
classes, and transform all those parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the 
socialist economic base. We will sweep out all the vermin and remove all obstacles".27 
Many senior cadres were attacked by Lin's clique under the "cadre policies" of "eradicate 
25"Decision of the CCPCC concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", RED FLAG, No. 10, 
1966, pp. 1-9; A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, op. cit, 
pp. 559-660. 
26"On the Question of the Cadre Line (10 Aug. 1966)", THE UN PIAO AFFAIR -POWER POLITICS 
AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., pp. 30-31. 
27"LinPiao's Speech at the First Red Guard Rally (18 Aug. 1966)", RED FLAG, No. 11, 1966, pp. 13-14; 
"A Great Struggle to Defend Party's Principle", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 26 Feb. 1967. 
320 
all", "transform all", "sweep out all", and "remove all". Ho Long was purged, Chu Te and 
Nieh Jung-chen could not escape either. 
On 3 January 1967, Lin criticised Yeh Chien-ying, Ch'en I , Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien and Nieh 
Jung-chen openly at a conference of the Military Academies.28 On 10 January, Kuan 
Feng, Wang L i and many other members of the Cultural Revolution Group drew up Some 
Suggestions on the Issue Concerning the Propagandist Policies of the Liberation Army's 
Daily, coining the slogan "purge the small handful of power-holders in the army who take 
the capitalist road". On 13 January, Chiang Ch'ing spoke in a meeting, indicating "the 
struggle between the two lines are very fierce in the army, don't think the struggle between 
the two lines does not exist in the army".29 On 14 January, the editorial of Liberation 
Army's Daily publicised the slogan of "purge the small handful in the army", asserting "the 
resistance to carry out the Cultural Revolution is mainly from the handful of power-
holders who took the capitalist road and have sneaked into the army, and from few die-
hard elements who persisted in capitalist reactionary line", 3 0 and this article was reprinted 
in the People's Daily the following day.31 The slogan "purge the small handful in the 
army" provided a legal basis for the cultural revolution ultra-Left to attack military leaders 
of Lin Piao's clique. Chiang Ch'ing once appealed to the army to intervene in the 
comprehensive inner struggles.32 
On 11 January, the CCPCC Military Commission reorganised the PLA Cultural 
Revolution Group, with Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien to relieve Liu Chih-chien as the chief; Chiang 
28"A Great Struggle to Defend Party's Principle", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 26 Feb. 1967. 
29Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 
op. cit., pp. 37-38. 
30"SeizeNew Victories", LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, 4 Jan. 1967; RED FLAG, No. IS, 1966, pp. 14-
16. 
3 1 "Seize New Victories", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 15 Jan. 1967. 
32Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 
op. cit., p. 38. 
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Ch'ing counsellor; Hsiao Hua, Yang Ch'eng-wu, Wang Hsin-t'ing, Hsu Li-ch'ing, Kuan 
Feng, Hsieh Ch'uan-chung and Li Man-ts'un deputy chiefs; Yu Li-chin, Liu Hua-ch'ing, 
T'ang P'ing-chu, Hu Chih, Yeh Ch'ttn, Wang Feng, Ku Yen and Chang T'ao group 
members.33 The new PLA Cultural Revolution Group was under the direct leadership of 
CCPCC Military Commission and of Cultural Revolution Group of the CCPCC, no longer 
subordinated to the General Political Department. 
On the same day of the reorganisation, Yeh Chien-ying spoke at the conference of the 
Standing Committee of the CCPCC Military Commission, discussing the issue on army's 
stability, which he pointed out, "An army's stability is especially important to the area of 
turbulence, domestic trouble will lead to foreign invasions, and the stability of the army is 
the only fundamental interest of the party and the army". On 14 January, CCPCC issued a 
"Circular on Never Direct the Target of Struggle at the Army", demanding that the army 
should neither carry out "great democracy", nor establish "militant organisations" or 
"exchange revolutionary experience". 
Shortly after, at a rendezvous of the CCPCC Military Commission at the Ching Hsi guest 
house, Chiang Ch'ing demanded the army to apply "four greats" of carrying out "struggle 
by reasoning" in their intervention of the Cultural Revolution - great contending, great 
blooming, big-character posters and great debates. It was because "only by insisting on 
struggle by reasoning, and by resolutely opposing those bad people who use force and 
coercion to provoke conflicts among the masses can true democracy under the proletarian 
dictatorship be definitely put into effect, only by 'four greats' can the free airing of views 
be guaranteed and the democratic rights of the masses of the people be protected" . 3 4 
33lbid., p. 39. On 30 March 1967, Hsieh Fu-chih was appointed as a member of the PLA Cultural 
Revolution Group, 
34"Seize New Victories", RED FLAG, No. 15 1966, p. 15 
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On 19 January, Yeh Ch'iin attacked Hsiao Hua, director of the General Political 
Department, by name at the rendezvours. On 22 January, Mao received members of the 
CCPCC Military Commission who attend the informal meeting, they reported to Mao 
personally on the military leaders being attacked by the cultural revolution ultra-Left 
including Hsiao Hua, Hsu Shih-yu (Commander of the Nanking Military Region), Yang 
Yung (Commander of the Peking Military Region), Cheng Wei-shan (Vice-commander of 
the Peking Military Region), Kuo P'eng (Vice-commander of the Sinkiang Military 
District), Wu Lieh (Vice-commander of the Second Artillery) and many others,35 while 
Mao replied, "Our fundamental principle is to side with the Cultural Revolution Ultra-Left. 
The non-intervention of the army we said in the past was not true, as a matter of the fact, 
many military regions like Sian, Chungking, Lanchow, Chengtu and Nanking have all 
intervened".36 
Consequently, the participants of the rendezvous drew up seven articles on the means of 
the army's intervention in the Cultural Revolution. The seven articles were examined by 
Mao, and then submitted to the rendezvours of the CCPCC Military Commission for 
discussion once again. During the discussion, the passage "the army's intervention in the 
Cultural Revolution must led by Party Committee, and it must not establish combat 
organisations for the Cultural Revolutions" was removed from the contents by the 
insistence of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CCPCC, in addition, military leaders 
unanimously agreed to add one more article - the cadres of all levels must strictly bring up 
their children with the thought of Mao Tse-tung, this became the increased eighth article 
of the CCPCC Military Commission. The total eight articles were submitted to Mao for 
3SLi K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 
op. cit., p. 40. 
36Ibid., p. 41. 
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his approval on 28 January, Mao commented, "the eight articles are very good indeed, 
approved for distribution".37 
After the rendezvous, the CCPCC Military Commission issued the "eight articles of the 
CCPCC Military Commission" to the whole army to restrain the PLA's outrageous 
intervention in the Cultural Revolution and the Cultural Revolution Ultra-Left's excessive 
oppression of the PL A. The Eight Articles of the CCPCC Military Commission read: 
1. "It is necessary to give resolute support to the true proletarian revolutionaries, 
resolutely oppose the rightists, and the resolute measures of dictatorship against 
conclusively proven counterrevolutionary organisations and counter revolution elements". 
2. "All commanders and fighters, political workers, orderlies, medical personnel, 
scientific, and confidential and security personnel must resolutely remain at their posts and 
must not leave their duties without proper authorisation". 
3. "In armed forces units where the Great Cultural Revolution has been launched, there 
should be big contending, big blooming, big character posters, big debates. Handling of 
contradictions among the people in the same way as dealing with the enemy is not 
permitted, ransacking and sealing of doors as will is not permitted. It is not permitted to 
carry out corporal punishment or disguised corporal punishment". 
4. "All college and school teachers and students, literacy and art bodies, physical culture 
work teams, hospital workers, workers of armaments factories, etc., who have gone to 
outside areas to exchange revolutionary experience should return as quickly as possible to 
37THE REMINISCENCES OF CH'EN TSAI-TAO, (Peking: Liberation Army's Press, 1991), p. 278. 
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their home areas or units". 
5. "The question of assaults on military leadership organs should be dealt with differently 
according to different cases, prosecution should be instituted in the case of assaults made 
in the past by counterrevolutionaries, but action need not be taken i f the assaults were 
made by leftists. Henceforth no assault shall be permitted". 
6. "It is forbidden to assault, or exchange revolutionary experience with, war preparation 
systems and security systems in the armed forces. It is forbidden to ask for or take by 
force any document, file, and technical data which do not concern the Cultural 
Revolution". 
7. "Organs at the army and higher levels should carry out the Great Cultural Revolution 
by batches at different times in accordance with provisions, armies, divisions, regiments, 
battalions, companies, and special units designated by the military commission must 
resolutely adopt the policy of positive education, so as to facilitate the strengthening of 
war preparedness, take care of national defence, and protect the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution". 
8. "Cadres of all levels, in particular higher ranking cadres, must strictly bring up their 
children with the thought of Mao Tse-tung. They must teach them to study hard chairman 
Mao's works, earnestly unite as one with workers and peasants and regard them as their 
own teachers, take part in labour training, reform their world outlook, and strive to be 
proletarian revolutionaries".38 
38"Eight Articles of the CCPCC Military Commission", THE COLLECTIONS OF THE ORIGINAL DATA 
OF CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, (Taipei: Chinese Communist Studies Press, 1979), p. 83. 
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To thoroughly carry out the "eight article of the CCPCC Military Commission", the 
CCPCC Military Commission successively issued three orders from 11 to 27 February -
"Regulations of the Military Commission of the Central Committee Governing Seizure of 
Power within the Party (16 Feb. 1967)", "Some Provisions of the Military Commission of 
the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution in Leading Organs 
above the Army Level (11 Feb. 1967), and "Additional Regulations for Carrying Out 
'Some Provisions of the CCPCC Military Commission Concerning the Great Cultural 
Revolution in Leading Organs above the Army Level'", and laid down the following 
provisions for carrying out the Cultural Revolutions within the army. 
1. "The Great Cultural Revolution in organs above the army level (the various 
headquarters, services, and arms; the various military regions, the provincial military 
districts, and military subdistricts; the Air Force and the fleets of the Navy) must wall 
posters, and conduct debates stage by stage and group by group according to chairman 
Mao's instructions". 
2. "Units of the Army and Air Force below the army level; units of the navy blow the base 
level; flying schools of the air force; the Peking Garrison district; the garrison districts of 
Shanghai, Tientsin, and Luta (port Arthur-Dairen); and the special units designated by the 
Military Commission shall as a rule not carry out full and frank airing of views, write wall 
posters, and conduct debates". 
3. "Leading military organs at all levels (including commands, political departments, 
logistics departments, and other leading departments) are as a rule not allowed to carry 
out seizure of power from bottom to top. No person or organisation is allowed to 
engineer attack". 
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4. "The sphere in which seizure of power may be carried out within the army is limited to 
academies and schools (schools for training confidential personnel, schools specialised in 
pioneering technique, flying schools, and classes and departments charged with the task of 
training foreign language personnel are expected), literary and art troupes, physical culture 
detachments, hospitals of military districts and services, and hospitals (for teaching 
purposes), and military factories (those charged with the task of testing pioneering 
techniques, factories attached to naval bases, and top secret factories are expected). In 
these units, whether or not seizure of power is called for depends on the character of the 
problems connected within the leadership of the Party Committees". 
5. "All armed forces of the Production and Construction corps are allowed only to carry 
out education by positive example and not to engage in 'four big1 -big airing, big 
blossoming, big debate, and big-character posters. This is in order to facilitate war 
preparations". 
6. "The leading organs of the armed forces must preserve a compact, integrated command 
system, and it is undesirable to form various kinds of militant organisations for the 
Cultural Revolution, when such militant organisations have already been set up, they must 
be reorganised as administrative units". 
7. "According to the principle of the absolute leadership of the party over the armed 
forces as defined by the resolution of the Kutien conference and the resolution of the 
enlarged meeting of the Military Commission in 1960, the Great Cultural Revolution in 
organs above the army level must be led by party committee".39 
39"Direc!ive on the Conduct of the Cultural Revolution within the People's Liberation Army (11 Feb. 
1967)", "Establishment of the Peking Military Control Committee (11 Feb. 1967)", "Regulation on the 
Military Control in Sinkiang (11 Feb. 1967)", "Directive on Power Seizures within the PLA (16 Feb. 
1967)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. IV, pp. 
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The issuing of the "Eight Articles of the CCPCC Military Commission" was a big 
compromise Mao had made with the military leaders of the PLA at the early stage of the 
Cultural Revolution. The current task of Mao Tse-tung, however, was the struggle of Liu 
Shao-ch'i, who had strong background in the Party and was Chairman of the PRC, and 
achieving such a goal was worth almost any concession. Consequently, the passage "the 
army's intervention in the Cultural Revolution must be led by the party committees" was 
removed from the original draft of the "eight articles", but in the subsequent order, "Some 
Provisions of the CCPCC Military Commission Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution 
in Leading Organs above the Army Level", issued by the Military Commission, it still laid 
down "the Great Cultural Revolution in organs above the army level must be led by the 
party committees". This was the result of compromise, and such compromise was mainly 
because Mao had to consider the military leaders' resentment aroused by army's 
involvement in the Cultural Revolution and carrying out the so-called "purge the small 
handful in the army". Mao had to make such a concession in order to achieve his ultimate 
goal. 
The issuing of the "Eight Articles" had not attained army's stability as it planned, the 
attack of militant organs, bases and military cadres at various levels remained to happen 
constantly. There were three reasons accounted for this. First, the struggle was unlikely 
to cease for the atmosphere had been stirred up by movement of the Cultural Revolution; 
and moreover, the ultra-leftist added further fuel to the flames; last and the most 
important, Mao supported the expansion of the struggle to its largest extent. 
The CCPCC Military Commission had most vigorous reaction to the political development 
1818-1819, 1819-1820, 1820-1821, 1822-1823; Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, THE PEOPLE'S 
LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, op. cit, p. 43. 
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of the Cultural Revolution. With the mixed expectation of stabilising the army and of 
maintaining their personal interests, the military leaders acted sharply at a conference of 
Political Bureau held by Chou En-lai at Huai-jen auditorium on 16 February 1967, which 
evoked the movement of "February adverse current".40 At the conference, the military 
leaders advocated that 16-point decision on the Cultural Revolution adopted in August 
1966 at the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC was not legal and thus should be 
abolished. They also urged suppression of the "anti-party, illegal" Red guard 
Organisation. 
The conference was mainly composed of two sides, one was formed by Yeh Chien-ying, 
Ch'en I , Nieh Jung-chen and Hsu Hsiang-ch1 ien, the vice-chairmen of CCPCC Military 
Commission, and T'an Chen-lin, L i Hsien-nien, L i Fu-ch'un, Yii Ch'iu-li and Ku Mu, 
member of the Political Bureau; the other was formed by Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng, Hsieh 
Fu-chih, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan, the ultra-leftist. The two sides had 
violent controversy over army's interference in the Cultural Revolution. Among all, some 
issues also touched upon the state system, the focal points of the disputes are summarised 
as follows: 4 1 
First, whether the leadership of the CCP must be complied - Yeh Chien-ying criticised, 
"Shanghai was renamed Shanghai commune presumptuously, such a big issue involved 
state system, but they renamed it even without discussed with the Politburo. What is the 
meaning of this? Can a revolution be done without the leadership of the Party? Can it be 
done without the army?" 
40A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, op. cit., p. 134; 
WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, op. cit., p. 437; 
"Chiang Ch'ing on the Attitude Toward the February Adverse Current" COLLECTION OF IMPORTANT 
DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION (Taipei: Intelligence Bureau, 
Ministry of National Defence, 1969), P. 238. 
41Ibid, pp. 44-46. 
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Second, whether the senior cadres should be purged - when Chang Ch'un-ch'iao refused to 
protect Ch'en P'ei-hsien, First Secretary of Shanghai Party Committee, T'an Chen-lin 
denounced Chang for holding metaphysics and nullifying the party's leadership by applying 
mass campaigns, he said, "your aim was to purge senior cadres, and this time is the most 
brutal one in the history of Chinese Communist Party". 
And third, whether the army's stability must be maintained - Yeh Chien-ying criticised the 
Cultural Revolution Group as saying, "You have messed up the party, messed up the 
government, messed up the factories and the countryside, and you don't think it is enough, 
and must mess up the army too, what are trying to do exactly?", Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien also 
commented, "The army is the pillar of proletarian dictatorship. I f you mess up the army, 
how can you still keep this pillar?" 
The ultra-leftists' excessive oppression of the PLA forced military cadres, especially the 
high ranking officials in the central, to make a last-ditch fight. 
Nevertheless, Mao supported the ultra-Leftist in this event.42 On 18 February, Mao talked 
to Yeh Chien-ying, Ch'en I and many others and criticised them. Mao said, "whoever 
opposes the Central Cultural Revolution Group, we shall oppose him. You may call 
Wang Ming and Chang Kuo-t'ao back and I and comrade Lin Piao, together with Yeh 
Ch'un, will go to the south. Comrade Chiang Ch'ing shall be with you as well the 
comrades of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. You may behead comrade Chiang 
Ch'ing and banish comrade K'ang Sheng. All this you may do". 4 3 
42WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, op. 
cit., p. 437. 
43Chou En-lai, "On the February Adverse Current", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979-
A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 1812. 
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On 14 March, a group of demonstrators appeared in Peking, shouting to overthrow the 
movement of "February Adverse Current", and strike down five vice premiers of the State 
Council and four vice-chairmen of CCPCC Military Commission, and shouting "defend 
Central Cultural Revolution Group with one's blood and life". 4 4 
K'ang Sheng indicated in his speech on 27 March that "The February Adverse Current is 
denying the correct leadership of Mao Tse-tung for the past decades, denying Chinese 
Cultural Revolution and denying Chinese Liberation movement".45 On 15 July, Ch'en I , 
then the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was purged, and on 19 August, the masses conducted 
a movement to criticise T'an Chen-lin at the people's conference auditorium, and later in 
March 1968 he was declared a "big traitor" by Chiang Ch'ing at the 100,000-man 
conference. The conference also dismissed Yang Ch'eng-wu, Acting Chief of the General 
Staff, and Fu Ch'ung-pi, Commander of the Peking Garrison Command, from the office 
for their attempt to reverse the verdict of "February Adverse Current", arrested Yu L i -
chin, and appointed Huang Yung-sheng Chief of the General Staff to consolidate the 
seizure of power of the cultural revolutionary extreme leftists. At the Twelfth Plenum of 
the Eighth CCPCC congress in October 1968, the event of the "February Adverse 
Current" was criticised openly, and Yeh Chien-ying, Ch'en I , Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, Li Hsien-
nien and Li Fu-ch'un were force to make a self-criticism.46 
The event of "February Adverse Current" was a vigorous political counterattack made by 
central-level commanders of the PLA at the early stage of Cultural Revolution. They tried 
to restrain extreme leftists' oppression of military heads by applying their military strength 
44"A Great Victory to Defend the Party's Principle", RED FLAG, No. 26Feb. 1967. 
4SWang Yuan, PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE, op. cit., pp. 203-204. 
46WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, op. 
cit., pp. 441-442; "A Great Revolution to Defend the Party's Principle", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 26 Feb. 1967. 
331 
and with Mao's revolutionary sentiment . At this stage, the political role and political 
function of high-ranking military commanders of the PLA was very distinct. From the 
beginning of the Cultural Revolution to the occurrence of the "February Adverse Current", 
there developed a spontaneous alliance among the PLA in an opaque form attempting to 
counter-balance the force of Lin's Fourth Field Army, which included Liu Po-ch'eng's 
Second Field Army, Ch'en I's Third Field Army, P'eng Te-huai's First Field Army and Nieh 
Jung-chen's Northern China Field Army, Yeh Chien-ying's Central Military System and Ho 
Lung's Red Second Front Army. The overall situation was Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army 
contended with other field armies. However, one thing could be for sure was that both 
sides were seeking for Mao's support, instead of taking over Mao's supreme position. 
PLA's political campaigns in the early days of the Cultural Revolution lay mainly in the 
interaction among military commanders. Lin Piao and other vice-chairmen of the CCPCC 
Military Commission held different opinions on whether or not the army should intervene 
the Cultural Revolution. Lin Piao advocated that the army overall should support the 
Cultural Revolution. This attitude of his was expressed clearly in an editorial, Hold High 
the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought and Cultural Revolution, of the 
Liberation Army's Daily (18 April 1966), which he said, "Classes and class struggle 
continue to exist in socialist society, the class struggle between the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the different political forces, and the class struggle 
in the ideological field between the proletariat and bourgeoisie will continue to be long and 
tortuous and at times will even become very acute ... Our people's Liberation Army, the 
people's armed forces created and led by the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman 
Mao, is the most loyal tool of the Party and the people, and the mainstay of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. It has always played an important role in the revolutionary 
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cause of the proletariat, and it will do so in this Great Socialist Cultural Revolution".47 
Moreover, in another editorial Never Forget the Class Struggle of the Liberation Army's 
Daily (4 May 1966), Lin also demanded "The broad masses of soldiers and revolutionary 
cadres must show a high degree of revolutionary enthusiasm. We revolutionary fighters 
should none of us stand aloof or be indifferent to this struggle. We must respond to call of 
the Party, hold high the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought, take an active part 
in this class struggle and resolutely carry the Great Socialist Cultural Revolution through 
to the end".48 
The event of the "February Adverse Current" was an important stage for the 
transformation of the role of the high-ranking militarists. After the event, the 
demonstration to strike down the "February Adverse Current" and to "defend Central 
Cultural Revolution with blood and life" appeared many times in Peking. The function of 
the Central Cultural Revolution overrode that of the Central Political Bureau. The 
CCPCC Military Commission stopped all its activities, and the Work Group of the 
Military Commission was formed by Lin Piao to take charge all military affairs. 
Furthermore, in the central level, the state of confrontation between the two sides of the 
PLA was broken and subsequently replaced by the monopoly of Lin Piao's Fourth Field 
Army when the event of the "February Adverse Current" was over. Mao temporarily 
sacrificed the stability of the PLA and the principle of "party commands the army" to 
launch a large-scale campaign for the seizure of power from Liu Shao-ch'i, he ordered the 
army to intervene in this power-seizure struggle by assigning it the tasks of "three 
supports and two militaries" - supporting the revolutionary Left, supporting agriculture, 
47"Hold High the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought, Take an Active Party in Socialist 
Cultural Revolution", LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, 18 Apr. 1966. 
48"Never Forget the Class Struggle", LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, 4 May 1966; RED FLAG, No. 7, 
1966, pp. 20-23. 
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and supporting industry; exercising military control and giving military training.49 
To prevent the military leaders from intervening in the Cultural Revolution and from 
standing in the way of his seizure of power, Mao oppressed senior military commanders 
without restraint and instigated extreme leftists and Red Guards to further attack P'eng 
Te-huai, Lo Jui-ch'ing, Ch'en I , Ho Lung, Yeh Chien-ying, Chu Te and many others.50 
The "February Adverse Current" was merely a event by Mao's revolutionary senior cadres 
to resist Lin Piao and extreme leftist, but under the prerequisite of power struggle, Mao 
would rather destroy factional balance in the army to support Lin Piao in the fear that the 
event to resist Lin Piao launched by military heads would thoroughly obstruct his goal to 
strike down Liu Shao-ch'i. Though the expansion of Lin's political and military influence 
was rapid, in reality, the substance of his political power was still weak, Mao remained the 
most autocratic and charismatic leader in China. 
49The tasks of "Three supports and Two Militaries" was assigned to the PLA at 23 Jan. 1967. By Sep. 
1968, revolutionary committees were established in all 29 provinces, municipalities and autonomous 
regions to replaces the old government machinery dominated by Liu Shao-ch'i and his followers. 
However, the intervention of the army built up defence minister Lin Piao's prestige and influence, which 
threatened Mao's position. See "Decision Concerning the People's Liberation Army's Resolute Support 
for the Broad Masses of the Revolutionary Left", YEARBOOK ON CHINESE COMMUNISM, (Taipei: 
Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of National Defence, 1968), p. 587. 
S0"A Great Revolution to Defend the Party's Principle", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 26 Feb. 1967. 
334 
III. Wuhan incident 
PRC claimed that "the Cultural Revolution is a great political revolution carried out by the 
proletariat against the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes; it is a continuation of 
the prolonged struggle waged by the Chinese Communist Party and the masses of 
revolutionary people under its leadership against the Kuomintang reactionaries, a 
continuation of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie".51 The 
Cultural Revolution aimed at striking down Liu Shao-ch'i and the power he represented 
because "Liu Shao-ch'i not only had a revisionist political line but had an organisational 
line which served his political line, only by arousing the broad masses to expose over dark 
aspect openly, in an all-round way, and from below would it be possible to clean out the 
Liu Shao-ch'i renegade clique".52 
One prerequisite for Mao to eradicate Liu Shao-ch'i's influence was to destroy Liu's 
organisational line. Lin Piao addressed the enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the 
Central Committee on 18 May 1966, he commented, "The fundamental problem of 
revolution is the problem of political power, once they obtain political power, the 
proletariat and the labouring people will have everything. Once they lost it, they will lose 
all. Production is certainly the basis; however, it relies on the change, consolidation, and 
development resulting from the seizure of political power, otherwise, it will become mere 
economism, beggarism, and the importuning of favours. Never forget political power -
always have it in mind. Once you forget political power, you forget politics and the 
fundamental view of Marxism, consequently, you serve toward economism, anarchism, 
and daydreaming. It is just like a fool who has lost his head and doesn't know what to 
s l "Commemorate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Communist Party of China", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 
LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, Uune 1971; RED FLAG, No. 7/8, 1971, p. 18. 
52Ibid. 
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do". 5 3 
Lin Piao's talk was considered by the CCPCC as an example for creative study and 
application of Mao Tse-tung thought and an important document for guiding the Cultural 
Revolution, and hence CCPCC transmitted this document to all units in the party, and 
army, demanding for fully carrying out the study, discussion and application. This 
document offered cultural revolutionary leftist an ideological basis for their seizure of 
power. 
On 19 March 1967, because of Mao's directive CCPCC Military Commission reached a 
resolution "on concentrating all efforts to execute the tasks of supporting the 
revolutionary Left, supporting agriculture, and supporting industry; exercising military 
control and giving military training". PLA carried out the task of "three supports and two 
militaries" in an all-round way, and took over all party, political, army and cultural 
organisations. In addition, Mao decide to extend the experience of "three bodies 
operating as one" created by Heilungkiang, the first province to build up revolutionary 
committee, to form a "three-in-one combination" force - a combination of PLA, 
revolutionary leadership cadres and revolutionary masses - to facilitate power-seizure, and 
to set up a provisional organ of power - revolutionary committee - based on this three-in-
one combination. 
Under the policy of "three-in-one combination", the army using revolutionary committee 
as backup force easily seized the leading position and replace the old government 
machinery and became the political dominating forces at the locality.5 4 
53Michael Y. M. Kau (ed.), "Address to the Enlarged Session of the Politburo of the Central Committee 
(18 May 1966)", THE UNPIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICSAND MILITARYCOUP, op. cit., p. 327. 
S4"Follow Cadres' Order", RED FLAG, No. 5, 1967, p. 7; Yen Chia-ch'i & Kao Kao, THE TEN YEAR 
HISTORY OF THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, op. cit., pp. 223-248. 
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At this stage, The Central Cultural Revolutionary Extreme Leftists did not obtain great 
success from this power struggle with the Central military heads. They then transferred 
their target of power struggle to the regional PLA heads in the hope to advance their 
power and establish a nation-wide foundation, their slogan at that time was "purge the 
small handful of power-holders in the army", attempting to purge those "capitalist-
roaders" within the army in name, and to seize power in reality. The attack of Central 
Cultural Revolution against regional military organs brought about the well-know "Wuhan 
incident" - the struggle of commanders of regional military organs to resist Central 
government. 
After the event of "February Adverse Current", Lin Piao gained Mao's overall support. 
Generally speaking, the power issue in the central military system was settled on the 
whole, while the regional army because of individual interest and demand for power had 
serious difference with central government in mounting a large-scale mass campaign. 
Though CCPCC ordered PLA to resolutely support the Left, many actions were taken by 
regional army to oppress leftist masses and leftist organisation. Consequently, on 6 April, 
1967, CCPCC Military Commission issued "Ten Articles of the CCPCC Military 
Commission" to restrain the PLA's excessive oppression of mass organisation during the 
Cultural Revolution. The ten articles read. 
1. "In dealing with mass organisations, be they revolutionary or controlled by reactionary 
elements, or when their situation is not clear, shooting is forbidden. Only political work 
maybe conducted". 
2. "Arbitrary arrests are forbidden, particularly large-scale arrests". 
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3. "It is forbidden to arbitrarily declare a mass organisation a reactionary organisation and 
repress it. It is moreover forbidden to call a revolutionary organisation a 
counterrevolutionary organisation". 
4. "No action shall be taken against the masses who intruded into or assaulted military 
organs in the past, regardless of whether they are the left, the middle, or the right. 
Persons or organisations should not be classified as left, middle, or right merely on the 
basis of their having or not having intruded into or stormed military organs". 
5. "Before deciding on what attitude to take toward the large mass organisation, 
profound investigation and study should be made locally and class analysis should also be 
made. Before taking any important action, a report should be made to the Central 
Cultural Revolution Group and the All-PLA Cultural Revolution Group and their advice 
sought". 
6. "No mass character 'self-blaming* movement should be launched. Nor should the 
masses be forced to write self-examination and criticism. Self-examination and criticism 
voluntarily written by the masses should be returned to the authors themselves". 
7. "Education in the struggle between the two lines - the proletarian revolutionary 
represented by Chairman Mao and the bourgeois reactionary line - must be carried out 
deeply in the armed forces. Study of chairman Mao's woks must be related to the struggle 
between the two lines". 
8. "Cadres sent to local areas or in charge of support the work must be carefully briefed 
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with regard to policy, counterrevolutionary elements of the Chao Yung-fu type 5 5 or 
persons with ultra-right thought should be prevented from taking charge of support the 
work". 
9. "In supporting the Left, it is necessary to learn to do mass work, trust the masses, rely 
on them, and consult with them on important matters". 
10. "Acts already done which run counter to the above-mentioned points must be rectified 
immediately, and remedial measures should be actively taken. From now on, resolutely 
work according to the above-mentioned points".56 
"Ten Articles of the CCPCC Military Commission" was issued to restrain PLA's 
suppression of "revolutionary masses", preventing it from further deteriorating. Basically, 
the "Ten Articles of the CCPCC Military Commission" was the counteraction of "Eight 
Articles of the CCPCC Military Commission" issued on January 28, 1967, it significantly 
represented that the revolutionary extreme leftist had gained their control over the PLA. 
The announcement of "Ten Articles of the CCPCC Military Commission" caused the 
power upsurge of the revolutionary extreme leftists and masses, and in consequence "the 
revolutionary masses" seized the army's weapons and faced a head-on confrontation with 
the army. 
55Chao Yung-fu, formerly a deputy commander ofTsinghai provincial Military District. Mao condemned 
him as a counterrevolutionary who had sneaked into the party and army, he usurped army power by 
adopting underhand and sinister tactics and carried out savage armed suppression of revolutionary mass 
organisation. See "Ten Articles of the CCPCC Military commission of 6 April 1967", YEARBOOK ON 
CHINESE COMMUNISM 1968, op. cit., p. 591. 
56"Ten Articles of the CCPCC Military Commission of 6 April 1967", YEARBOOK ON CHINESE 
COMMUNISM, 1968, (Taipei: Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of National Defence, 1969), p. 591; THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 1834-
1835; Warren Kuo (ed), THE COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST 
TERMINOLOGY, op. cit., p. 95. 
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The violent power-seizure struggle had intensified the "armed struggle" spreading to every 
corner of the country, and the "Wuhan incident" especially represented a major struggle 
launched by regional militarists to fight against Lin's faction and Central Cultural 
Revolution Group. The Wuhan incident had been regarded by the Central Cultural 
Revolution Group as the most fiercest struggle of regional military heads in resisting the 
policy of Central Government. It was a serious line mistake in army's supporting the Left, 
which ought to be criticised, otherwise it would be difficult for Revolutionary Extreme 
Leftists to seize power in the region. Lin Piao attempted to eradicate opposed forces 
aiming at regional mountain-stronghold militarists, while the commanders of Wuhan 
military region considered that Central Government should appreciate their ruling position 
and the way they supported the Left, recognising their line to be correct. 
At that time, the revolutionary masses of Wuhan could be divided into two groups. One 
was known as the "one million brave soldiers" under the leadership of Wan K'e-wen, 
secretary of CCP Wuhan Municipal committee, and Hsin P'u, deputy director of the 
Propaganda Department of Wuhan, this anti-Cultural Revolution Group force was 
composed of about one million persons from military and civil organisation, and was 
backed up by the commander of the Wuhan Military Region, Ch'en Tsai-tao, and by the 
political commissar, Chung Han-hua. It's rival, the "Workers Headquarters", consisted of 
local Maoist Red Guards favoured the radical cause led by Red Guards from Peking. 
Numerically inferior, it too, received military backing but from units disloyal to Ch'en. 
In the first half of 1967, more than three hundred organisation masses in Hupei province 
were attacked, more than ten thousand people arrested and some three hundred killed. 
More than one million workers and peasants were also provoked to take action in more 
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than three hundred large-scale armed struggle. 
On 1 April 1967, the Maoists adopted the first measure to curtail the authority of the 
army. While retaining responsibility for the maintenance of order and the establishment of 
Revolutionary committees where they were stationed, the army was forbidden to indict, 
without prior approval from Central authorities, any Red Guard faction for being 
"counter-revolutionary" and was ordered to release all imprisoned radicals, including those 
who had raided military installations. The military was further instructed not to overreact 
or suppress the radicals under the pretext of "suppressing counter-revolution" after having 
forced them to admit guilt. 5 8 
On 4 April, Chiang Ch'ing spoke to a group of Red Guards in Peking, she reproached the 
PLA for persecuting the radicals, emphasised the "duty" of the army to support the "Left", 
and urged the military to "respect the Red Guards and other representatives of the masses" 
and to "join with them in the construction of new revolutionary power structure to replace 
the shattered party and administration".59 
On 10 June 1967, "the million brave soldiers" blockaded the Yangtze River Bridge, and 
two violent armed struggles occurred on 17 and 24 June. Shortly after, on 1 July they 
took control of several Cultural Revolution Group based organisations. 
14 July. The CCPCC dispatched Hsieh Fu-chih, then a vice-premier and concurrently an 
alternate member of the Politburo, Deputy Chief of the Cultural Revolution Group of the 
57Warren Kuo (ed), A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, 
op. cit., p. 396. 
58Y. C. Chang, FACTIONAL AND COALITION POLITICS IN CHINA - THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 
AND ITS AFTERMATH, op. cit., p. 44. 
59Ibid. 
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PLA, minister of Public Security and chairman of the Peking Revolutionary Committee, 
and Wang L i , then a member of the Cultural Revolution Group under the CCPCC and 
concurrently first vice editor-in-chief of Red Flag to settle the conflict. 
However, "the million brave soldiers" did not submit. Instead Hsieh, Wang and their 
supporters were under attack near Hansui bridge, and subsequently on 20 July, Hsieh and 
Wang were arrested by Ts'ai P'ing-ch'iu, political commissar of Ch'en Tsai-tao's 88201 
army. The arrest of Wang and Hsieh represented an open defiance of Mao and the central 
authorities. Lin Piao himself went to Wuhan to mount the offensive against Ch'en. 
Gunboats and paratroopers took part in the assault, and the city was taken by government 
forces in late July. Ch'en and some of his supporters were captured and brought to Peking 
for trial. 
After the Wuhan incident, a meeting presided over by Lin Piao and attended by members 
of the Cultural Revolution Group passed a resolution to confine the "Wuhan incident" to 
the "Counter-Revolutionary Rebellion". Lin Piao commented "The Wuhan incident was 
an extremely bad event, at this time it has thoroughly exposed the reactionary line of Ch'en 
Tsai-tao, exposed counterrevolution, and exposed the acute and complicated nature of 
class struggle".60 
After the meeting, Lin Piao issued "a letter to the Wuhan revolutionary masses and broad 
commanders" in the name of CCPCC, State Council, CCPCC Military Commission and 
Central Cultural Revolution Group, complimenting on their success in defeating the 
violent attack of the "small handful of power-holders in the Army who take the capitalist 
60Michael Y. M. Kau (ed.), "Instruction on the Cultural Revolution (9 Aug. 1967)", THE UN PIAO 
AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., p. 432; COLLECTION OF IMPORTANT 
DOCUMENTS ON THE GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION OF THE COMMUNIST BANDITS, (Taipei: 
Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of National Defence, 1969), pp. 214-219. 
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road".61 
In the meantime, Chiang Ch'ing coined the slogan of "struggle by reasoning and defend by 
force", K'ang Sheng highlighted the attack of militant organs with the slogan of "resolutely 
overthrow the small handful of power-holders in the Army who take the capitalist road". 
On 22 July, Lin Li-kuo, Lin Piao's son and Deputy-commander of the Air Force 
Operations Department, delivered a paper Overthrow the Small Handful of Power-holders 
in the Army at People's Daily under the pen name "Sharp Red Guard".62 
Moreover, in the discussion the propaganda of the "Wuhan incident", the slogan "seize the 
small handful of power-holders in the army who take the capitalist road" was added at the 
insistence of Chiang Ch'ing, K'ang Sheng and Ch'en Po-ta. On 25 July, when New China 
News Agency submitted a news release entitled "millions of masses and soldiers in the 
capital supported Wuhan revolutionary leftist" for approval, Kuan Feng and K'ang Sheng 
again added in the slogan "resolutely overthrow the small handful of power-holders in the 
army who take the capitalist road". At this stage, the struggle level of Wuhan incident 
advanced from "seize the small handful in the army" to the "resolutely overthrow". This 
news release and relevant editorials were carried on the front-page of People's Daily. 
Within the following six days, People's Daily, Liberation Army's Daily and Red Flag, 
published 16 editorials, and 22 new releases and special columns related to the "Wuhan 
incident", all these articles exercised "the movement to criticise the small handful of 
power-holders in the army and the party who take capitalist road" as the "general direction 
of the struggle"63 
61Ch'en Tsai-Tao, "The Whole Story of Wuhan Incident", CHIN DAILY, No. 10, 1984, p. 50. 
62"Overthrow the Small Handful of Power-holders in the Army", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 22 July 1967. 
63Li K'e & Hao Sheng Chang, THE LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, op. cit., p. 
50. 
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On 1 August, two editorials entitled Proletariat Must Firmly Grasp The Barrel of A Gun 
- Celebrating the Fortieth Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese People's 
Liberation Army and Fire Fiercely at the Prime Enemy of the People, which signed and 
issued by Ch'en Po-ta, revised by Wang L i and drafted by Kuan Feng, were published at 
RedFlag.64 
The first editorial brought up again the issue of P'eng Te-huai and Lo Jui-ch'ing, it said, 
"In order to change the proletariat nature of our army and to seize military power, P'eng 
Te-huai and Lo Jui-ch'ing, counter-revolutionary revisionists, desperately oppose to give 
prominence to proletarian politics and copy revisionism from foreign countries, they use 
bourgeois individualism in opposition to proletarian revolution, they always put military 
skills in front of everything and deny the fact that political and ideological works are the 
prerequisite of fighting force. P'eng Te-huai talked something nonsense like 'the 
performance of army's military training and the performance of cadres of all levels learning 
military science is the basic standard for judging the fighting capacity of our army'. Lo 
Jui-ch'ing attack politics by applying 'grand military contest1, he spread the absurd theory 
of 'compromise' or 'opportunism' and opposed comrade Lin Piao's directive of 'giving 
prominence to politics' and of'four first"1.65 The editorial continued, "At this moment, a 
big movement of criticising the small handful of power-holders in the army and the party 
who take the capitalist road is surging throughout the country, this is the general direction 
of struggle. People's Liberation Army should work together with the proletariat 
revolutionaries, vigorously participate in big criticism and thoroughly eradicate the bad 
influence created by the small handful of counter-revolutionary revisionists in the army".66 
6 4 "Proletariat Must Firmly Grasp The Barrel of A Gun - Celebrating the Fortieth Anniversary of the 
Founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" and "Fire Fiercely at the Prime Enemy of the 
People", REDFLAG, No. 12, 1967, pp. 43-49. 
65Ibid., p. 45. 
66Ibid., p. 47. 
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The second editorial indicated, "The chief culprits of Wuhan incident must be exposed, 
resolutely overthrown, strictly investigated and punished according to law". 6 7 
In the meantime, the Cultural Revolution Group began to direct its target of attack at 
regional army. They set off a movement to purge military figures like "Ch'en Tsai-tao", 
attacking various kinds of regional militant organs throughout the country. Many regional 
leaders including Hsu Hai-tung, General of the PLA, former member of the People 
Revolutionary Military Commission; P'eng Shao-hui, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of 
Chinese People's Liberation Army; Wang Jen-chung, First Political Commissar of the 
Wuhan Military Region, former First Secretary of the Central South Bureau of the 
CCPCC; Pa Fang-ting, Political Commissar of the Wuhan People's Armed Troops; were 
attacked. 
In the mid of August, after Mao returned to Peking from his provincial tour to Honan, 
Kiangsi and Hunan, he criticised the editorial of Red Flag vol. 12, "purge the small 
handful of power-holders in the Army", was a "big poisonous weed".68 Mao used the 
word "big poisonous weed" to express his disapproval of the Central Cultural Revolution 
Group and Lin Piao for their armed power-seizure from the regional army. No matter 
what his real attitude was, one thing can be sure Mao would never give up his prime target 
of struggle, the purge of Liu Shao-ch'i. This was his strategic aim, while the rest was only 
tactics. Tactics could be adjustable, and their implementation must never violate the 
accomplishment of the strategic aim. 
67Ibid, pp. 48-49. 
^Yen Chia-ch'i & Kao Kao, THE TEN YEAR HISTORY OF THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 
op. cit., p. 273. 
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It was unprecedented in the PLA that the regional military leaders dared to oppose the 
Central authority. Although Ch'en Tsai-tao, the leading role of the Wuhan incident, was 
escorted to Peking, he was not punished severely. Mao hadn't repressed the army fully. 
Two reasons could account for this. 
First, Mao had to preserve the actual strength of military regions for counteracting the 
power expansion of Lin Piao. Second, Mao's power basis in the army would be destroyed 
i f the extreme Left went on attacking regional army without any restriction. 
Mao understood very clearly that the army was of the vital importance to him, he would 
never destroy the symbiotic relationship between himself and the army. Consequently, on 
the Wuhan incident, Mao's final stand decided the fall of extreme leftist including Wang Li , 
Kuan Fang and many others.69 The most striking feature of this stage was the expansion 
of the political role of the local militarists. Nevertheless, from the macro-viewpoint, the 
local military did not continue to expand its political influence following the Wuhan 
incident although they had the power to do so and the ability to oppose the Central 
government. Why this was the case stemmed from their respect for Mao's supreme 
leadership and his long-standing authority in the party and the army, and their loyalty to 
Mao alone. 
69Ibid., pp. 273-274. 
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Chapter VI . The Influence of the Party Congress on the 
Political Role of the PLA 
In the course of the evolution of the PLA's political role, the Eighth CCP National 
Congress in 1954, the Ninth CCP National Congress in 1969 and the Tenth CCP National 
Congress in 1973 represented the re-distribution of the PLA's political influence of 
different stages. The rise and fall of the political position of the PLA's elites were all 
dominated by one key role, that is, Mao Tse-tung, and his strategy of struggle at that 
stage. 
The Eighth CCP National Congress was, to Mao, a challenge of power struggle. The 
Party Constitution of Eighth CCP National Congress discarded Mao Tse-tung's thought as 
the guiding principle for the party and thus enhanced Mao's determination to reinforce the 
PLA's political nature and apply it as a political means to carry out his power-seizure 
struggle. 
The Ninth CCP National Congress was a congress of victory to celebrate Mao and Lin 
Piao's successful power seizure from Liu Shao-ch'i. It was also a congress that formally 
brought the central and regional military leaders into political arena. This found evidence 
from the high proportion of the military elected to the Ninth CCP National Congress at the 
central, and to the Provincial Revolutionary Committees at the local level. Nevertheless, 
the over-expanded military power of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army and the disclosure of 
Lin Piao's political ambition also evoked Mao's determination to purge Lin and to restore 
the political tradition of "party commands the gun". 
The convening of the Tenth CCP National Congress was to deny the importance of Lin 
Piao's position in the Ninth CCP National Congress, to approve Mao's punishment of Lin 
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Piao and Lin's clique, and to deprive the military of their political power at the central and 
the local level. The decline in the number of the military elected to the full and alternate 
members of the Tenth CCPCC had truly presented the political role of the PLA at that 
stage. 
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I. The Eighth CCP National Congress 
The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, approved by the CCPCC on 20 
September 1954, had brought about the reorganisation of not only the state but the 
military, economic, and party structures and the radical redistribution of political power 
among the Chinese leader. 
Until 1954, as the official head of Central People's Government, Mao Tse-tung had had 
the power,1 established by the "common program" of 1949 as follows: 
Firsly, enacting and interpreting the laws promulgating decrease and supervising their 
execution, annulling or revising any decision or orders of the Government Administrative 
Council met in conformity with the laws. (Common Program article. 16: The Jurisdiction 
of the Central People's Government and the Local People's Governments shall be defined 
in accordance with the nature of the various kinds of affairs and shall be prescribed by 
decrees of the Central people's Government Council.... Article 17, all laws and decrease 
protecting the people shall be enacted . . . ) 2 
Secondly, ratifying treaties and agreements with foreign countries. (Article 55: The 
Central people's Government of the People's Republic of China shall examine the treaties 
and agreements concluded between the Kuomintang and foreign government and 
recognise or abrogate, or revise or renew them according to their respective contents).3 
And Finally, commanding the army and carrying out unified leadership. (Article 20: The 
'"Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (29. Sep. 1949)" THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 51-54. 
2lbid., p. 51. 
3lbid.,p.55. 
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People's Republic of China shall build up a unified army, that is, the People's Liberation 
Army and the People's Public Security forces, which shall be under the command of the 
People's Revolutionary Military Council of the Central People's Government and which 
shall institute a unified command, unified system, unified formation and unified 
discipline).4 
Under the new structure, from the view of institutional and organisational level, as 
Chairman of the PRC, Mao's power were severely limited by the Standing Committee of 
the National People's Congress, whose chairman was Liu Shao-ch'i. The Chairman could 
promulgate laws and decrees only in accordance with the decisions of the congress, or, 
when not in session, of its standing committee. The Constitution of 1954, article 40 laid 
down the following: The chairman of the People's Republic of china, in accordance with 
decisions of the National People's Congress or the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress, promulgates laws and decrees; appoints or removes the vice-chairman 
and members of the council of National Defence; ... proclaims martial law; proclaims a 
state of war; and orders mobilisation5. 
In addition, Article 41 stated: Chairman of the PRC couldn't annul or revise and decision 
or order of any government organ, he could ratify treaties with foreign state only in 
accordance with the decision of the Standing Committee6. 
Under the restriction of article 40, Mao had no independent power to make appointments 
to any post. The only power which Mao exercised independently of the Standing 
4lbid., pp. 52-53. 
^'Constitution of the People's Republic of China (20. Sep. 1954)" THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 1949-1979-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY. Vol. I, op. cit., p.102. 
6Ibid, 
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Committee was command of the armed forces7, and this, too, was qualified. 
The Chairman of the PRC had no veto power over the decisions of the congress and its 
Standing Committee. The Standing Committee enacted decree, interpreted laws made by 
the congress, supervised the cabinet, the supreme court, and the persecutor - Generals' 
office. It had the power to annul laws, and appoint Vice-premier and ministers. When the 
congress was not in session, the Standing Committee assumed it prerogatives relating to 
the negotiation as treaties with foreign countries, proclamation of war to decide on general 
or partial mobilisation, to decide on the enforcement of martial law throughout the country 
or in certain areas, and so forth. 8 
Essentially what had taken place in the state reorganisation was that the Standing 
Committee was interposed between Mao and the major administrative organs of the new 
state structure, the Standing Committee became responsible for supervision of the day-to-
day workings of the cabinet, the Defence Council, the supreme court, the office of the 
prosecutor-general, and the general office. 
However, it was noteworthy that the special characteristics of the structure of the party, 
government and the army, and of the dual-role elite, and the fact that the Seventh CCP 
National Congress included Mao Tse-tung's thought in its new Party Constitution, and 
that for many years, propagandist department had been advocating Maoist thought. All 
these had contributed to the consolidation of the authority of Mao Tse-tung in the party, 
government and the army, which could not be altered easily simply by the stipulation of 
the Common Program. 
7Ibid. 
8Ibid, pp. 101-102. See article 31. item 3, 4, 5, 8, 12, 16, 17, and 18. 
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Mao firmly believed that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun", the possession 
of the post of Chairman of the PRC and the CCPCC Military Commission meant the 
control of armed forces. Although Mao lost some power as the result of the adoption of 
the 1954 Constitution, however, the Constitution still entrusted Mao the right to control 
military power in organisational level as it laid down in its article 42, "The Chairman of the 
people's Republic of China commands the armed forces of the country".9 
In addition, the title, "Chairman of the PRC", was equivalent to that of "king" in the feudal 
society of China. After the Seventh CCP National Congress, Mao Tse-tung's thought and 
his authority gained from the victory of Civil war had deeply rooted in Chinese society, 
especially among those poorly educated peasants, who were absolutely loyal to the 
monarch. While the leading class of the Party held different views, they preferred 
collective leadership. The 1954 Constitution was their first step on the road to collective 
leadership, and the Eighth CCP National Congress marked the climax of their 
achievement. Furthermore, the attack on Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU on a 
charge of developing a personality cult encouraged the leading class including Liu Shao-
ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing to continue their efforts on moving towards collective 
leadership. 
The Eighth CCP National Congress, held form 15 to 27 September 1956, was the first 
national congress the CCP had called since the establishment of communist regime. It saw 
a further realignment of political forces and the erosion of the position of Mao Tse-tung. 
Mao made no major address to the congress.10 Liu Shao-ch'i delivered the important 
9Ibid, p. 102. 
10Mao Tse-tung "Opening Speech to the Eighth Party Congress (15. Sep. 1956)" THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY. Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 359-360; NEW 
CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 15. Sep. 1956. 
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political report,11 and Teng Hsiao-p'ing reported on the revision of the party 
constitution.12 After the congress, both made significant advance in the political hierarchy. 
Liu's report on this occasion contained far fewer references to Mao and his "thought" than 
had his report on the Party Constitution to the Seventh Party Congress in the spring of 
1945. In his political report, Liu from an organisational viewpoint, stressed the 
importance of reinforcing supervision by the National People's Congress and its standing 
committee over the departments of the Central Government, and supervision by all the 
local people's congress overall the local government organs. 
When reporting on "the leadership of the party", Liu negated his previous arguments made 
at the Seventh CCP National Congress in May 1945, when he said, "Our party has 
developed in strict adherence to the Marxist-Leninist teachings signified by comrade Mao 
Tse-tung and the political and organisational line formulated by him... to study Marxism-
Leninism and Mao Tse-tung thought".13 Although Liu still stressed the importance of 
ideology, he did not include the words "Mao Tse-tung thought", but instead he used 
"Marxism-Leninism", in his report. It stated, "The strength of the leadership of the 
Chinese Communist party lies in the fact that it is armed ideologically with Marxism-
Leninism,... one of the tasks confronting the party leadership is to study and analyse past 
mistakes, draw lessons from them.1 4 
Teng Hsiao-p'ing also rejected Mao Tse-tung in his report On the Party Constitution, 
nLiu Shao-ch'i "Report on the Work of the Central Committee (16 Sep. 1956)" THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY. Vol. I, op. cit, p. 3. 
12Teng Hsiao-p'ing "Report on the Party Constitution (16 Sep. 1956)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBUC OF 
CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY. Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 389-406. 
13"On the Party (14. May 1945)", SELECTED WORKS OF LIU SHAO-CH'I. Vol. I (1984), op. cit., pp. 
323-325. 
14Teng Hsiao-p'ing "Report on the Party Constitution (16 Sep. 1956), THE PEOPLE'S REPUBUC OF 
CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 384. 
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when he commented, "Democratic centralism is the organisational principle of Marxism-
Leninism, the basic organisational principle of the party. In all important questions of the 
party, Lenin advocated collective decisions and not individual decisions. The great 
significance of upholding the principle of collective leadership and opposing the cult of the 
individual has been powerfully elaborated at the 20th Congress of the Communist party of 
the Soviet Union. Such elaboration has not only influenced the communist party of Soviet 
Union, but also the communist parties throughout the world It is quite evident that an 
individual decision on an important question is against the party build-up policy of 
communist parties and as much is necessarily wrong. Only collective leadership based on 
associations with the people conforms to the principle of democratic centralism and is 
capable of reducing the chances of error to the minimum... One of the major 
accomplishments of the 20th Congress of the CPSU was to tell us the possible serious 
adverse efforts of deifying individuals... any party and any individual cannot always avoid 
mistakes.. Thus, our party also posts guards against deification of individuals".15 
As to the leadership among the PLA, Teng pointed out, "The decision also mentioned that 
the system of collective leadership of party commissioners had long been established in the 
Chinese People's Liberation Army - in other words, this collective leadership of 
commissioners was actually a system of division of labour and responsibilities among army 
commanders".16 
In addition, the Party Constitution of the Eighth CCP National Congress laid down, "The 
Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism as its guide to action, only Marxism-
Leninism correctly sets forth the laws of development of society and correctly charts the 
15lbid., pp. 384-397. 
J6Ibid, p. 396. 
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path leading to the achievement of socialism and communism".17 This undoubtedly had 
formally discarded Mao Tse-tung's thought as the guiding principle for the Party. The 
background of the convening of the Eighth CCP National Congress, in essence, was 
waged by Liu Shao-ch'i with the advocating of "collective leadership" to seize power from 
Mao Tse-tung. 
Ideologically, collective leadership was emphasised over the role of the leader. However, 
to the "Eighth CCP National Congress", it was undoubtedly in part a reaction to the de-
stalinization campaign begun by Khrushchev earlier in the year at 20th Party Congress of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
Organisationally, shortly after the Eighth CCP National Congress, in the First Plenum of 
the Eighth CCPCC, several key changes took place, the Central Committee was enlarged 
from 13 to 17 with 6 alternate members. Liu Shao-ch'i became first vice-chairman of the 
Standing Committee of the Party politburo. This first six personnel in politburo composed 
the politburo Standing Committee. They were: Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central 
Committee; Liu Shao-ch'i, first vice-chairman; Chou En-lai, vice-chairman; Chu Te, vice-
chairman; Ch'en Yiin, vice-chairman; and Teng Hsiao-p'ing.18 The seventh person was 
Lin Piao, who did not become a member of the Standing Committee until May, 1958. 
Clearly, among the six member of the Standing Committee, Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-
p'ing were in the same side, to view from the "collective leadership", anyone from the 
remaining three (excluding Mao), Chou En-lai, Chu Te or Ch'en Yun, sided with Liu and 
Teng, it would have been impossible for Mao to obtain a majority vote. Mao's power 
J7"Constitution of the Communist Party of China (26 Sep. 1956)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 406. 
18WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, op. cit., p. 
689. 
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would therefore be seriously suppressed. And the situation was in favour of Liu Shao-ch'i 
and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, because Teng was placed at the head of the Secretariat of the 
Central Committee and was charged with "attending to the daily work of the Central 
Committee".19 
The personnel arrangements of the Eighth CCP National Congress and at the First Plenum 
of the Eighth CCPCC contributed to Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing's successful 
suppression of Mao Tse-tung's thought as guiding principle for the Party, and to the 
reinforcement of the theoretical foundation of "collective leadership". Collective 
leadership was in fact organisational leadership. Judging from Mao's political ambition, he 
would not yield himself to these arrangements, especially to Liu's attempt of carrying out 
collective leadership among the PLA, and thus his resolution to struggle against Liu was 
determined. Mao waged a series of power-reseizure struggle and masses' social 
movement throughout the country to purge dissidents after the First Plenum of the Eighth 
CCPCC when Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing were setting about carrying out the 
system of collective leadership. 
After the First Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC had ended. Mao moved to bolster his 
sagging political position. On 27 February 1957, Mao delivered a speech, On the Correct 
Handling of Contradiction among the People, which he pointed out: "We are confronted 
with two types of social contradictions - those between ourselves and the enemy and those 
among the people... Today, matters stand as follows. The large-scale, turbulent class 
struggles of the masses characteristic of times of revolution have in the main come to an 
end, but class struggle is by no means entirely over... At the same time as we criticise 
dogmatism, we must direct our attention to criticising revisionism. Revisionism, or right 
19"Mao Tse-tung's Talk at a Central Work Meeting (25 Oct. 1966)", FACTS AND FEATURES. Vol. II, 
No. 9, Feb. 1969 (Taiwan), pp. 25-27. 
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opportunism, is a bourgeois trend of thought that is even more dangerous than 
dogmatism. The revisionists, the right opportunists, pay lip-service to Marxism; they too 
attack "dogmatism". But what they are really attacking is the quintessence of Marxism, 
they oppose or distort materialism and dialectics, oppose or try to weaken the people's 
democratic dictatorship and leading role of the Communist Party, and oppose or try to 
weaken socialist transformation and socialist construction".20 
Mao's speech initiated and provided the justification for his step. The speech itself 
represented Mao's first move in a long-run drive to re-establish his image as supreme 
leader, one who stands above the Party. In actuality, the contest for control over the mass 
media was joined at this time. 
The Eighth CCP National Congress was indeed a great challenge to Mao. In order to 
prove the masses' loyalty to him and to lure the opposition into a trap, Mao launched the 
movement "A Hundred Flowers Blossom and a Hundred Schools of Thought Content" in 
1957,21 hoping to elicit an honest response. This movement, however, triggered 
intellectual's attack on Mao which was harmful to Mao's prestige. At this point, Mao took 
repressive reassures to rectify dissident intellectuals in the so-called "anti-Rightist 
campaign"22 lasting for more than a year. 
By the Second Plenum of Eighth CCPCC in May 1958, Mao, presumably as a result of the 
purge of the lower level party organisation, was able to enlarge the politburo and the 
20"On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People (27 Feb. 1957)", SELECTED WORKS 
OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. IV, op. cit, pp. 384-421. 
2 1 "Let A Hundred Flowers Blossom, A Hundred Schools of Thought Contend", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 13 
June, 1956. 
22"Follow the Communist Party or Follow Chang Po-ch'un and Lo Lung-chi?" and "Oppose Chang Po-
ch'un Who Leads Astray the Peasant-Worker Democratic Party", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 16 June, 1957; "All 
of Us Should Join Criticism of Rightists", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 17 June, 1957. 
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politburo standing committee, added to the politburo at this time were K'e Ch'ing-shih, 
party first secretary of Shanghai city; Tan Chen-lin, member of the Central Committee 
Secretariat; and L i Ching-ch'iian, party first secretary of Szechuan province, added to the 
politburo-standing committee was Lin Piao. Now, Mao's influence in the politburo and 
politburo-standing committee was largely increased, and he could do whatever he liked. 
The Second Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC adopted the "General Line" and it's "Basic 
Points",23 promoted by Mao, for "building socialism by exerting our utmost efforts, and 
pressing ahead consistently to achieve greater, faster, better, and more economic results". 
After the session, PRC set off "Three Red Banners" movement - namely, the Great Leap 
Forward, the General Line, and the People's Communes - throughout the country. 
The "Great Leap Forward" symbolised China's, in particular Mao's group determination to 
back free of Soviet controls, to disengage the Chinese economy from the USSR, and to 
reject what the Chinese have since asserted were "unreasonable" demands designed to 
bring China under Soviet military control.2 4 
I f successful, the Great Leap Forward would have emasculated the military 
"establishment", the break with the Soviet Union meant the end of the military 
modernisation program, which depended on Soviet Military assistance. In addition, Mao 
had attempted to create a military force which he could employ for political purpose by 
greatly expanding the militia in 1958 as part of the commune plan. The issue of party 
control of the militia was discussed in the 10 December 1958, Party Resolution, the same 
meeting at which it was decided that Mao would not stand for re-election to the 
23The basic points of the General Line called for the mobilisation of all positive factors and the correct 
handling of contradictions among the people. See COLLECTED LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Vol. VII, (Peking: Law Publishing House, 1958), p. 4. 
2 4 "The Origin and Development of the Difference between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves (6 
Sep. 1963)", THE POLEMIC ON THE GENERAL LINE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST 
MOVEMENT, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 77. 
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chairmanship of the state. The connection of those events suggests the possibility that 
Mao agreed to step down from the post in return for acceptance of his commune and 
militia proposals.25 
As mentioned before, the militia under the commune system had greater political than 
military significance. Since the militia was to be an independent military organisation, the 
armed instrument of the self-supporting commune, which was directly responsible to the 
party centre, that is, Mao Tse-tung, Mao had to carry out People's Commune for the 
suppression of party organisation headed by Liu Shao-ch'i, and of transplanting Soviet 
military system of professional and regular army-building program advocated by P'eng Te-
huai. Mao had great confidence in his leader's charisma, as he mentioned at the Eighth 
Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC to criticise P'eng Te-huai, "We are said to have departed 
from the masses, but the masses still support us", Mao asserted "the loyalty of the PL A 
rank and file was to him personally", " i f you the Liberation Army don't follow me, I 'll go 
find a Red Army, I think the Liberation Army will follow me".26 
The Eighth CCP National Congress had largely deprived Mao of his power, and thus 
evoked Mao's determination to re-seize power and purge the opposition. The professional 
army-building programme of the PLA was terminated owing to Mao's disapproval of 
P'eng Te-huai's learning from Soviet army-building policy and of Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng 
Hsiao-p'ing's pro-Soviet behaviour for supporting Khrushchev and opposing a personality 
cult. 
25After full and all-round consideration, the plenary session of the Central Committee has decided to 
approve this suggestion of comrade Mao Tse-tung, and not nominate him again as candidate for 
Chairman of the PRC at the first session of the second nation people's congress. See Richard C. 
Thornton, CHINA, THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER 1917-1972, (Indiana: Indiana Uni. Press, 1973), p. 
245; "Central Committee Decision on the Status of Mao Tse-tung (10 Dec. 1958)", THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 720. 
26"Mao Tse-tung Speech at the Eighth Plenary Session of the CCP's Eighth Central Committee", ISSUE 
AND STUDIES, Vol. VI, No. 7, (April 1970), pp. 80-86. 
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Until Lin Piao replaced Feng Te-huai as the Minister of National Defence after the Eighth 
CCP National Congress, and could vigorously carry out the military line of "politics takes 
the lead" according to Mao's will, the movement of People's Communes and the 
organisation of militia was a powerful weapon to oppose P'eng Te-huai's professional 
army-building program. Mao certainly realised that he must reconstruct social structure i f 
he want to organise and efficiently operate the militia, and the People's Communes were 
an important means to achieve it. Mao's attempt to seize the power was so clear and 
strong even at the cost of changing the policy of land distribution at the early stage of 
PRC's regime, and returned to the cycle of "annexation of land holdings", which was one 
of the tasks carried out by the People's Communes, at the last stage of past dynasties. His 
chief aim was to organise the world's biggest militia system, attempting to minimise the 
importance of the PLA led by P'eng Te-huai and take over its political and military tasks, 
by applying the organisation of people's commune. The "Central Committee Resolution 
on the People's Communes", approved by the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC on 10 
October 1958 clearly stated, "A new social organisation appeared fresh as the morning sun 
above the broad horizon of East Asia. This was the large-scale people's commune in the 
rural areas of our country which combines industry, agriculture, trade, education, and 
military affairs.... The people's commune is the basic organisation of our country's state 
power. It is absolutely not allowed to use 'getting organised along military line' as a 
pretext to make use of the militia system, which is directed against the enemy".27 
It is noteworthy, however, at the same day of announcing the "Central Committee 
Resolution on the People's Commune", the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC also 
27"Central Committee Resolution on the People's Communes (10 Dec. 1958)", THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. 11, op. tit., p. 720, 729; Robert 
R. Bowie & John K. Fairbank (ed.), COMMUNIST CHINA 1955-1959: POLICY DOCUMENTS WITH 
ANALYSIS, (Massachusetts: Harvard Uni. Press, 1971), pp. 490-503. 
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approved Mao Tse-tung's proposal that he would not stand as candidate for Chairman of 
the People's Republic of China for the next term of office. 2 8 The resolution embarrassed 
Mao by stating that "he may also be enabled to set aside more time for Marxist-Leninist 
theoretical work". 2 9 
Mao gave up his chance to be nominated again as candidate for chairman of the PRC at 
the First Session of the Second National People's Congress to gain the approval of 
carrying out the policy of people's commune and militia organisation. Thus it can be seen 
how deeply Mao was hurt at the Eighth CCP National Congress and how strongly his 
ambition to regain power was, and Mao's anger can be realised when P'eng Te-huai 
"openly" criticised the faults of the movement of "Three Red Banners" at the Lushan 
conference in 1959. As a result of such inner-party struggles, the professional army-
building program of the PLA after the Eighth CCP National Congress was doomed to 
failure. Mao began to show his resolution to remove P'eng Te-huai and replaced him with 
Lin Piao as the Minister of National Defence at the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCP 
National Congress. 
28RobertR. Bowie & John K. Fairbank (ed.), op. cit., pp. 487-488. 
29Ibid, p. 487. 
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II. The Ninth CCP National Congress 
The PLA's involvement in the Cultural Revolution was neither an attempt at the seizure of 
political power, nor intended to oppose Mao's policy of "party command the army". It 
was Mao Tse-tung himself who instructed the PLA to become involved in the Cultural 
Revolution for the restoration of his falling military power. However, after PLA's 
intervention in politics, the phenomena of a "Praetorian Political Guard" appeared. The 
local military leaders not only dominated organs of provincial and county's power, but also 
became members of the CCPCC, and so expanded their political influence at the state 
level. 
At the early stage of Cultural Revolution, Mao used the PLA as a weapon to destroy party 
organisations for the purpose of striking Liu Shao-ch'i. This course of action, however, 
had landed him in an unpredictable situation. The power of Lin Piao and local military 
commanders had apparently expanded to the extent far beyond than Mao could originally 
expected. To suppress the army's political influence, Mao had to restore the party 
organisations. His first step was to make preparation for the convening of the Ninth CCP 
National Congress. After repeated delays, congress was finally held from 1 to 24 April 
1969. Apart from rebuilding the party organisation, the other reason for the convening of 
Ninth CCP Congress was to celebrate the successful power seizure from Liu Shao-ch'i. 
The agenda of the Ninth CCP National Congress was quite simple. It was as follows: 
First, Lin Piao was to deliver the "political report"; second, revise Party constitution, and 
third, elect full and alternate members of the Ninth CCPCC. 
Mao was received with enthusiasm at the opening session.30 At the end of his opening 
30Mao addressed the opening session, and he said, "Comrades! The Ninth congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party is now in session", all delegates gave "long and enthusiastic applause", and shouted: 
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speech, Mao stressed: From the Eighth CCP National Congress up to now we have 
become more clear about them (Liu Shao-ch'i, P'eng Chen, Po I-po... etc.). We are 
clearer about their political line, their organisational line, and their ideology, therefore we 
hope that this congress will become a congress of unity. Can we win victory on the basis 
of this unity? Can this congress become a congress of victory? After the congress, can 
we win still greater victories throughout the country? I think we can. I think this will be a 
congress of unity and a congress of victory. After the congress we can win still greater 
victories throughout the country.31 When Mao finished the speech, all delegates gave him 
"prolonged enthusiastic applause" and shouted "long live chairman Mao! A long, long life 
to chairman Mao! May chairman Mao live forever!" once again.32 
Lin Piao's "political report"33 delivered on 1 April and adopted on 14 April, it was 
discussed by the congress "sentence by sentence". Moreover, the congress sent both Lin's 
report and the revised constitution to the secretariat of the presidium for "modification in 
wording" and the report was not made public until 27 April. 
Lin reiterated that the Ninth CCP National Congress was a congress of victory in his 
report, which he indicated, "Our present congress is convened at a time when victory has 
been won in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution".34 
Lin Piao also mentioned the new Party constitution in his report, which he said: "The 
"Long live chairman Mao, a long, long life to chairman Mao" in an enthusiastic fashion. See Stuart 
Schram (ed.), THE CHAIRMAN MAO TALKS TO THE PEOPLE - TALKS AND LETTERS 1956-1971, 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), p. 24. 
31lbid., p. 281. 
32lbid. 
33James T. Myers (ed.), CHINESE POLITICS - DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS, Vol. 11, op. tit., pp. 57-
85; NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 27 April 1969; Lin Piao, "Political Report to the Ninth Party congress 
(1 April 1969)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. 
V, op. cit., pp. 2224-2238. 
34Ibid., p. 2224. 
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revision of the party constitution is an important item on the agenda of the Ninth National 
Congress of the Party, the Central Committee has submitted the draft party constitution 
to the congress for discussion. This draft was worked out jointly by the whole party and 
the revolutionary masses throughout the country. Since November 1967 when chairman 
Mao proposed that basic party organisation take part in the revision of the party 
constitution, the Central Committee has received several thousand draft. On this basis, the 
enlarged Twelfth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the Party drew up the draft 
constitution, upon which the entire party, the whole army, and the revolutionary masses 
throughout the country once again held discussions".35 
The new constitution adopted by the Ninth congress was essentially the same as the draft 
except for certain changes affecting the PLA, they were: 
First, article 5: The People's Liberation Army... must all accept the leadership of the 
party.36 
Second, the party attempted to tighten its control over the political activities of the PLA 
as it stated in article 6, "The highest leading body of the party is the national party 
congress and, when it is not in session, the Central committee elected by it. The leading 
bodies of party organisations in army units ... are the party congress or general 
membership meetings at their respective levels.... The convening of party congresses... in 
the army units... are subject to approval by the higher party.3 7 
And third, the statement that primary party organs must "persevere in the four firsts, and 
3Slbid., p. 2234. 
36"The 1969 Party Constitution (14 Apr. 1969)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 -A 
DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. V, op. cit., p. 2240. 
37lbid. 
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foster the three-eight working style in the big way", a slogan coined by Lin for the 
military, was dropped, as was a section that called upon the party to learn from the 
political work of the PLA. 3 8 
Overall, it appears that the party intended to reassert its authority and persist in 
implementing the doctrine of "politics in command". Mao like Lin Piao was pressured 
into compromising on these issues, and hard bargaining was probably the reason for 
delayed publication of the constitution, in People's Daily on 29 April, despite the fact that 
it was adopted "unanimously" on 14 April. 
It was noteworthy that the new party constitution stressed "the PLA was under the 
leadership of the party", and removed "party to learn from the political work style of the 
PLA", this was the restriction and the warning that Mao placed on the PLA for its over-
expanded power during the Cultural Revolution, and a prelude to his party consolidation 
and the reorganisation of the party committee at provincial level after the Ninth CCP 
National Congress. Mao's attempt to weaken the political power of the PLA was now 
very clear. 
In item 6 "On the Consolidation and Building of the Party" of his political report, Lin Piao 
indicated: "Discussing the consolidation and building of the party, chairman Mao has said, 
'A human being has arteries and veins through which the heart makes the blood circulate, 
and the breathes with his lungs, exhaling carbon dioxide and inhaling fresh oxygen, that is, 
getting rid of the stale and taking in the fresh, for only thus can it be full of vitality. 
Without eliminating waste matter and absorbing fresh blood the party has no vigour', with 
this vivid analogy, chairman Mao has expounded the dialectics of inner-party 
38Y. C. Chang, FACTIONAL AND COALITION POLITICS IN CHINA - THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 
AND IT AFTERMATH, op. cit, p. 62. 
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contradiction. 'The law of contradiction in things, that is the law of the unity of opposites, 
is the basic law of materialist dialectics'. Opposition and struggle between the two lines 
within the party are a reflection inside the party of contradictions between classes and 
between the new and the old is society. I f there were contradictions in the party and no 
struggles to resolve them, and i f the party did not get rid of the stale and take in the fresh, 
the party's life would come to an end. Chairman Mao's theory on inner-party 
contradiction is and will be the fundamental guiding principle for the consolidation and 
building of the party" . 3 9 
However, this idea of "getting rid of the stale and taking in the fresh" Lin advocated was 
not Mao's real intention, in fact Mao was hoping that the participants of the Ninth CCP 
National Congress could "select more delegates from the army, workers, poor and lower-
middle peasants, and the Red Guards", on the basis of the principle of 'three-in-one 
combination' - the combination of 'army, revolutionary cadres and the organisational 
representatives of revolutionary masses', of 'workers, peasants and soldiers', and of 'the 
old, the middle-aged and the young'", and the principle of "selecting from high to low, 
from the combination of high and low, of inside and outside, and consulting all sorts of 
opinions" to convene a real "conference of ten thousand people"40 under the leadership of 
Mao. Nevertheless, only 1512 representatives attend the Ninth CCP National Congress,41 
and among which, nearly three fourth wore the uniform of the Liberation Army. 4 2 
39Michael Y. M. Kau (ed), "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China 
(Delivered on 1 April and Adopted on 14 April 1969)", THE UN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS 
AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., p. 546; RED FLAG, No. 5, 1969, pp. 24-25. 
40"A Circular of the CCPCC and CCP Cultural Revolution Group Concerning the Enquiries for the 
Convening of the Ninth Party Congress (27 Nov. 1967)", THE COLLECTIONS OF THE ORIGINAL 
DATA F CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, op. cit., p. 13. 
4 1 "Communique of the Secretary Office of Chairman Group on the Ninth Party Congress (1 April 1969)", 
THE COLLECTIONS OF THE ORIGINAL DATA OF THE NINTH PARTY CONGRESS, (Taipei: Chinese 
Communist Studies Press, 1979), p. 75. 
42Jiirgen Domes, CHINA AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, (Berkeley: Uni. of California Press, 
1977), p. 16. 
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Because of their contribution to the downfall of Liu Shao-ch'i, coupled with the rise of Lin 
Piao, a sharp increase in military representation in all bodies of the Ninth CCP National 
Congress and especially in the Central Committee resulted. From the background of 
members of the presidium, one can clearly understand the role that PLA played in this 
congress. The delegates to the congress elected a 176-man presidium (an increase of 113 
persons than the Eighth CCP National Congress), occupying 11.6 percent of all 1512 
participants, with Mao as its chairman, Lin Piao, its vice-chairman, and Chou En-lai, its 
general secretary. In the presidium, military representation43 amounted to over 35 percent 
43The list of names was as follows: Huang Yung-sheng (chief of the general staff, commander of the 
Canton Military Region); Wu Fa-hsien (Air Force commander-in-chief); Wen Yu-cheng (commander of 
the Peking Garrison Command); Wang Ping-chang (vice commander of the Air Force); Wang Huai-
hsiang (political commissar of the Kirin Military District); Wang Hui-ch'iu (vice political commissar of 
the Air Force); Kung Shih-ch'ttan (political commissar of the Canton Military Region); Wei Kuo-ch'ing 
(first political commissar of the Kwangsi Military District); Lung Shu-chin (commander of the Sinkiang 
Military Region); Pi Ding-ch'un (vice commander of the Foochow Military Region); Liu Feng (political 
commissar of the Wuhan Military Region); Liu Hsien-ylian (political commissar of the Canton Military 
Region); Liu Hsien-ch'iian (commander of the Tsinghai Military District); Jen Jung (political commissar 
of the Tibet Military District); Hsti Shih-yu (commander of the Nanking Military Region); Tu Ping 
(political commissar of the Nanking Military Region); Yang Te-chih (commander of the Tsinan Military 
Region); Wu Tao (political commissar of the Inner Mongolia Military District); Wang Chia-tao 
(commander of the Heilungkiang Military District); Hsiao Ching-kuang (Navy commander-in-chief); Li 
T'ien-yiu (deputy chief of the general staff); Li Tsai-han (first political commissar of the Kweichow 
Military District); Li Tso-p'eng (first political commissar of the Navy); Li Te-sheng (commander of the 
Anhwei Military District); Hsien Heng-han (political commissar of the Lanchow Military Region); Cheng 
Wei-shan (acting commander of the Peking Military Region); Chang Szu-ching (second political 
commissar of the Shansi Military District); Chang Ta-chih (commander of the Lanchow Military Region); 
Chang Chiang-lin (commander of the Tsinghai Military District); Chang Kuo-hua (first political 
commissar of the Chengtu Military Region); Ch'en Shih-ch'ti (commander of the Engineer Troop); Ch'en 
Hsi-lien (commander of the Shenyang Military Region); Nan P'ing (political commissar of the Chekiang 
Military District); Yuan Shen-ping (political commissar of the Tsinan Military Region); Liang Tien-tsu 
(commander of the Chengtu Military Region); Tseng Shao-shan (political commissar of the Shenyang 
Military Region); Tseng Szu-yu (commander of the Wuhan Military Region); Tseng Yung-ya (commander 
of the Tibet Military District); Han Hsien-ch'U (commander of the Foochow Military Region); Cheng 
Shih-ching (first political commissar of the Kiangsi Military District); Li Ytian (commander of the Forty 
sixth Army); Teng Hai-ching (commander of the Inner Mongolia Military District); Pan Fu-sheng (first 
commissar of the Heilungkiang Military District); Tan Fu-jen (political commissar of the Kunming 
Military Region); Wang Tung-hsing (chief of the guards regiment of Mao Tse-tung). 
Others included 9 low-rank military officers, they were Wang Shih-fan, Wang Ke-ching, Nien Szu-wang, 
Fan Ching-min, Chang Yin-tsai, Hu Hsiu-tao, Shu Chi-cheng, Chang Ying-tsai, and Ma Yi. 
See "The Chinese Communist Party after the Ninth Party Congress", STUDY ON CHINESE 
COMMUNIST PARTY, No. 15, (Taipei: The Secretary Office of the National Assembly, 1969), p. 13. 
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of its all. 
On 15 April, the congress entered the final stage, that was, the election of members of the 
Ninth CCPCC. However, the convening of the third meeting of whole delegates had a 
substantial delay for settling the matter of "power distribution", it was finally presided over 
by Lin Piao on 24 April, and elected 170 full members and 109 alternate members of the 
Ninth CCPCC. An total increase of 86 members than the Eighth CCP National Congress, 
which elected 97 full members and 96 alternate members of Eighth CCPCC. Among the 
newly elected full members and alternate members of the Ninth CCPCC, 119 (71 full 
members and 48 alternated members), or 42.6 percent were military commanders; 76 (57 
full members and 19 alternate members), or 27.6 percent were cadres, and 63 (37 full 
members and 26 alternate members), or 22.6 percent were the so-called revolutionary 
rebels.44 
On 28 April the First Plenum of the Ninth CCPCC was held in Peking, and elected Mao 
Tse-tung as chairman, Lin Piao as vice-chairman, Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, Yeh Ch'un, 
Yeh Chien-ying, Liu Po-ch'eng, Chiang Ch'ing, Chu Te, Hsu Shih-yu, Ch'en Po-ta, Ch'en 
Hsi-lien, L i Hsien-nien, L i Tso-p'eng, Wu Fa-hsien, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Ch'iu Hui-tso, 
Chou En-lai, Yao Wen-yuan, K'ang Sheng, Huang Yung-sheng, Tung Pi-wu and Hsieh 
Fu-chih as members of the Politburo, and Chi Teng-k'uei, L i Hsueh-feng, L i Te-sheng ad 
Wang Tung-hsing as alternate members of the Politburo. 
Excluding Mao, 13 of the Politburo members, that is to say over 50 percent, were military 
men, which included Lin Piao, Yeh Ch'un, Chu Te, Yeh Chien-ying, Liu Po-ch'eng, Hsu 
Shih-yu, Ch'en Hsi-lien, L i Tso-p'eng, Wu Fa-hsien, Ch'iu Hui-tso, Huang Yung-sheng, 
44lbid, p. 39. 
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Hsieh Fu-chih and Tung Pi-wu, in sharp contrast to only the 7 of 27 members in the 
Eighth Politburo who could be so described. In addition, among the four alternate 
member, L i Te-sheng and Wang Tung-hsing were military men. 
Included in the total 21 Politburo members, 10 were reappointed and 10 newly-elected, 
plus Hsieh Fu-chih was promoted from alternate member to Politburo member. And 
among the Eighth Politburo members, six (Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, T'ao Chu, Ho 
Lung, T'an Chen-lin and L i Kan-Ch'uan) were purged, five (Ch'en Yiin, Ch'en I , Hsu 
Hsiang-ch'ien, Nieh Jung-chen and Li Fu-ts'un) failed to be re-elected, and only managed 
to keep their membership of the CCPCC. 
These politburo members produced five different political groups:45 
First, the Cultural Revolutionary extreme left until the end of 1969 and in the central 
committee by Mao Tse-tung, Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng, Chiang Ch'ing, Chang Ch'un-
ch'iao, Yao Wen-yuan, Hsieh Fu-chih, as well as by alternate members Chi Teng-k'uei and 
Wang Tung-hsing. 
Second, the cadres of the Administrative apparatus with Chou En-lai, Tung Pi-wu and L i 
Hsien-nien. 
Third, the Central Military Group with Lin Piao, Huang Yung-sheng, Ch'iu Hui-tso, L i 
Tso-p'eng, Wu Fa-hsien, Yeh Chien-ying, Yeh Ch'un and the alternate member L i Te-
sheng. 
45James T. Myers (ed.), CHINESE POLITICS - DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS, Vol. II, op. ext., pp. 5-6. 
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Fourth, the Regional commanders with Hsu Shih-yu, Ch'en Hsi-lien. 
And fifth, the Group of Party Veterans whose public appearances and become increasingly 
rare and who probably only occasionally took party in the decision-making process. These 
included Chu-Te and Lin Po-ch'eng. 
The General Staff Department of the PLA elected Huang Yung-sheng chief of general 
staff; Wu Fa-hsien, L i Tso-p'eng, Ch'iu Hui-tso, L i T'ien-yiu, Wen Yu-ch'eng, Wang Hsin-
t'ing, P'eng Shao-hui, Han Hsien-ch'u, and Yen Shen-ch'uan vice chief of general staff. All 
of them were from Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army except Wang Hsin-t'ing and P'eng Shao-
hui, 4 6 in which Wu Fa-hsien soon became commander-in-chief of the Air Force, L i Tso-
p'eng first political commissar of the Navy, and Ch'iu Hui-tso director of the General 
Logistics Department. 
The military occupied a high proportion not only at the Central, but also at the local level. 
20 of the total 29 chiefs of "revolutionary committee" at provincial level were military 
men, and most of the remaining 9 had a concurrent post in the army (shown as fol lows) 4 7 
In addition, among all chiefs and deputy chiefs of the revolutionary committee at county 
level and above, 5193 were military men, occupying 78 percent in Peking city, 81 percent 
in Kwangtung province, 84 percent in Liaoning province, 95 Shansi province, 97 percent 
in Yunnan province and 98 percent in Hupei province. 
46Ting Wang, THE ORGANISATIONAL AND PERSONNEL ISSUES IN THE CHINESE CULTURAL 
REVOLUTION, (Hong Kong: Contemporary China Research Institute, 1970), p. 160. 
47Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 
op. cit., pp. 25-26; Livio Maitan, PARTY, ARMY AND MASSES IN CHINA - A MARXIST 
INTERPRETATION OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH, (London: NLB, 1976), 
pp. 162-163. 
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Establishment of Provincial Revolutionary Committees 
Date of Es-
tablishment 
of Rev. 
Com. 
Province Chief Post in the Army 
31 Jan. 
1967 
Heilungkian 
X 
Pan Fu-sheng political commissar of the Shenyang Military Region; first 
political commissar of the Heilungkiang Military District 
3, Feb. 
1967 
Shantung Wang Hsiao-yu first commissar of the Tsinan Military Region 
13 Feb. 
1967 
Kweichow Li Tsai-han vice political commissar of the Kunming Military Region; 
and concurrent first commissar of the Kweichow Military 
District 
23 Feb. 
1967 
Shanghai Chang Ch'un-
ch'iao 
first political commissar of the Nanking Military Region; 
first political commissar of the Shanghai Garrison 
Commands 
18 Mar. 
1967 
Shansi Liu K'e-p'ing political commissar of the Peking Military Region; first 
political commissar of the Shansi Military District 
20 Apr. 
1967 
Peking Hsieh Fu-chih General; member of CCPCC; political commissar of the 
Peking Military Region; first political commissar of the 
Peking Garrison Command 
12 Aug. 
1967 
Tsinghai Liu Hsien-
ch'ttan 
Major General; commander of the Tsinghai Military 
District 
1 Nov. 
1967 
Inner 
Mongolia 
Teng Hai-ching Lieutenant-general; vice-commander of the Peking 
Military Region; concurrent commander of the Inner 
Mongolia Military District 
6 Dec. 
1967 
Tientsin Hsieh Hsueh-
kung 
political commissar of the Peking Military Region; 
concurrent first political commissar of the Tientsin 
Garrison Commands 
5 Jan. 1968 Kiangsi Ch'eng Shih-
ch'ing 
Major General; deputy political commissar of the 
Foochow Military District; concurrent political 
commissar of the Kiangsi Military District 
24 Jan. 
1968 
Kansu Hsien Heng-han political commissar of the Lanchow Military Region 
27 Jan. 
1968 
Honan Liu Chien-hsun first political commissar of the Honan Military District 
3 Feb. 
1968 
Hopei Li Hsueh-feng political commissar of the Peking Military Region 
5 Feb. 
1968 
Hupei Teng Ssu-yu Lieutenant-general; commander of the Wuhan Military 
Region 
21 Feb. 
1968 
Kwangtung Huang Yung-
sheng 
commander of the Canton Military Region 
6 Mar. 
1968 
Kirin Wang Huai-
hsiang 
Major General; political commissar of the Sixteenth Army 
23 Mar. 
1968 
Kiangsu HsU shih-yu General; commander of the Nanking Military Region 
24 Mar. 
1968 
Chekiang Nan P'ing Major General; political commissar of the Chekiang 
Military District 
8 Apr. 1968 Hunan Li Yuan Major General; commander of the Forty-seventh Army 
10 Apr. 
1968 
Ninghsia K'ang Chien-
min 
Major General; commander of the Lanchow Military 
Region 
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18 Apr. 
1968 
Anhwei Li Te-sheng Major General; commander of the Twelfth Army 
I May. 
1968 
Shensi Li Jui-shan political commissar of the Lanchow Military Region; 
concurrent first political commissar of the Shensi Military 
District 
10 May. 
1968 
Liaoning Ch'en Hsi-lien General; commander of the Shenyang Military Region 
31 May. 
1968 
Szechwan Chang Kuo-hua Lieutenant-general; political commissar of the Chentu 
Military District 
13 Aug. 
1968 
Yunnan Tan Fu-jen Lieutenant-general; political commissar of the Kunming 
Military Region 
19 Aug. 
1968 
Fukien Han Hsien-ch'u General; commander of the Foochow Military Region 
26 Aug. 
1968 
Kwangsi Wei Kuo-ch'ing General; first commissar of the Canton Military Region 
5 Sep. 1968 Tibet Tseng Yung-ya Major General; commander of the Tibet Military District 
5 Sep. 1968 Sinkiang Lung Shu-chin Major General; commander of the Sinkiang Military 
Region 
The convening of the Ninth CCP National Congress represented a new stage of the 
interaction among the party, government and the army. Thirteen years after the Eighth 
CCP National Congress, Mao finally regained power. After the Ninth CCP National 
Congress, Mao began another cycle of reconstruction in the party, government and the 
army. As an important congress in the history of Chinese Communist Party, the 
convening of the Ninth CCP National Congress, serving as a link between past and future, 
had the following distinguishing features. 
First, it was a secretive congress. 
During the proceedings of the Eighth CCP National Congress, every decision reached at 
the session including speeches and documents were made public day by day. While a 
certain degree of secrecy was maintained throughout the proceedings of the Ninth CCP 
National Congress. The opening session was held at "People's Assembly Hall", but was 
then moved to "Chungnanhai" the next day. No official announcement regarding the 
convention was made until 9:00pm on 1 April, following the completion of the opening 
session, which had begun at 5:00pm. Nothing more appeared in the mass media until the 
communique of 4 April, and all in all, only four communiques, Lin's "political report", and 
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the Party Constitution were published; yet the Eighth CCP National Congress had printed 
over 715 pages of various speeches and documents.48 None of the three "most important 
speeches" made by Mao at the opening session of the Ninth CCP National Congress, the 
plenary session on 14 April, and the plenary session of Ninth CCP, was ever made known. 
Second, it was a congress of isolation. 
For the Eighth, 56 invitations were sent to the so-call "democratic party"49, people's 
group, responsible cadres of the PLA, and at least 47 foreign delegations came and 
delivered congratulatory speeches subsequently published in the People's Daily,50 while 
this time, no nonvoting delegate attended. 
Third, it was a congress of purge. 
At the Ninth Congress, cadres from Liu Shao-ch'i's "party in the White area", the 
intellectual, or those who opposed Mao and Lin were largely purged, and replaced with 
the rise of cadres from the "party in the base area", and from the "party in the army" in 
power. 
Fourth, it was a congress of inner-party factional reorganisation. 
In addition to the influence of the Cultural Revolutionary extreme left was substantially 
expanded. A series of power-seizure struggle was carried out inside the PLA, the military 
48Y. C. Chang, FACTIONAL AND COALITION POLITICS IN CHINA - THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 
AND ITS AFTERMATH, op. cit., pp. 60-61. 
49The democratic parties were 1) the Revolutionary Committee of the KMT, 2) the China Democratic 
League, 3) the China Democratic National Construction Association, 4) the China Association for 
Promoting Democracy, 5) the Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party, 6) the China Chih Kung 
Tang (reorganized from Chih Kung Tang in the United States), 7) the Chiu-san (3 Sep.) Society, and 8) 
the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League. Another party called the KMT Association for 
Promoting Democracy was later merged into the Revolutionary Committee of the KMT. These 
democratic parties were put under the CCP leadership and were prevented from any independent moves 
or platforms. See A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, op. 
cit., p. 362. 
50Ibid.,p. 61; PEOPLE'S DAILY, 22 Sep. 1956. 
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cadres from the non-Fourth Field Army, or related to P'eng Te-huai, Ho Lung and Lo Jui-
ch'ing's and many others were attacked, while the central and local militarists from Fourth 
Field Army were promoted to important posts. 
And fifth, it was a congress largely expanding the political role of the military. 
The Ninth Congress promoted some regional military to the central political arena and 
therefrom reinforced their political authority at the local level. The Ninth Congress was in 
fact a celebration of central and regional military. Until the Cultural Revolution, the 
regional party's and political affairs were usually conducted by the first secretary of the 
party committee, who was also a concurrent first political secretary of the provincial 
military district or military region, responsible for the supervision of the policy of 'party 
commands the gun'5 1. While after the Ninth CCP Congress, military men constituted the 
major force of the Party Committee, and became secretary or first secretary, and usually a 
concurrent first political commissar of the Military Region, and monopolised all powers in 
the regional party, government and military. The regional military power expanded 
rapidly, while the party's power began to decline. 
5 1 John Gittings, "Army-party Relations in the Light of the Cultural Revolution", in John Lewis (ed.), 
PARTY LEADERSHIP AND REVOLUTIONARY POWER IN CHINA, (London: Cambridge Uni. Press, 
1970), pp. 373-403.2 
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I I I . The Tenth CCP National Congress 
Since military men headed by Lin Piao colluded with Chiang Ch'ing's Cultural 
Revolutionary extreme left during the Ninth CCP Congress, with the consequence that 
among the members of the Ninth CCPCC elected by the congress, the military were of 
prime importance, the Cultural Revolutionary extreme left came second. This result, 
however, ran counter to Mao's principle of consistency, that is, the principle of "party 
commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party". After the 
Lin Piao incident, the political and military situation of the PLA began to change. On 1 
Jan. 1973, an editorial New Year's Speech, carried by two newspapers and one periodical, 
had revealed the appearance of Mao's deployment of political strategy. The editorial 
indicated, "the masses' organisations - namely, labour unions, the Communist Youth 
League, the Red Guards and the Little Red Guards, poor and lower-middle peasant 
associations, and women's federation - must be consolidated step by step. The leading 
organs of all levels must pay attention to fostering new cadres on the basis of "three-in-
one combination of the old, the middle aged and the young", especially promoting new 
cadres from among labour unions, women's federation and minority nationality, and 
helping those cadres on the job to improve their theoretic level and working capability. 
Every cadre regardless of old or new, army or local must learn from the masses 
modestly".52 It was quite obvious Mao's intention was to replace PLA's political influence 
with the five masses' organisation - labour unions, the Communist Youth League, the Red 
Guards and the Little Red Guards, poor and lower-middle peasant associations, and the 
women's federation. 
After the publication of the New Year's Speech, the conference of various kinds were 
52"New Year's Speech", PEOPLE'S DAILY, LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, I Jan. 1973; RED FLAG, No. 
1, 1973, p. 8. 
375 
convened one after another throughout the country. The first conference of the 
Communist Youth League at the provincial, municipal, and autonomous district's level 
were held in Shanghai from 12 to 19 Feb. of the same year; the conference of labour 
unions at the provincial, municipal and autonomous district's level were convened in 
Shanghai and Peking between 16 and 21 April; the conference of the women's federation 
at the provincial, municipal and autonomous district's level were convened in Tientsin and 
Anhwei between 27 and 30 June; the conference of the poor and lower-middle peasant 
associations at the provincial, municipal and autonomous district's level were held in 
Hunan on 17 November. By the mid July, the conference of the Communist Youth 
League in 29 provinces, municipalities an autonomous districts had also came to an end.53 
The aims for the convening of the above masses' organisations were as follows: 
First, change the political ecology in the PRC, replacing PLA's political influence at the 
local level with that of the regional masses' organisations, and terminating the phenomenon 
of "the gun commands the party" during the Cultural Revolution. 
Second, provide a better environment for restoring the unified leadership of the party. 
The so called unified leadership was in fact the leadership of the party over the troops. 
And third, attempt to balance the influence of the PLA in the central and the locality by 
integrating the forces of the Cultural Revolutionary extreme left headed by Chiang Ch'ing 
with that of the local masses. 
53Chang Chin-wen, "The Inner-Party Struggle of the Chinese Communist Party after the Tenth Party 
Congress", in Warren Kuo (ed.), THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AFTER THE TENTH PARTY 
CONGRESS, (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Cheng-chi UnL, 1974), p. 37. 
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As the provincial conference was developing into a national movement, Mao decided to 
convene the Tenth CCP National Congress before the due date. 
The Tenth party congress met in Peking again under conditions of extreme secrecy from 
24 to 28 August 1973. The congress was held before the end of the five-year 
constitutional term of the Ninth CCP National Congress. According to article 8 of the 
Ninth Party Constitution, a party congress could be convened earlier than prescribed only 
under "special circumstance",54 which in this instance was certainly the Lin Piao incident, 
the name of Lin Piao had to be removed from the Party Constitution. There was, 
moreover, a need to replace those top leaders who had fallen with Lin Piao. 
The Tenth CCP National Congress, like the Ninth, received no advance publicity despite 
the fact that delegates were elected to this important gathering as early as May 1973.55 
The session of the Tenth CCP National Congress was extremely brief in comparison with 
those of the Eighth and Ninth CCP National Congress, which had lasted 13 and 24 days, 
respectively. 
The agenda of the Tenth CCP National Congress was as follows: First, Chou En-lai 
delivered the "political report" on behalf of the Central Committee of the CCP; second, 
Wang Hung-wen delivered the report on the revision of the party constitution on behalf of 
the CCPCC and submitted to the congress the Draft of the Constitution of the Communist 
Party of China, third, the Tenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was 
elected.56 
S4"The 1969 Party Constitution (14 Apr. 1969)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 -A 
DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 2240. 
SSCHINA MONTHLY, No. 697, (1 Oct. 1973), p. 17. 
56James T. Myers (ed), "Communique of the Tenth Party Congress", CHINESE POLITICS -
DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 225. 
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Other important reasons for the convening of the Tenth CCP National Congress before the 
due date were; to subsequently approve the resolution of the CCPCC on "Lin Piao anti-
Party clique", and to nullify Lin Piao's position and stress that of the Mao's throughout the 
proceedings of the Ninth CCP Nationl Congress. There was, moreover, a need to solve 
some important issues brought by Lin Piao incident, including the re-verification of the 
relationship between the party and the army, and the reconstruction of the army and 
party's organisations. 
In the "political report" that Chou En-lai delivered to the congress revealed publicly a full, 
official explanation of the rise and fall of the "Lin Piao anti-Party clique". Chou frequently 
referred to Mao's writings and used a certain amount of radical rhetoric. 
As to the denial of the importance of Lin Piao's position and stressing that of Mao's during 
the Ninth CCP National Congress. Chou made the following comments: "The party's 
Ninth Congress was held when great victories had been won in the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution personally initiated and led by chairman Mao... the political report to 
the Ninth Congress was drawn up under chairman Mao's guidance. Prior to the congress, 
Lin Piao had produced a draft political report in collaboration with Ch'en Po-ta. they were 
opposed to continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, contending 
that the main task after the Ninth Congress was to develop production. This was a 
refurbished version under new conditions of the same revisionist trash that Liu Shao-ch'i 
and Ch'en Po-ta had smuggled into the resolution of the Eighth congress, which alleged 
that the major contradiction in our country was not the contradiction between the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie, but that "between the advanced socialist system and the 
backward productive forces of society'. Naturally, this draft by Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta 
was rejected by the Central Committee. Lin Piao secretly supported Ch'en Po-ta in the 
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latter's open opposition to the political report drawn up under chairman Mao's guidance, 
and it was only after his attempts were frustrated that Lin Piao grudgingly accepted the 
political line of the Central Committee and read its political report to the congress".57 
As to the issue of political line, Chou En-lai asserted once again in his report as saying:58 
"Chairman Mao teaches us that 'the correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and 
political line decides everything'. I f one's line is incorrect, one's downfall is inevitable, 
even with the control of the central, local and army leadership. I f one's line is correct, 
even i f one has not a single soldier at first, there will be soldiers, and even i f there is no 
political power, political power will be gained... Lin Piao wanted to 'have everything 
under his command and everything at his disposal', but he ended up in having nothing 
under his command and nothing at his disposal. The crux of the matter is line. This is an 
irrefutable truth". 
Wang Hung-wen also indicated the importance of strengthening the party's centralised 
leadership in his Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution, he said: "The state 
organs, the PLA and revolutionary mass organisations 'must all accept the party's 
centralised leadership'. Organisationally, the party's centralised leadership should be given 
expression in two respects. First, as regards the relationship between various 
organisations at the same level, of the seven sectors - industry, agriculture, commerce, 
culture and education, the army, the government and the party, it is the party that 
exercises overall leadership; the party is not parallel to the others and still less is it under 
the leadership of any other. Second, as regards the relationship between higher and lower 
levels, the lower level is subordinate to the higher level, and the entire party is subordinate 
S7Ibid, pp. 207-208; Chou En-lai, "Report on the Tenth Party Congress (24 Aug. 1973)", RED FLAG, 
No. 9, 1973, pp. 5-6; THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979-A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, 
Vol. V, op. cit., pp. 2463-2469; NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 31 Aug. 1973. 
58Ibid, p. 212; Ibid, (RED FLAG), p. 10. 
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to the higher level, and the entire party is subordinate to the Central Committee... The 
most essential thing about the party's centralised leadership is leadership through a correct 
ideological and political line. Party Committees at all levels must, on the basis of chairman 
Mao's revolutionary line, achieve unity in thinking, policy, plan, command and action".39 
On these grounds, the article 7 of the Tenth Party Constitution laid down: "State organs, 
the People's Liberation Army and militia, labour unions, poor and lower-middle peasants 
associations, women's federation, the communist youth league, the Red Guards, the Little 
Red Guards, and other revolutionary mass organisations must all accept the centralised 
leadership of the party".60 
As the result of new Party Constitution, the phenomena of the gun commands the seven 
sectors, - industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, the army, the 
government and the party - formed by the PLA for carrying out its tasks of "three 
supports and two militaries" - supporting the revolutionary Left, supporting agriculture, 
and supporting industry; exercising military control and giving military training - during 
the Cultural Revolution, would cease. As to the relationship between the party and the 
army, the Tenth CCP National Congress had clearly stated that the Central Committee 
must thoroughly carry out the principle of "party commands the gun", and "the gun must 
never be allowed to command the party". 
Mao's intention to reinforce the unified leadership of the Party was aimed at restoring 
Party's control over the central and local military leaders of real power, and eradicating the 
mountain-stronghold mentality. According to the rule of the system of leadership, the 
59James T. Myers (ed.), "Wang Hung-wen's Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution", CHINESE 
POLITICS - DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 223; RED FLAG, No. 9, 1973, p. 22. 
60"The Party Constitution of the Tenth Party Congress (28 Aug. 1973", RED FLAG, No. 9, 1973, p. 27; 
NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 1 Sep. 1973. 
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leadership of the army was controlled by the CCPCC Military Commission. However, 
after the Cultural Revolution, most of the members of the CCPCC Military Commission 
were attacked or purged by the Cultural Revolutionary extreme left. Apart from Mao, the 
leadership of the army fell into the hands of Lin Piao and other regional military leaders, 
which mainly composed of the original Fourth Field Army. I f we take Canton Military 
Region for example, Ting Shen the commander; Kung Shih-ch'uan and Jen Szu-chuang the 
political commissar; all 11 vice-commanders included Huang Hai-lung; and 3 deputy 
political commissars included Hsiao Yiian-li, were all from Fourth Field Army. In other 
words, among the total 22 military leaders at the rank of vice-commander and above, and 
the rank of deputy political commissar and above, in the Canton Military Region, 17 
people, or 77.3 percent were from Fourth Field Army. 6 1 
In view of the strong force that the Fourth Field Army had at the centre and the local level 
which could not be ignored, and for the concern of army's stability, until the Tenth CCP 
National Congress, Mao handled the replacement or the transfer of military leaders of Lin 
Piao's faction with great care except for those who had direct connection with Lin Piao 
incident. Mao's approach was to carry out the replacement or the transfer by stages and in 
groups. To take Canton Military Region for example again, only Liu Hsin-yuan the first 
political commissar was transferred to the Chengtu Military Region and took charge of the 
same responsibility, while Hua Kuo-feng and Chung Han-hua were transferred in and 
became the political commissar and deputy political commissar of the Canton Military 
Region respectively, besides this, no other transfers or replacements were made. This 
situation also applied to the other military regions. Under such circumstance, i f Mao 
attempted to restore the principle of party commands the gun, and to secure the army at 
the same time, the only effective way was to conduct ideological works first, and 
6 1 "The Party-Army Relations after the Tenth Party Congress", in Warren Kao (ed.), THE CHINESE 
COMMUNIST PARTY AFTER THE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS, op. cit, p. 179. 
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moreover, with the revision of the Tenth Party Constitution and the personnel 
arrangement of the full and alternate members of the CCPCC, the political power of the 
army could be thus gradually weakened. It was noteworthy, however, Mao still agree to 
reserve considerable seats to military men to stabilise the army. 
A total of 1249 delegates were elected to the Tenth CCP National Congress. Tenth 
Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party, was elected at the congress, consisting 
of 195 full and 124 alternate members, a 40 members increase over the Ninth CCPCC. 35 
of the 170 full Ninth CCPCC members were not reelected and 3 were demoted to 
alternate status, while 10 had died. 55, or 28.2 percent, became full CCPCC members for 
the first time. The turnover was even more striking among the alternate members of the 
Tenth CCPCC, where those newly elected totalled 58, or 46.7 percent. While 18 of the 
109 Ninth CCPCC alternates were promoted to regular status, 28 were dropped.62 
The persecution of Lin Piao's clique was evident in the Tenth CCP Natioanl Congress; 22 
of the 35 full and 15 of the 28 alternates not reelected can be classified as Lin's 
accomplices.63 Some of Lin's supporters, such as Ting Sheng, Liu Hsing-yuan, and Han 
Hsien-ch'u, still retained their seats in the Tenth CCP National Congress, but their 
importance as a viable political group is rapidly diminished. Among the 195 full members 
of the Tenth CCPCC, 58 (28.8 percent) were military persona; 36 of the 124 alternate 
members, or 29 percent, were military personnel.64 
The following four points are significant concerning the growth and decline of the 
62Y. C. Chang, FACTIONAL AND COALITION POLITICS IN CHINA - THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 
AND ITS AFTERMATH, op. cit, p. 92. 
63Ibid, p. 92. 
64For the list of full and alternate members of the Tenth CC, please refers to RED FLAG, No. 9, 1973, 
pp. 34-35. 
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influence of military representation in the Tenth CCPCC and Politburo. 
Frst, the majority of the top military leaders of Lin Piao's clique were not reelected in the 
Tenth Congress. These included: Huang Yung-sheng (Chief of the general staff), Wu Fa-
hsien (commander-in-chief of the Air Force), L i Tso-p'eng (first political commissar of the 
Navy), Ch'iu Hui-tso (director of the General Logistics Department), K'uang Jen-nung 
(vice commander of the Air Force), Wu Jui-lin (commander-in-chief of the Navy), Tseng 
Kuo-hua (vice-commander of the Air Force), Wen Yu-ch'eng (deputy chief of the General 
Staff), Wang Ping-chang (vice-commander of the Air Force), Lung Shu-chin (commander 
of the Sinkiang Military Region), Liang T'ien-tsu (commander of the Chengtu Military 
Region), Cheng Wei-shan (commander of the Peking Military Region), Liu Feng (political 
commissar of the Wuhan Military Region), Chou Chih-p'ing (political commissar of 
Foochow Military Region), Nan P'ing (first political commissar of the Chekiang Military 
District), Ch'eng Shih-ch'ing (deputy political commissar of the Foochow Military District 
and concurrent political commissar of the Kiangsi Military District). 6 5 
Second, with the exception of those top military leaders who had fallen with Lin Piao, the 
influence of Lin's faction, however, was not completely eliminated. With Lin Piao, as a 
group, they were still very much entrenched in the party, evidenced by the fact that every 
leading figure in the PLA headquarters was elected to the Tenth Central Committee. 
Moreover, with the exception of 3 political commissars, Yang Sheng-p'ing (Tsinan 
Military Region), Yeh Cheng (Chengtu Military Region), and Ts'ao Su-ming (Sinkiang 
Military Region), the commanders and political commissars of the 11 military regions were 
selected for positions in the new Central Committee.66 In short, the military still wielded 
6STHE COLLECTIONS OF THE PERSONNEL DATA OF THE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS, (Taipei: 
Institute of Chinese Communist Studies, 1973), pp. 187-189. 
66Y. C. Chang, FACTIONAL AND COAUTION POLITICS IN CHINA - THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 
AND ITS AFTERMATH, op. cit., p. 95. 
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considerable power, which they could bring to bear in future controversies. 
Third, the person who occupied an important military post was usually a member of the 
Tenth CCPCC, this was relevant to the above point. 
And fourth, Most of the military leaders of outside Lin's clique, who were purged during 
the Cultural Revolution, were liberated and reinstated. 
Furthermore, the number of members in the Tenth politburo had remained the same as that 
of the Ninth CCP National Congress. With the exception of Lin Piao (purged) and his 
clique including Yeh Ch'un, Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, L i Tso-p'eng, Ch'iu Hui-tso 
and Ch'en Po-ta (purged), and Hsieh Fu-chih (died), all Ninth Politburo members were 
elected. They were: Mao Tse-tung, Yeh Chien-ying, Liu Po-ch'eng, Chiang Ch'ing, Chu 
Te, Hsu Shih-yu, Ch'en Hsi-lien, L i Hsien-nien, Chou En-lai, K'ang Sheng, Tung Pi-wu, 
Yao Wen-yuan, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, a total of 13 members. Of the 4 alternates of the 
Ninth Politburo, only 1, L i Hsueh-feng, was purged; the other three L i Te-sheng, Chi 
Teng-k'uei and Wang Tung-hsing, were elevated to the status of full members, all 8 
purged were connected in one way or another with the military. 
In addition, 8 new full members, Wei Kuo-ch'ing, Wang Hung-wen, Hua Kuo-feng, Chi 
Teng-k'uei, Wu Te, Chiang Tung-hsin, Ch'en Yung-kuei and L i Te-sheng, and 4 new 
alternate members, Wu Kuei-hsien, Su Chen-hua, N i Chih-fu and Sai Fu-ting were elected 
to replace those eliminated; all can be categorised as cadres with the exception of L i Te-
sheng, Wang Tung-hsing and Su Chen-hua. 
Of the 9 members of the standing committee of the Tenth politburo, Mao Tse-tung, Chou 
En-lai, and K'ang Sheng retained their seats, the remaining six: Wang Hung-wen, Yeh 
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Chien-ying, L i Te-sheng, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chu Te and Tung Pi-wu were newly 
elected. The list of order was:67 Mao Tse-tung, Wang Hung-wen, Yeh Chien-ying, Chu 
Te, L i Te-sheng, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chou En-lai, K'ang Sheng and Tung Pi-wu. 
The number of vice-chairman was increased from 1, Lin Piao, to 5 in the Tenth Congress -
Chou en-lai, Wang Hung-wen, K'ang sheng, Yeh Chien-ying and L i The-sheng.68 The 
ordering was a subtle indication of their relative status and ranking. Of five vice-chairmen, 
Yeh Chien-ying were military men, Wang Hung-wen, K'ang Sheng, belonged to Cultural 
Revolutionary extreme left, only L i Te-sheng covered the both. 
The special feature of the Tenth Congress and its influence includes: 
First, The Tenth Congress eradicated Lin Piao influence from the Politburo, openly 
declared Lin Piao's "crime" and subsequently approved the "Resolution of CCPCC 
concerning Lin Piao anti-Party Clique". The "Communique of the Tenth Party Congress" 
clearly stated: The congress indignantly denounced the Lin Piao anti-Party clique for its 
crimes. All the delegate firmly supported this resolution of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China: Expel Lin Piao, the bourgeois careerist, conspirator, 
counterrevolutionary double-dealer, renegade and traitor, from the party once and for all; 
expel Ch'en Po-ta, principal member of the Lin Piao anti-Communist, Kuomintang 
element, Trotskyite, renegade, enemy agent and revisionist, from the party once and for 
all, and dismiss him from all post inside and outside the party. The delegates unanimously 
supported the decisions made and all the corresponding measures taken by the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of china with regard to the other principle members of 
6 1 "Communique on the First Plenum of the Tenth Party Congress (30 Aug. 1973)", RED FLAG, No. 9, 
1973, p. 36. 
^Ibid. 
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the Lin Piao anti-Party Clique. 
Second, the Tenth Congress did not appoint the successor to Mao Tse-tung. Among five 
vice-chairmen of the Eighth CCPCC were Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Ch'en Yiin 
and Lin Piao, Liu Shao-ch'i ranked the first and was appointed the successor to Mao, 
while in Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC, Lin Piao became Mao's successor, and 
moreover, the Party Constitution of the Ninth Congress clearly stated that Lin Piao was 
Mao's successor and the only vice-chairman. Of five vice-chairmen of the Tenth CCPCC, 
Chou En-lai ranked the first, but he was not appointed the successor to Mao Tse-tung, 
Wang Hung-wen (from working-class, and a member of Cultural Revolutionary extreme 
left) ranked the second, K'ang Sheng (with the background of secret service, and a 
member of Cultural Revolutionary extreme left), L i Te-sheng (from the Second Field 
Army, and a member of Cultural Revolutionary extreme left), after Yeh Chien-ying, 
ranked the last of all. Such personnel arrangement by Mao was to counterbalance the 
force of Chou En-lai with that of the above three. Mao chose Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao 
to be his successor at the Eighth and Ninth CCP National Congress respectively, but 
omitted Chou En-lai intentionally. While at the Tenth CCP Nationsl Congress, under the 
stress of circumstance, Mao had to use Chou En-lai for his prestige in the party and army. 
However, the intention to contain Chou's force was quite evident, although Chou ranked 
the first of all vice-chairmen, his political space was rather small, and moreover, of 9 full 
members of the standing committee of Politburo, Wang Hong-wen ranked the second, 
while Chou only ranked seventh, after L i Te-Sheng and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao. 
Third, for the concern of army's stability, Mao had not eradicated completely the political 
influence of the army in the Central. After the Tenth Congress, however, Mao began to 
69"Communiqui of the Tenth Party Congress", RED FLAG, No. 9, 1973, p. 31; James T. Myers (ed.), 
CHINESE POLITICS-DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS, Vol. II, op. cit.,pp. 226-227. 
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counteract the expansion of military power with the force of Cultural Revolutionary 
extreme left stage by stage. 
PLA had considerable influence in the Chinese Communist Party in the past. Of the ten 
marshals, Chu Te, Lin Piao, Yeh Chien-yin was the vice-chairman, and all of them had 
been members of the Politburo. In the Eleventh Plenum of Eighth CCPCC, with the 
exception of Lo Jung-huan, who died, and P'eng Te-huai, who was purged, all 8 
commanders were the members of the Politburo. 
In the two struggles against Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao during the Cultural Revolution, 
many military cadres from Red First Front Army, First Field Army and Red Fourth Field 
Army, who could be counted as Mao's direct line of descent, were purged. Consequently, 
after the incident of Lin Piao's, the military power was mainly controlled by the cadres 
from Fourth Front Army, Second Field Army and Third Field Army. Strictly speaking, 
these cadres, however, were not Mao's direct line of the descent. Thus, the arrangement 
of Cultural Revolutionary extreme left headed by Chiang Ch'ing to enter the political arena 
of the Central at the Tenth Congress was, to a certain extent, for containing the influence 
of non-Mao's direct line of descent. 
Mao depended on the army to settle the social unrest and chaos accompanied by the 
Cultural Revolution, but to do so, the prerequisite was to have a stable army. Moreover, 
Mao had responsibility for the occurrence of Lin's Piao's incident, to restrict the attack to 
the range of Lin's clique, would only be too beneficial to himself. 
And the fourth, the Fourth Field Army was seriously destroyed before and after the Tenth 
Congress, and consequently, the other field armies regained power, which laid the 
foundation for a series of army consolidation program in later days. In addition, Mao 
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retained certain amount of military representation in the Central units at the Tenth CCP 
National Congress, which constituted the major failure of the Cultural Revolutionary 
extreme left in their subsequent power-seizure struggle. Moreover, by taking the 
opportunity to transfer the commanders of eight military great regions, Mao successfully 
restored the party's control over the army70. 
To avoid any panic in the army, the purge of military leaders of Lin's clique was carried 
out by stages and in groups. After the Tenth CCP National Congress, apart from the 
continual purge of Lin's clique, an order of transfers among the commanders of eight great 
military regions in ten days was issued by the CCPCC Military Commission on 22 
December of the same year.71 The detail of transfers were made as follows: the transfer 
70Prior to the Tenth Congress, the major military cadres of Lin's clique being purged included: Huang 
Yang Sheng (chief of the General Staff), Wu Fa-hsien (commander of the Air Force), Li Tso-p'eng (first 
political commissar of the Navy), Ch'iu Hui-tso (director of the General Logistics Department), Yeh 
Ch'un (director of the Administrative Office of the Military Commission), Yen Chung-Ch'uan (deputy 
chief of the General Staff), Ch'en Chi-te (deputy chief of the General Staff), Huang Chih-yung (deputy-
director of the General Logistics Department), Wang Hsi-ke (deputy-director of the General Logistics 
Department), Ch'en Pan (deputy-directory of the General Logistics Department), Chou Yu-chen (deputy-
director of the General Logistics Department), Yen Ch'un (deputy-director of the General Logistics 
Department), Chang Ming-yuan (deputy-director of the General Logistics Department), Han Chen-chi, 
(deputy-director of the General Logistics Department), Chang Ching-i (vice commander of the Navy), 
Chang Hsiao-chuan (vice-commander of the Navy), Tseng Kuo-hua (vice-commander of the Air Force), 
Wang Ping-chang (vice-commander of the Air Force), Tan Chia-Shu (vice-commander of the Air Force), 
Ho Cheng-ya (vice-commander of the Air Force), Liu Chin-ping (deputy political commissar of the Air 
Force), Yu Wen (deputy political commissar of the Air Force), Yang Chin (deputy political commissar of 
the Air Force), Ch'en Shih-ching (first political commissar of the Kiangsi Military District), Yang Tung-
Hang (commander of the Kiangsi Military District), Lan Yi-Nung (first political commissar of Kweichow 
Military District), Pu Chan-ya (deputy political commissar of the Canton Military Region and concurrent 
first political commissar of the Hunan Military District), Wei Tsu-ling (political commissar of the 
Kwangsi Military District), Nan P'ing (political commissar of the Chekiang Military District), Hsiung 
Ying-tang (commander of the Chekiang Military District), Liu Feng (political commissar of Wuhan 
Military Region), Chou Chih-p'ing (political commissar of Honan Military District), Liang Tien-tsu 
(commander of the Chengtu Military Region), Lung Shu-chin (commander of Sinkiang), Wang Hsin 
(political commissar of the Honan Military Region) and so on. 
See Chang Chin-wen, "The Inner-Party Struggle of the Chinese Communist Party after the Tenth Party 
Congress", in Warren Kuo (ed), THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AFTER THE TENTH PARTY 
CONGRESS, op. ext., p. 44. 
7 1 Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 
op. cit, p. 146; "Speech at a Plenary Meeting of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of 
the CCP (28 Dec. 1977)", THE SELECTED WORKS OF TENG HSIAO-P'ING, op. cit., p. 97. 
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between L i Te-sheng (Peking Military Region) and Ch'en Hsi-lien (Shenyang M . R.); Hsu 
Shih-yu (Nanking M R.) and Ting Sheng (Canton M.R.); Yang Te-chih (Tsinan M R.) and 
Tseng Szu-Yu (Wuhan M R ) ; Han Hsien-ch'u (Foochow M.R.) and Pi Ting-ch'un 
(Lanchow M.R.). In addition, Mao also appointed first political commissars of 3 great 
military regions, Peking, Canton and Tsinan, at the same time. 
On 2 January 1974, People's Daily reported this transfer, but the additional title, secretary 
of the provincial party committee, of these commander was not added.72 The Party's 
Central could select appropriate persons to fill the vacancies in the provincial party 
committee caused by this transfer, and thus restored party's control over the regional 
army. 
The Tenth CCP National Congress was one of the key conferences in the transformation 
of political role of the PLA. The congress subsequent approved the resolution of the 
CCPCC on Lin Piao anti-Party clique. It was, in reality, to approve Mao's purge of Lin 
Piao, and to openly criticise Lin Piao for his betrayal of Mao. 7 3 Lin Piao and his followers 
were criticised as follows: Lin Piao and his handful of sworn followers were a counter-
revolutionary conspiratorial clique who never showed up without a copy of Quotations in 
hand and never opened their mouths without shouting long live and who spoke nice things 
to your face but stabled you in the back. .. They pursued the criminal aim of the 
counterrevolutionary armed coup d'etat they launched in order to usurp the supreme 
powers of the party and the state.74 
"PEOPLE'SDAILY, 2 Jan. 1974. 
73James T. Myers (ed.), "Chou En-lai Political report to the Congress", CHINESE POLITICS -
DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 209-213; NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 31 Aug. 
1973. 
74lbid, p. 210. 
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After the Tenth CCP National congress, People's Daily and Red Flag published a series of 
articles for carrying out ideological works so as to eradicate the party and political power 
of the regional military cadres. Among all, some important paper were as follows: 
In October 1973, the Red Flag published a paper, entitled On Esteeming Confucian and 
anti-Legalist. The paper indicated, "Ch'inshihhuang (the First Emperor of the Ch'in 
Dynasty) abolished the feudal system after he unified China in 221 B.C., bring the status of 
split to an end. However, the overthrowned masters of the slaves and feudal nobles 
resolutely opposed the system of prefectures and counties of the centralism of the state. 
Wang Kuan, the Prime Minister and their political representative, suggested the 
restoration of the feudal system, while Li Szu, the well-known representative of Legalist 
School, reputed this was an backward and reactionary assertion, and stressed that the 
system of prefectures and counties was the only way to consolidate the stability of the 
feudal dynasties, i f the feudal system should be restored, the status of split and chaos 
would happen again. Ch'inshihhuang adopted Li Szu's suggestion, considered the feudal 
system was the origin of split and civil war, and, consequently, persisted in the system of 
prefectures and counties".75 The above viewpoint was reasserted in the paper, On the 
Struggle between the restoration and anti-restoration in the course of the establishment 
of Ch'in Dynasty - The Social Structure of The Polemic between the Confucian and 
Legalist Schools,16 of the Red Flag in November of the same year. 
In May 1974, the Red Flag carried a paper, entitle Study on Salt and Iron -Big Polemic 
between the Confucian and Legalist Schools in the Middle Western Han Dynasty.11 The 
75Shih Lun "On Esteeming Confucian and anti-Legalist", RED FLAG, No. 10, 1973, p. 38. 
76Lo Shih-ting, "On the Struggle between the Restoration and Anti-restoration in the Course of the 
Establishment of Chin Dynasty - The Social Structure of The Polemic between the Confucian and 
Legalist Schools", RED FLAG, No. 11. 1971, pp. 30-40. 
77"Study on Salt and Iron - Big Polemic between the Confucian and Legalist Schools in the Middle 
Western Han Dynasty", RED FLAG, No. 5, 1974, pp. 12-19. 
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paper once again applied the method of "using ancient matters to satirise the present", and 
indicated: The conference on salt and iron held in 81 B.C. (6 years after young Emperor 
Chao succeeded to the throne of Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty) was virtually a big 
polemic between the Confucian and Legalist schools in the political, economic, military 
and cultural fields.... The theme of the conference on salt and iron was the question of 
whether to persist in or alter Emperor Wu's political line on consolidating national unity 
and strengthening the Central government. .. As soon as the conference on salt and iron 
began, they (Prime Minister, General Huo Kuang and many others) ferociously launched 
their attack. The aim of their attack was the government salt and iron monopoly policy 
during the reign of Emperor Wu. They appeared to be attacking an economic problem, 
but hiding behind the attack was a vicious and dangerous political motive. It is known 
that the implementation of the government salt and iron monopoly policy was one of 
Emperor Wu's important measures to strengthen the Central government's power and 
cope with the Huns during the Han Dynasty. Nullification of this policy meant destruction 
of the material base for a series of other domestic and foreign policies to strengthen the 
Central government. At the conference on salt and iron, the debate between the Legalist 
and Confiicianists on domestic policy centred on the question of whether the state should 
remain unified or be divided ... Carrying on the cause started by Ch'inshihhuang, Emperor 
Wu of Han Dynasty resolutely suppressed local tyrants in order to strengthen the 
centralism of the state and insure the smooth implementation of the policy on the 
government salt and iron monopoly. 
These papers highly praised Ch'inshihhuang for his suppression of Confucians as well as 
the substitution of the system of prefectures and counties for the feudal system, and 
emphasised the importance of strengthening the centralism of the state by applying the 
case of the conference on salt and iron in 81 B.C. It's aim was, applying the method of 
"using ancient matters to satirise the present", to criticise Lin Piao and commanders of 
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military regions, who were usually the concurrent first secretary of the Provincial Party 
Committee and director of the Revolutionary Committee, for arrogating all powers in the 
party, government and the army to themselves. Moreover, the papers intended to lay the 
theoretic basis for a series of measures, the transfer of commanders among the 8 great 
military regions and the assignment of the first political and first secretary by the CCPCC, 
to ensure the centralised control of the party over the regional party, government and the 
army. 
In addition to the above, in February 1974, the Red Flag carried a paper, The Study 'On 
Feudalism' by Liu Tsung-yuan of the Tang Dynasty. The paper constantly mentioned 
"The vassals' occupation of territory", and "the arrogant and imperious vassals often 
quarrelled with Central Government in Changan for the independence of it's territory", and 
concluded that "the cause for their rebellion was "having the armed forces", and thus "the 
control of the army was of the most important".78 
Shortly after, the Red Flag carried another article, What Determined Ch'in's Unification 
of China?, in No. 3 in the same year, arguing that "Ch'in's unification was determined by 
Ch'inshihhuang's correct line, not by commanders' military success", and "under the 
correct line, the victory can be achieved even without capable commanders".79 
This two article was aimed at stressing the importance of the correct line, nullifying the 
military achievement of Lin Piao and other regional commanders. The so-called "correct 
line" was, of course, Mao's line of "party commands the gun", of "politics takes the lead", 
and of "opposing purely military viewpoint". In other words, only party commands the 
78Chou Yi-liang, "The Study 'On Feudalism' by Liu Tsung-yuan of the Tang Dynasty", RED FLAG, No. 2, 
1974, pp. 32-39. 
79LiShih, "What Determined Chin's Unification of China?", RED FLAG, No. 3, 1974, pp. 15-21. 
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gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party. 
After the Tenth CCP National Congress, the political role of the PLA began to weaken. 
The phenomena of military representation in all bodies, of making no distinction between 
the party and the army, or even of "the army control the party" during the Cultural 
Revolution was gradually diminished. Nevertheless, the historical background of the dual-
role elite of the PLA, the political role of the army could only be weakened, but would 
never be rooted out. One of the best proofs was that among the full and alternate 
members of the Tenth CCP National Congress, over 25 percent were military men. 
It was noteworthy that Mao had not encountered much resistance from the army in 
weakening the party and political power of militarist in the central and locality. Of course, 
Mao's approach of carrying out the purge or transfer by stages and in group, paying 
attention to the stability of the army, had much to contribute to it, but, moreover, there 
were another two important factors. 
The first, Mao's authority had made him became the "supreme leader" worshipped by the 
military. Be loyal to the "supreme leader" became a part of the doctrine of the PLA. This 
personality cult enabled Mao to carry out his personnel changes in the PLA smoothly, and 
thus when Mao issued a order to transfer or dismiss some high-rank military leaders, it 
undoubtedly carried absolute authority and legitimacy. 
And the second, Lin Piao's clique purged many military leader other than Fourth Field 
Army for the seizure of power during the Cultural Revolution. This had caused the 
disapproval of outside Lin's faction and made too many enemies. Once Lin had fallen, 
Lin's clique would certainly became the prime target of attack. Consequently, when Mao 
issued an order to transfer these people, the great majority would only be too happy to see 
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it done. 
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Chapter VII . Conclusion 
Characteristically, although not universally, the political structure in a developing country 
came to be marked by three salient phenomena: the repeated emergence of armed patron -
client sets, cemented by personal ties of dominance and sub-mission, and by a common 
desire to obtain wealth by force of arms; the lack of institutionalised means for succession 
to offices; and the use of violence in political competition.1 Furthermore, civil-military 
relations in any society reflect the overall nature and level of development of the society 
and its political system. The key question is the extent to which military men and interests 
are differentiated from non-military men and interests. This differentiation may take place 
on three levels, namely, the relation between the armed forces as a whole and society as a 
whole; the relation between the leadership of the armed forces as an elite group and other 
elite groups; and the relation between the commanders of the armed forces and the top 
political leaders of society.2 
In addition to all of the above, the political role of the military appeared differently 
according to the special features of a nation's structure. For example, the function of the 
PLA, basically, was to firstly to defend the nation from external attack and to deter such 
an attack if possible; secondly to counter internal threats to the regime in order to maintain 
order and stability, by directing police forces and public security forces, which in turn were 
backed up by army regulars; thirdly to provide inspiration for the people as a symbol of 
ideological and political devotion which the leadership expects; fourthly to exercise an 
important portion of political leadership, particularly through its inter-looking systemic 
connections with the party hierarchy; and finally to guarantee and support Chinese foreign 
lEric R. Wolf & Edward C. Hansen, "Caudillo Politics: A Structural Analysis", COMPARATIVE 
STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY, No. 9, 1967, p. 169. 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE, Vol. II, (The MacmiUan Company 
& The Free Press, 1968), p. 487. 
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policy.3 The function of the PL A covered a wide range of areas, and as in most 
developing countries, it could not remain politically neutral. The PLA, however, had 
never intervened in politics, and this was a major difference from other developing 
countries. It always followed the leadership of the Party. Moreover, the special 
characteristics of PLA's organisational structure and of its dual-role elite had direct and 
influential significance to the development of the political role of the PLA. 
It should be noted that the formation of the political role of the PLA was derived from 
Mao's principle of "party commands the gun". Although Mao continually stressed the 
political functions of the PLA, his view different from Carl von Clausewitz's assertion that 
"War is the policy by other maeans".4 The main function of the army, fundamentally, was 
to safeguard national security. In Mao's view, however, politics were the highest priority 
as he said before, "politics is the commander, is the soul", all policies must be subordinate 
to politics. Mao's concept of politics was also nothing like that of the democratic 
countries. His politics, in reality, is another word for struggle and clearly still remained at 
the stage of people's war. Mao regarded the military as merely the peasant in uniform. 
Since the peasant was the tool for revolution, the military, without a doubt, could only be 
a tool as well. 
Like the army of those successive dynasties since the Ch'in (221 B.C. - 207B.C), the 
peasant also constituted the major force of the PRC's army. However, if one compares it 
with that of each successive dynasty in Chinese history, the cardinal difference was that, 
the army of Mao's was imbued with the thorough teaching of political ideology and was 
given a high degree of political responsibility. This political function of the PLA was 
* Jason C. Hu, "On the Influence of he PLA in Post-Mao PRC Politics" in Jiirgen Domes (ed.), CHINESE 
POLITICS AFTER MAO, (Cardiff: University College Press, 1979), p. 88. 
4For details ofClausewitz arguments refer to C. Reynolds, THE POLITICS OF WAR, op. cit., pp. 59-83. 
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gradually strengthened when Lin Piao replaced P'eng Te-huai as the Minister of National 
Defence in 1959 and reached its peak during the Cultural Revolution. As mentioned in 
Chapter I I , the function of the PL A in politics was determined at the "Sanwan 
Reorganisation" in September 1927 and the "Kutien Conference" in December 1929. The 
"Sanwan Reorganisation" was the foundation of the PRC's implementation of a Party 
Committee System in the army. Although it also touched upon the system of political 
works of the PLA, in reality the quality of the constituent members of the PLA was poor, 
the system of political works was not sound enough to put into practice. The "Kutien 
Resolution" clearly declared that "military affairs are only one means of accomplishing 
political tasks, the army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the 
revolution". In the "resolution", Mao explicitly opposed the "purely military viewpoint" 
and stressed that "the Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political 
tasks of the revolution".5 
The military policy of integration between soldiers and peasants was an important policy in 
the history of China. It was debatable whether "all soldiers are peasants" or "all peasants 
are soldiers", The army based on peasants was likely to be restrained by the characteristics 
of Chinese social structure and by Confucian morals. Most soldiers possessed the 
following traits: being loyal to autocratic authority or central authority, and "Loyalty" as 
perfect morality; having certain respect and fear towards autocratic authority, fear of 
punishment by superiors; and the army, in name, is the nation's army, but, in reality, is the 
autocratic authority's army, and therefore they potentially play an important role in 
politics. 
Moreover, the CCP's Revolution was one based on peasant support and led by a small 
5"On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec. 1929)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, 
Vol. I (1975), op. cit, p. 105. 
397 
number of intellectuals. In the initial stage of party-building, an intellectual usually had to 
be in charge of party's work, or to be a commander to direct the peasant uprising. At the 
stage of army-building, the responsible cadres of the party in the central or the locality 
were normally political commissars in the army. Therefore, among leaders of the CCP 
revolutionary generation, most of them were dual-role elites from a political and a military 
background. The party and military leadership had no significant differentiation and were 
controlled by the same organisation. After its regime was founded in 1949, the party 
leaders of the revolutionary generation not only occupied important posts in the party and 
the army, but also became administrative bureaucrats of various government 
organisations. Based on such a unique structure combination of party, military, and 
government, hence, the overlapping between various roles and functions in the PRC 
political system can been seen in many cases. 
The unique structure of dual or multi-role elites accounts for the reason why the ultimate 
political principle of the "party commands the army" or of the "party commands the gun", 
on which Mao insisted was never opposed publicly by the military bureaucrats. This also 
accounts for one of the reasons why the praetorian political system did not appear during 
Mao's regime. PRC is a typical nation of "party commands the army". It should be noted 
that the scope and depth for PLA to participate in politics depended entirely on how much 
the leader or the authorities had to rely on the army. The army never took the initiative, 
but was, rather, passive in its participation in politics. 
To analyse from the intensity of military intervention in politics, civil-military relations can 
normally be illustrated by the application of the Mathematical concept of a continuum, 
shown as follows:6 
Occupational opinion group, which expresses or lobbies for certain interests and policies, but exerts 
relatively little or no political pressure. Pressure interest group, which exerts pressure on decision-
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(l)Complete 
Civilian Rule 
(2)0ccupational (3)Pressure (4)Competitive 
Opinion Group Interest Group Elite Group 
(5)Veto 
Elite Group 
(6)Direct 
Military Rule 
7 Increase of Military Influence Note: 
Decrease of Military Influence 
At left end, the complete civilian rule represents the non-existence of military participation 
in political affairs, at right end, the direct military rule represents all the political power 
controlled by the military. Because of Mao's supreme position in the Party and the PLA's 
unique structure, neither the complete civilian rule, nor the veto elite group or the direct 
military rule appeared in the PLA. The PLA simply raised from the occupational opinion 
group to the competitive elite group according to Mao's wish. 
Mao's view concerning military power was quite candid and straightforward. He indicated 
that "every communist must grasp the truth, 'political power grows out of the barrel of a 
gun', our principle is that the party commands the gun and the gun must never be allowed 
to command the party" . 7 In order to guard against the appearance of the "gun commands 
the party", Mao deliberately controlled the army through the direct involvement of a 
power system and personnel arrangement in politics, the military as well as the Party. He 
further intensified his control over the army to the extent of absolute loyalty to himself 
alone by developing a personality cult in all political campaigns. It was because of this 
that Mao held a special viewpoint about the political role of the military, he in reality did 
not care for the importance of the political role of militarists, or whether they were strong 
making in political affairs but remains outside the decision-making elite. Competitive elite group, which 
produces considerable influence. Veto elite group, which having the might to veto any decision that goes 
against its interest but falling short of the decisive power to realise a new decision totally on its own 
initiative. 
See Jason C. Hu, "On the Influence of he PLA in Post-Mao PRC Politics" in Jtirgen Domes (ed), 
CHINESE POLITICS AFTER MAO, op. cit.p. 86. 
1 "Problems of War and Strategy (6 Nov. 1938)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE TUNG, Vol. II 
(1965), op. cit., p. 224. 
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or weak, what he insisted on was the effective control of the army and to ensure his 
supreme position in the army. The political campaigns of the PLA, he argued, at all times 
should follow his absolute leadership and should proceed under the general principle of 
consolidating Maoist ideology. Any political movements in the army should stick to the 
principle of "safeguard chairman Mao's military line" and "support the central committee 
led by chairman Mao". Any militarist showing a slight difference in his political standing 
or anyone whom Mao subjectively believed did not or possibly would not follow his 
leadership absolutely was criticised, The incidents of Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih, P'eng Te-
huai, Lo Jui-ch'ing and Lin Piao were examples of this. 
The national conference of the Chinese communist Party, passed the "Resolution on the 
Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih anti-party Alliance" on 31 March 1955.8 Kao and Jao were 
denounced on the grounds that "Their only program was to seize the supreme power of 
the party and the state by conspiratorial means".9 
The incident of "Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance" had two impacts on the development of the 
political role of the PLA: firstly, Mao took the first step of weakening the regional 
commanders so as to consolidate his control over the local armies, and finally, Lin Piao 
successfully escaped the consequences of the purge of Kao-Jao, and preserved the actual 
strength of the Fourth Field Army which was led by him. This contributed to his rise 
because Mao had to rely on him and the PLA's forces to carry out the struggle against Liu 
Shao-ch'i. The rise of Lin Piao also put an end to the professional army-building program 
promoted by P'eng Te-huai in his tenure as Minister of National Defence. 
^"Resolution on the Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih Anti-Party Alliance (31 Mar. 1955)", PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 160-161; WHO'S 
WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, op. cit., pp. 377-378. For 
details ofKao^Jao Anti-party event please refer to Chapter V, Section I. 
9"An Analysis of Kao-Jao Anti-Party Event", Yao Heng-Hsuen (ed), A SUMMARY OF INNER-PARTY 
STRUGGLE OF THE CCP, op. cit., p. 228. 
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Following the Kao-Jao incident, other important events, which had substantial impact on 
the development of the political role of the PLA, were P'eng Te-huai's appointment of 
Minister of National Defence in September 1954 and the convening of the "Eighth CCP 
National Congress" in September 1956. The Eighth CCP National Congress passed the 
resolution to enumerate Marxism-Leninism instead of Mao Tse-tung's thought as the 
guiding principle for the party in the "General Program" of the new Party Constitution, 
and thus the General Program of the old Party Constitution adopted by the Seventh CCP 
National Congress stating "Mao Tse-tung thought - the theory which integrates Marxism-
Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution - as the guide in all its work" . 1 0 
Both military and politics are the same sub-system of the state, and there exists a 
relationship of transaction between them, but in a well democratised country, the role of 
the military should be in military instead of political affairs, that is, apart from the task of 
national defence, the military should not intervene in political or social movements, and 
the military should not wield their armed forces to seize political power. Furthermore, the 
recruitment of military elite should have standard procedures and confine to laws. The 
army can only belong to the state, not to any political party, and should pledge its loyalty 
to the government, instead of an individual. 
Prior to the Eighth CCP National Congress, after P'eng Te-huai became Minister of 
National Defence, he had attempted to reconstruct Maoist revolutionary and politicised 
army into a modernised armed force, This had offended Mao. Moreover, Mao's crisis 
consciousness was further strengthened at the Eighth CCP National Congress when it 
passed the resolution to remove Mao Tse-tung's thought from the Party Constitution of 
J0"On the Party", THE SELECTED WORKS OF LIU SHAO-CH'I, Vol. I (1984), op. cit., p. 315. 
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Seventh CCP National Congress, which was considered as the prerequisite for turning the 
PLA in a professional and regular national army and for the discarding of personality cult. 
In view of this, after the Eighth CCP National Congress, Mao began to reconstruct the 
army to ensure "red" above "expect" and the long-standing tradition of "party command 
the gun", and to further secure his supreme leadership. 
The Eighth CCP National congress was undoubtedly the begining of the CCP's attempt to 
take the road of collective leadership. To Mao, it was a challenge to his power, Mao of 
course could not accept this. After the Eighth CCP National Congress, Mao's 
reconstruction of the army was aimed at consolidating the control of the "barrel of a gun". 
The Lushan conference in 1959, where Mao successfully turned the original anti-left 
struggle into the anti-right struggle and where P'eng Te-huai's fate was decided, had 
clearly confirmed Mao's peerless prestige in the Army and the Party. The removal of Mao 
Tse-tung's thought in the Party Constitution of the Eighth CCP National Congress did not 
violate Mao's authoritative leadership. While Mao did not feel enhanced because of this, 
the sense of power insecurity forced Mao to expand military political influence to a even 
larger extent. Consequently, by Mao's appeal, the military had expanded their political 
role, provided they were subordinated to the absolute leadership of Mao. Basically, the 
political power of the militarists should never endanger the authority of Mao's supreme 
leadership, otherwise a purge was inescapable. In other words, the army only played a 
dependent variable in politics, Mao himself was the real independent variable. 
The experience of the Korean war undoubtedly had a profound effect on the army-building 
program of the PLA. P'eng Te-huai, who once was the commander of "Chinese People's 
volunteers" for the "struggle to resist US aggression and aid Korea", ordered all members 
of the PLA to study intensively all the advanced experiences of the Soviet forces, to 
acquire the art of modern war, to obey orders, observe discipline, and struggle to assure 
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victory in each military operation. This marked the beginning of a concentrated effort 
thoroughly to professionalise and regularise the armed forces in imitating soviet military 
ethic and style. 
During the Korean war, the advent of extreme-professionalism in the PLA seriously 
undermined the credibility of the commissars especially at the unit level, his traditional 
right to countersign all orders was frequently ignored, especially at the company level 
where battle pressures were most acute. 
The accomplishment of military tasks was an essential prerequisite of Pang's army-building 
program of regularisation and professionalisation. Military training therefore had to 
increase considerably, while other political and non-military tasks must decrease in 
proportion. Based on this condition, not only the role of political commissars and 
members of the party committee must be restricted, but their power and responsibility 
must also be reduced, and thus the principle of "party commands the army" and the 
fundamental essence of the "army is the fighting group as well as working team", which 
were determined by the "Sanwan reorganisation" and "Kutien conference", would also be 
questioned. The army-building program of Pang's was in essence in confrontation with the 
principle of Mao's "party commands the gun" and "politics takes the lead". 
At the Lushan conference in 1959, P'eng was classified as the "anti-party group" and of 
being a "representative of rightist opportunism attacking the party". Mao accused P'eng 
of "recruiting men and buying horses" and being "overweeningly ambitious".11 On 1 June 
1966, the editorial of the Liberation Army's Daily clearly pointed out the reason for 
P'eng's fall from power, it stated "the chief members of the anti-party group that were 
1 1 "Mao Tse-tung's speech at the Eighth Plenary Session of the CCP's Eighth Central Committee", 
ISSUES AND STUDIES, Vol. VI, No. 7, (April 1970), pp. 80-86. 
403 
exposed by the party in the Lushan conference, making use of their power that seized from 
the army, attempted to abolish the absolute leadership, of the party in the army and 
political work,... abolish local forces and militia, and fundamentally negating Mao's 
people's army and the ideology of the people's war" . 1 2 
After P'eng fell from power, Lin Piao replaced him as Minister of National Defence and 
was promoted to the post as the First Vice-chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission, 
and handled its day-to-day works. Immediately after Lin Piao assumed power, he 
delivered the paper March Ahead Under the Red Flag of the Party General Line and Mao 
Tse-tung's Military Thinking,13 this was an important article in determining the political 
role of the PLA. The paper criticised and nullified P'eng's professional and regular army-
building program, and re-established the political tradition of "party commands the gun". 
It was noteworthy, the PRC fell into a strategic predicament facing a possible pincer 
attack from the United States and the Soviet Union as two potential enemies. This was 
the biggest threat to the PRC's national security which Lin had to encounter after he 
becoming the Minister of National Defence. On the one hand, Lin had to pacify the army's 
morale and eradicate P'eng's influence in the army, terminate the army-building policy of 
learning from the Soviet Union, and brought the army back to the traditional line of 
Maoist "political army building", On the other hand, Lin had to find a way to deal with the 
military threat from the United States and the Soviet Union to safeguard it's national 
security. Within these circumstances, at the early stage of Lin's tenure as Minister of 
National Defence, the relationship between the military line and politics was in practice 
some kind of compromise. However, this situation changed as the inner power struggle 
12LIBERA TIONARMY'S DAILY, 1 June, 1966. 
1 3 "March Ahead Under the Red Flag of the Party General Line and Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking", 
PEOPLE'S DAILY, 29 Sept. 1959. 
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expanded and Lin Piao promoted the personality cult of Mao. The PLA entered an era of 
being a "political tool". 
During Lin's tenure as Minister of the National Defence, his struggle with Lo Jui-ch'ing, 
the Chief of the General Staff, had profound political significance. The fall of Lo Jui-ch'ing 
and the purge of Liu Shao-ch'i at the early stage of the Cultural Revolution both 
represented an important course of political operation. That was, the significance of the 
military role in the power struggles. The failure of Liu Shao-ch'i was due to his neglect of 
a decisive role of military in the politics; being a "professional revolutionist", Liu 
underestimated the importance of militarists. Moreover, at the 1959 Lushan conference 
when the situation was unfavourable to Mao, Liu did not wield his power in the army to 
support P'eng Te-huai's stand wholly, the loss of P'eng also meant the loss of the army set 
up by P'eng's professionalised army building which could had been a supporting force to 
his power consolidation. Lo opposed Lin's army-building principle of "giving prominence 
to politics", which means, from Mao's viewpoint, he also opposed Mao's principle of 
"politics takes the lead". Lin was Mao's proxy to carry out Maoist army-building 
program. Lo not only promoted "Grand Military Contest" in the armed forces, but his 
policy to aid Vietnam war was in opposition to that of Lin's. Lo's fate to be purged was 
doomed. 
At the time of rising crisis of the Vietnam war in 1965, in the policy to aid Vietnam, 
outwardly, the conflict between Lin Piao and Lo Jui-ch'ing could be regarded as the 
conflict between two different directions of army building, that was, Lin laid the stress on 
revolutionisation, while Lo emphasised the importance of modernisation. But, inwardly, it 
was the conflict of their personalities and of power distribution. Lin Piao was a power 
that Mao used to control and reorganise the army, Mao relied on him for bringing a strong 
political figure to the army in order to ensure that the army would carry out the political 
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task Mao entrusted to it. Above all, one of his objectives was the overthrow of Liu Shao-
ch'i. Lo failed to appreciate the true situation and opposed Lin, Mao had no other choice 
but to sacrifice Lo. The debate over military policy towards the Vietnam war had nothing 
to do with the real military issue. It was merely another confrontation in the power 
struggle. 
Yet, the intensity of the struggle against Lo had an ulterior motive, Mao and Lin hoped 
that the struggle against Lo could lure Lo's followers into a trap, smash the non-Lin's 
faction in the PLA, and eradicate all dissidents in the party who were against Lin's "politics 
takes the lead" so as to boost the development of Cultural Revolution. 
After the fall of Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao took his chance to seize power. His status as 
"Mao's close comrade-in-arms and successor" and as Minister of National Defence 
enabled him to possess power both in name and in reality, and thus enlarge his real forces. 
Lin's ambitions and vigorous attempt to extend his political power, in essence, had run 
counter to Mao's principle. This brought about a change in the relationship between Mao 
and Lin. To analyse it from the viewpoint of "alienation" which came from the Marxist 
doctrine, Lin Piao, as an object, was transformed into an alienating force and conversely 
threatened the subject Mao's position, he simply refused to accept this fact. At the Second 
Plenum of Ninth CCPCC, Lin Piao insisted on the issue of re-establishing the chairman of 
the PRC, the struggle between him and Mao was brought out into the open. One month 
after the Second Plenum, On 14 October, The Red Flag published an article Reinforce the 
Party Nature of Proletariat Class14 to criticise Lin and clearly express Mao's standpoint. 
The rise and fall of Lin Piao exemplified the real political and military strength of Mao. In 
""Reinforce the Party Nature of Proletariat Class", RED FLAG, No. 11, 1970, pp. 17-20. 
406 
fact, no matter how much Lin had expanded his political and military power, he was still 
subjected to Mao's control. Once Mao withdrew his support, the power of Lin Piao had 
was based on the kind of dependent power structure which could be terminated 
immediately. The biggest mistake Lin made was that he really considered himself as Mao's 
close comrade-in-arms and successor, and the number two figure of the whole nation 
expanding his military and political power without reservation. Lin ignored Mao's real 
intention and his belief that "political power grow out of the barrel of a gun". 
Moreover, if one observes from the election of full and alternate members of the CCPCC, 
one could roughly reveal the evolution of the political role of the PLA. In summary, the 
"Seventh CCP National Congress" in 1945 and the "Ninth CCP Nation Congress" in 1969 
were the two stages that militarists occupied highest political status in the central 
government. The two stages provided the PLA best opportunity to expand its political 
role. 1945 was the year that the CCP started an overall civil war with the Kuomintang 
government, Since the Military elite were the real heroes who fought to win the PRC's 
regime and in view of their dual role of the party and army, the importance of the military 
elite in the Party grew as the war became more vigorous. This was confirmed from the 
numbers of the election of full and alternate members of the Seventh CCPCC. Among the 
44 full and 33 alternate members, 23 full and 18 alternate members were militarist, 
occupying a high proportion of approximately 50 percent of the total numbers. 
The Ninth CCP National Congress convened in April 1969, It was a victorious conference 
for Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao in their struggle against Liu Shao-ch'i. Lin, as Mao's 
prime proxy, had rendered great service to Mao, Mao had to give Lin and Lin's faction 
certain tangible benefits, and thus the military were allowed enter into the arena of the 
CCPCC. The Ninth CCP National Congress elected 170 full and 109 alternate members 
of the Ninth CCPCC. Among all, 77 full and 50 alternate members were from the military, 
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occupying approximately 45 percent of the total numbers. 
The "Eighth CCP National Congress" and "Tenth CCP National Congress" were two 
stages that produced a dramatic fall in the PLA's political status. By 1956, the CCP had 
gone through the Korean war and began its first five year plan. In politics, it had 
established a solid ruling foundation and could effectively control the whole nation; in 
economics, the preliminary socialist reform had been completed on the whole, and it was 
regaining its strength that was seriously damaged during the civil war; On the military 
front, the Korean war had just finished, Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan and no 
longer constituted an important threat to mainland China, and the Sino-Soviet friendship 
treaty and military co-operation was on the way. Such was the background to the 
convening of the Eighth CCP National Congress. Since the Eighth CCP National 
Congress was focused on the economic works of the socialist society and the inner-party 
struggle was not yet brought out into open, it was natural that the political status of the 
PLA declined and its political role shrank. Among the 97 full and 73 alternate members of 
the Eighth CCPCC, 36 full and 24 alternate members were military men, occupying about 
35 percent of its all. A decrease of 22 percent compares to that of the Seventh CCPCC, 
and of 10 percent compared to that of the Ninth CCPCC. This ratio remained on the high 
side, because of the phenomena of dual role elite of militarist in the CCP, and that Mao 
had to look after those military cadres who followed him for many years and who had 
rendered great service to him. 
The background for the convening of the Tenth CCP National Congress was to eradicate 
Lin Piao's influence and re-establish the political tradition of "party commands the gun". 
Therefore, among the 195 full and 124 alternate members of the Tenth CCPCC, 52 full 
and 25 alternate members were military men, occupying only about 24 percent of its all, a 
33 percent decrease compared to the Seventh CCPCC, and a 21 percent decrease 
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Compared to the Ninth CCPCC. The reason that army remained able to maintain 24 
percent was because Mao still depended on the army to settle the social unrest and chaos 
accompanied by the Cultural Revolution, Moreover, Mao had responsibility for the 
occurrence of Lin's Piao's incident, to restrict the attack to the range of Lin's clique, would 
only be too beneficial to himself. 
The above personnel arrangement of the CCPCC reflected two characteristics of the 
political role of the PLA. 
1. The change of the proportion of the PLA in the Central Committee reflected Mao's 
recognition about what kind of the political role that PLA should play at each stage. 
Mao's attitude determined the political role of the PLA. 
2. The phenomena of the dual role of military elite and party elite and the special 
character of the homogeneity of the army and party brought militarists entered into 
political arena. The principle of the "party commands gun" was still highly respected, and 
thus, militarists still restrained under the control of the party although they occupied a high 
proportion in the members and alternate members of the CCPCC. 
Furthermore, the proportion of the PLA in the central and local organs could only briefly 
sketch the political role of the PLA. It is uncertain how much the function could be 
elaborated by this role in its power operation. This was because they remained 
constrained by the following reasons: 
1. Military had different factional interests. Military of different faction arranged in a 
same personnel organisation represented not only the significance of the expansion of 
political role of the PLA, but also had a symbolic meaning of mutual power balance. 
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2. Although the military entered into the political arena of the central and the local 
government, the scope of its power operation was still highly depended on Mao's attitude. 
There may be a situation that the military did not handle political tasks properly, but it was 
only a special case, Mao remained control the final arbitration. 
Generally speaking, in a high political institutionalised country, the army should have 
loyalty to the government, not to the ideological or military leader. However, this was not 
applicable in the case of China under Mao's domination for Mao was a charismatic leader. 
He played an important role in the political development of the PLA, and therefore had the 
ability to change the style of power operation. Mao in practice faithfully practised Ludwig 
Feuerbach's concept of "religious alienation" during his domination of China. By the hand 
of Lin Piao and the PLA, Maoist thought and The Quotation of Mao Tse-tung became 
almost the bible of the Chinese people, is image was cast in the mould of an omnipresent, 
mighty God, and became the sword of Maoist domination and Maoist religion, whether in 
the army or in politics. After Mao was cast in the mould of God, he used this power and 
position as God to transform his criticism of the old society, class, party line and the 
viewpoint of purely military, into criticism towards his close comrade-in-arms and his 
successor. Neither Kao, Jao, P'eng, Lo, nor Lin had denied the fundamental principle of 
"party commands the gun", or dissented from the authoritative leadership of Mao in 
essence. All of them recognised Mao's parental position in the Chinese communist family. 
Nevertheless they were eliminated for transmitting their discontent of certain Maoist 
policies, or attempting to acquire more power from him, indeed this made Mao suspicious 
of their loyalty and thus adopted vigorous measures to deal with it. The evolution of the 
political role of the PLA had nothing to do with the matter of political intervention. The 
PLA's participation in the politics, whether weak or strong, was always restrained by the 
supreme leadership of the party. The principle of "party commands the gun" was not only 
what Mao personally insisted on, but it was also highly respected by all military elites. 
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Furthermore, with regard to the PLA, since the countryside and social infrastructure 
constituted its source, only if it didn't run counter to Mao's ideology and his authority of 
leadership, could it continue to enjoy its special position in society and the status arising 
therefrom. Although Mao constantly advocated the importance of the proletarian 
revolution, the PLA would never apply "class suicide" to return to the vagabond 
proletarian class on its own accords, under such circumstances, a unique bureaucratic 
system had thus formed, the PLA had to follow Maoist thought and thus became his 
personal political weapon. Since Mao controlled the distribution of class interest in the 
army, it became necessary for PLA to give their absolute support if they wished to secure 
its vested interests. The political tradition of the PLA formed under such a structure, 
worshipping an idol, not a institution. Mao at all times controlled the military power of 
the PRC and directed the development of the PLA. 
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